
A funeral procession leads the coffin of prominent Serbian opposition journalist Slavko Curuvija, owner of the daily Dnevni Telegraf, who was killed in Belgrade April 11, 1999. Photo courtesy of Reuters.
On the façade of Jadran Hotel in    Kosovska Mitrovica (in    Kosovo) there is a stone sculpture    of a woman with seven children    gathered at her feet. She is the grandmother    of my father, who is one of    those children. When my father’s forebears,    who were paupers in what today    is the Federation of Bosnia and    Herzegovina, returned from America    about 1919 as rich folks, they moved to    Kosovo. History tells us that their ancestors    moved away from that place in    the 14th century, fleeing from the Turks.
Serbs claim they have emotional ties    to Kosovo, that unhappy land. The    only remnant of the Zarkovic family in    Kosovo is the petrified sculpture of a    mother with seven children. I was born    in Belgrade but I traveled to Kosovo    many times as a reporter. One summer    night in 1981, the howling of dogs    woke me from my slumber. It was only    midnight. I approached the window    and from the fifth floor of Hotel Grand    in Pristina witnessed a ghostly spectacle.    A pack of dogs were howling in    the dark, their heads turned toward    the lit hotel. The dogs controlled the    empty streets in this dark city. Because    of demonstrations by Albanians, a curfew    had been declared.
Despite my origins and experience,    I do not dare present myself as someone    who is an expert on Kosovo. However,    the sculpture of my great-grandmother    and an ominous midnight    experience give me an advantage over    many people who spent tons of printing    ink on proving that the solution to    the knot of the Balkan problem is a    bombing campaign. Today, more than    one year after the bombing of Yugoslavia    began (March 24, 1999), many things    can be viewed more clearly, explained    in greater detail, and understood more    easily. This does not mean that the world has become any smarter or better    for it.
Regarding journalism during the    war, there is an important point I’d like    to make, and it concerns the role the    independent media in Yugoslavia    played during that time. By independent    media, I mean those journalists    who really represent the democratic    potential of this country and who have    been battling Milosevic’s policies with    far greater sincerity (including his policies    toward the Albanians of Kosovo)    and for a far longer period than the    Western alliance has done. These journalists    had very good political reasons    and made very solid political judgments    when they decided to accept the rigorous    conditions of government censorship    during the 80 days of bombing    and to continue doing their jobs, which    in any case is a mere matter of professionalism.
VREME weekly magazine, where I    am Editor, is a leader in setting professional    and political standards in this    not-so-small group. In making this decision,    we took into account the following    reasons:
- We were unwilling to abandon our readers to pure propaganda, either to the propaganda of the Serbian government or to the propaganda articulated by spokesmen of the Western alliance.
- It was not fair to turn our backs on faithful readers who are suffering on a daily basis as victims of war, when our job is to inform people to the best of our abilities.
- The division into the good and the bad guys, into victims and criminals, was too simplistic.
- The war will last several months, despite whatever anyone said to the contrary at the beginning: It will solidify the position of President Slobodan Milosevic.
- Kosovo will remain a political problem: The air attacks do not solve any problems.
- War is threatening the fragile, democratic potential of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo.
When we look back at the dangerous    reality of that time and we exclude    several refugees who clamored loudly    about the so-called betrayal by the    Serbian independent media, reactions    by the Yugoslav readers were universally    positive. Lack of understanding    about our decision to go along with the    censorship rules was proportional to    the geographic and emotional distance    between the clamoring critics and the    place where the bombs were actually    falling.
After “the period of censorship,”    however, questions began coming at    us from people throughout the world.    They’d ask me questions such as, “Why    did you publish during the war?” or    “Didn’t you become Slobodan    Milosevic’s allies by publishing?”
In the beginning, I gave lengthy and    detailed answers to the first question.    Then one day I came across a convenient    paradox in an article by fellow    journalist Dimitrije Boarov. His message    effectively curtailed my willingness    to respond. In a VREME article,    Boarov wrote that had the citizens of    Novi Sad known that the political fate    of Milosevic depended on the bridges    in their city, they would have destroyed    them themselves! The situation is much    the same with the media. If the media    decided to be silent or to quit publishing,    it would just be a nice present for    Milosevic. Apart from his propaganda    drums, there wouldn’t be other voices    heard in Serbia. As for the issue of members of the independent media    “being allies,” it can be answered by    looking at actions. This year Milosevic    is concentrating on destroying the independent    media in Serbia. Hardly the    way one would treat his allies!
It is, however, worth pointing to    one interesting political fact. Anyone    who wanted to use his or her head    realized very quickly that there is censorship    of the censors themselves, and    we were given to learn this in very    perfidious ways. Who was at the head    of that supreme censorship could only    be guessed at. Perhaps he or they were    fictitious.
This would have been masterful    deception had that actually been the    case. The interposition    of an invisible    power in the    game being played    between the government    and the    citizens appears efficient.    One office    is carrying out repression    by limiting    and denying    certain previously    relevant rights and    freedoms. Its    power is small    when compared    with an invisible    authority. This invisible    authority    acts ominously; in    time, you come to    recognize it as your    own fear. You are    constantly being    sent the message:    Yes, you passed the    censorship, but    that means nothing,    you must satisfy    us also!
After considerable argument and    battle—that was unwarranted by the    actual news item—VREME managed to    publish that Radio B92 had been essentially    closed by an official decision    passed by Belgrade’s Court of Commerce.    But the censors asked VREME’s    editor in chief that in the event problems    arose he would say that the censors    had not seen this news item! We    did put together an entire page on the    death and funeral of Slavko Curuvija,    Founder and Editor in Chief of the    daily Dnevni Telegraf and weekly    Evropljanin, who was murdered at his    doorstep in Belgrade on April 11, 1999.    Three days earlier, media controlled    by Milosevic published that Curuvija    was an ally of the enemy who was    advocating NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.    We managed to convince the censors    that it was necessary for us to write    about his death and funeral. This time    the censors told us we could get into    real trouble for doing so but that we    should say that the material passed the    censors! When we asked the censors    whom we were supposed to lie to,    whom we had to tell the truth to, and    who is the one who decides who gets    closed down despite the fact that the    censors approve material, we never    got a straight answer.
Every dictatorship is based on this    invisible power. The supreme principle    is fear, and we saw this in the eyes of    the censors. Under such conditions we    had to bend over backwards in order to    bring as many facts as possible to our    readers. Our security was in jeopardy.
Statements made by Western officials    also contributed to making our    jobs more difficult and our security    more perilous. For instance, Robin    Cook, British Minister of Foreign Affairs,    announced details about the    amount of aid his government gave to    Belgrade’s Radio B92. This gave    Yugoslav authorities arguments for accusations    similar to those that probably    led to the murder of Curuvija.    NATO spokesman Jamie Shea announced    that Veton Surroi, Baton    Haxhiu, Shkelzen Maliqi, and others    had been killed.    After that, we    spoke to Veton    Surroi over a cellular    phone. The    number of mass    gravesites grew    staggeringly with    the increased intensity    of the    bombing. Those of    us who are more    familiar with the    political situation    and with the actors    in the field were    suspicious of the    sources that NATO    quoted.
The citizens of    Serbia, who refused    to be destabilized    by state propaganda    and    satellite programming    of Western    stations (watched    closely during air    alerts) were looking    for a balance in    the reporting of independent electronic    media (Radio Pancevo, for instance)    and in newspapers which were still    being printed. Perhaps we didn’t have    all the important news. Certainly we    lacked editorials that would help to    explain developments to people. As far    as in-the-field reporting goes, we could    not even consider it when our movements were limited—foreign reporters    were in a slightly better position    because the Army occasionally permitted    them to travel to Kosovo. But at the    very least, the independent media that    reported during the war were free from    primitive propaganda and from hate    speech.
Phillip Knightley’s book, “The First    Casualty,” which collected dust on the    shelves of various editorial offices in    Belgrade prior to the NATO aggression    against Yugoslavia, became very popular    with our journalists beginning on    March 24. This is of little surprise,    given that Knightley’s work deals with    the history of war reporting and, of    course, with censorship from the time    of the Crimean War to Vietnam. In    short: It is instructive reading.
When a state of war is declared—and in Yugoslavia that state of war was    declared when the first bomb fell in    Montenegro—censorship naturally follows.    This has been the case always,    from the battles in Crimea to the massacres    in Vietnam, and it exists in different    forms in all countries. Conflict between    journalists and censors unfolds    on the thin frontline, a line dividing    two powers, the state and the media.    And there is an imaginary line in no    man’s land where it is easy to lose    sense of what is the protection of the    state and the people and what is the    protection of those in power. Knightley    showed that censorship was most rigorous    and perfidious in those countries    that want to present themselves as    models of democracy and of freedom    of the press.
Dealing with censorship is part of    the fate and the job description of the    journalistic profession amidst the great    tragedies of war. It is normal and acceptable    as long as it protects the specific    defense interest of a country. It    respects the convention of sparing a    government and its institutions from    uncontrolled criticism while war efforts    are continuing. But it becomes    torture and crime perpetrated over the    public word and freedom of thought    when someone attempts to protect    narrow political interests or to continue    media censorship after a war has    ended.
Neither Serbian journalists nor the    Serbian censors (incidentally, many of    the former are predisposed toward    doing the job of the latter) were able to    avoid the traps of this unpleasant business.    In that, we are not alone. At one    point in his book, Knightley quotes    what one official U.S. censor said in a    meeting at the start of World War II:    “While the war lasts don’t report anything.    When the war ends, report who    won!”
All censors have the same logic. A    specific problem in Serbia is that in the    war between the state and the media,    we still do not know who is the winner.    When we find out, we will let you    know. 
Dragoljub Zarkovic is Editor in      Chief of Belgrade’s VREME weekly      magazine.

 
                     
                    