THE WAR AND THE PRESS

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Worse To Come?

BY BILL KOVACH

Along with the writers in this issue of Nieman Reports, journalists all over the United States have been picking through the litter of the recent rout of the United States press corps in the Middle East. Much to regret in the performance of the press has been found. But the wreckage in the desert holds important possibilities for the future which must be considered now, two in particular. The first is that the conflict between the press and the military during the next war will not be fought in the field but in the home offices. The technology that produced CNN’s worldwide real-time information from the battlefield continues to develop. It will soon produce satellite telephones portable enough that each reporter can carry his or her own into the field. Reporters in the next war will have the capability to dictate a story on deadline from almost anywhere in the world.

The same technology is rapidly bringing the day of a television camera as small as a penlight, a recording device as small as a portable radio and a satellite transmission unit as small as hand luggage. With this equipment a television journalist will have the same capability to transmit a story from almost any point in the world at almost any time.

Controlling a press contingent made up of hundreds thus equipped will be virtually impossible. To do so by the sort of pool restrictions in place during the gulf war would require the use of more troops than did the Iraqi Republican Guard.

In the face of such a challenge the Pentagon would likely try to move censors into the home office. Generals in the field usurped the functions of the assigning editors and in some cases the copy editors during this most recent war. In the next war their goal would be to assume the powers of the executive editor, determining what information coming into the building would be presented to the public. Short of a total war, such an action would touch off a constitutional confrontation of historic proportions.

The second possibility is that at the peak of such a communications system’s efficiency and effectiveness the ability to wage war itself may be threatened.

The United States has picked its most recent enemies carefully and wisely. Neither Manuel Noriega nor Saddam Hussein was likely to understand or appeal to public opinion sufficiently to challenge U.S. media dominance.

Leaders of other countries are studying the lessons of the gulf war. High on their list of priorities is a better understanding of the emerging international communications network. The role of national and international press corps, access to information, manipulation of messages and images have become important elements of governance. The battle for the hearts and minds of potential enemies may decide issues long before any military action is possible.

As Hermann Goering said in 1936: “Naturally the common people don’t want war . . . But after all it is the leaders of the country who determine policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along . . . All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger.”

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Operation Washington Shield

Administration’s Manipulation of News Embraced Diplomacy and Politics, as Well as the Battlefield

"The media, be it press, TV, radio or other form, impresses me and, I'm sure, the general public, as being a voracious, insatiable animal. It claws, snaps, tears at and insults just about anyone it faces, especially those feeding it information. I sometimes wonder whose side the media is on."

—An angry reader, in Letters, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 6, 1991

"The American media surrendered to a barrage of propaganda ... a credulous and jingoistic press ... The administration ... knew that it could rely on the media's complicity in almost any deception dressed up in patriotic costume ... a servile press ..."

—Lewis H. Lapham, Editor, Harper's, May, 1991

BY MURREY MARDE

I n the Persian Gulf crisis the diplomatic, political and economic reporting was manipulated by the Bush Administration as much as the military press, only more subtly. The Administration engaged in intensive news management to shape and exploit crisis information far beyond the battle zone throughout the six-month buildup for the war, as well as during the six-week conflict. Indeed, the press was maneuvered into looking like a "voracious, insatiable" inquisitor to some Americans, and to others just the opposite, a "credulous... jingoistic... servile press."

Surpassing any injury to journalistic pride, however, is the capacity that the Bush Administration has demonstrated for shrinking First Amendment rights in "a new world order." A press so readily manipulated during months of preparation for war tempts fate in either peace or war.

Major news organizations that have protested "virtual total control" of the press by the Pentagon during the gulf war have narrowly focused on direct constraints in the war zone — military censorship, restricted press "pools," military "monitors." From the first week of the crisis, however, the White House, Defense Department, State Department and other agencies used a dozen more discreet techniques to manipulate the substance, flow and timing of non-military as well as military information to protect and support the Administration's policy. These techniques included the calculated use of deliberate ambiguities, evasions, half truths or outright misleading information.

The news management of Operation Desert Shield might well have been dubbed Operation Washington Shield. As journalists should know better than others, the less blatant the control of news, the more effective it is.

Walter Lippmann, drawing on his own World War I experience, observed in his classic study, Public Opinion: "Military censorship is the simplest form of barrier to public information but by no means the most important, because it is known to exist, and is therefore in certain measure agreed to and discounted."

The Bush Administration achieved a level of control over the American print and broadcast press and public opinion that Presidents Johnson and Nixon would have given anything to have had during their turbulent years of Vietnam War. It was months into the Persian Gulf crisis before allusions to a new "credibility gap" were made by frustrated reporters, but that stigma did not adhere to the Bush Administration. It set out from the beginning of the crisis determined to manage the news in a manner that would make it no easy mark to attack for deception.

After the February ceasefire in Iraq, however, the contrast between a controlled or managed press, and an uncontrolled press, was inescapable. A free press revealed the desperation of Iraq's Kurds, forcing the Bush Administration to change policy and aid Saddam Hussein's latest targets, who had been

Murrey Marder, Nieman Fellow 1956, went from copy boy (1936) to reporter at The Philadelphia Evening Ledger, to Marine Corps Combat Correspondent in World War II. In 39 years at The Washington Post his reporting helped topple Sens. Joseph R. McCarthy in the '50s. In 1957 in London he launched the auspiciously named Washington Post Foreign Service — originally just him. He was one of the creators (1965) of the term "credibility gap" to describe the Johnson Administration's information dilemma in the Vietnam War; a writer of the Pentagon Papers disclosures (1971), and ultimately chief diplomatic reporter of The Post. He retired in 1985 for further research and writing on manipulation of perceptions in foreign affairs.
encouraged to revolt by the President's own loose rhetoric.

Until then, the Bush Administration's hold on the American press stretched from the Persian Gulf to the United States and back — literally. Its news managers not only could make all bombs targeted on Iraq look smart; they could equally make frustrated reporters at televised briefings look stupid, or appear to be snarling watchdogs.

When officials discovered the hostile reaction by average Americans to the questioning of spokesmen in uniform, they rehearsed the press briefings to sharpen the antagonistic perception. Ergo, a press that "claws, snaps, tears at and insults just about anyone it faces, especially those feeding it information." The reality was just the opposite press failing: inadequate questioning, skepticism, probing.

It was not the Administration's objective simply to taunt the press. The purpose was to diminish and discredit it as a competing force in shaping public opinion, even though the Bush policy had overwhelming support from the public, and from the press itself.

The crossfire over press performance has boxed the compass. It has stretched from Pentagon encomiums for "best war coverage" — which makes experienced reporters wince — to charges that reporters "more often resembled government stenographers than newspaperers."

*New York Times* columnist Tom Wicker, a persistent and thoughtful critic of the news coverage, saw a "dangerous" precedent in the Bush Administration's easy success in limiting what it wanted the public to know. "Perhaps worse," Wicker wrote, "press and public largely acquiesced in this disclosure of only selected information."

His columnist colleague at *The Times*, Anthony Lewis, called for urgent "self-examination . . . in our business . . . ." He found "most of the press . . . not a detached observer of the war, much less a critical one," but "a claque applauding the American generals and politicians in charge." Lewis labeled "television . . . the most egregious official lap dog during the war."

**But First-Class Reporting, Too**

Blanket characterizations pro or con, however, are ill-fitting for anything as diverse and discordant as the American print and broadcast press. In the record number of columns of space and hours of broadcast time filled by any American crisis in a comparable time span, there were innumerable examples of balanced, penetrating, first-class reporting, as well as countless pieces of shallow, witless, glibbile work.

No segment of the press was uniformly in one category or another: clearly not television. Cable News Network was indispensable for news coverage of nations, with Peter Arnett in Baghdad as an extra bonus — and anti-press target. Public television's MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour consistently provided more balanced and penetrating news, debate and analysis than any, and sometimes all, commercial channels.

This article disproportionately cites news coverage of *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal*, all with large staffs and all available for home delivery in Washington. They therefore have special impact on Congress, and on the large Washington-based national and international press corps often influenced by their coverage.

Congress and press have an important symbiotic relationship of stimulating each other into public scrutiny of government that is not well-known outside the Washington-New York-Boston corridor. In the gulf crisis *The Times*, *Post* and *Wall Street Journal* all supported Administration policy, along with most of the nation's press, contributing to the fact that in this crisis cross-stimulation of press and Congress to produce a more probing examination of Administration policy. For the major news organizations were misled no less than the smaller ones.

Out of political fear of challenging the broadly supported commitment of American military forces to a war zone that could erupt before the Congressional elections in November, Congress virtually abdicated its responsibilities in scrutinizing Administration policy.

Except for limited hearings, Congress avoided questioning crisis policy until jolted into debate by the Bush Administration's carefully timed, post-election disclosures that it was doubling American forces in the gulf, and openly shifting from economic sanctions and military pressure against Iraq, to offensive war. With American and coalition forces poised for a U.N.-authorized war, Congress, forced to choose, voted for it after its first real debate in the crisis. Such a debate months earlier would have stimulated deeper press questioning of U.S. policy, and vice versa. There Administration strategists-news managers could claim a double success.

Journalism's highest awards this year went to news coverage of the gulf crisis, along with profound individual journalists' criticisms of press performance in a war that the rest of the nation cannot celebrate ecstatically or exhaustively enough.

**Vietnam a Reason For Controls**

Just what caused the American press to incur so much damage to its own self-esteem in this war, in contrast to its pride in vigorous reporting in the Vietnam War, will be explored and debated for years to come. The unending criticism of the American press for the loss of the Vietnam War, however ahistoric, contributed heavily to the controls imposed by the Bush Administration in the gulf war. A journalistic cynic might add, at least the messenger cannot be shot for losing this one.

But the resourcefulness of the Bush Administration, and the magnitude of the journalistic task, should not be underestimated. Veteran reporters did penetrate many of the Administration's calculated ambiguities, half-truths, evasions, misleading guidances and other tricks of the news management trade.

There was unquestionably insufficient awareness in the press as a whole, however, of the added demands that war or the threat of war make on press vigilance: the inherent adversarial relationship between government and
press is at its peak in wartime, when the President is both chief executive and commander-in-chief of an authoritarian structure. Truth is the first casualty not just in war, but equally in preparation for war, for both rely heavily on secrecy, evasion and deception.

What is disclosed and concealed from press and public in the initial stages of a crisis has extra criticality for all that follows. The press invariably is at its most vulnerable point when the rationale for crisis action is put forth.

"It is not truth" the government is intent on communicating at that time, "they’re selling something they’ve done," Hodding Carter, State Department spokesman in the Carter Administration, and now a television commentator and producer, explained on the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour on September 30, 1990.

"Panama invasion, Grenada invasion" and in other deployments of military force, Carter continued, "the press initially accepts. It then begins to question."

However, "for the first week after any military engagement," Carter emphasized, "there is virtually never going to be sustained questioning of anything the government does — particularly the assumptions. It sometimes takes a month, it sometimes takes a year . . . ."

Indeed, dozens of fundamental questions were not raised in the rush to report the American military plunge into the Persian Gulf. President Bush, for example, was not asked whether the Bush Administration took time to explore not only diplomatic alternatives, but also far more limited forms of U.S. military intervention, in differing configurations. If the press had done so effectively it could have learned very early in the crisis that the Administration had plunged into a hasty policy choice without exploring the implications with Mideast experts in or outside the government.

In the gulf crisis, domination of public opinion was particularly essential for the Administration to sustain a venturesome and improvised policy, which was launched cloaked in calculated ambiguities to conceal its dimensions and intensions.

Even though the American troop deployment was ennobled as the core of a multinational force, fulfilling the United Nations’ dream of collective security, the public had to be conditioned to tolerate a huge military commitment to war without warning.

No censorship of war zone controls could have long concealed the mushrooming of an American force from 50,000 troops — the target originally given to the press — to 540,000 in six months, matching peak U.S. troop strength in Vietnam after a decade of buildup. Exceptional news management was required to rationalize the growth of a defensive Desert Shield operation, and to screen its seamless transformation into an offensive Desert Storm.

**Controls Needed To Sustain Strategy**

Sophisticated information control techniques were needed to sustain simultaneously the interwoven diplomatic, political and economic components of U.S. strategy. They supplied the critical domestic and international support for American military power in the gulf.

A disclosure at the start that at least 200,000 to 250,000 American troops were planned in the force level discussed in President Bush’s first meeting with his military at a Camp David meeting on August 4, just two days after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, could have played havoc with any news management. That would have aroused immediate questions about American offensive military intentions, U.S. seriousness for a diplomatic solution of the crisis, and prospects for any United Nations-endorsement of an American force, or cost-sharing of the venture.

No American President has thrust the United States into a major war so swiftly and massively. The day after the invasion of Kuwait, August 3, the President made a personal pledge to Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Washington to give that nation powerful American military support. By August 5, as he returned from Camp David, the secret planning to topple Saddam Hussein had begun, and the President stunned even the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff by publicly pledging to reverse the invasion of Kuwait. On August 6, American jet fighters and the 82d Airborne Division began flying into Saudi Arabia. The news dominated American headlines the next day.

President Bush was determined to conceal both the magnitude of the American deployment and its full purpose, but he and his advisers also wanted to avoid a charge of crass deception. The President, therefore, in his first press conference August 8 on the troop deployment, deliberately left open the option for an offensive military strategy, but spoke only of defense, and referred all questions about the size of the American force, or other military factors, to the Pentagon. That figure, given to the press on "background" — where it would not be open to on-the-record challenge — was the misleading figure of 50,000.

That initial press conference on troops to the gulf offers a primer in American news management.

President Bush said U.S. troops were entering Saudi Arabia "in a defensive mode right now," and it was "not the mission to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait." He went on to say "We’re not in a war. We have sent forces to defend Saudi Arabia" and "other nations will be participating . . . ."

Veteran reporters like R.W. (Johnny) Apple of The New York Times, with extensive diplomatic and political experience, quickly detected many of the calculated ambiguities in the Presidents’ remarks. To call the U.S military mission "defensive," Apple wrote the same day, August 8, "really applies only in a tactical sense." The objective of American air, sea and land forces, including "a de facto naval blockade of Iraqi commerce" — labeled sanctions — he noted, was "intended to help force President Hussein to pull back" from Kuwait.

Furthermore, Apple reported, "although the White House and the State Department continued to express anxiety about the possibility of an invasion" of Saudi Arabia (to justify sending large ground forces), "there
were no signs of [an invasion] on the ground, and some analysts continue to believe one unlikely.” Apple had deftly raised several caution flags for readers.

But Apple’s story, and the print and broadcast press across the United States, fell victim to “background” news management on a key factor that went into the headlines, the grossly misleading figure of 50,000 troops as the projected size of the U.S. force. His lead read: “Thousands of elite United States troops, the vanguard of a force that senior defense officials said may reach 50,000, took up positions in Saudi Arabia today as President Bush vowed to defend the Middle Eastern kingdom and its oil reserves, the richest in the world.”

And news analysis written the same day for The Washington Post by Patrick E. Tyler, who had served as a foreign correspondent in the Iraq-Iran war, (during the gulf crisis Tyler switched to The New York Times), wrote that the United States had “contingency plans to deploy up to 50,000 or more ground troops” to Saudi Arabia by the end of the month.

**Decision Reached At Camp David**

The Washington Post on August 9 published the first behind-the-scenes account reporting that the President’s decision was reached hastily on August 4 at Camp David. There, White House reporter Ann Devroy and political reporter Dan Balz recounted, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin L. Powell, and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, laid out the military options for the President.

That account contained new pro-Administration information about the sequence of events, with the President as the central, “speed-dialing” figure in launching the troop deployment, convincing Saudi Arabia it needed U.S. troops, and negotiating with other world leaders.

Missing from that report, however, and also from a more revealing account in The Post on August 26 about the Camp David meeting, written by Washington Post editor-reporter Bob Woodward and reporter Rick Atkinson, was the most salient fact: that an initial force of 200,000 to 250,000 troops was in the plan presented by Gen. Schwarzkopf to President Bush.

It was not until after the war, on May 2, that those important numbers appeared in The Post, coupled with disclosures that punctured the news-managed image of constant unity and harmony among the crisis managers, in excerpts from Woodward’s book, The Commanders. The news managers had successfully masked the original large size of the American force concept when that was publicly volatile. Also suppressed was any timely news of General Powell’s strong reservations about shifting from sanctions and military pressure against Iraq to an offensive strategy — the argument the Democrats lost when Congress voted in January to support President Bush.

**Number Imbedded In Other News**

The crisis therefore began with public misinformation about its expected magnitude, and the misleading number of 50,000 became imbedded in diplomatic, political, economic and other early crisis news, analyses and interactions around the world.

Editors and reporters soon discovered they had been gulled as force levels quickly swept past the 50,000 mark. They generally took that in stride as a cost of “background” gamesmanship, but a pattern for news management had been successfully launched.

Early on, therefore, it was widely recognized in the press, in Congress and elsewhere that the Administration’s stated policy contained numerous evasions, contradictions and unanswered questions. They were almost as likely to be winked at or rationalized in the press, however, as focused on.

After the first full surge of American troops reached the gulf in August, Time magazine columnist Hugh Sidey wrote: 

“...Bush keeps moving: White House to Camp David to Pentagon to Kennebunkport to wherever. He pops up to shake a fist, then pumps out a smoke screen of fuzzy gray words. The blockade is an ‘interdiction,’ the detained Americans are not called hostages, and what is happening is not war but a defensive operation. Bush’s press conference last Tuesday sounded like a court deposition ... his lawyers and his rights under the U.N. Charter.

“While the world was watching Bush ... [the U.S. military] sent more men and material further and faster than at any time in history. This huge cavalcade was not exactly secret, but nearly a week went by before the vast size of the operation dawned on an astonished world ...”

For the news magazines, the President’s apocalyptic comparisons of Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler were
rich nourishment for magazine covers, Armageddon-like language and battle-plan graphics which newspapers hurried to match.

U.S. News & World Report in late August produced a special double issue on World War II and the gulf crisis, headlined “Defying Hitler” — with Hitler, Churchill and Roosevelt on the cover. “By next month,” Newsweek informed its readers at the end of August, “the Americans will be as ready as they’re going to be” in the gulf, “with about 125,000 combat troops and support personnel in the theater.”

Beyond manipulating the media about military aspects of the crisis, the Administration had numerous non-military priorities, requiring varying levels of concealment, obfuscation and partial disclosure. They ranged from finding a path through the Arab world’s suspicions of the West, and the constant Arab-Israeli crisis, to inducing Western allies and Third World nations to join the multinational force, and offset the huge costs of the crisis.

At the same time, the Administration had to sustain the precarious and unprecedented consensus against Iraq that it achieved among the Big Five holding veto power in the U.N. Security Council. That required constant diplomacy to retain qualified support from the Soviet Union, for years Iraq’s prime arms supplier, and the uneasy toleration of China — all for a price.

Indeed these requirements all came with diplomatic, military and economic prices, which today are still unfolding.

This flood of developments engulfed a somnolent press, Congress and nation in the vacation-oriented month of August. Even if there had been no news manipulation to compound the task of short-staffed news organizations, they could barely cope with the surge of information pouring out of world capitals about the gulf crisis: military, refugee, hostage, oil, diplomatic, religious, political, economic and other news, to be explained in the American context.

And to do that, the press itself had to crash-learn the fundamentals of the gulf region. That meant everything from geography, turbulent history, disparate cultures and punishing climate, to the boggling complexities of nationalism, shifting loyalties and leadership, and alignments.

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Blocking Probe
Of Aid to Iraq

The Bush Administration had a special problem with recent Iraqi-American history. It was determined to block or impede any in-depth investigation by Congress or the press of the Reagan and Bush Administrations’ decade-long major support of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

A public inquiry into multiple special benefits that the United States extended to Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime as a counterweight to fundamentalist Iran, was the last thing the Bush Administration wanted as it exhorted the nation to risk thousands of lives to contain Iraq as a newly designated evil empire.

Portions of the relationship have emerged in Congressional hearings and press accounts, especially in what The Wall Street Journal reporter Paul A. Gigot was first to describe in December, 1990, as “the mindset” in favor of Iraq that existed for years inside the American government. That myopic characterization of U.S. policy, Gigot reported, was by then being used by Administration insiders themselves, after the invasion of Kuwait, to account for official inability to recognize the danger of Saddam Hussein. The Administration blocked Congressional sanctions against Iraq right up to its invasion of Kuwait.

The “mindset” was reflected in the instructions given to April Glaspie, the American Ambassador to Iraq, in her controversial meeting with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad a week before the invasion. Glaspie has challenged Iraq’s leaked version of that meeting transcript, which quoted her as saying the Bush Administration had “no opinion” about Iraq’s “border disagreement with Kuwait.” Glaspie insisted that she strongly cautioned restraint in Saddam Hussein’s overall policy.

Secretary of State James A. Baker III ridiculed the idea that the Bush Administration shared any responsibility for Iraq’s action against Kuwait, but his department repeatedly blocked Congressional committees from questioning Glaspie until after the war ended. Even then, in March, her testimony was limited to a “non-hearing” meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, just after publication of a lengthy, questioning report in The Washington Post, entitled, “Was the War Inevitable?”

That article by Don Oberdorfer, The Washington Post’s chief diplomatic reporter, probed deeper into the “the mindset” inside the Administration, and reinforced its existence, broadening the questions about U.S. failure to recognize the Iraqi threat. Oberdorfer’s article was used by the Senate committee in questioning Ambassador Glaspie, which it did very gently, conditioned by the public acclaim then reechoing for the lopsided U.S. military victory.

With the ceasefire on February 27, the Administration’s management of crisis news relaxed in many areas, but only marginally on disclosure of pre-crisis relationships with Iraq, to prevent damage to the Administration’s war-won prestige. A full examination of pre-war U.S. policy toward Iraq by the press, Congress, or anyone else continues to be impeded by the Administration. It is therefore open to debate whether the United States bungled opportunities to head off the Persian Gulf War when the Iraqi leader was no less brutal or ruthless.

Throughout the crisis, diplomatic reporters with their natural skepticism frequently questioned the Administration’s shifting explanations of its goals and policies. In the first week of the crisis, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times senior diplomatic reporter and a specialist on the Middle East, wrote:

“One reason Bush Administration officials have not clearly articulated what is at stake is that the real interests involved are not quite so lofty as some of the broad principles used by the President to explain the operation.”

“The United States has not sent troops to the Saudi desert to preserve democratic principles,” Friedman con-
continued. "The Saudi monarchy is a feudal regime where women are not even allowed to drive cars ... This is about money, about protecting governments loyal to America and punishing those which are not and about who will set the price of oil."

Similarly, the Administration's professed eagerness for a diplomatic settlement of the crisis was openly questioned. "Theoretically," David Hoffman of The Washington Post wrote on September 2, "if Saddam agreed to a settlement that met all U.S. objectives it might be accepted. But few officials now think it is realistic that Saddam will just walk out of Kuwait or surrender his large military machine and his ambitions to become an Arab superpower."

Moreover, Hoffman continued, U.S. officials "do not want to entertain scenarios for a negotiated settlement now because it could quickly weaken the resolve of some nations that have lined up against Saddam, while alarming others . . . ."

Even so, the Administration's crisis managers were able to obscure their own moves in the global sprawl of developments in the crisis. A continuing stream of often-conflicting reports came from all sides of the unusual anti-Iraq coalition, from Iraq and its supporters, and from would-be intermediaries in-between. That was another natural gift to news managers.

Iraq Leader's Bungling Helped

But the greatest boon to President Bush and his advisers proved to be the obtuseness and inflexibility of the supposedly supremely cunning Saddam Hussein. One American diplomatic veteran drily observed after the war: "He never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity."

Iraq's leader repeatedly bungled opportunities urged by the Soviet Union particularly, as well as by France and other nations, to show his readiness for a plausible compromise settlement that could have split the coalition against Iraq, a prime fear of the Administration. Saddam then failed finally to snap up President Bush's ultimatum to withdraw his forces from Kuwait by noon, February 23; an ultimatum deliberately cast in peremptory language intended to produce a rejection.

Outright acceptance and action on the ultimatum would have confounded Administration strategists, eliminating the opportunity to cripple Iraq's military power. American troops were over 10 miles inside Iraq even before the ultimatum was issued, Michael R. Gordon of The New York Times discovered after the ceasefire.

More than 3,000 U.S. Marines were secretly sent into Iraq two days before the official beginning of the allied ground attack to prepare for the main forces, and a day before the Bush ultimatum was issued, Gordon reported from Saudi Arabia in mid-March. The Marines, he disclosed, were already capturing prisoners, and ordering artillery barrages and air strikes on Iraq when the ultimatum expired. Iraq in fact did claim the war began before the ultimatum arrived, but the claim was ridiculed by American officials.

Watchdog v. Lap dog Comparison Unfair

As the selective examples in this article indicate, the performance of the American press in the Persian Gulf crisis cannot be fairly described in black-or-white terms of watchdog v. lap dog. There were abundant examples of both.

One clear pattern, however, is consistently evident: the news coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis encountered exceptional news management, for which the press as a whole was unprepared.

President Bush and his politically adroit advisers demonstrated a sustained level of crisis news management far more challenging than anything journalists have encountered at least since the Vietnam War. The President's exclamations about the difference between the two wars is susceptible to more interpretations than he intended: "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all." That could serve as notice to the press that the "new world order" can bring both subtler and rougher tests of journalistic vigilance than the Cold War.

To quote Walter Lippmann again, "every leader is in some degree a propagandist." Compelled to choose between his goals and public candor, Lippmann wrote, the leader, with increasing consciousness, decides "what facts, in what setting, in what guise he shall permit the public to know."

President Bush and his chief advisers had a wealth of political and governmental experience to guide them in rationing public candor.

Secretary of State Baker was the President's election campaign manager; White House staff director John Sununu, as governor of New Hampshire, was credited with the decisive role in Bush's primary election victory; Defense Secretary Cheney was President Ford's chief of staff and then a powerful figure in Congress. Added to that political depth, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force general, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell contributed years of experience in the political command post that is the White House.

But the most effective news controller was the President himself, the dominant generator of information. With his whirlwind style of telephoning, he was a global diplomatic-military strategist, commander-in-chief, information central for his own advisers, chief spokesman, and chief censor.

The President's disarming affability and frequent availability to the press obscured the reality that he and his advisers were manipulating public opinion with the intensity of a ruthless American political campaign, transferred to the international scene with a diplomatic gloss.

As a consequence, protests by American news organizations against Defense Department control of the press during the gulf war do not reach the underlying problem that confronts the press. For news management was government-wide, without rules and regulations comparable to restrictions on the press in war zones. And the Administration is free at any time, without waiting for a crisis or war, to resort to that abnormal level of news management.

This is not to denigrate in any way the
protests raised against explicit press controls, but rather to expand the focus of concern.


Newsday columnist Sydney H. Schanberg labels those groups the press that “behaved like part of the establishment,” and now is “feeling embarrassed and humiliated and mortified.”

Schanberg, who won a 1976 Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the fall of Cambodia, was one of five independent writers who joined 11 smaller news organizations in an unsuccessful legal attempt to block the Pentagon’s press controls on constitutional grounds, before full-scale warfare in the gulf began in mid-January. Those publications included The Nation, Mother Jones, The Progressive, The Village Voice and Texas Observer.

Schanberg argues that the problem the press has is “its own scars from Vietnam. And Watergate. We were accused, mostly by ideologues, of being less than patriotic, of bringing down a Presidency, of therefore not being on the American team. And as a professional community we grew timid, worried about offending the political establishment. And that establishment, sensing we had gone under the blankets, moved in to tame us in a big and permanent way.”

Only the Press Can Heal Itself

Many journalists nod in agreement; many disagree. That is the nature of the American press. But there is a sizeable group in-between.

For example, a leading participant in the protest filed at the Pentagon was Michael Getler, Washington Post assistant managing editor for foreign news. He wrote in The Post’s Outlook section on March 17 that “the civilian and uniformed leaders of the U.S. military did a pretty good job of mopping up the press in Operation Desert Storm. No one seems to care very much about this except several hundred reporters and editors who know they’ve been had.”

But Getler and others at The Post also are proud of two Pulitzer prizes for gulf crisis work (one to Caryle Murphy, for 26 precarious days as the only American newspaper reporter in Kuwait chronicling the Iraqi invasion; a second to columnist Jim Hoagland for Persian Gulf and Soviet affairs commentary) plus a string of other awards.

What the gulf crisis has done to the press, and also for the press, is to make its more reflective members look with wider eyes at the current role of journalism in the American structure. It needs many things; if its relevance shrinks crisis by crisis, it obviously will reach irrelevance. To prevent that, the press would be foolish to wait for government to resolve its problems; government is an adversary, and knows it. But it would be invaluable to try to determine, perhaps by survey, what proportion of publishers and editors who pay lip service to that credo actually believe it — and act on that premise.

One of the stinging aspects of the gulf crisis was ridicule of the press, along with the more familiar reactions of anger or indignation. All underscore the inadequacy of press efforts to explain its functions to the public. Why not be more candid with the public? Why not tell the public what the press does not know? Or caution the audience that a story is of questionable accuracy? Or in time of war frequently inform the reader-viewer-listener that all participants are engaging in propaganda, and the only sound guideline is caveat emptor?

Above all, the press must recognize that its vigilance has slaked markedly since the beginning of the Reagan Administration. Its wounds in the gulf crisis, therefore, were primarily the product of its own vulnerability. No one can heal that damage except the press itself.
Journalistic Incompetence

‘War Correspondents’ and ‘Analysts’ Showed Ignorance of Basic Facts About the Military

‘When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.’ — Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841-1935)

BY H. JOACHIM MAITRE

Michael Gartner was not amused. Four weeks after Iraq’s army had invaded Kuwait and during the initial stage of Operation Desert Shield, the editor of The Daily Tribune in Ames, Iowa, told the American public via the op-ed page of The Wall Street Journal (August 30): “Much of the news that you read or hear or see is being censored.” Gartner, who doubles as president of NBC News and thus represents the government-regulated entertainment industry, then tried to alarm his readers with the contents of a list handed to American journalists by the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia.

The sheet declared as “unreleasable” these categories of information: (1) number of troops, (2) number of aircraft, (3) number of other equipment, such as artillery, tanks, radars, trucks, etc., (4) names of military installations and geographic locations of U.S. military installations, (5) information regarding future operations, (6) information regarding security precautions at military installations, (7) names and hometowns of U.S. military personnel interviewed, (8) photographs that would show the level of security at military installations, (9) photographs that would reveal the name or specific location of military units or installations.

“For $32 million a day, the government should tell us what’s going on,” Gartner concluded, “there is no reason — there is no excuse — for this kind of censorship in this undeclared and undeclared war.”

But the American public was neither alarmed nor persuaded by Gartner’s complaint. On the contrary, it judged the press restrictions as eminently reasonable. Throughout the forces buildup of Desert Shield, polls revealed solid majorities supporting the government’s press policy. On at least one occasion, a majority of 53 per cent demanded even greater limitations on press activities.

Major Lesson: Training Needed

If Mr. Gartner, once president of the distinguished American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), could see no excuse for the government’s “censorship,” the public saw no excuse for the blatant shortcomings, if not frequent incompetency, shown before and during the shooting war by “war correspondents” and “analysts” representing major newspapers, magazines and television networks. A major lesson of the war is that the media had failed to train enough defense correspondents deserving of this title. The public expects a defense reporter to know his trade, i.e., all aspects of defense — just as a science, business, and — yes: a sports — reporter’s credibility rests on his or her specialized knowledge in the field. Throughout the gulf crisis, too many writers displayed dilettantism bordering on ignorance. By not recognizing the visual difference between GBU’s (“guided bomb units”) and plain gravity bombs shipped to Saudi Arabia, for instance, the press allowed the Air Force to later claim the unlimited success of “precision bombing,” when less than 10 percent of all bombing was “smart” or “brilliant,” the remaining 90 per cent: plain “dumb.”

The gap separating press from public widened even further with the air war commencing in mid-January, causing the venerable Walter Cronkite to lament in Newsweek (February 25): “With an arrogance foreign to the democratic system, the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia is trampling on the American people’s right to know . . . recent polls indicate the public sides with the military in its so-far successful effort to control the press. This can only be because the press has failed to make clear the public’s stake in the matter.”

The American people’s “right to know” — pure cant in times of war. Cronkite added pathos when asserting that “Americans are not being permitted to see and hear the full story of what their military forces are doing in an action that will reverberate long into the nation’s future.”

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10 Nieman Reports
Curbs Designed To Aid War Plan

Gartner and Cronkite ignored, and the American public recognized, that the paramount objective of war is victory. It is achieved, among other measures, by inflicting in the shortest possible time the highest possible damage and the maximum level of casualties on the adversary while suffering the lowest level of losses to one's own forces.

Among those other measures applied to facilitate victory in modern times we find press restrictions, ranging from access limitation to outright censorship of all reporting from the war zone.

The free press everywhere, naturally and habitually, will object on principle to any restriction imposed on its activities by the government. The U.S. press, in particular, can point to the First Amendment of the American Constitution when rejecting these "other measures," although its cool-headed representatives might at least question the validity of the First Amendment during combat or preparation for combat abroad. Moreover, hard logic requires the profession to concede that its freedom of speech — unimpeded in time of peace — cannot force the military to reveal information judged "classified." The First Amendment does not provide tools for breaking into the government vault protecting the secrets of national security.

It needs to be stressed that throughout the short war in the Gulf, the American press operating at home could do so without restrictions of any kind, without censorship and free of the limitations inherent in any pool system. Furthermore, all news material — print or electronic — gathered in Saudi Arabia by "unilaterals" and sent to the USA through private channels could be and was disseminated without government interference.

War was a long way from breaking out when Michael Gartner protested the press controls in place in Saudi Arabia: "This is no way to run a war." His quest for the American media's unrestricted access to all military information, operations, equipment, specifications, and — why stop anywhere? — strategic planning suffered a final blow in mid-January when the balloon went up in the desert. How do you "cover" an air war, aside from watching combat aircraft taking off and landing at airfields and from flight decks?

Error Noted In N.Y. Times

Eric Schmitt, a defense reporter for New York City's prestige paper, was one of the newsmen "covering" an instant of the air war from aboard the carrier USS America. "Before setting off," he reported, "the pilots had put on their gravitational suits, tight leggings that inflate with water on takeoff, keeping the blood in the pilot's head from draining into their lower body, which would cause them to black out." (The New York Times, January 27). Schmitt's copy had obviously evaded the censor's close attention. It is air, of course, not water that inflates the G-suit in high-G maneuvers. But worse for The New York Times, the paper no longer seems to employ editors sufficiently current with defense matters who would have detected and corrected the nonsense in Schmitt's dispatch.

Flocks of Tomcats and Intruders, Eagles and Ravens, Fighting Falcons and Wild Weasels, Aardvarks and Warthogs, Hornets and Harriers took off for Iraq's hostile air, unaccompanied by American writers, reporters or cameramen, out of sight of the ever-so-watchful guardians of the public interest. Consequently, all reports of air-to-ground and air-to-air action up north came from the media's traditional nemesis, the Pentagon and its public affairs arm on the ground in Saudi Arabia.

In no previous modern war have press conferences and "military briefings," held far away from the field of battle, satisfied the media's curiosity and demands for hard news, gathered in the pressman's ideal scenario without interference from press officers. The Gulf war produced no change. Military information on success or failure in Iraq could not be verified through "independent sources" — the journalist's nightmare come true — and the media's frustration could only worsen with General Colin Powell's well-meaning invitation to the Pentagon press corps: "Trust me."

Trust in government officials, however, does not rank high on the journalist's order of priorities. "A dutiful press that merely regurgitates what it is told
is useless, in the field and at home. The job of the press is to tell the truth, about right and wrong alike,” lectured the London Economist (January 19), but failed to tell how truth can be established about an airfield attack in central Iraq by a journalist located 700 miles away in Dhahran, Saudia Arabia. In most cases, even the attack pilot flying the mission in darkness, would be reluctant to try to tell “the truth” with any degree of certainty.

Besides, hardly a war correspondent will claim the ability to uncover the truth about anything. He will merely seek out the news. “The function of news is to signalize an event,” Walter Lippmann has cautioned us. “The function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men can act.” Lippmann’s cautionary words are essential today, when newsmen almost invariably understand themselves not merely as reporters of fragments of information, but as competent gatherers and distributors of “the truth.”

In democracies, the relationship between government and press is adversarial in time of peace. But war, an aberration, magnifies adversaries into antagonists. And the operational necessities of war strengthen the government’s hands — while weakening the media’s. Thus, coverage of the war is gravely truncated. Rather than being “the first war made for television,” warned Hodding Carter in The Wall Street Journal (January 24), it should be seen as “a war made for government censors: Strip away the verbiage and in-house experts, the other-worldly electronic images shown over and over again, and what has been transmitted so far has been, at base, propaganda.”

**War Propaganda Called Legitimate**

Propaganda — “ideas, facts or allegations spread deliberately to further one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause,” according to the dictionary — is a government’s legitimate weapon in war (and peace). The film and video footage taken from U.S. combat aircraft on bombing runs over Iraq can, of course, be viewed as propaganda wares, distributed by the Pentagon, free of charge, to the free press — which, however, is also free to reject them and substitute their own, propaganda-free footage.

“They’re not releasing videos of the bombs that miss,” Michael Gartner protested (Boston Globe, January 27), but he apparently failed to convince his network’s board to dispatch a private reconnaissance aircraft into the war over Iraq and produce the required independent footage of the bombs that missed.

The conflict is “an impossible thing to cover,” former New York Times war correspondent David Halberstam calmed the waves of growing indignation over the information gap and the media’s impotency, “because it’s all air power. That means you are entirely dependent on the briefing officers. . . . Once the ground war begins, it will be much harder for anyone to control the news.” (Boston Globe, January 20)

**How Galloway Got Invited**

That proved to be true, but the short duration of the final “ground war,” really a mopping up operation lasting a mere 100 hours, found the media’s battalions in Saudia Arabia unable or unprepared to cover it. Only a handful of privileged correspondents rode with the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) into Iraq. Its drive to the banks of the Euphrates and on toward Basra was chronicled in depth only by U.S. News & World Report (March 11). Written by Joseph L. Galloway, “The Point of the Spear” is a shining example of competent, no-nonsense classic combat reporting, easily the best to originate from the war in the gulf.

Therein lies a story of its own. How did Galloway obtain the privilege of riding with the leading tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of the 24th Division? Through a personal invitation from General Norman Schwarzkopf, supreme commander of Desert Storm, a close acquaintance of Galloway’s from months in the field in Vietnam. The military fully trusted Galloway, so much, in fact, that he was shown final operational plans for the conclusive thrust into Iraq a full two weeks prior to implementation.

The U.S. Army’s trust in Galloway and another chosen few spelled distrust in hundreds of fellow journalists. “Media coverage of a war is very much affected by the mood and prejudices of reporters,” wrote veteran defense correspondent Fred Reed from Saudia Arabia. “Relations between the military and the media, here are bad. The press corps are the aggressive, prenaturally ignorant cowboys usually found near wars. Unsurprisingly, soldiers who have to deal with them regard them with restrained contempt.” (The Washington Times, February 12)

“What went wrong?” asks David Gergen, editor-at-large of U.S. News & World Report (March 11), and finds that “in retrospect, it’s apparent that the press was far less prepared for this crisis than the armed forces. From the onset, many reporters went beyond their appropriate and important role of asking tough and probing questions and basically approached the early days of this conflict from an antiwar perspective. They were still fighting the last war in Vietnam, always suspecting that the United States would eventually screw up, that its generals would lie and that its soldiers would die in droves.”

The opinion pages of the U.S. press had been awash, indeed, in predictions of monumental casualty numbers: “Military historians recall what can happen when tank armies hurl themselves at one another,” lectured The New York Times (February 10). “The Battle of the Bulge in World War II claimed 81,000 U.S. casualties, including 19,000 killed,” (never mind if that battle was launched by the Germans against unsuspecting Americans). Washington “defense expert” Edward Luttwak warned that “the widely circulated estimates of 30,000 U.S. casualties, including 10,000 killed, are becoming credible,” and the Center for Defense Information fed the offices of senators and representatives and through them the op-ed pages with jeremiads on horrendous coming U.S. losses.

It was the media’s opinion pages and air waves, not the Pentagon, that had
painted Iraq’s armed forces ten or more feet tall. Warned Senator Sam Nunn, allegedly a defense expert: “Iraq already has had five months to dig in and to fortify and they have done so in a major way. Kuwait has fortifications reminiscent of World War I... Rooting out the Iraqi army with ground forces going against heavy fortifications plays right into Iraq’s hands (National Public Radio January 11). Consider the silly “assessments” by Martin Sieff, an otherwise competent writer on political and economic affairs of The Washington Times:

“Iraq’s combat commanders are a formidable lot, worthy of their men,” Sieff warned the nation, “Iraq’s new defense minister, Major General Saadi Tuma Abbas, is a military genius in defensive wars” (January 14)

Or: “Most of our public prognosticators have woefully misread Iraq’s tactical battle plan,” Sieff wrote. “In eschewing mobility and digging its tanks into heavily defended positions, the Iraqi army is following the tactics Rommel so successfully used in eighteen months of desert warfare, when he smashed up one fruitless British offensive after another.” (February 4)

But Marshall Rommel never dug in any of his tanks. He would have scoffed at Saddam Hussein’s planned use of armor in Kuwait. Sitting in the desert, with or without berms and bunkers, without air cover of their own, Iraq’s tanks would be obliterated by the allies’ air power. Rommel had seen it happen in Normandy in 1944, after allied air superiority had driven him out of Africa.

Scores of writers, however, pontificated without paying attention to history or the technology gap between American and Iraqi forces. Consider Edward Luttwak again, one of the numerous armchair strategists in Washington and a regular “expert” on even more television talk shows. “At more than 5,000, Iraq’s tank force is greater than what any coalition could possibly transport and deploy against it,” Luttwak pronounced, effortlessly boosting the known number of Iraq’s tanks in the Kuwaiti theater by 10 to 20 per cent. (cited in The Washington Times, March 6)

And how would Saddam Hussein deploy his overwhelming armor and protect it against the allies’ high-tech air power? “Iraq’s defensive strength derives from its solid engineering units. The mines, the obstacles, the sand barriers they have erected will stretch a ground war out indefinitely,” opined Luttwak, summing up with this: “The U.S. Army’s armored and mechanized forces can play no offensive role against the vast defensive strength of the Iraqi army.” (cited in The Washington Times, March 6)

More Errors, Some Hilarious

Throughout the buildup in the gulf, editorials cast doubt on the capabilities and survivability on U.S. frontline combat systems: “The Air Force’s premier fighter, the F-15, has powerful engines but, unfortunately, they smoke, giving away the plane’s position.” (The New York Times, October 10) Also unfortunately, the F-15 Eagle engines do not smoke.

Defense writer Charles Lane worried with “some A-10 pilots” that “the fast-flying F-15E and the gadget-laden Apache helicopter will be of little use against Iraqi tank columns.” (Neuweek, January 21)

Headlining a memorable interview with “defense expert” Steven I. Canby, a former Army officer, “U.S. Technology Won’t Win the War,” The New York Times (January 20) spread hilarious skepticism about the U.S. military’s equipment. Canby didn’t think “our ground forces are that superior to Iraq’s when it comes to technology.” The high-tech missile-guiding heat-seekers? “You can set up smoke pots to confuse the heat sensors.” The M-1 tank? “It doesn’t have a bulldozer blade up front, and that’s a great limitation in the desert. It can’t scoot into position.” On the U.S. element of surprise and Iraqi intelligence gathering methods: The Iraqis “don’t have satellites, but they could have a Bedouin on a camel out in the desert with a radio or a person in a rowboat.” But is was, of course, U.S. technology alone that made the war such a walk-over.

The heights of utter silliness were scaled without effort by Fred Kaplan, “defense correspondent” for The Boston Globe. His skepticism was directed against the M-1 “Abrams” heavy tank: “It breaks down too often” and has other “serious deficiencies that could affect the course of a land war.” Worse, the Abrams, pride of the U.S. Army’s armor, “is not suited for the desert.”

In conclusion, Kaplan counseled General Schwarzkopf: “You will creep very slowly with your tank force. You will not be able to make the wide, sweeping movements you need to win tank wars.” The U.S. ground offensive would also be slowed down by “vulnerabilities of the M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle.” In the Vietnam War, you see, American soldiers always rode on the outside of the M-2 predecessors, the M-113, but no one can sit on the M-2 (which has a turret). As a result, “soldiers may have to walk.” The piece carried the headline, “Analyst Warns Deficient Arms Are ‘Makings of a Catastrophe.’ ” (The Boston Globe, January 25)

American readers of the British Spectator were treated to a far different scenario weeks before the air war
started. "If it comes to shooting, the Iraqi army will suffer a catastrophic defeat," wrote military historian and defense specialist (on the staff of the London Telegraph), John Keegan. "Air power will prove the decisive factor...but is deployed only on amphibious assault ships, and it doesn't provide air cover (it cannot) but close-air support. Not a single Harrier, however, had been "recalled.""

Obviously, The New York Times opinion pages employ no one versed in military hardware and technology matters. But such a person works elsewhere at The Times, running the paper's science pages. He is Malcolm Browne, veteran war correspondent, honored with a Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam reporting. Would it not have made sense to install Browne as chief editor and coordinator during the gulf crisis for all defense matters printed in The Times, thus avoiding embarrassment? Instead, Browne was dispatched to Saudi Arabia and into the general frustration of the pool system.

Defense Editors Need Recognition

No U.S. prestige daily shows in its masthead a Defense Editor. By international comparison, The London Telegraph has John Keegan (and the illustrious Max Hastings as editor-in-chief), The Frankfurter Allgemeine, the all-around defense experts Guenther Gillesen and Karl Feldmeyer. If war is too important to be left to the generals, then the business of war reporting is too serious to be left to amateurs.

What about television coverage of "history's most televised, least visible war?" (Economist, February 16) What about its effect on Americans? A comprehensive survey conducted by the Roper Organization in early 1991 found that while the United States prepared for a ground assault in the gulf, a record 81 per cent of Americans were getting most of their news from television. For example: A "troublesome weapon is the latest-model Harrier fighter-bomber..." The Harrier "takes off from the aircraft carriers..." but a critical component wears out much faster than it's supposed to. Now that the Marine Corps may need every Harrier it can get for air cover, some of the planes have to be recalled and refitted.

On basics, the Harrier (AV-8B) doesn't take off from carriers (although it could) but is deployed only on amphibious assault ships, and it doesn't provide air cover (it cannot) but close-air support. Not a single Harrier, however, had been "recalled."

Coverage of the first Scud attacks on Israel was similarly speculative — and inaccurate. Dan Rather of CBS "reported" and continued to insist that at least one Israeli missile crashing into Tel Aviv had carried a chemical warhead and that the Israeli air force "was retaliating." Competing networks "reported" that nerve gas victims were arriving in Tel Aviv's hospitals. It was all untrue. Newspapers eventually — but belatedly — set the record straight.

When the joy over instant TV coverage had faded, critic Jeff Greenfield saw as "the most significant, most troublesome aspect of television's first 'real-time' war: the uneasy blend of instant, immediate, round-the-world, round-the-clock access to information that is inherently incomplete, fragmentary or downright wrong." (TV Guide, February 16-22).

Nonsensical Chatter on TV

With the air war in Iraq into its tenth day and Saddam Hussein huddling several stories down with his "revolutionary council," NBC ran a special, "The Realities of War," hosted by glamorous Faith Daniels, a pretty specialist in nothing. "Saddam Hussein is a cunning man," reporter Arthur Kent, most noted for his movie star looks, informed her from Saudi Arabia. "And nowhere does he show his cunning more clearly than on a battlefield when he is under attack."

"And that, Arthur, seems to be this Administration's greatest miscalculation," cooed anchor Daniels. How was
that? The allied air campaign over Iraq had reached its zenith. Whatever Saddam Hussein’s war strategy may have been, it now seemed reduced to fatalism. His airfields and runways cratered, his concrete shelters punctured or pulverized, the former strongman dispatched his remaining fighter and bomber aircraft into uncertain exile in Iran.

But never mind. “Saddam Hussein is ruthless, more than ruthless,” Kent advised Daniels from Dhahran. “In the past eleven days, he’s surprised us. He’s shown us a capable military mind and advised Daniels from Dhahran. In real time. Advanced communication technologies had made it possible. That Daniels and Kent knew what they were doing. Their nonsensical chatter was transmitted to us via satellite, ‘‘in real time.’’ Advanced communication technologies had made it possible. Immediacy had become an end in itself.

There was no indication, however, that Daniels and Kent knew what they were doing. Their nonsensical chatter was transmitted to us via satellite, ‘‘in real time.’’ Advanced communication technologies had made it possible. Immediacy had become an end in itself. Content did not matter.

“If technology has improved,’’ warned former war correspondent David Halberstam on the op-ed page of The New York Times (February 21), ‘‘then the editing function, the cumulative sense of judgment — the capacity of network news executives to decide what to use and how to use it and how to blend the nonvisual and visual — has declined in precise ratio to the improvement in technology.’’

Twelve hours into the land war, when (according to General Schwarzkopf) more than 5,500 Iraqi troops had thrown in the towel and allied forces, meeting only with light resistance, were advancing “through, around, over, and underneath the enemy,” CNN news anchor Mary Ann Loughlin reported that “allied soldiers were dying like flies” in Kuwait. This was according to Radio Baghdad via Peter Arnett.

Ms. Loughlin, maintaining her objectivity, didn’t even risk a smile while relaying this information. Reliable information was hard to come by during those hectic hours of February 24, after all. Whom to believe? Peter Arnett or Norman Schwarzkopf? Dick Cheney or Saddam Hussein? Everything was so confusing.

(continued on page 50)
Is Staffing Worth the Cost?

Yes, Says the Dallas Morning News, Despite Problems
With Pentagon Pools and Access

BY BURL OSBORNE

The middle of a recession isn't the obvious place for a regional newspaper to spend large, unbudgeted amounts of money on a story that television already is giving large, unbudgeted amounts of time. Yet our newspaper, among others, did exactly that. We spent heavily to bring staff coverage to the Persian Gulf War, despite television saturation, a soft business climate and the angst about how to pay for it and whether it was wise to try.

We took into account both business and journalistic issues and obviously thought it was worthwhile. The value added to coverage justified the effort; the added circulation, particularly in the face of the heaviest television viewing in history, justified the cost. That spurt in circulation is one of the few causes for optimism in an industry lately awash in pessimism.

This is not to say that every newspaper should have gone off to cover the war. A persuasive argument can be made that fewer, not more, reporters would have been useful.

This also is not to say that coverage was as efficient or as timely as it could and should have been. There were big-time problems with the military pool structure and with access to the action. We went anyway, and would go again, for these reasons:

• Staff coverage of the war was consistent with our intent to provide the best possible coverage for our readers within the limits of resources available to us.

• Readers of The Dallas Morning News have come to expect staff coverage on major events, particularly those of special importance to them. This was was a personal story for almost everyone.

• This was was local news for us. Strong ties have existed between Texas and the Mideast for 60 years, since oil was found there. Much of the U.S. war machine originated in or passed through Texas.

• Our staff was qualified to add value to coverage by being there. Reporters and editors involved with the coverage were familiar with the geography, the issues, the people and the logistics of coverage. Moreover, we are better qualified if and when there is a next time.

The Morning News published about 275 unbudgeted pages of news from January 17 through March 4. This expanded coverage included two extra editions the first two days of the war and a third when it seemed Iraq would accept a Soviet-brokered peace offer. There were 13 separate sections as well as assorted advertising-free pages in the main news section each day. Circulation jumped 80,000 in the first day of the war and helped to double our usual rate of growth in the latest six-month circulation statement. Altogether, unbudgeted expenses pushed toward $500,000, much of which we are gradually recovering through tighter expense management throughout the newspaper.

Six reporters and a photographer, some in pools, provided staff coverage from Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Turkey and, in the later stages of the war, from Iraq and Kuwait. Altogether, about 200 staffers in Dallas, Washington and other bureaus participated in the coverage.

It could not have been successful without detailed planning.

War Plans

Jim Landers, foreign editor, led the War Desk. He spent two years in the late 1970s working in Saudi Arabia and covered energy and the Mideast from the Washington bureau during the 1980s.

BY JIM LANDERS

Planning coverage for a war is something that usually happens after the war begins. At The Morning News, there were few things in place before the U.S. intervention in Panama — a small Pentagon pool, of which we were a partici-
pant, and experience with disasters such as plane crashes and hurricanes, where we published extras and special sections. But Panama caught us without an overall plan.

The prelude to war in the gulf region stretched over four months. Many of us found it hard to believe the conflict would go all the way to a shooting war. We ran through several plans as the crisis continued to build. In October, at the prompting of Managing Editor Bob Moog, we began a grander design for the outbreak of war that involved integrating the entire newsroom into our coverage. The planning process was successful because we were able to suspend our disbelief and use the time to position ourselves.

We combined the International and National Desks for our core War Desk, then started adding editors and writers from the Washington bureau and several other sections: Texas & Southwest, Metro, Projects, Business and Today. By January 15, plan documents included: a War Desk activation directory for 59 newsroom employees and 17 advertising, production and circulation employees; a master glossary and style sheet; a mammoth source list for reporters and several story lists, with preliminary schedules for when we would use the articles.

We had two ad-free pages of war-related stories set in type and dummied, ready to be inserted into the press run. We had dozens of maps and weapons graphics ready to go. On the War Desk, we had two 24-hour clocks set on Saudi time and facing different areas of the newsroom.

We knew we were going to publish special sections, for at least a week, of six to 10 pages each, with several other blanks of dedicated space inside the main A-section. We had time to plan a design for the special sections.

We planned a regular feature for the top of Page 3 called “Letter From . . .”, aimed at featuring the best-written story or column of the day. Eventually writers from Sports, Metro, National, Today, International and even Photo contributed. A point was made: good writing gets good display.

By January 15, we had two reporters in the field: European bureau chief George Rodrigue with the Pentagon pools in Saudi Arabia; and Mexico City bureau chief Gregory Katz in Amman, Jordan. Washington bureau energy correspondent Anne Reifenberg was on her way to Saudi Arabia via London. Staff photographer David Leson was in Washington, standing by to fly to Saudi Arabia aboard military transport with other pool journalists. South American bureau chief David Marcus was in Washington ready to help with war features from the capital.

Each dispatch of a reporter, each commitment of space involved considerable debate about cost and effectiveness.

We delayed sending Anne Reifenberg until just before the war began, which made setting her in place much more difficult. Saudi Arabia closed its airspace once the war began, trapping Anne in midair and forcing her flight back to London. That helped cost us a crucial story. (George Rodrigue’s pool dispatch about the cruise missile launch that opened the war reached us two days late because no one in the Dhahran press pool office would fax it to us). In addition, not having Anne on the scene for a week left us without a correspondent in Saudi Arabia with whom we could communicate because George was out to sea on pool assignment.

But we saved tens of thousands of dollars by a gradual commitment of staff to this story in the months before war broke out. Each time we wanted another reporter to go to the Middle East, Executive Managing Editor Bill Evans wanted to know: What are we seeking? What will this give us that we’re not already getting from our wires?

George was the first staff writer to
arrive, a week after Iraq's August 2 invasion of Kuwait. He had never been to the Mideast and had spent the previous six months preparing to cover Europe. What we wanted from George was background and context stories about politics, history and people.

Throughout his six-week stay, we were able to pick and choose what we wanted to pursue. He wrote about the consequences of the invasion on the people in Kuwait; the consequences for the economies of Jordan and Egypt; and the legacies of empire and imperialism that make the Middle East such a tinderbox.

Lee Hancock, a reporter on the Texas & Southwest desk, made the hostages seized by Iraq her beat, focusing on the families of Texans held captive. She broke the story of how pay was suspended for some of those taken hostage. We sent Lee to Baghdad in December with family members of the hostages. Her spot stories the evening the hostages learned they would be freed were far better than those the wires offered; AP at that point was relying on us to provide reports that would help their other Texas members.

Lee also gave us a strong story from Baghdad showing that many Iraqis were unwilling to engage the United States in war and were unenthusiastic about the annexation of Kuwait. This one, they said, would be Saddam's war, not Iraq's. It was a telling look at Iraq's will to fight. Vietnam had taught us that a weary and uncertain nation would not respond with intelligent stories.

Just before the land phase of the war, we sent National Desk staff writer Ed Timms to Saudi Arabia. Ed was soon in Kuwait and stayed there until the beginning of April to report the endgame stories.

We invested lots of effort in trying to make contact with families, trainers and reservists at military bases in Texas — both before the during the war. We regularly visited the different Arab communities in North Texas to see what they thought about the war.

We challenged every desk in the newsroom to anticipate ways the war would affect their beats, and all were able to respond with intelligent stories.

## Covering The War, What We Gained

Kevin Merida is assistant managing editor in charge of foreign and national news coverage. A former White House correspondent for The Dallas Morning News, he was a member of the Pentagon pool that covered the U.S. invasion of Panama. Earlier this year, he was named by the Headliners Club Star Reporter of the Year in Texas for his work in 1990.

### By KEVIN MERIDA

Planning for war left much of our staff prepared for battle; covering the war was much more complex.

There were lots of cooks and assistant cooks. Virtually every news department wanted and deserved a piece of the war. There were intense debates in the newsroom about the tone and focus of our coverage. Are we running too many stories about television's role? Has our coverage of the antiwar element been too superficial? Are we giving readers the right mix of stories from the gulf region and from the homefront? Are we simply producing so many war stories that readers are not able to digest our daily package?

Everyone from the mail clerk to the publisher contributed to the discussions. And the process produced the most exciting, candid and freewheeling exchange of ideas and viewpoints that I have seen at The News.
Each morning, the War Desk convened a meeting that served as the main forum for hashing out ideas and tracking gulf developments. From this meetings, a daily war-news budget was prepared. Virtually every section of the paper sent a representative — from Food to Sports. And unlike the daily news meetings, which are populated by editors, reporters were regular participants. This process, I believe, helped to broaden the scope of our coverage.

Like most major newspapers, we didn’t plan everything just right. For instance, we had prepared in advance a package of stories, graphics and front-page layouts, figuring that the outbreak of war might well catch us on deadline without enough time and material to fill the newspaper.

What happened was exactly the opposite. Even though we got word of the Allied attack on Iraq shortly after 5:30 p.m. Dallas time — two hours before our first-edition deadline — we had 75 staff-written stories working. We had room for only 48. From Day 1, we were constantly adjusting our coverage plan to reflect changing circumstances.

We had planned, for instance, to rely on a stringer, Linda Gradstein, a regular Mideast contributor to National Public Radio, to cover Israel. But when Iraq launched successive Scud attacks on Israel in the early days of the war, our thinking shifted. We decided to move South American bureau chief David Marcus from Washington — where he had been sent to do general assignments and features — to Israel. In making that call, we believed that if Israel were drawn into the war, the entire complexion of the conflict would change. We thought it was important to have more reliable and consistent coverage from that venue than a stringer could provide.

Some might ask: What could we get from our own correspondent in Israel that we couldn’t get from available wire services? Answer: Continuity and flexibility.

We were not beholden to whatever dispatches moved over the wires on a given day. Having our own correspondents on the scene, not only in Israel but also in other locales, gave us a greater ability to develop and follow up on coverage. This was a service to our readers.

“We wrote about the economic hardships in Tel Aviv one day,” David Marcus said. “We followed a few days later with a story about the suffering of unemployed Palestinians in Bethlehem. We wrote about the enthusiasm of Soviet Jewish immigrants, who left behind economic chaos for the uncertainty of life in a country on the edge of war. We followed with a look at the political implications of these new immigrants settling in the occupied territories.

“We didn’t force the local angle, but sometimes it was appropriate. One feature, for example, described Tel Aviv and Haifa as ‘Israel’s equivalent of Dallas and Fort Worth’. A deadline story recounted the mixed emotions of a delegation of Dallas Jewish leaders visiting during the war.”

Throughout the war, our goal — and our challenge — was to bring the war home to readers. We wanted to give them insightful and sophisticated coverage of global and battlefield events, but we also wanted to be the best source of information about the war’s effect on Texas and its citizens.

On Day 1 of the war, for instance, State Desk reporter Bruce Nichols went to New Waverly, Texas, a town of fewer than 1,000 people but with 40 men in the military and two dozen in the gulf region. He turned in a fine piece about the anxiety and resignation war produces in a small town.

Sometimes we made special efforts to merge our local and international reporting. One example was a project on the effect of war on children. In Dallas, we combined interviews from our correspondents in Israel and Jordan with interviews of children in Dallas and El Paso. This gave our readers a
sense of how different war was for kids of separate and distinct cultures.

In my opinion, we did well covering the war because we were prepared to do well. We had talented editors and reporters who were poised to raise their games a notch or two. And they did. Operating as a team, writers and editors in our lifestyles section, Today, made testing the mood of Dallasites their specialty. Sometimes, we just thought of stories before other news organizations did and executed them well.

One example is the B-1 bomber. At one of our War Desk meetings during the early days of the war, State Desk Editor Donnis Baggett raised the question “I wonder if they’re using the B-1 bomber?” State Desk reporter David Hanners, a Pulitzer Prize winner who has an interest in aircraft and air-safety issues, jumped on the story. He wrote a piece on the B-1 bomber’s being grounded, a story picked up by others in succeeding days.

When this war began, few of us at The Dallas Morning News had any experience covering a war. No one directly involved in our planning or coverage of the war was involved in the coverage of Vietnam (although one of our War Desk rewrites is a Vietnam veteran).

From my standpoint, one of the great benefits of doing the Persian Gulf War in such extensive fashion is that the process accelerated our development as a newspaper.

Before the Persian Gulf crisis broke out in August, Lee Hancock was a State Desk reporter who had never been overseas. Now, she has reported from Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey. Her pre-war trip to Iraq with the families of Texans held hostage gave her some perspective we were able to use in analyzing Saddam Hussein’s actions once war broke out. Now, she is not only capable of, but also hungry for, other foreign assignments.

Ed Timms, our Dallas-based national correspondent, is another who had little foreign reporting experience before the war. His gulf experience, particularly in Kuwait, where he turned in some first-rate enterprise stories, adds to our institutional depth. In addition, because he spent the first month of the war in Dallas writing about military strategy, The News, in effect, has developed another layer of expertise in a specialized field of reporting.

Similarly, George Rodrigue’s experience as a pool reporter has given him a deeper knowledge of U.S. military weaponry and strategy. And that will help the newspaper and benefit our readers. His careful reporting and detailed pool reports won him the respect not only of his press colleagues but also of military officials who may not have been familiar with the caliber of work done at The Dallas Morning News. Anne Reifenberg’s contacts and initial reporting in Saudi Arabia last fall made it possible for us to do stories on Saudi society when she returned for war duty in January — stories that some others were not able to get. Now, if we need to send someone back to the Mideast or to analyze Arab culture and politics from Washington, she is equipped to do it.

The war was a success for the newspaper; it also was a learning experience. We still need to develop more discipline to not take every nugget of good information and make a separate story out of it. Sometimes we had duplicate stories. Sometimes we didn’t use our news services as well as we could have. We also needed more analyses of the day’s military events and diplomatic maneuverings. This would have given our readers more perspective on what the generals were outlining in their daily televised briefings and what the leaders were trying to negotiate by phone.

But we will get better.

So, if we had it to do over again, I would again advocate sending our own correspondents to the region as opposed to relying only on the news services. And I would again advocate elaborate planning and the use of virtually every news department. A newspaper becomes great, I believe, by challenging its staff to rise to a higher level. We did that.

The Writing Pools

George Rodrigue, European bureau chief, spent four months covering the crisis and war in the gulf region, first in Jordan and Egypt and then from Saudi Arabia. He was assigned to the pool covering naval operations. Rodrigue, a Nieman Fellow in 1990, won the 1986 Pulitzer Prize for national reporting.

By George Rodrigue

In the middle of the war, a Navy A-6 pilot tried to describe the adrenaline rush he got from flying combat. “If you like the feeling after your first car accident,” he said, “you’ll love this job.”

Pool work was like that. Not fun. But intense.

Emotionally, we shared the feelings of the troops we lived with. Fear was first.

The war started, for me, with a “media pool” aboard the battleship USS Wisconsin. The ship’s Tomahawk missiles stood on blinding-white tails in the darkness and curved toward street addresses in Baghdad. Waves of U.S. aircraft followed, heading north unopposed. We were killing people. They might kill us.

Still, it was a surreal, long-distance war, until the next morning.

“Vampires inbound,” the bosun’s mate shouted into the intercom.

“General Quarters, general quarters. This is not a drill.” We were about to be blown up by an Iraqi Exocet missile.

Notebook in hand, I sprinted to my battle station above the bridge. Eight decks up, my legs trembled as I jammed my helmet on.

“Missile inbound bearing 90 degrees,” the intercom squawked. We’d be hit amidships, somewhere below where I was standing. “Brace for shock.” We
Commanding officers were supposed to review our files only for security problems. A captain or two insisted on editing himself to sound more intelligent. That was annoying, but we had to be polite. We needed their radio transmitters to get our stories ashore. One of our media escorts, a lieutenant, actually told his captain that we, and not the captain, got to make such judgments. We reached an understanding: We’d modify our stories if the captain supplied us with new information to support the changes.

The big problem was access. Our pool could go only where the Navy and Marine Corps wanted to send us. Sometimes they astounded us, working for hours to line up helicopter transport to a distant ship. Sometimes, for no apparent reason, they couldn’t carry us to a ship 500 yards away. Space seldom seemed to be a problem. Every ground or Navy unit we visited said they wondered why we hadn’t been there earlier. A friend at the military’s Joint Information Bureau (JIB) said the problem was not logistics but commanders. “They are afraid the troops will get to know you and talk too much,” he said. Another JIB officer said commanders tended to think their careers could gain nothing from the media and lose much.

When the war started, there were only 13 media pools. The access restrictions frustrated pool reporters. They enraged hundreds of our colleagues who could get nowhere near the war. Out of boredom and frustration, reporters left behind in Dhahran and Riyadh complained: about the military, about the “privileged elite” in the pool and about the greedy SOBs from their own newspapers who refused to return from the field and swap pool positions.

The media pools were a mixed blessing but a blessing nonetheless. They gave us valuable first-hand insight into some of the war’s most crucial features, but they also tied us to those places and people that the military wished us to see. And being a member of the pool completely precluded real enterprise reporting because we had to be on call within less than two hours. In other words, we were pretty much chained to the hotel when we were not on pool assignments and chained to our military escorts when we were. In my case, working mostly aboard ships, I found that most of the restrictions and security rules melted away after a few days. That was not the case with several of my colleagues on shore.

Those with clout tried to use it — against the military if possible and against their colleagues if necessary. Nicholas Horrock of The Chicago Tribune became “print pool coordinator” and quickly pushed me off the pool that was to cover an amphibious invasion. “History, journalism and the American people” would be better served by someone from a larger newspaper, Nick told me. The larger newspaper, of course, was Nick’s own.

At the JIB, officers apologized for the switch. One public affairs specialist said: “Don’t worry. What if there ISN’T an amphibious invasion?”

Compared to this infighting, combat was restful.

The pool work reminded me of the importance of making your own observations and drawing your own conclusions. In other words, the pool system often did not work well for non-pool reporters. They were forced to rely on the work of us out in the field, and many of us did not support them as well as we should have. Instead of filing pool reports, we filed cute little features about people from our hometowns. Or terse news bulletins when there had been no news and when background, perspective and analytical material were badly needed. Some reporters were far better than others, but none of us was good all the time or consistently lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time. For the sake of all our readers, there needed to be more of us out there. Perhaps one lesson from the Persian Gulf war is this: Either there should be no pools, or pools so huge that they amount not to restrictive arrangements (forcing the media to fight among themselves) but to logistical support mechanisms.

The military, logistically, could have handled far more of us. I never saw a ship, a base or a company in the field...
that couldn’t have taken one or more extra people. And almost every unit we visited welcomed us heartily.

The Photo Pools

David Leeson is a staff photographer with considerable experience covering international conflict. Wounded by a shotgun blast in Panama, David has twice been a Pulitzer Prize finalist.

BY DAVID LEESON

The best example of the frustration experienced by photojournalists was the day when the sign-up list was full for a Saudi pool trip to a camel market.

The air war was raging across the border just four hours north of the Dhahran International Hotel and from an airbase five minutes away. So why was a trip to a camel market so interesting?

Only a handful of credentialed (usually wire service) photographers were selected to be part of the combat pools. The less fortunate spent their days chasing Patriot/Scud missile air wars overhead, furtively cruising Saudi Arabian streets and cursing their fate when the camel trip sold out.

Newspaper photographers were placed at the bottom of the pool pecking order. Roughly 15 newspapers had sent photographers to cover the Gulf conflict. But the early formation of combat pools did not encourage independent coverage. And the pool slots were usually divided among photographers who had been in Saudi Arabia the longest.

Three hours after I arrived in Saudi Arabia, I found the system had expanded a bit for “rapid response” pools, whose members would be chosen in a lottery. My name was picked eighth. Holding the No. 8 slot meant that I would have waited for more than a month before being assigned to one of four or five pools.

As luck would have it, one day the top four photographers in the rotation could not be located for a Navy pool scheduled to leave in one hour. I was the first one found. No. 8 had suddenly become No. 1.

The photographers ahead of me in line discovered the change in schedule and learned another reality of the pool system. Your life belongs to the military. Working independently meant risking any sudden opportunity for pool duty. (Two of the missing photographers had spent the day at the camel market.)

We were captives of the military. The greatest threat was the revocation of our credentials and possible expulsion from the country for operating outside the rules. Being good meant staying close to the hotel, venturing out occasionally in vain attempts to localize a story happening hundreds of miles away. The average reader knew more about the war than we did.

Many of us made illegal trips to the restricted areas along the border trying to pass the numerous checkpoints. Some wore desert camouflage fatigues and helmets. One photographer sprayed his four-wheel drive vehicle with cooking grease and threw sand on it so it would resemble the khaki vehicles the military drove.

We learned to display our Department of Defense Geneva Convention Card to the Saudi soldiers and the Saudi press credential to the Americans. The Saudis could not take the Geneva card from us because they didn’t issue it; the U.S. military could not take the Saudi card for the same reason.

Few of the trips were successful. One photographer, a friend of mine based in El Salvador, was caught near the Iraqi border by members of the Alabama National Guard and held at gunpoint for 36 hours. Mostly, we were turned back after hours of driving on desert roads.

Our gravest concern wasn’t encountering Iraqi soldiers. We worried over whether the MPs would report our travels and seek our expulsion.

Eventually all of us ended up on at least one pool. I was on two during my two-month stay in the Middle East. The first pool was a one-week trip aboard an Aegis cruiser, the U.S.S. Mobile Bay. The ship’s missiles had all been fired two days before my arrival.

The second pool was with the First Marine Division Combat support group for the attack into Kuwait, where I confronted other realities of the pool system.

Almost all my attempts to cover the war were thwarted by the military’s concern for my personal safety. The pool system places personal risk in the military’s hands. This was unlike my coverage of conflicts in Central and South America, where I had choices. I could either move forward or back out if things didn’t feel right. Under the pool system, you relinquish this vital control to the military. Where they go, you go.

A war raged around me, but I never saw it. There were even restrictions concerning the photography of the Iraqi soldiers who surrendered. At one point my military escort leaped in front of my camera with his clipboard, screaming because I was taking a photo that would have revealed the faces of the prisoners.

The pool system ensured that the newsmedia would see only what they were allowed to see. It was not set up to serve us but rather so that we could serve the system.

(Editor's note: Though David’s pool experiences were unpleasant, his photography was a success. After reaching Kuwait with the Marines, he stayed on for several weeks free of pool restrictions. His pictures dominated the front page several times, and his portfolio has since been assembled in a slide presentation popular with The Dallas Morning News readers.)

Nieman Authors

Writing a book? Please let Nieman Reports know of publication date in plenty of time so that we can have it reviewed.
Covering Saudis

Anne Reifenberg is the Washington bureau’s energy correspondent. She reported from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in late October and November and again from mid-January to mid-March.

BY ANNE REIFENBERG

Female journalists had something of an advantage in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf crisis and war. We were prohibited from driving. We were not allowed to sit down to eat a sundae in a family ice cream parlor. We were often unable to walk quietly down the street without running into problems with the religious police. But as explorers of Saudi society, politics and culture, we were in prime positions.

All women are items of curiosity in the kingdom, and American women are among the most curious of all. On both my tours of duty there, I found the Saudis as interested in Western female reporters as Western reporters were in Saudis. Because of that, I was able to break through barriers that men were not.

Breaking through was important to The Morning News. Our readers already had a keen interest in Saudi Arabia itself — as opposed to Saudi Arabia as a sterile staging ground for a war — because of the long Texas relationship with the kingdom’s oil industry. One of our goals in covering the invasion of Kuwait and its liberation was to keep the Saudi and Kuwaiti people from getting lost in the high-tech bombings, diplomatic shufflings and endgame speculations that made up the main stories.

Our readers, I think, were as interested in the daily lives of the citizens of Riyadh as they were in how First Cavalry Division soldiers were faring without beer in the desert.

Most Saudis were appreciative of that interest. Conservative women wanted to speak with me to convert me. Liberal women wanted to meet me either to convince me that their lives weren’t as bad as American women thought or were worse. Men agreed to be interviewed because they wanted to be polite, because they wanted to be daring and because they didn’t know what else to do when a woman asked them a question because no women unrelated to them had ever asked them a question.

Male reporters from the West were able to report brilliantly on aspects of Saudi society. But sexism played into women’s hands in many instances. We were permitted to peek beneath the veil, and our readers got to come with us.

Roving Coverage

Gregory Katz is Mexico City bureau chief. He covered the gulf crisis in Dallas, Washington, Geneva, Jerusalem, Amman, Nicosia and Cairo.

BY GREGORY KATZ

The Persian Gulf War ended quickly for the United States, but such an outcome could not be foreseen ahead of time. Coverage plans had to take into account the possibility that the war would escalate and completely reshape the Middle East.

What if Israel entered the war? What if Israel retaliated against Iraqi chemical attacks with nuclear weapons? What if Iran invaded a wounded Iraq? What if the Soviet Union broke with the United States over Iraq and plunged the world into a new Cold War?

These possibilities were all real, and the outcome was completely unpredictable, giving the stories from the region an incredible tension and importance. So the task became to describe a world on the precipice. The opportunity was to establish a strong personal connection with readers.

When people are worried about their families or loved ones, or when they feel their country’s honor is at stake, they crave information. And information delivered by the paper’s own reporters has a more personal tone than wire reports. It was a time to bond with readers, not by taking up the country’s cause as our own but by trying to make the people and history of the Middle East come alive.

From my point of view, covering mostly Arab countries during the war offered several advantages. The first was flexibility. In Jordan, for example, I did not have to concentrate on trying to discern what was happening inside Iraq and produce daily stories to rival the ones produced by Reuters or The New York Times. I was free to travel, to poke around, to go to refugee camps looking for odd stories such as the bitterness I found when I visited a private girls school to interview teenagers about the war.

I learned a tremendous amount from this process. The teenagers, for example, were much more articulate and well-versed than I expected. And they despised the United States. In their hatred, I found some insight.

Stories such as this one could be tied into projects being directed by editors in Dallas. The high school girls, for example became a feed for a larger staff package about children and war.

I also wrote several short stories about refugees that were not candidates for the front page but did, I hope, offer brief, readable insights into how the war set millions of lives into turmoil. In one camp, for example, I found refugees from Somalia who had fled Iraq but could not go home because of the violent civil war in Somalia.

I also was free to travel to Syria to write about the war’s effect on American hostages held in Lebanon and to take several days to write about Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt. These trips would not have been possible had I been forced to spend every working

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The Press Collaborators

Elitist Clique Helped Defense Department Set Up Pools While Freezing Out Other News Organizations

By Frank A. Aukofer

From a journalistic viewpoint, the most telling event of the Persian Gulf War came early in May — long after the end of hostilities — when a tidy group of executives from the television networks, the news magazines and the nation’s major newspaper organizations wrote a letter to Defense Secretary Richard Cheney protesting the combat pool system that had been set up to cover the war.

I read the newspaper story about their protest with bitter amusement. It was, for the most part, the same closed clique. As it turned out, they became pawns of the Pentagon.

“The press behaved like part of the establishment,” Sydney Schanberg, an author and war correspondent from the Vietnam era, now a Newsday columnist, told The Washington Post’s Howard Kurtz. Schanberg said the news executives were “feeling embarrassed and humiliated and mortified.”

The letter’s signers were Washington-based, and I know most of them. To be fair, they were not all individually responsible. But they were members of the cartel, and even in their belated attempt to redeem themselves after the war they presumed to speak for the entire American press.

Their attitude had been summed up spectacularly during the war in an interview I had with Joseph Albright, a reporter for Cox Newspapers, who was one of the print pool coordinators. The pool coordinators were the anointed representatives of the combat pool members. It was they who acted as buffers between the military and angry reporters shut out of the war coverage.

I had arrived on January 13 to cover the war and found myself on the outside looking in, my nose pressed against the glass. All of the pool slots had been assigned to the four television networks, the wire services, the three news magazines, a few Saudi Arabian correspondents and the “Sacred 14” newspapers — or “Sacred 16,” depending on the time frame. The original group included USA Today, Gannett, Knight-Ridder, The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Chicago Tribune, Cox Newspapers, The Boston Globe, Newsday, The Washington Times, The Dallas Morning News, The Wall Street Journal and Stars & Stripes.

Not only had these newspaper organizations taken all the pool slots, they had decided among themselves to keep the pools to themselves institutionally, allowing the possibility of rotating different reporters in and out. Any less fortunate publications fortunate enough to get into a pool at a later date were to keep the slot only for one tour of duty, then would drop to the bottom of the waiting list.

Like other frustrated reporters shut out of the action, I had decided to write a story about the pool system, and so had sought out Albright. He was too busy to see me at first, explaining that he was conferring with Edy Lederer of the Associated Press on a list of story ideas for Col. Bill Mulvey, the Army officer in charge of the JIB, the military’s Joint Information Bureau (it was called “joint” because it worked with the Saudi government, which issued the press passes and set up some of its own press tours). Mulvey was functioning as the de facto assignment editor for all the news media representatives. The idea was to persuade Mulvey to agree to allow pool reporters to do the suggested stories.

When we finally talked, I asked Albright why the newspapers involved in setting up the combat pool system had decided to keep all the slots for themselves.

“There is no question,” Albright said deliberately, “that the predominant view among the newspapers that were here and never left is that — in this unique situation and this unique blend of cultural circumstances — the American people would be best served

Frank A. Aukofer is the Washington Bureau Chief for The Milwaukee Journal, where he has worked for 31 years, including 21 as a Washington correspondent. His regular coverage involves reporting primarily on Congress and the Supreme Court. There also have been numerous White House, political campaign and foreign assignments. He was in the first group of journalists allowed into Saudi Arabia to cover the deployment of American troops last August. He returned in January to cover the war. Aukofer also writes a syndicated column on automobiles, “Keys to Wheels,” collaborating with cartoonist Bill Rechin. Aukofer has received numerous journalistic awards.
by having the more experienced corres­pondents cover the war."

I had been a member of the Pentagon press pool, both as a reporter and as The Milwaukee Journal's Washington Bureau Chief, from the start in 1984. The previous August, I had been in the 17-member pool that was activated and sent to Saudi Arabia to cover the US military buildup after Iraq invaded Kuwait.

I'm sure Albright was not directing his comment at me personally. He was merely stating the obvious: Some of the bigger news organizations, the ones with the resources to keep caretakers continuously in Saudi Arabia regardless of whether there was any news to report, were exacting the return on their investment. There were no principles of "open coverage" or "press freedom" involved; those arguments were only used earlier when they were on the outside looking in — and later when they found out they'd been had.

**First Pool Worked Well**

I wound up in Saudi Arabia last August purely by chance. Under the Pentagon pool arrangement, developed and refined in countless meetings over the years, a pool was to be on call at all times, with different people rotating in every three months.

Because of their small numbers, the wires, networks and news magazines each got the call about once a year or less. But with 26 newspapers in the rotation, my chance came only rarely. I had been on an exercise in 1986; then I was put on call for the July through September period in 1990. The other newspaper reporters were from Scripps Howard and The Los Angeles Times. Other "pencils" in the pool were Time, the Associated Press and Reuters. We had three photographers — from AP, United Press International and Time; a National Public Radio reporter; a crew of five from CNN, and two satellite technicians.

John King of the AP dubbed us "the average white band." By coincidence, we were all white males. Only a few of us knew any of the others when we left Andrews Air Force Base on an Air Force C-141 transport plane on August 12. But we developed a remarkable camaraderie and kinship for the two weeks we worked together as a pool.

On the first day, the six print reporters abandoned traditional pool reports. Our first stop was at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla., for a briefing by Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and a tour of the Central Command headquarters. With all of us clustered together and King at his portable Tandy 200 computer, we put together a pool report about our stop.

But after we arrived in Saudi Arabia, we agreed that we should take advantage of the diverse talents of members of the group, and should pursue individual stories — clearing them, of course, with each other. It worked surprisingly well. We had two wire reporters — King and Jim Adams of Reuters — to chase and write the hard news leads. The L.A. Times' Mike Ross had been his newspaper’s Cairo bureau chief, and he had a fat book full of names and addresses of diplomatic and other sources. Jay Peterzell of Time, formerly a thinker in a Washington tank, was a military and intelligence specialist; defense correspondent Peter Copeland of Scripps Howard and I did color stories and interviews with the grunts. Peter, along with Mike, also did stories on Kuwaiti refugees, and I also focused on the Saudis and what their concerns and expectations were. Mindful of our obligation to newspapers not in the pool, we did not do any stories with strictly local angles.

When we first went to Saudi Arabia, we had no idea how long we would be able to stay, and the signals kept changing. It was a day, then it was two days, then a couple more. Obviously, the powers at the Pentagon were keeping open their option to jerk us out as soon as we displeased somebody. But we were so busy just trying to get as much as we could in our limited time that we actually wound up telling a good chunk of the story, and the military brass obviously learned that we were not disposed to editorialize or disclose military secrets.

So the pool lasted two weeks. In the first four days, the six print reporters produced 24 stories. In the two weeks of the pool we wrote 70 stories. For months afterward, after open coverage was allowed, other reporters went out and did the same stories we had done.

That's why some of us were furious when we saw a New York Times story quoting editors and bureau chiefs as saying that they weren't using many of the pool stories because they weren't much good. The fact of the matter was that they weren't using the pool stories because they didn't have their own people in the pool.

At the same time these editors were criticizing the pool they were whining to the military authorities about not being included in the pool. And as soon as the pool was dissolved and coverage opened up, The Chicago Tribune editor who had belittled the pool stories was putting virtual duplicates of earlier pool stories on page one. The difference, of course, was that those stories deserved page one because they were written by The Tribune's own reporter.

The pool also was betrayed when the wire services did not live up to their written agreement to move the raw pool reports to the wires. Had they done so, the 70 stories by the six print reporters would have been made available to newspapers all over the country. As it was, the wires mostly used snippets for the roundups, although a few stories did get out. I had a byline on a story about the Apache helicopters in one of the English-language Saudi newspapers; it had a UPI identifier on it.

**Escort Officers Worked Well**

Given the limitations, the pool worked well. I can't write authoritatively about the photographers, television or radio members of the pool, though I am certain from what I saw and heard that they performed as well or better than the group of print reporters. Moreover, our military handlers did their best to get us out to see as much as possible under the circumstances. Our escort officers did not try to control us, as their successors later did to pool reporters during the war.
As soon as other journalists started arriving in substantial numbers, the pool was dissolved and open coverage was allowed — subjected, not surprisingly, to the same restrictions under which the pool had worked. The restrictions basically forbade disclosure of future plans, or locations or numbers of troops. We also had good co-operation from the Saudis, who even marched us one day through their F-15 bunkers at the Abdul-Aziz Air Base in Dhahran — the first time any journalists had been allowed inside.

For the newspapers fortunate enough to have reporters in the pool, it was a bonanza. With the wires not moving the pool reports, and the big papers too snooty to use them, our papers were able to run our pool stories as virtual actual stories. That, in my opinion, was what led to the eager collaboration of the big news organizations with the Pentagon.

I believe the “Sacred 14” newspapers were determined to be included in whatever combat pool system was set up to cover the war, to make certain that they had their own reporters on the front lines. They were well aware that other publications might use information from their reporters’ pool reports, but they would only rarely use the actual stories.

I was not in Saudi Arabia during the last four months of 1990, when the combat pool system was established. But it was obvious that the wealthier news organizations were keeping people in the country mainly to protect their interests. There were not that many stories to cover. For example, USA Today sent Larry Jolicon to Saudi Arabia in August, and he stayed for the duration, becoming the senior correspondent on the ground in Dhahran and, because of that, the godfather of all the pool coordinators. When the combat pools were set up, there were slots for USA Today and its parent, Gannett. Similarly, Cox Newspapers sent Albright in to protect their access.

The Pentagon did a masterful job of controlling the press through the combat pools. It soon became obvious that the only way anyone could officially cover the war would be through one of the pools — a violation of the oft-stated principle over the years that pools were to be temporary arrangements to get reporters to the action quickly. Open coverage was to be allowed as soon as possible.

When The New York Times disclosed, in a two-part series in early May, that the Bush Administration and the military brass had orchestrated the press coverage of the war, it should have come as no surprise to anyone. Reporters on the scene knew what was happening. In a letter to Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams several weeks before The Times articles appeared, Joan Lowy of Scripps Howard wrote:

“Frankly, it’s my feeling the principal purpose of the pool system was to control the story by controlling the access of journalists. In this you succeeded very well. But I think the real losers are the American public who may never know the full story of the war and the troops who may never get the recognition they deserve . . . . DOD has said it was not trying to use the pool system and the security review to prevent reporters from writing things that presented military operations in a poor light instead of a good light. HOGWASH!! That happened every day on every pool trip.”

Only two of the signers of the protest letter to Cheney had actually been to Saudi Arabia. They included bureau chiefs and other executives of the four television networks, Time and Newsweek, the AP, and The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, Knight-Ridder, Cox Newspapers, Hearst and The Wall Street Journal. Only Hearst had not been involved in setting up the combat pool system. Dale McFeatters, the managing editor at Scripps Howard, had learned about the group, asked to be included in any meetings, and offered to sign a protest letter. He never heard back.

Nobody mentioned it to me. But hey, it’s okay. I had already decided not to trust the Pentagon in the future.

As I said in a hearing on war coverage before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on February 20, I think most of the pool as well as the combat pool system in Saudi Arabia — were made by individuals honestly trying to work out a solution to a common problem. But on both sides, they were mostly lower level folks. The higher-ups, the brass in the news media and the Pentagon, had their own agenda. But when the war started, the military held all the aces.

We should not expect anything different in the future. When the crunch comes, military people become soldiers first and public affairs specialists somewhere behind that. Everything is subverted to the military objectives. All the good-faith planning in the world will not change that.

I also don’t expect the American press to come up with any united stand on covering future wars. The late Pete Lisagor of The Chicago Daily News used to say you couldn’t get news people together to organize a game of “Spin the Bottle.” What we’ll likely get is yet another round of the people with the gold making the rules.

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**Gone Forever . . .**

R.W. Apple of The New York Times on the “major miracle” of the Persian Gulf War, the laptop computer that kept him in constant touch with editors in New York:

“Gone forever, I’m afraid, is the sense of isolation that used to come with a war, that romantic feeling that you were at the end of the earth with nothing to sustain you but your wits and your expense account. Times have changed forever. Never again will the harried correspondent be able to explain that the hotel must have lost the cable ordering him someplace he doesn’t want to go or requesting a story he doesn’t want to write. Never again will he be able to blame sunspots for delaying the transmission of the story that he never had.”

A Television Plan for the Next War

‘Disciplined’ CNN Would Provide 24-Hour Real-Time News, Old Network Would Explain and Interpret

BY LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN

The euphoria we experienced from watching television’s first live and in-color war has faded, leaving behind many questions about what we actually saw and heard of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm on our TV screens at home. Recognizing that the next war or major international crisis, whenever it comes, will bear little resemblance to the last one, television executives must still address several key issues raised by the most recent gulf war coverage. The only thing worse than continuing to fight the last war is to learn nothing at all from it.

The Limitations Of Live Coverage

For viewers at home, experiencing news while it is happening can be fascinating, dramatic and often irresistible. One drawback of live television, however, is that it eliminates what journalist Theodore H. White called, “the protective filter of time.” Editors have surprisingly little independent reporting. In 1989 he occupied the Frank Stanton Chair on the First Amendment at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. From 1969 to 1976, and of Lawrence K. Grossman, Inc., an advertising agency and production company specializing in media and public affairs, from 1966 to 1976. He received his B.A. from Columbia in 1952 and attended Harvard Law School.

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In their impatience to get on the air live rather than wait to find out what was going on, television reporters wondered aloud on-screen what they were seeing and what was happening. No longer did they perform as reporters trying to filter out true information from false. Instead, they were merely sideline observers, as ill-informed as the rest of us. Was it the sound of “thunder,” or a “lethal rocket attack” outside? Was it the odor of “nerve gas” or “conventional explosives” that was seeping into the TV studio in Tel Aviv? (It turned out to be bus exhaust.)

This was not some inconsequential small town gossip and rumor exchange. This was television transmitted live to the global village of the telecommunications age. These authentic-seeming, real
time reports reached millions of enthralled viewers throughout the world, as well as government leaders, policy-makers and military officials who were capable of making life-and-death decisions based on what they saw on television. As CNN was quick to advertise, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney acknowledged at the White House press briefing on the eve of war (Jan. 16) that, like many Americans, he was getting most of his information about what was happening in the Gulf from watching CNN. (Although it is noteworthy that after the war, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf told an interviewer that he had "basically turned the TV off in the headquarters very early on because the reporting was so inaccurate I did not want my people to get confused").

Only after the war did we learn that the smart bombs we saw destroying their targets with unerring precision day after day comprised less than 10 percent of all the bombs dropped on Iraq and Kuwait. Only after the war did we learn that more than 90 percent of the bombs used on Iraq were old-fashioned, unguided explosives that missed their targets 75 percent of the time. Only later did we learn that the vaunted Patriot interceptors we saw on our TV screens hitting the Iraqi Scuds, had actually failed to destroy the Scud warheads; that Iraq had no nuclear missile capability; that our bombing had caused "nearly apocalyptic" devastation of Iraq, some parts of which had been blasted back to the pre-industrial age, according to a United Nations' postwar report.

To see how television might do better next time, it is worth looking briefly at its coverage of the three phases of the last war:

- The Build-up, the five-month deployment of 500,000 U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia that began after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
- The Softening-up, the devastating air offensive against Iraq that began on January 16.
- And the Mopping-up, the one-sided ground war that began on February 23 and ended just five days later.

During the first phase, the President's sudden deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops and buildup of reserves, provided perfect material for exciting television pictures. For months the anticipation of war, stimulated by daily television coverage featuring patriotic graphics and martial music, produced exciting, arousing, dramatic television programming. To fill up long stretches of quiet time and keep the television audience from drifting away, small incidents and human interest items were treated as major new developments.

News from the gulf during the months before the shooting began was filled with chatty, heartwarming local features about hometown troops. During the months prior to the bombing, daily personal message were televised to and from Saudi Arabia on all networks and local stations. These intimate pictures-and-sound TV post cards featured children left at home, parents at the front, wives, husbands mothers and fathers sending their love and prayers. Hundreds of local anchors, odd-ball weathermen and local news crews turned up in the war zone to cheer hometown troops, courtesy of press junkets arranged and paid for by the Pentagon public information apparatus.

The war build-up story was pictured largely in terms of personal vignettes and human interest features. The amount of coverage was overwhelming and people could not seem to get enough of it. News studios, including the studio of the CBS Morning Show, produced by CBS News, sprouted yellow ribbons in support of the troops.

This was television picture coverage: showing bits and pieces of human interest incidents as they happened each day. It contrasted with knowledgeable reporting that should have given coherence to a complex international story by providing context, perspective, history and background, as well as factual information about the day's developments.

In preparation for the second phase, the start of the war itself, the Pentagon issued its Desert Shield press rules on Jan. 9, severely restricting all coverage in the war zone. Access to the combat troops and the battlefield was denied to all but an authorized few in pools controlled by the Defense Department. No one could go to the front without a military escort, or even talk to the troops outside of the presence of public information officers. All pool reports had to be cleared by the military before they could be filed. All interviews with the troops had to be on the record. Access to Dover Air Force base in Delaware, the scene of the arrival of military coffins of the Marines who had been killed in Lebanon, was refused. Special restrictions were also at first imposed on coverage of the wounded; to protect their privacy, it was explained.

The Administration and the Pentagon, concerned about what bad news had done to public support for the Vietnam War, took no chances this time. After the Vietnam War, the military had studied what went wrong not only in the battlefields of Southeast Asia, but also on the television screens back home. In the words of Col. Darryl Henderson (Ret.), former commander of the Army's Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, reported by Tom Wicker in The New York Times, May 9, 1991, the Army began to train its personnel in techniques of "marketing the military viewpoint," primarily by seeing to it that only "upbeat" reports went to the public.

The military's most striking success in controlling the flow of battlefield information, however, came not from its censorship of war news (which was mostly rather light-handed) and its onerous restrictions on reporters in the field, but from its well-planned and inspired decision to flood the world's television screens with fascinating video tapes of smart bomb strikes that never missed and with detailed official briefings. All during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Pentagon officials proved adept at providing selective access, dramatic video press releases and favorable image control. Their success was reminiscent of the work of the
most skilled political consultants and spin doctors during recent Presidential elections.

The Government, in effect, commandeered the gulf war's television coverage and set the tone for almost all the news that appeared each day. The official sanitized, upbeat version of the war dominated American television screens and neither the public nor the press, which should have known better, was aware that anything was missing at the time. We saw hardly any of the casualties and gore of war.

The White House monitored and controlled the briefers. The military gave sympathetic reporters special access, weeding out the critical ones and tending to favor the home town press. In most cases, the television press not only went along, but also enlisted in the cause. Dan Rather literally saluted the troops in the field during one news broadcast and congratulated Army officers for their outstanding performance while he was interviewing them. Overall, a Gannett Foundation Media Center post-gulf war press round-table found NBC News to be the most "extreme "in using patriotism as a merchandising device."

The military had outplanned and outsmarted the media, especially the television media. The new all-professional U.S. Army scored a major victory over a press that by contrast was largely untrained and inexperienced in covering war.

As Lewis H. Lapham wrote, with only some exaggeration, in the May Harper's, "Between two campaigns waged by the American military command last winter in the Arabian desert — one against the Iraqi army and the other against the American media — it's hard to know which resulted in the more brilliant victory. Both campaigns made use of similar tactics . . . and both were directed at enemies so pitifully weak that their defeat was a foregone conclusion."

In truth, the military had been far better prepared not only to fight the war in the Arabian desert, but also to deal with the press during that war, than most of the press was to report on the war. By the time the press had begun to catch up with the story, the war was over.

The third phase, the ground war itself, ended almost before it began. Lasting only five days, it was so brief and the victory so one-sided that there was little meaningful opportunity to report the story with a measure of independence and initiative. In any war, the first days of combat are so tense and dramatic that the initial focus is on the overwhelming drama of soldiers going into battle. The same happened in Vietnam. But as war grinds on, other dimensions begin to emerge and more questions start to get asked. By the end of the gulf war, reporters, especially at ABC and CBS News, had already begun to move out on their own. The press pools had started to break down, despite at least one network correspondent's unceremonious effort to bar an unaccompanied, non-pool British reporter from his territory by calling on the military police to throw out his fellow newsman.

The 48-hour news blackout, imposed at the start of the ground action by Defense Secretary Cheney, fell apart before the first day ended. It happened only because the Saudi forces, exuberant over their surprisingly speedy advance into Iraq, started to brief the press about their military success. Alarmed that the Saudis were receiving too much credit and attention, American officers in Riyadh immediately rescedned the Defense Secretary's press blackout and also started briefing reporters about their own early victories.

Ironically, the newsmen and women in the field say they were given more battlefield access and information by the supposedly uncommunicative Arab officials and secretive Arab armed forces, than by supposedly open and democratic American Army. The only television coverage of ground combat in the desert came from the Arab forces' encounter with Iraqi tanks and troops at Khafji. ABC's Forrest Sawyer was the only journalist who was able to fly on a combat mission in the Persian Gulf war, and that was in a Saudi plane.

Preparing For the Next War

What lessons have we learned from the Persian Gulf?

First, the military's zealous effort to control the flow of all information from the next battlefield must be fought with as much energy as the press can muster. The White House chief of staff, John Sununu, and Defense Secretary Cheney have indicated that the gulf war's restrictive press policies will serve as a model for the future. From the perspective of the Pentagon and the Administration, as well as the American people, these stringent limitations on reporting proved to be so successful that they are likely to be with us in full force during the next war.

While Washington news executives continue to protest the rules, their network bosses in New York demonstrate far more eagerness to fight government restraints on program syndication than to fight government restrictions on war reporting. Seeking to cultivate a friendly Administration, top network officials have been totally silent about Government's news restrictions in wartime. Indeed, these is some suspicion that they actually welcomed the military's imposition of the press pools as a forced economy measure on their free-spending news divisions. Certainly, the chairman of General Electric, one of the nation's major defense companies, who also doubles as chairman of NBC, is the least likely candidate to lead any challenge to the Pentagon's excessive wartime press restrictions.

I am not optimistic, therefore, about the prospects for loosening the rules in the future. But I am confident that if the next war lasts long enough, television's better journalists will figure out ways to circumvent the more onerous frontline restraints. Their individual enterprise, ingenuity and competitive instinct will undoubtedly overcome excessive official limits on their freedom to report.

Based on the experience in the Persian Gulf, news organizations should take steps now to deal with the problem realistically. Some are saying that they'll refuse to participate in the next wartime
press pools. Others say they will not cover the war at all unless the press rules are changed. Such threats are neither responsible, realistic nor credible. Press pools are often necessary, especially at the beginning of a military action. But press pools should not be the only way that the military permits war to be reported. And no responsible journalist can possibly refuse to cover a major international crisis just because the news restrictions imposed are unacceptable. The journalist's job is to overcome those restrictions.

What the press should be doing is educating selected reporters, producers and crews about military affairs, military issues and military practices so that they will know how to bypass official channels and go off on their own during wartime. Independent journalistic initiative to circumvent unnecessarily restrictive press pool rules should be encouraged and rewarded by news managers.

Second, even more important than the need to circumvent overly restrictive press access in wartime, is the need to figure out how to counterbalance the manipulation of television by Government-supplied video press releases, daily official military briefings, orchestrated appearances by Administration leaders, staged picture opportunities and press conferences. The Administration and the military were so successful in controlling the flow of information about the gulf war that they were able to tell the public exactly what they wanted the public to know. By filling up the television pipeline, they determined the major stories of the day. They did not have to make up the news or manufacture the facts, but they did control what went on the air. They determined the daily story lines by deciding where to send the pools and by setting the themes at the widely carried and excerpted press briefings. Too often, television served more as a funnel for this Government-sponsored barrage of one-sided information than as an independent journalistic enterprise.

Counterbalancing the dominance of the official line will require more skeptical, independent-minded and knowledgeable reporters on the scene, and more skeptical editors back home, than we had during the gulf crisis. Television's infatuation with the technology of transmitting live news pictures from faraway places must be tempered by journalistic responsibility, by sound editorial judgment and by the need to verify all claims before reporting them.

As former correspondent Landay wrote, "the instantaneousness of communications satellites and field cameras makes it possible to publish images simultaneously with the event. But professional journalism requires that a sensible story accompany the images, so that the reader, viewer, or listener is given a context in which to understand what he or she is seeing ... This means practicing the rules that are drummed into aspiring print and electronic reporters in Journalism 101."

Third, the experiences of the gulf war also reaffirmed, even in this era of real-time technology, the need to value accuracy over speed. CNN's instantaneous, continuing live coverage, must be shaped by more journalistic discipline and stronger editorial control, even if what gets on the air is delayed until the reporters and their editors are sure the story is right.

The networks' chief role should be to provide thoughtful, expert reporting after the fact, rather than mere live narration over an endless stream of satellite pictures. The main job the networks need to do in the next war is not merely to describe events, but also to illuminate, explain and make sense out of them, to help put them in context, to provide perspective and background, and to give us insight into what the day's developments mean and how they fit into the larger world picture.

Fourth, much has been made in postwar discussions of TV's gulf coverage about the need for the press to be a neutral force. Journalists in this global era, it is said, should not be "on the military's team"; should not refer to "our" troops, "our" Government and "our" side; should, in sum, be impartial in its war coverage. Others argue that journalists must be patriots first, reporters second. In the words of a
controlled in some fashion and sometimes protected. During the gulf crisis, that gave the military and the Government a completely legitimate reason to set up their own priority lists of news media and pecking order of journalists, as well as to establish rules for management of the press.

Criteria for pool assignments and the selection and accreditation of correspondents and newsmen and women should be in the hands of the press, not the military authorities. To deal with the problem, sound journalistic guidelines should be developed by representatives of the news media themselves. It won't be easy to develop such priorities and to set up rules that will inevitably exclude some and give preferential treatment to others. That goes against the very nature of competitive journalism. But better that the job be done by professional journalists than by the Defense Department or the White House.

The Networks' Roles In the Next War

As television channels have multiplied and audiences have grown increasingly fragmented, the national network news divisions that dominated television for decades have become an endangered species. At this point no one can say for sure how many of them will be left to cover the next war. A big question centers especially on the future of CBS and NBC News, both longtime broadcasting leaders with a proud tradition in news.

We can count on CNN to cover the next war, of course. It emerged from Operation Desert Storm almost as celebrated as Gen. Schwarzkopf and established itself as the new place to turn for continuing coverage in a global crisis. Chances are, ABC News will also be on-the-scene for the next war. It emerged from the Persian Gulf alive and well and far ahead of its competition, even if its coverage did cost ABC's parent company, Capital Cities, an extra $40 million. With Peter Jennings anchoring from New York, supported by Ted Koppel's Nightline and the strongest correspondent corps in television, ABC News enjoyed the best notices and highest ratings of all the networks.

During the next war, the individual local TV stations are also likely to be heard from in a big way. The next time a large contingent of American troops goes off to fight, we can expect another army of local TV anchors, weathermen and eyewitness news crews to cheer them on, flown overseas courtesy of the Pentagon's Hometown News program. How much the press should allow its costs to be paid for out of the military’s public relations budget is another major question that needs to be addressed before the next war breaks out.

The Networks’ Roles In the Next War

During the gulf crisis, both CBS and NBC News, eager to demonstrate to new owners that they had a major journalistic role to play, sent their well-known anchors, correspondents and crews to the scene as they had done in past wars. Despite several courageous and memorable feats of individual reporting, however, both networks emerged with mixed reviews, also-ran ratings, disaffected advertisers and unbudgeted deficits. In the aftermath of the gulf war they face the certainty of painful cutbacks by their nonbroadcast owners, who are less concerned about serving the public interest than about the shrinking network bottom line.

Once the unassailable monarchs of television journalism, CBS and NBC News are now under siege on all sides. CNN, on the air 24 hours a day, scoops them regularly. ABC News, for decades a noncompetitor, consistently beats them in the ratings. By contrast with CBS and NBC, ABC's experienced broadcast owners have continued to build and nurture television's most successful network news operation. During the gulf crisis, CBS and NBC even found themselves abandoned by many of their once loyal affiliates, whose direct access to satellites, computers, CNN and other news gathering agencies, made them far less dependent on their networks than they had been. And both of these network news divisions have come under the gun from their new owners, who regard their network news operations as extravagant and troublesome and who continue to insist that news costs be drastically cut.

CBS chairman Laurence A. Tisch and NBC president Robert C. Wright have made no secret of their envy of the fledgling Fox Television network, which operates without any news division at all and supplies nothing but entertainment programming. To make matters worse, last March the FCC redefined network television, exempting Fox from all restrictions on network syndication and program ownership as long as it does not distribute more than 15 hours of prime time programming a week. Under the FCC's new Alice in Wonderland definition of a network, CBS and NBC conceivably could transform themselves into "non-networks," like Fox, by cutting out only one hour of prime time programming a night. As "non-networks" they would no longer be barred from participating in profits from syndication of programs they own, making CBS and NBC far more attractive candidates for acquisition or merger. Reports have surfaced in New York and Los Angeles that if CBS and NBC were to succeed in getting out from under the FCC's network syndication rules, either or both of them might be sold to, or merged with a major Hollywood production company. Since no acquisition-minded movie mogul is likely to have an interest in a money-losing network news division, CBS, NBC, or both, may be gone from the network news scene by the time the next war breaks out. CBS's Tisch denied he had any intention of merging or selling the network or reducing its prime time hours, according to The New York Times of June 3.

A Modified Approach To War Coverage

What is certain now is that in the aftermath of the gulf war, all of the old-line networks are closing news bureaus and relying increasingly on international news agencies and their own local affiliates to gather the news for them. CBS News has held exploratory talks with CNN about using its services overseas. NBC News has held discussions with

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MacNeil/Lehrer Goes to War

NewsHour Competes Head to Head Against Networks and Is Pleased and Surprised by Results

BY MICHAEL D. MOSETTIG

It was about 6:30, right in the middle of our show, when the first reports flashed on ABC and CNN from their correspondents in Baghdad that the war had begun. In more ways than one, I thought, this will be a long night. Our competitors will be on the air with the first live coverage ever of a full-scale American war, and against that we will be offering talking heads.

But to put a new twist on an old Churchill phrase, even live televised “war, war” ends up as “jaw, jaw.” And our core audience plus thousands more decided over the next few days that their hunger for information needed to be met as much by analysis as by the compelling coverage from Baghdad. And in a war in which the military tightly controlled the access of correspondents at the front, there turned out to be plenty of room for studio talkers.

That we were thinking in competitive terms against our commercial brethren was itself quite a turnaround. Never before in the 15 years of this program had we tried to go on the air and stay on through the night, and night after night. Hour-long specials, such as the night of the raid on Libya, yes, but not wall-to-wall coverage against news organizations whose budgets are ten times ours and whose personnel count against our 70 plus staff (in New York, Washington and Denver) is comparable to the difference between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti armies of August 1, 1990.

The decision had been made by us and PBS that when war came, certainly in the first few days, we would stay on through prime time on the West Coast. That commitment expanded to weekend programming, another first, and to hourly updates until 2 a.m. (11 p.m. Pacific time), all to be done by the same staff, with no foreign bureaus, that is accustomed to programming five hours a week of studio discussion and tape documentaries. At least on the night of January 16, unlike the night of the Libyan raid in 1986, we had plenty of time for advance planning and for our off-air reporters to line up prospective guests and know how to reach them after office hours. And in an unusual linkage between two autonomous units within public broadcasting, we were able to do two hookups with a previously scheduled town meeting that Bill Moyers was conducting in South Carolina. That also brought us voices of the public outside Washington.

Somewhat to our surprise, the picture part of covering the war turned out to be a manageable problem. For the past four years we have been well served in foreign tape coverage by an arrangement with Britain’s Independent Television News and especially their Channel Four news program with a format similar to ours. They have seasoned, highly professional correspondents who are not forced to cram their reports into 90 seconds and who realize there is much more to war reporting than trying to look handsome under incoming missile fire. They were back in Baghdad sooner than the American networks, giving us a small window on that part of the story. Through a more recent arrangement with Time magazine, we could use their correspondents by phone or studio hookups, and they proved especially valuable in keeping abreast of public opinion in Arab capitals. We also had access to BBC reports, and during the brief land war both British companies had freer range covering their forces than their American counterparts.

That still left us with the question of covering the American forces. We were represented in Saudi Arabia by a corres-

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and February. These Hunter-Gault conversations, running from eight to twelve minutes, could tell what the lives of service people were like and provided an insight into the people sent to fight the war not readily available elsewhere. Going back in the winter and interviewing people whom we had first met in August allowed us to watch them change from peace-time volunteers to battle-tested veterans. (We interviewed several after they returned home, chronicling still another kind of transition).

Eventually, after the war began, we were able to craft, from the frustration of being stuck in briefings, pieces that married the sound of the Riyadh briefer to the pool footage being made available in New York. Perhaps the biggest surprise was the sheer volume of footage accessible to us or anyone else who bought into the pool. For all the complaining about coverage restrictions, there was far more material on hand than any news organization could use. No question that some of it served the needs of the Pentagon as much as us — all those interviews with pilots who talked and looked as if they had to pass a screen test as well as flight school.

Every day, we had a team of producers in New York and Washington culling through hours of tape to get the best and most up-to-date bits of not only what was visually compelling but also reports that helped set the editorial direction of a particular night’s program.

Still, our correspondents in the gulf wanted to do their own reporting and not just be captives of the briefing room. Our run-ins with military minders probably were not exceptional, but they did reflect the frustrations of dealing with a press control system that often appeared to be protecting more than operational security. Hunter-Gault said requests for an interview about bomb damage assessment, for instance, were not met by a flat “no” but with a “we’re working on it.” The interview never materialized. A request to do a story on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a controversial weapons system, met a similar fate. In the course of doing other interviews, Hunter-Gault would try to talk with black service personnel about a piece she was compiling on blacks in the military. She once made a six-hour trip from Riyadh to King Khalid City to do a story on the armed forces broadcasting setup. When she told the public affairs minder she wanted to talk with the black soldiers on the blacks’ story the captain intervened. That wasn’t part of the program, he said. Only after long and heated protests did the Army relent, to allow interviews on a sensitive subject, but not one affecting military security, in which all the interview subjects reflected positively about their Army experience.

After the first week, and with the exceptions of the night the ground war began and the night the President declared it over, we reverted back to our standard one-hour program, taped at 6 p.m. but with more regular updating at 7 p.m. and again at 9 p.m. for the West Coast. By that time the networks were also expanding their evening newscasts to an hour (although many of their affiliates took only the first half hour). Once again we were in direct competition, in this case over who could put to best use a full hour of news programming. Somewhat immodestly we felt time was on our side even though we were often dealing with the same material. It boiled down to a question of who was most ready to give a briefing excerpt or a pool report time to breathe.

During the battle of Khafji, the network pool reporter, Brad Willis of NBC News, filed a compelling piece, notable for grippingly sparse narration over pictures and sound, of American Marines and Arab troops trying to dislodge the surprise Iraqi attackers. The report ran more than twelve minutes. We ran almost seven minutes of it, the Today Show about four minutes. Not long after, the networks established a rule that other pool recipients could use only the pictures but no narrations from pool reports filed by their correspondents. That decision was directed primarily at CNN, which was establishing breaking news hegemony at the expense of the networks’ thirty-year dominance, but it meant our correspondents in Washington and New York had to put their voice tracks on other people’s work.

On some days an hour can be a lot of time to fill. In a war, we discovered it shrinks dramatically when there are enough correspondent reports and briefing material to fill two hours before we even get to the analysis, which is supposed to be our stock in trade and which separates us from the competition. Given the overwhelming and palpable hunger for information, we probably could have run military analysis every night. (We did not. Our full-fledged discussions during the war included several on the economy, energy and the media). Our critics indeed thought our coverage was too oriented to tactics and strategy and not enough to the overarching moral issues.

We did a few discussions with peace activists and religious representatives. We probably should have done more, but once this country was in war we worked from the premise that most of our effort had to be directed not to theological semantics but to the two compelling questions on the mind of most of the public — what’s happening in the battle and what is the level of casualties.

Like everyone else we had a team of military analysts for the simple reason that if you are going to discuss warfare it helps to have someone who has participated in it and managed it. But the qualities of skepticism, detachment and questioning of authority that discussions also require are not the qualities immediately associated with professional officers. Yes, they tend to be gung ho. But is it also possible to have strategic and tactical discussions with the skepticism and detachment provided by civilian analysts who also happen to be knowledgeable about military affairs and weapons systems. And those discussions can be conducted without becoming cheerleading sessions.

If there were one day and discussion I would want to take back it was February 13, the day of the bombing of the shelter in Baghdad. Through a series of mishaps we ended up with a cast that was about four and a half to one half continued on page 52
NPR's First War

Round-The-Clock News and Analysis Broadcast
Without Running Up Any Deficit

BY WILLIAM E. BUZENBERG

When a nation goes to war, it is a brutal, murderous business — one that stirs great passions of patriotism and of pacifism. One thing is certain: however well we in the media do our jobs, we will be scrutinized, vilified, pilloried and pummeled from all sides as we are on few other issues.

In his recent autobiography, Out of Thin Air; Reuven Frank of NBC makes this basic point about Vietnam:

"From the smallest detail to the least connected event, we were seen by viewers, by politicians, by ourselves in the light of our coverage of the war and how our coverage was perceived. During my time as division president, we did many different things... but we were known to everyone, and forever, by how we covered the war."

Once again, after the gulf war, sweeping media appraisals are underway, along with batteries of panel discussions and legions of journal articles. There is a tendency by some toward blanket ideological assessments of the media's performance, such as, "inaccurate and overly critical" (say some conservatives), or "glamorized and enthusiastic cheerleading" (say some liberals).

Whatever others say in judgment, we posed the question to ourselves at National Public Radio, asking what we did right and what we could have improved. In retrospect, in a way, we are proud that we did so well. It was our first war. There were things we should have done better; at times, for example, we could have looked harder into the postwar world. But we believe NPR became a major source of news, the place to hear thorough, coherent war coverage with perspective and context. We know our audience grew by at least 13 percent — with more than a million additional listeners the week the ground war began — bringing the audience well above eight million for the first time.

At NPR, our own postwar postmortems have focused on the institutional accomplishment of going to war and not going broke. In the months immediately following Iraq's August invasion of Kuwait, a team of senior editors developed an internal war plan. That planning period before the war was vital. We estimated it would cost slightly more than $1 million extra (above an annual news budget of $14 million) to provide extensive coverage of the coming conflict by our own reporters without depending on other news organizations.

The war plan, calling for expanded coverage, was approved by the NPR Board of Directors and supported by many of NPR's 430 member stations with voluntary contributions. Station pledges started pouring in by the time the air war began in mid-January, often based on special station fund-raising drives. Eventually, a total of $1.1 million was raised, with nearly three-quarters of that from stations and the remainder from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and private donors. Unlike some other news organizations, NPR just closed its books on six months of war-related coverage with its new budget firmly in the black.

Planning for the war and having the extra station financial investment allowed us to anticipate filling substantial additional air time and fielding almost a dozen NPR reporters in the Middle East. This was the largest number of reporters we have ever sent on a single foreign assignment, but still we were understaffed with far fewer people in the region than CNN's 153, or the BBC's 35. The fact that there were 11 experienced NPR correspondents available stemmed from a steady buildup of an international reporting team over the last five years. Their presence meant we would not be covering the conflict simply by calling up and interviewing other news reporters on bad phonelines, or relying on the BBC as we once did.

Ten years ago, NPR had only one correspondent abroad, based in London, plus several stringers in other capitals. Even five years ago, the network still had only one full staff member abroad, a few contract reporters and stringers. Today we have a dozen foreign corre-

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spondents, (half are full staff members and half contract employees) as well as many stringers. More Arabic speakers would have been helpful at times, but three of the 11 staff members in the gulf had extensive Middle East experience (Deborah Amos, Neal Conan and John Hockenberry). Four others had covered wars (John Burnett, Tom Gjelten, Scott Simon, and Alan Tomlinson in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada or Panama). Others involved at different points in the coverage from the region included London Correspondents Mike Shuster and Jacki Lyden, Asia Correspondent Deborah Wang, and Science Correspondent Michael Skoler, along with our stringer in Israel, Linda Gradstein.

More Producers,
Technicians Needed

These were the correspondents, then, who provided the core of NPR's coverage from the field. They worked with an expanded NPR Foreign Desk, a hub of six editors who coordinated assignments, made final editing changes, and established filing times for the various programs. One shortcoming our post-mortem identified later was the need for more producers and technical help from the field to assist both reporters and editors. Because NPR had only four visas for Saudi Arabia, we used all four for reporters. As a consequence, as the battle moved into Iraq and Kuwait, those reporters had only themselves to depend on to actually file their reports. We did not have satellite phones, like those of other news organizations, costing $50,000 apiece. Nor did we have producers and technicians to help pull stories together for each feed. What we had were extremely overworked reporters with tape recorders who sometimes had to stand in line for hours to "borrow" a few minutes' satellite time on someone else's phone.

Back in Washington, almost the entire NPR News Division (150 staff members) went on a two-shift, 24-hour schedule six days a week. That began at the start of the three days of Congressional debate over the war. NPR broadcast the entire debate live by satellite for any NPR station that wanted to carry it (many did), and went on, once the war started, to provide anchored coverage of every military briefing, whether from Saudi Arabia or the Pentagon, along with all White House news conferences and Presidential speeches. Some days we were using three separate satellite channels simultaneously feeding a program, a briefing and a speech when all were going on at the same time, allowing stations to pick whichever they wanted to air live or maybe to record for broadcast later. The live events coverage was a logistical challenge with constant coordination problems but seemed to work well for stations, as we heard later.

Besides events coverage, we began five-minute newscasts 24 hours a day (normally 18 hours a day). Our overnight newscasts were produced out of the London bureau, with its fiber optic and computer link to Washington, in order to make it easier to include the newest material from the gulf from both our own people and the BBC. In addition, we added other programming, including a two-hour national call-in program each afternoon, hosted by news analyst Daniel Schorr. The call-in, which included dozens of knowledgeable guests from the Middle East and across the country, became a program for listeners to ask their own questions about the war and to hear a coherent discussion of the conflict or get answers and information beyond the limited official perspective.

Shows Expanded,
Pre-packages Dropped

Another new element in NPR's war-related programming was rolling live coverage during expanded versions of Morning Edition and All Things Considered. (Both shows added hours to their normal schedule. For example, Morning Edition went on the air from 5 a.m. to 2 p.m. and All Things Considered from 4 p.m. until after midnight.) When the air war and ground war began, both shows dropped all pre-packaged portions of their programs and moved to all live coverage, using computers in the studio for the first time to allow minute by minute monitoring of news wires. In addition there were three and sometimes four reporters, analysts and newsmakers on the line or in the studio to discuss the latest news. At its best, when there was a heavy flow of new information on the fighting in the gulf, the rolling coverage worked wonderfully well to keep listeners on top of the story and understanding the latest developments. There were drawbacks, too. At is worst, however, when little news was actually breaking, discussions might focus on the latest bulletin even though that may have been relatively unimportant. In other words, rolling live coverage could lead to speculation before the facts had been established and analyzed. We quickly saw the danger that such coverage, unless carefully tailored to the flow of information coming in, could become a kind of surface re-hash of the news, without providing an in-depth perspective. We are not and did not want to become a CNN of radio, constantly repeating sometimes limited information.

Yet, the night the air war began, we recognized that without our own reporter in Baghdad (a decision we made out of concern for safety), our live coverage had a slightly ragged beginning compared to the important service CNN provided. Later, we believed, we achieved a fair balance between rolling live coverage and in-depth analysis, which is our strength. For example, the night Iraqi Scuds were fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia, we were the first to report the successful combat interception by Patriot missiles and we did not make the mistake some others did of reporting chemical warheads on the Scuds.

NPR also sought to correct the record or at least apply tests of consistency to official statements. When the campaign against Saddam Hussein was at its height ("worse than Hitler") we looked into the tactic of demonization as well as Saddam's record; when the gulf oil spill story was at its height ("biggest ever, dwarfing the Exxon Valdez spill") we examined both the facts behind those assessments and the likelihood that the size of such a spill was much smaller; as the daily military briefings piled one on top of another, we sought to examine
how the military’s story changed from
day to day with regard to the success of
the bombing and the decimation of the
Iraqi air force.

On coverage of the gulf war specifically,
three basic areas of criticism have been
 leveled at the news media, including
NPR’s coverage. These areas of
criticism, mostly from the left, include
allegations that the media adopted a
narrow selection of voices to discuss the
war; tended to get caught up in the thrill
and technology of war; and, failed to
fight the military’s restrictions on
coverage.

At least in the first two areas of
criticism, NPR editors believe we did a
better job than some others in the
media. Throughout the war, we sought
out the broadest possible range of views,
including many Arab voices, to provide
analysis from every angle. To suggest, as
some have done, that we relied heavily
on retired military officers and Admini-
stration officials for our analysis, is to
miss the myriad of alternative voices we
sought out and put on the air, who
often turned up on television a few days
later. Opponents of the war, even those
who were sympathetic toward Saddam,
found a place on our air along with pro-
ponents of the war and critics of
Saddam. We have always considered it
NPR’s role to expand the often narrow
spectrum called news.

For those who were looking for
history and context along with analysis,
we broadcast several background
reports on the region, including a two-
part series describing how European
colonialism contributed to the conflict.
We also rebroadcast an updated 13-part
series called the World of Islam. We
understood that war is much more than
a military story, and sought to include
the political, social and historical
dimensions. Like others, we perhaps did
not do enough on the likely outcome of
the fighting with an expectation that
Saddam would still be in power.

Although they could not and should
not be entirely avoided, NPR did far
fewer gee-whiz high-tech weapon
features, along with fewer segments on
“our men and women in the desert”
than did most other news organizations.

Certainly the hype and graphics
available to tabloid TV was lacking in
our coverage. Radio has the advantage
of not being driven by pictures, that is
images. Discussion of serious issues held
away over attempts to have the image
of antiseptic war make people feel good
and forget the reality of organized
killing.

When the pictures of smart bombs
were filling TV screens, we were asking
about the accuracy of other bombs, as
well as analyzing the footage provided
by the military. We were among the first
to report that the Patriots were causing
as much damage in Israel as the Scuds
they were intercepting. Recently, Bill
Moyers spoke about government editors
in the context of a controlled political
campaign that could apply equally to
the military selecting the material for
war television. “Some pictures are news,
and the visual image can give us a pic-
ture of reality,” Moyers said. “But jour-
nalists are supposed to gather, weigh,
obtain and evaluate information, not
just put on pictures.” We cannot afford
to be smug on this point, but again the
strength of NPR’s war coverage was its
depth and analysis and our aversion to
orchestrated rah-rah coverage of any
kind.

On the third area of criticism — deal-
ing with military restrictions — NPR
probably did no better or worse than
other news organizations, which is to
say we had a difficult time. A
Washington Post editor put it bluntly
when he said, “We were contained,
controlled and ultimately crushed” by
the military. The military pools NPR
reporters joined did not produce much
great material; after the system broke
down our reporters were free to move
around for a time inside Iraq and
Kuwait. (Although our most difficult
week of the war occurred when NPR
Correspondent Neal Conan was picked
up and held for five days by Republican
Guards while travelling to report on the
fighting in Basra.)

**NPR in Action**

- Scott Simon, at first stuck on a logistics pool far away from the fighting,
finally striking out on his own. By truck and helicopter he reported
from the front on General Schwarzkopf’s fast-moving left hook.

- Mike Shuster accurately describing the first combat launch of a Patriot
missile and its interception of a Scud fired at Saudi Arabia. His de-
scription was broadcast live before anybody else’s. And, unlike some,
he didn’t make the mistake about chemical warheads on those Scuds.

- Deborah Amos, rushing into liberated Kuwait, filing day and night —
as usual — while scavenging for food. She literally ate candy bars for
several days. On her third day, dizzy from a sugar high, she watched
while a major American network served 150 steaks flown in for its
employees. She lost 20 pounds from what was called the “Kuwait-
Watchers” diet . . . Finally Tom Gjelten arrived with cook stove and food.

- Neal Conan, also filing nonstop from Kuwait, and getting closer to the
story in Iraq than any of us wanted. That was during the fretful week
of his captivity by the Republican Guards. We all lost weight that
week.

- John Hockenberry riding a donkey for hours to get to the top of a
ridge to collect tape from Kurdish refugee families. And Deborah Wang,
after a 24-hour bus ride, hiking for hours more to get to refugee camps
inside Iraq. Then, with no satellite phone, having to hike out again to
file her stories.
Racial Censorship

What Information Was Missed Because So Few Blacks and Hispanics Covered the War?

BY THOMAS MORGAN

While the nation’s journalists continue to debate government censorship of events in the Persian Gulf War and the manipulation of the press, the war underscored concerns of many black journalists that the American press, with some exceptions, practiced its own form of censorship. The reporters and photographers who covered the war and Middle East “experts” interviewed, were overwhelmingly white and male.

Underlying the press’s argument is the notion that the government’s manipulation of the press for “security reasons” was unwarranted in many cases and that censorship restricted free speech and debate by limiting the information the American public receives to make informed decisions.

In the coverage of this war, as in its everyday new operations, the American press can also be accused of limiting the information the public needs in its effort to make informed decisions. The press in this country has a well-documented history of exclusionary hiring and promotion practices. Too many of the journalists making the decisions about what is news and how it should be interpreted come from similar economic, racial and social backgrounds.

The indictment here is not necessarily that the press missed a particular element of the war because there were few minority journalists, but rather what questions might have been asked by those of different racial and cultural backgrounds that would have added to the information mix. There were only about a dozen black news professionals, including cameramen, among the hundreds of correspondents covering the war. There were even fewer Hispanics.

“I am aware of one incident in which a white reporter conducted five interviews and no blacks were interviewed when there were so many over there,” said Charlayne Hunter-Gault, a correspondent for the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, who was one of a few African-Americans and among the few women to cover the war. “He was stunned when I pointed this out. I don’t think it was racist hostility. The need for diversity is just not internalized by whites in the media yet.

“It’s intellectualized to the extent that when you point it out to them they say, ‘Oh, My God,’ and they change it,” Hunter-Gault said. “But it’s not internalized and it may never be. That’s why we [minority journalists] need to be there. Those of us who are black and good reporters will see what the good reporters see, plus. If there is no ‘plus’ or variable, then we’ll still get the job done.”

Despite the fact that the American troops sent to the Middle East were nearly one-third African-American and Hispanic, the press featured whites overwhelmingly in photographs and stories about the war’s impact at home for several weeks during the beginning of the troop deployment. The National Association of Black Journalists and minority journalists in individual newsrooms were among the first to complain that the coverage underrepresented the men and women who served and that the American public missed perspectives of a range of opinions of minorities both in support of the effort and against it.

In one example, a story that Hunter-Gault filed about a black gunnery sergeant revealed that he supported the U.S. involvement to show his patriotism and to “earn” the right to demand better treatment as a black man when he returned home.

Hunter-Gault and other black journalists interviewed said they were conscious of making sure that their coverage reflected the diversity of the troops. And, in some cases they assert, they filed stories that were different from those filed by whites.

Larry Copeland, a reporter at The Philadelphia Inquirer, said that after President Bush vetoed civil rights legislation in Congress, and during the observance of Martin Luther King’s birthday celebrations, he wrote a story about morale of black troops in Saudi Arabia.

“The Presidential veto and King’s observance continued on page 54

Thomas Morgan, a 1990 Nieman Fellow, is a metropolitan reporter for The New York Times. He joined the Times in December 1983 as an assistant metropolitan editor after six years with The Washington Post as assistant city editor, editor of a special section called The District Weekly and general assignment reporter. He served in the Air Force for two years. Born in St. Louis, he graduated from the University of Missouri in 1973. In August 1988, he was elected president of the National Association of Black Journalists, a nonprofit group of media professionals whose goal is to encourage progress in the hiring and advancement of black journalists.
Sexism by Colleagues

Male Reporters’ Occasional Bias More Upsetting
Than Restraints Imposed by Saudis

BY CARLA ANNE ROBBINS

I must begin by confessing to some discomfort with my topic. After insisting for years that editors hire, assign and promote reporters without considering their gender, it seems counter-productive, if not downright dangerous to the cause of women foreign correspondents to admit that we may have had a different experience covering the gulf war. I believe we did.

Did that different experience affect our coverage? Did we bring a new “women’s perspective” to the gulf war? Or even should we? These questions are better left to the historians and critics because I honestly don’t have an answer. The best I can do here is to convey what it was like being a woman covering the gulf crisis and hope that it will help reporters and editors prepare for similar difficult assignments. If I also end up reinforcing some curmudgeonly editors’ stereotypes about women covering wars, my only defense is that my experiences in the gulf proved to me that those stereotypes, while fading, have not been erased from the news business.

Saudi Arabia itself is Disneyland for sexists. No, I didn’t have to wear a veil, headscarf or abaya (black robe) — although the flak for the Prince of the Eastern Province did send me one with the suggestion that I wear it for my husband. I couldn’t legally drive a car. Women reporters also couldn’t check into a hotel or get on an airplane without a letter from a husband, brother, or the Ministry of Information attesting to our good intentions. (We called them “I am not a hooker” letters.) Once we checked in, we usually couldn’t use the health clubs or swimming pools. Finding a ladies’ room in a government office was impossible, since Saudi women do not enter official buildings.

On the Dhahran to Riyadh train, I almost got into a fist fight with the conductor who wanted me out of the first class section and then tried to shut me behind a green velvet curtain in the dining car. Later I happily shut myself in when it turned out to be the quietest place to finish writing a story.

What began as novelties (and the subjects of amusing dispatches) after several months became genuine hassles that made it somewhat harder to work — but nothing we couldn’t cope with. Not being permitted to drive was, of course, the biggest problem. But most women reporters still rented cars with the expectation that when the war started nobody was going to stop our dashes to Kuwait. We also usually found sympathetic, if amused, male colleagues to chauffeur us when we needed help.

Getting Invited Out of the Way

As women we did have access to one part of Saudi society off limits to male reporters: Saudi women. This was especially helpful in the first months of the crisis when how Saudi Arabia was reacting to the American buildup was one of the biggest stories. Early in my stay four reporters (two women, two men) were invited to King Fahd University of Petroleum and Mining for pizza and beer (non-alcoholic) with some of the professors (all male). About 45 minutes into the discussion, our host asked the two women reporters if we’d like to meet his wife. We hadn’t met any Saudi women and jumped at the chance. The male reporters looked genuinely chagrined and we felt smug as we marched into the inner sanctum women’s living room. That smugness faded about twenty minutes later when our dinners arrived in the back room, then our drinks, and then dessert. It was clear that our male host expected us to stay in the back, thereby solving his own social dilemma. Next week when we were invited back, our host again suggested we greet his wife, we agreed sweetly, and asked him to bring her out to the main living room. He didn’t and we stayed where we were.

We may also have had slightly better access to Saudi officials and businessmen too. It’s what I call the talking dog phenomenon: It wasn’t so much what we said, the very fact that we could do it may have convinced some Saudis to return my phone calls. But for every official who did call back, there was likely one who wouldn’t dare be caught alone in a room with a woman he wasn’t married to — a crime punishable by a tongue-and-switch-lashing by the religious police. But there again adaptability, a foreign correspondent’s most important tool, got us by.

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When we heard that video stores in Riyadh were bootlegging copies of Peter Arnett’s CNN interview with Saddam Hussein, a male reporter and I rushed out to confirm it only to find that women were not allowed inside video stores. My colleague did the interview with me whispering questions from the sidewalk.

The United States military has a reputation for sexism probably second only to Saudi Arabia. But in my dealings with the U.S. military I had very few gender-related complaints. The gap of mistrust and ill will that divided the press and the military during the gulf war was bitter and wide — but focused on professional differences, not gender. And by comparison, it made the gender gap look inconsequential. While access was a constant problem for me and all reporters, I never felt that the military excluded me from an interview or a pool because I was a woman.

I also had no gender-related problems in the field. With military women playing increasingly important roles, up to and even behind battle lines, a female reporter was really not all that much of an oddity. True, when I visited several units of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) there was a little more joking about wet T-shirt contests (the previous reporter to visit was a local TV anchor and a runner-up to the Miss Georgia contest who apparently complied). But on the whole they and all the units I visited were pleased to have reporters come by, share their hardships, and tell their tales to their families and friends at home. Indeed, the good will I experienced in the field is one of the most compelling arguments against the need for a restricted pool system to cover the war. The troops were glad to have us visit and would have happily taken hundreds reporters more — both men and women.

Were men, especially war veterans, better prepared to cover the war? When I first started working in Central America I was jealous of male reporters who had served in, or covered, the Vietnam War — they seemed to know reflexively when to jump out of harm’s way. But I quickly developed reflexes of my own. In Saudi Arabia, where covering every agonizing detail of the military deployment became the only story in town, I was again jealous of the war veterans who knew military hierarchy and technology and could I.D. an M-15 vs a Belgian FAL at 40 paces. But as my husband, a Vietnam veteran, pointed out, his own military experience was a long time ago and the technology and a lot more about the military had changed since Vietnam. The skills we needed were learnable, and we all traveled with copies of James F. Dun­igan’s How to Make War.

Worst Bias By Colleagues

The most disturbing prejudice I experienced was that of my own colleagues — brought out and magnified by the stress and competitiveness of covering the war. The frustration level was incredibly high. The pools were small, the news scant, the access almost nil, and our editors’ appetites insatiable. All those furious egos crushed into a few small hotels inevitably collided. And when they did, gender prejudices, among others, sometimes came bubbling up. The fact that we in the news business turned our frustrations on each other — rather than the military — may also be one of the key reasons why the military was so able to manipulate the news and the reporters during the war.

As strange as it may seem now, in the run-up to the war we all desperately wanted to win slots on the pools. Indeed our editors kept hundreds of us on hand in Dhahran for months when the news was thin and the costs prohibitive solely to defend pool slots and win more. There were bloody fights between news organizations which used everything from corporate affiliation to frequency of publication to circulation to knock each other out of the pool system, and win another slot for our own organizations.

On a few occasions gender also played a role. Consider this chilling example: A reporter from one of the big four was dissatisfied with his assignment in a “quick reaction” pool, dedicated to the Air Force or Navy, and wanted a slot on an Army ground combat pool. He figured that the easiest way to get that slot was by ousting a woman from one of the newsmagazines (not mine) from her ground combat assignment by arguing to other male colleagues that she was too physically frail to cope with the arduous conditions in the field. The fact that the woman lived in Beirut and had seen more fire than any of us was ignored and the big paper got its ground combat slot — its case strengthened by heavy pressure on the Pentagon from editors back in Washington. It was a low point for everybody involved and an instructive lesson not only on sexism, but also on how easy it was for the military to divide and conquer our profession. There was one consolation. The “quick reaction pool” turned out to be a plum slot, with a front row seat to the air war, while the reporter on the ground pool sat in the desert for weeks stewing with little to report.

My own editors never suggested that they were anything but thrilled having a woman out covering the story. But when the shooting finally started and time came for reinforcements, all the reporters they sent were male. It seems that most news organizations made similar choices. Indeed of the 126 reporters, photographers, and technicians on the “Big Foot” plane that left Washington the morning after the air war started, fewer than a dozen were women. Whether this accurately reflects the representation of women on foreign/national staffs or some more specific prejudice or even the number of women who volunteered for war duty will have to await a systematic study.

I recently got a hint of an answer, however, when I overheard one of my editors bragging that the strength of our war coverage came from his decision to “send a bunch of old guys who had been in Vietnam.” When I challenged this description, he shrugged, but made no apology. Old perceptions die hard. But perhaps next time there’s a big crisis, he and others will say they’re glad they can send both men and women who covered the gulf war. That will be real progress for the whole profession.
Bush’s Foreign Policy

President’s Strategy on Iraq Shakier Than Results; His Postwar Moves are ‘Total Confusion’

BY LESLIE H. GELB

I’m always embarrassed to be introduced because all my resume demonstrates is my inability to keep a job. My mother is absolutely convinced of this and when I called to tell her several months before the column started that I was going to be a columnist for The New York Times she said, “What’s that?”

I said, “Well, you know, I’ll be writing columns on the opposite editorial page of the Times.”

She said, “Didn’t you do writing before?”

And I said, “Yes but this is different, now I’ll write what I really believe.”

She said, “Before you wrote what you didn’t believe?”

I said, “No. This is really different and it’s much better. Believe me.”

And she said, “Well if that’s what you say, I believe you.”

Then a few weeks later she called and she said, “You know, now your name is on the top of the editorials with those other names in the little print. When you become a columnist will your name still be in that place?”

And I said, “No.”

And she said, “Is that good?”

So I said, “Well it’s not not good. Because I’ll really be doing what I want — writing a column.”

And she said, “If that’s what you say, I believe you.”

And the day the announcement appeared in The New York Times, a close friend of hers at the nursing home immediately gave her a copy of the paper and she called me and she said, “When you got the job you’re in now on the editorial page the story was on the front page of The New York Times and your picture was there. Now the story about you having the column is on the next to the last page and there’s no picture.”

And I said, “It doesn’t make any difference. You see, one is a managerial post at The Times and this other is a writing post and it’s really better.”

And she said, “If that’s what you say, I believe you.” [Laughter]

I ask at least the same level of credibility from you.

I’m going to talk to you tonight about the Bush foreign policy and a little more — a little epistemology. I can’t escape it since this is the Joe Alex Morris Lecture, and I think you have to mingle the business of journalism with the business of foreign policy.

President Bush and his team of pragmatic conservatives have produced a policy — a foreign policy that’s not bad for the government. But the perspective that you bring to the analysis affects how you see that policy.

To Know and Needle

If I were an academic, I would be interested in conceptual beauty — getting control of the innermost essence of the Bush policy. If I were a government official, I would be interested in whether the policy was a political success — whether it worked. But as a journalist, the perspective I bring is the perspective of to know and to needle. Those are our principal obligations.

Now I say to know but it’s very hard to know. Earlier this evening I was talking with the Nieman Fellows and gave them examples of how hard it is to know what you’re about to pronounce judgment on in print. In 1981-1982 Secretary of State Haig was brandishing the thought of the United States going to the source in order to stop the war in Central America, suggesting that we would invade Cuba. And Bob Woodward of The Washington Post did a story saying the he had obtained a secret intelligence document showing that the intention of the United States was to overthrow the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua. Well Bill Kovach, who was then the Washington bureau chief of The Times and a great journalist, set all dogs loose to go match the story, and I went all over town talking to people about what exactly Ronald Reagan had directed. And finally a senior intelligence official gave me an appointment. In his office we were talking about the

This article is a slightly edited version of the 10th annual Joe Alex Morris Jr. Memorial Lecture delivered by Leslie H. Gelb, foreign affairs columnist of The New York Times.

The lectureship honors Mr. Morris, a 1949 Harvard graduate, who reported from the Mideast for The Los Angeles Times. He was killed while covering the Iranian revolution in 1979.

Mr. Gelb became chief foreign affairs columnist for The New York Times in January of this year. He had been Opposite Editorial Page Editor and at one time National Security Correspondent in the Washington Bureau. As Director of Policy Planning and Arms Control, International Security Affairs, in the Defense Department, he was head of the analysis of the Vietnam War that became known as the Pentagon Papers Project. Later he was an Assistant Secretary of State.
Woodward story and he said it was wrong, that the President had not directed the overthrow of the Sandinista regime. As he was talking he walked over to his desk and he said, “Let me read to you from the President’s intelligence finding.” He read the words from it which indeed were not to order the overthrow of the Sandinista regime. And I said to him, “Well, can I take a look at that?” And he said, “Sure,” He walked over and he handed it to me and I said, “Can I write that down?” And he said, “Sure, as long as you don’t put the words in quotes.”

I went back to tell Bill that I’d gotten this great scoop but that both of us ought to be suspicious about it because even though I had talked to one of the few people who would know and who would have possession of this document, why the hell did he show it to me? And was this the real document? And did this really prove that the aim was not to overthrow the Sandinista regime?

To this day I can’t tell you whether that document was real or fabricated for purposes of that meeting with me. But what I did know then and do know now was that if you looked at what the Administration was doing in Central America you could see very clearly that the intent was to overthrow the Sandinista regime, whatever the piece of paper said. But we reported on that piece of paper and the piece of paper is in many respects part of the essence of press-government relations in Washington — namely, an act of manipulation.

The best way to deal with the manipulation inherent in press-government relations is to worry less about what’s said in private conversations in governmental offices and to look at what public officials say publicly. What they do observably. There’s no better test of what a political leader thinks he can do than what he does. That’s his calibration of what’s possible. What’s thinkable. What’s potentially politically successful and wise. And it’s really on that I would base my analysis of the Bush Administration foreign policy. Not what they tell me in the private conversations nearly as much as what they say and what they do openly.

We’re also supposed to needle as journalists. That is, it isn’t our business to be cheerleaders and tell officials what a great job they’re doing. Because one of the foundations of government-press relations is for the press to understand that even though officials know more about what they’re doing than we do, they don’t necessarily know what they’re doing. [Laughter] We have to bring to the business of finding out what they’re doing — of knowing — the needling process. That is the way to discover what’s true, especially in any crisis, especially on any issue that demands high intellectual horse power, and to see if they know what they are doing.

Now I’m in the business not only of trying to know and trying to needle but in the business of expounding. I can’t say I feel terribly comfortable about all this because some days I feel like expounding this way and some days I feel like expounding some other way and it’s very embarrassing to change your mind in public. That’s why politicians never change their minds. [Laughter] They have never changed any of their own policies in the history of policy.

The Wife Cheater
So everything I am about to say to you on the subject of the Bush Administration foreign policy should be taken in the spirit of the following story. It’s a story about a fellow who went to church to seek absolution for having cheated on his wife and he goes with his buddy. His buddy waits outside while he goes into the confessional and tells the priest what he has done and the priest says, “Well that is a terrible sin. If you tell me who the other party was I’ll grant you absolution.” And he says, “Father I really can’t do that.” And the father having read the books about Watergate says, “Well, all right, you don’t have to tell me. I’ll say the names and you can say yes or no.” [Laughter] And he says, “Was it Mary Smith?” The man says, “Father I won’t say.” The priest says, “Was it Kathleen Jones?” The man says, “Father I can’t tell you.” And the priest says, “Well I’ll give you one last chance, this is you last chance for absolution. Was it Kathleen Johnson?” He says, “Father I am not going to tell you.” And he walks out of the church and his buddy is waiting there and his buddy says to him, “Did you get absolution?” The man answered, “No. But I got a lot of new leads.” [Laughter]

All I’m going to do is give you some things to think about just as I’m thinking about them. I’m going to talk about George Bush’s wartime policy, which turns out to be shakier and more questionable than the results. And I’m going to talk to you about George Bush’s postwar policy in Iraq, which I think has been revealed as a total confusion of ends. And then talk to you finally about the President’s vision of a new world order.

I warn you even before I get to the subject of his vision that I’m not a vision man. I’ve always gone by the credo that: “Without vision men die. With vision more men die.” [Laughter]

In that spirit let’s start looking now at what I would still term a successful conduct of war and a wise assessment on the part of President Bush of what had to be done and what had to be done first. Namely, the U.S. had to destroy the military power of Saddam Hussein to threaten its neighbors. To achieve that objective he was to do many questionable things but Iraq’s military power to threaten its neighbors was the clear and present danger. He had to do that first and I think that is the basis on which he will ultimately be judged and be judged well.

But that said, my business is not to praise him but to look back at that experience to see what didn’t make sense even as we cheered him on.

Before the Shooting
The place to start evaluating a wartime strategy is always what was being done before the guns went off. This is a key to understanding whatever Presidents will do once the fighting begins. And President Bush’s pre-war policy was one of indifference and ignorance; miscalculation and arrogance.
Iraq was the sword of the West and of the Persian Gulf states against Iran. This presumption which took root in the Reagan Administration carried over to the Bush Administration — the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Indeed so, up to a point. But at a certain moment he had a failure of nerve. Even though he had built up Noriega into public enemy #1, he would not in the end pull the trigger on him and remove him from power. So, Mr. Bush launched an invasion. Having failed to achieve his objective by reasonable and limited means, he went all out.

The Panama Lesson
I think what we saw then was what was to happen in Iraq later. The Presidency is not a time for learning many lessons, but he did learn a lesson from Panama. He would not let his resolve slip a second time. The next time, he would use overwhelming force to achieve his objective. With the success of Panama ringing in his ears, he had no idea what was about to happen in Iraq. Now there are other aspects of the Bush strategy familiar to you all. He started thinking in terms of an economic embargo and went to blockade and then to the air war and then to a ground war. The objective remained constant. Get Iraq out of Kuwait and smash Iraq's power to threaten its neighbors. But as he evolved his military strategy, he always gave a very different mix of reasons: oil, jobs, international law, defeating aggression, preventing a larger war later on. These changes tended to confuse the public. And the reason was not that he didn't know why he was doing it. He was doing it for all the above reasons.

Right out of the box the Administration was pretty honest and said it was going in there for oil. We couldn't let Iraq get a stranglehold over oil and thereby over the economies of the Western world. But the immediate public reaction was quite negative, "We're not going to spill American blood for oil." So Bush readjusted and repackaged, and every time he did that in order to find a safe political place, he disturbed American public opinion. Many began to think that he really didn't know what he was doing. So, we went through almost two months of considerable uncertainty as President Bush was trying to find solid ground on which to stand.

Throughout the crisis, the alternative to war was to continue sanctions. Mr. Bush tried sanctions long enough to make sanctions into a viable and conceivable alternative to war, but never long enough actually to put sanctions to the test as a winning strategy. If you go back to the early months of the American commitment, you will see that George Bush made precisely the same arguments about the potential effectiveness of sanctions as the Democrats were to do later, during the debate on authorizing the President to use force. The exact same arguments. Both Mr. Bush and the Democrats argued that Iraq was a special place geographically, it was peculiarly dependent on oil for money, easy to cut off, easy to blockade, sanctions could work here. Now I happen to believe that Mr. Bush was correct in judging that sanctions ultimately would not have worked. But it is simply true that the Democrats said nothing in behalf of sanctions beyond what Mr. Bush himself had argued during the first three months of the conflict.

Ability to Hang On
I don't think the sanctions would have been successful because as I watched the situation unfold it seemed to me that the war itself — the 40-day bombing campaign — telescoped what the effects of sanctions would have been over say two or three years. My sense is that had we kept up the sanctions for two or three years, Iraq would have looked like it did in mid-February. And by mid-February Saddam Hussein still was able to hang on to Kuwait. I also don't think the coalition could have stayed together for two or three years, but I think it is an argument rather than an open and shut matter.

In any event, Mr. Bush discarded sanctions and went to war. I would say despite the success of the war strategy his strategy is open to serious question. In the first place, it depended on stupidity. Saddam Hussein had to be very stupid for it to work. What I mean by that is he had to reject every opportunity to settle for half a loaf. Now you remember that in the early months of the crisis the conventional wisdom was — Saddam Hussein is a genius. Everything he did set us back on the defensive. Well, I don't think he was a genius. He put us on the defensive because at that point George Bush didn't know
George Bush needed that stupidity and the time it allowed him to build up American forces before the fighting began on January 15.

Mr. Bush also needed a lot of luck once the fighting began. His strategy depended on luck because Americans don’t like to engage in wars that involve high casualties. And this one didn’t have high casualties because the Iraqis didn’t fight. They hardly opposed the air war, they hunkered down into a tortoise strategy for the ground war which was over in 100 hours. It is hard to draw lessons from such little resistance.

I also think that the Bush strategy can be faulted in that it guaranteed the destruction of Kuwait. We still don’t know very much about the bombing campaign in Iraq. We really don’t even know at this point exactly what targets were struck in Iraq and when. But the impression is that we struck almost everything over the course of those 40 days of bombing. An alternate strategy could have been to tell the Iraqis, “If you start destroying anything in Kuwait, we will destroy comparable facilities in Iraq. You destroy Kuwaiti oil fields, we’ll destroy Iraqi oil fields.” But what I suspect, and what we’ve got to find out through further reporting, is that the U.S. struck Iraqi oil fields first before Saddam burned the Kuwaiti wells. I think we struck the Iraqi oil fields first and that virtually guaranteed the destruction of the Kuwaiti oil fields.

Finally, I think George Bush can be faulted because he really didn’t get a sufficient military commitment from our Allies. He made an instant and total American commitment to fight the war and then went around begging for the funds to pay for it. He had a precious opportunity to establish the principle of collective security. He could have gone in and told the allies, whose interest in defeating Iraq were at least as great as ours, that you have to contribute your fair share of the combat forces, that there must be common dying for a common interest. The United States will never have a better opportunity to establish the principle of truly collective security than it did in Iraq, but George Bush missed that opportunity.

I’m not saying that the Bush strategy was wrong or bad. It depended on luck and stupidity. It did guarantee the destruction of Kuwait and Iraq. It did reinforce the rule that U.S. would do the job rather than establishing the principle of collective security. And it did ensure the breakdown of order in Iraq and bring on the civil war. What Mr. Bush produced was a passable political and military strategy, coupled with an extraordinary display of personal diplomacy and personal resolution.

**Bush’s Skill**

What really made the Persian Gulf war a military success was not the brilliance of the strategy but the personal skills and character of the President. There’s an important lesson in this, too, for those of us who spend a lot of time trying to polish one carat strategic diamonds. It is that in the end the success of great enterprises often depends less on the intellectual merit of a strategic construct than on the quality of the people carrying out the strategy. There’s an old Spanish proverb that says, “The devil knows more than we do not because he’s smarter but because he’s been around longer.” It’s a lesson I think leaders often forget. That is: great issues do not bend so much to brilliance as to determination. Great nations can lean
on others to the point of submission. Great leaders persist despite odds and long after others have given up the ship. I think that is really the story of U.S. military success in the Persian Gulf. The story of postwar policy in Iraq is not very successful at all. It's very clear that President Bush gave very little consideration to postwar policy. He focused entirely on winning the war and forgot the peace. It reminds me of a story I read in *Sports Illustrated* a year ago when the Yankees traded their left fielder, Luis Polonia. *Sports Illustrated* interviewed Mr. Polonia and said, "Why did the Yankees trade you?" and he says, "You know, I don't know," he says, "The Yankees always wanted one thing and only one thing, always one thing, the Yankees and I never knew what it was." [Laughter]

George Bush said he wanted one thing, to win that war. When the war was suddenly over and he was thrust into the vacuum created by his success, he had to start thinking afresh. That's the standard pattern: fight now, think peace later. He knew that he wanted Saddam Hussein out of power but he also figured out by the end of the conflict that he did not want to destroy Iraq as a unitary state. Thus, his military strategy wounded Iraqi forces so that they could not threaten their neighbors, but not nearly enough to prevent them from defeating their internal rebels.

### Confusion Lingers

The confusion of this war strategy and the absence of thought about postwar strategy lingers on to today. Now, Mr. Bush has the nightmare of having to balance off what I consider to be the sensible American goal of maintaining a unitary Iraqi state and the sensible goal of getting rid of Saddam Hussein; and the sensible goal of America not becoming involved militarily in a civil war, yet protective of the Kurds. Thankfully it is our nature not to stand by and watch people being slaughtered. But it's a devil's choice: Killing now or killing later. Mr. Bush's problem at this point is he doesn't even recognize that. He is so committed to avoiding the prime sin of military intervention that he is committing the second sin of doing nothing at all to save Saddam's internal adversaries. Politics is always more complicated than war.

I think the President hopes all of this will vanish once his new world order begins to unfold. He hopes somehow his vision — his intellectual construct — will subsume all of these minor problems and the fallout of the war itself. He laid the basis for his new world order in a speech to Congress on March 6, 1991. He talked about shared security arrangements, about the need to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, about comprehensive peace diplomacy and finally about economic development. It all sounded very visionary. But I think even a modest examination of the contents of his new world order suggests there's very little new and there's very little thoughtful or promising in what he had to say.

He has very little to say about the growing economic power of Germany and Japan and how that power factors into our economic policy and our future security policy. He tells us nothing about how to deal with the explosion of national self-determination movements in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East. These are the kinds of security problems any serious foreign policy must come to grips with in the future. He doesn't talk at all about the decline in American power. He acts as if there has been no decline at all and the proof is, "Look at our victory in Iraq." He doesn't even square his own vision and desire for economic development in the Middle East with his commitment to sell even more armaments — conventional armaments — to the area. By the time all these conventional armaments are bought and paid for, there will be little money left for economic development in the region.

### New Threats

In the Mideast itself his new world order focuses on the old enemy not on the new ones. It's all designed to contain Iraq. Look at that speech. Everything is focused on preventing Iraq replicating the last ten years. He doesn't look at the possible new threats — the likelier new threats from Syria or from internal rebellions in friendly countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. There's no readjustment of thinking about Israel in light of the fact that the Soviet Union is no longer a strategic alternative for Arab states. Arabs cannot so readily turn to Moscow as an alternative to Washington if they don't like our policy toward Israel.

We can do pax Americana, but it will be very expensive. If you look at the thinking of the American conservative movement such as the Unipolarists, they are quite explicit in how they envision the future. What they say is the United States ought to set the rules and enforce them. In this new world order there is little new and little new is put in new focus.

What's the alternative? Again, I'm always hesitant to expound counter visions so let me suggest some counter ideas. I would say that the focus of any future U.S. foreign policy must be first and foremost to focus on the United States itself. To me all foreign policy is the extension of domestic politics and values by other means. To me all consequential power in the world is an extension of domestic political power and internal strength. And our ability to conduct a foreign policy in the future is directly proportional to what we do here in this country over the next decade.

### Bush the Comedian

Now President Bush in his March 6th speech delivered what I would call one of the best laugh lines from the Congressional podium in history. He said, when talking about his new world order: "We must bring that same sense of self discipline, that same sense of urgency to the way we meet our challenges here at home." But there is no urgency, no self-discipline, almost no domestic program at all. Renewal has to start here. Foreign policy has been an escape for American leaders for four decades now. Now it's time to return to the primary business of being President — taking care of the U.S. Now this is not isolationism I'm preaching. I'm in favor of continuing all the activities that have been part of the American foreign policy landscape. Let's continue to do
them. It's a question of where you put your emphasis, where you put your priorities, and our practices belong here.

First the source of power in the New World will be the strength of the American political and economic model. What eventually won the Cold War for the United States was not simply that we maintained our military might; we did and we should have. It was that the Soviet model failed, and the American model succeeded. We won the critical battle of ideas. But our economic policy and less on political

War for the we did and we should have. It was that Security Council dealing with the so many people would agree with what economic policy . And what's tru e in the future of mankind. Now again I'm talk­

ing about a matter of emphasis. But it is notable that even at this stage when so many people would agree with what I just said that we have a National Security Council dealing with the political-military issues, but no comparable council to deal with foreign economic policy. And what's true in the government is also true in newspapers and magazines where we have few reporters qualified to cover foreign economic policy.

Third, economic aid and development, here again I think the focus has to be kept it simple. Provide aid and credits to build infrastructure and provide for child development, much as we ought to be focusing on these priorities in the United States. Don't get involved in aid programs that we can't manage and where we end up throwing most of the money down the drain. And deny aid to trouble makers and human rights violators.

Aid doesn't work to moderate the bad guys; they never change.

Now even to my own conception of U.S. foreign policy in a new world order. I bring an uneasy concoction of skeptic­

ism and conviction. Especially I bring skepticism. Policy making and reporting or commenting are all a process of making mistakes and fixing them. To foreclose the possibility of error is to block the path to remediation. So the credo to me is skepticism, skepticism, skepticism. Whenever I have forgotten that credo I've made my worst mistakes. Whenever governments have though they really knew what they were doing, they made their biggest blunders.

But skepticism is not based solely and cannot be based solely on the proba­

bility of human error. It is also based on the sense of right and of human rights. All my questions about the Bush foreign policy and my own modest construc­

for an alternative policy, are rooted in a sense of America. We, America, were once the new world. For all our serious failings, we represented freedom and equality and tolerance and hope and hard work. If we can only be that new world again, that will be the surest basis for a durable and just world order. Thank you very much. I'll take any questions that are not especially hostile.

Q and A

Q—Mr. Gelb, this question is based on your reputation in Washington as having been a moral voice or con­

science down in Washington on the Na­tional Security establishment while you were there. The case of the Kurds in Iraq who a lot of reports say are about to be massacred, it may be hundreds of thousands. Should the United States not do anything, should they in fact be massacred or should we stand by — if we do stand by for that what do you think would be the consequences for this — for the United States in a concrete way?

A—You know that is the burning question of the day and it's a question, as I explained briefly in my remarks, about which I feel terribly conflicted. I want to stay out of Iraq's civil war, because I think we will in the end only make it worse for ourselves and the Iraqis. Our military involvement will mean more killing in the long run. I also want to get rid of Saddam and I want to keep Iraq whole so it doesn't become a vacuum for regional power conflicts which will drag us in once again. These goals call for American restraint. On the other hand, I don't want to sit by and watch people get slaughtered. It's intolerable for Americans to do that. Just as it was intolerable for Americans to let U.S. forces slaughter Iraqis forces as they were in total retreat at the end of those 100 hours of the ground war General Schwarzkopf said he could have con­

ducted a battle of annihilation. Well he could have, but Americans never would have tolerated it. American pilots wouldn't have continued to shoot down the Iraqis, we don't do things that way — maybe some would, but Americans are repulsed by this and we're very for­

tunate for that. Our moral qualms lead to political problems that other nations don't have because they lack that same ethical concern. So our caring about avoiding the slaughter helped to bring on another slaughter.

What can you do about it? What is our moral responsibility? We're still in the process of finding that out. I would like to know, for example, what the United States government said and did with respect to the Kurds, privately. In addition to what President Bush said publicly about urging rebellion. I would like to know whether there were any CIA contacts with the Kurds that encouraged them to do this or led them to believe that the United States would provide them with military assistance. I would like to know who was financing this "Voice of Iraq" that was broadcast from outside Iraqi territory and urging rebellion. I want to know what our responsibility was.

We don't know the answers to these questions yet. But responsibility we do have and I think the way I would try to square this impossible circle is not to get involved militarily in their civil war, but to do the following:

First, insist on and maintain strict observance of the cease-fire agreement between the coalition forces and Iraq. They put up any aircraft or helicopters, we shoot them down. Now I don't think for a minute that's going to change the course of the battle inside of Iraq, but I do know that it will send a strong message to the Iraqi military leaders that everything will be harder for them as long as Saddam Hussein is
around and as long as they continue to brutalize their people. Secondly, I would do what I would call elementary political deterrence. The President of the United States has to step up to the microphone and say, "We intend to hold the Iraqi leadership accountable for this slaughter. And we will ensure that the economic hardships on Iraq are even greater if this slaughter continues." Now let them worry about exactly what that will mean, but tell it to them. Third, I would not sign the cease-fire agreement with Baghdad and thereby remove our troops until Iraq begins to comply. And finally I think the U.N. must deal with this situation. I don't give a damn about the U.N. credo that the U.N. doesn't get involved in the internal affairs of other states. The U.N. has a special responsibility in this case because it made the declaration of war. And at a minimum the U.N. ought to pronounce itself on the question of brutality and killing, and at a minimum they ought to be providing refugee aid and relief.

Q—Yes. I want to focus on two of the statements that you made. One was referring to the idea that the U.S. should concentrate first on shoring up first its domestic needs, secondly at the end when you reminisced about the time when the U.S. represented the new world. This — it seems to fall under the debate that goes on about whether America is a country in the decline— I'd like to know how you feel — what your position is on that and then depending on that how does that play into America's role in the new world order.

A—Look. I'm an obscurantist on the subject of American decline, because I don't base my judgments on statistics. I base it on my eyes and my eyes see America in decline almost everywhere compared to the America I knew. You don't have to show me the college board scores. I'll show you millions and millions of Americans who can't read including many college students who get a hernia at reading 750 words. American students in science and math are not nearly comparable to their counterparts in other industrial societies. American roads, bridges, airports are falling apart. I don't care what the statistics show. I see those airports; I see those roads; I see those bridges, they are in decline. Yes we are exporting more, but the truth of the matter is our manufacturers are less competitive than they were throughout most of our history. We aren't as good as we were at making things. We care less about fixing them. In these important respects — the infrastructure of our country, the quality of our education — we are in decline. And to deny that based on data which, I think, can be construed in many different ways, is the most important obstacle now to begin to tackle those problems. So yes, in that sense I am a declinist because only if you are a declinist can you be a fixist.

Q—[Laughter] Could you tie that into America's position in the new world order? Does it have one?

A—Well we don't have nearly as strong a position as we did before. I would not mistake the aftermath of military victory over Iraq for America's position in the world constellation a year from now. Everyone is all shook up by what has happened, all questioning their role. What they did or what they didn't do. And this was a pure military situation where we could still excel for all the obvious reasons. But within a year, we're going to be back to business as usual and then we will see once again — when not blinded by the fox of victory — how much we need to do with ourselves.

Q—One reason that President Bush's justifications for the war against Iraq seem to ring hollow in some people's ears was that at the same time as we were condemning aggression by Iraq in Kuwait, we ignored or even countenanced, China's occupation of Tibet, the Soviet Union's occupation of Lithuania, Turkey's occupation of part of Cyprus and so on. This lack of consistency, of hypocrisy, of sort of choosing, you know, who — which is a Hitler and which one is our friend and I don't think that makes us look good to all the rest of the world and I wanted to hear your comment a little bit about a more broad outlook on foreign policy than just Iraq.

A—This is a discussion I often have with my daughters and son who are, as I was in the '20s, very concerned with the issue of hypocrisy. And as I get older I become more sympathetic to hypocrisy. [Laughter] What we're doing is clearly hypocritical. I mean, we're not applying the same standards of human rights and self-determination, pushing back aggression elsewhere in the world as we did in Iraq. It's so obvious as to be undeniable. But my answer to that is, "You do what you can." You can't resolve all these problems, particularly in the way that we did in Iraq, nor should we. But those we can do something about, we should. We could do something with Iraq, we did, I'm glad for that.

Q—Mr. Gelb, was the Bush administration capable of maneuvering Iraq into Kuwait to destroy their military, also to get the U.S. economy out of recession?

A—I don't believe that's what happened for a minute but I know there are going to be a lot of books and articles written suggesting this, much the same way they were written about Franklin Roosevelt and World War II. Conspiracy theorists charged that FDR knew the Japanese were going to attack and that he didn't want to deter them because he wanted them to attack so that the United States could get involved in the war. And similarly today, you hear the very argument you just made. I never saw any evidence whatsoever to suggest that that's the case. Now is it conceivable? Is it true? It's conceivable but until somebody comes up with real evidence, I don't give any weight to it at all.

Q—I'd like to know how you feel about the parallel between the Palestinians and the Kurds and the aspects of self-determination with the Kurdish movement and what do you see as the — I know you mentioned the fact that you're a visionary — but what you see in the possibilities for a semi-autonomous or autonomous Kurdish state in the foreseeable future?

A—I would say the possibilities of an autonomous Kurdish state are, I think, zero. I don't think the U.S. wants it. I
don’t think Iran wants it. I don’t think Turkey wants it. And I think they will go to considerable lengths to prevent it. I do think that if George Bush and the United States interest themselves in this problem in a serious way, and the U.N. does, that we could carve out with Saddam’s successors a relatively autonomous situation for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. But I’m not sure exactly what that means because I don’t know enough about how it would work. But I know that’s a direction I would want to go in. Now you raise an interesting question when you tie the Palestinians and the Kurds. I did that at the end of my column today to tweak some of my colleagues who are prepared to go to earth’s end for an independent Kurdish state, but who would not dream of the possibility of a Palestinian homeland let alone a Palestinian state. So again one has to weigh what we’re prepared to do there against what we’re prepared to do elsewhere.

Q—You implied earlier that President Bush’s decision to send massive force into the area was more due to his previous blunder in Panama and so let’s for a moment assume that he hadn’t done so. What do you think would have been the disposition of the Israelis towards this war, what would have been the disposition of Iran towards this war?

A—If Bush had done what I suggested and instead of pouring in — making a commitment to pour in 500,000 American troops had put pressure on our allies to put up more troops — is that?

Q—If he hadn’t made this complete commitment to a military solution do you think France would have joined the coalition? Do you think Iran would have stayed back? Do you think Israel would have stayed back?

A—You know the question is how and when you do it not whether you do it. I think he made the commitment to a military solution and to raising U.S. force levels to near 500,000 too soon to bring about more participation by the others. And I don’t think he had to do it that way. I think he lost the leverage then because at that point the Allies all felt we would do the job. Now I don’t think the Iranians would have intervened in any event. Nor do I think the Israelis would have intervened once we told them we were going to deal with Iraq, and it was a matter of highest concern to us that Israel stay out. I think those risks you talk about were always much lower than people thought at the time.

Q—My understanding is that Saddam Hussein did offer to withdraw from Kuwait as early as August 4th and he said that he was establishing a revolutionary — or supporting a revolutionary government in Kuwait and establishing a revolutionary army there composed of different nationalities, whatever. And I don’t think that’s the only time that he offered to withdraw and as a matter of fact later on he made several peace initiatives. One involving linkage and there are several others I don’t have the details of.

A—I don’t think he made any outright offer to withdraw. It was always contingent on something like a peace conference in Palestine. He never flat out said there will be complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait even if there was to be a peace conference. He hinted around about it. Some of his officials hinted around about it, but there was never a clear and definitive statement before the January 15 deadline. After that his hits seemed to go more in this direction but at that point it was too late. I think there were always ambiguities and if he had been clear I think it would have been almost impossible for George Bush to reject his offer outright. Saddam never gave any of the many countries that were looking for any excuse to avoid combat that clear hook.

Q—I’d like to ask you about George Bush’s most critical tool, perhaps, in affecting foreign policy which is the press. Now 100 hours may not be long enough to learn many military lessons but certainly it was plenty of time for lessons about the role of the press in foreign policy. Aside from the need for more skepticism, what are the lessons for the American press or the world press from this war and perhaps for the government in how to manage the media?

A—Well there are a lot but let me just mention two. First of all we should have been much tougher in pressing for our rights to cover the war. We gave in much too quickly, much too easily. We still don’t know a lot of what happened. This Administration and the U.S. military in particular learned a very important lesson from Vietnam, and they’ve studied Vietnam in all the war colleges for the last 18 years: keep the press out. Keep the press out. You’ll have far less trouble with domestic political support if the American people don’t know what’s going on. It’s our responsibility to conduct the war, therefore we have the right to deny the information. I think that’s a position the press cannot accept. We’ve got to fight that issue. I don’t think we ought to publish war plans or anything like that — although continued on page 53
Indian Country Reporting

'Half-Baked' Articles Result From Journalists' Failure To View Tribes as Third-World Nations

By Tim Giago (NANWICA KCIJII)

The artistic and financial success of Kevin Kostner's, "Dances with Wolves," plus the anticipation of the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus' errant voyage to the Western Hemisphere, have caused the mainstream media to put the American Indians on their agenda in a big way for the first time since the illegal occupation of Wounded Knee, S.D., in 1973.

This new interest doesn't mean that all of the attention is necessarily good. When articles written by misinformed journalists only perpetuate myths and misconceptions, what purpose do they serve? Most Americans, journalists included, are already ignorant about Native America without having that ignorance compounded by half-baked news articles that dwell primarily on the negative.

For the average non-Indian journalist to begin to comprehend the major differences between how Indians view themselves and how that image is usually distorted by journalists, consider the simple fact that "not all of your heroes are our heroes."

George Armstrong Custer is not our hero. President Andrew Jackson is not our hero. The first is obvious. The second is not so obvious. Andrew Jackson was President of the United States when the Indian Removal Act of 1830 became law. It was a law that called for the forced removal of all the tribes in the Eastern Seaboard states to the Oklahoma Territory. It was an act that led to what the Indians have called, "The Trail of Tears," the march that left thousands of Indians dead along the way, the American version of the Death March at Bataan in the Philippine Islands in World War II.

The next thing to consider is that many of the events that showed the United States government in a bad light, such as the "Trail of Tears," do not appear in the books used to teach the young of this nation about American history.

But the major reason most non-Indian journalists have such a hard time reporting on Indians and Indian tribes is their inability to consider Indian nations as sovereignties, emerging Third World nations within the nation and the white American ignorance of treaties.

Indian nations were sovereign entities long before the advent of the white man. As a matter of record, many of the Indian nations were never defeated militarily. They were forced to surrender because of the deliberate destruction of their economic base. A good example of that is the destruction of the buffalo, which crippled and eventually forced many of the tribes of the Great Plains to succumb.

Symbol of Life

One must understand that the buffalo was a walking symbol of life to the plains Indian. It was a spiritual symbol, but equally important to the tribes, it was the one beast that clothed, fed, and housed the plains Indians. How many more years would the tribes of the Great Sioux Nation have fought the United States soldiers if the buffalo had not been destroyed?

If the diseases brought to this hemisphere by the white man had not claimed the lives of millions of Indians who had no immunity, would America's history be different?

I use these basic examples to show you what happens when two cultures collide. The values held by each culture are different. Indians believed in tribal ownership of land, not individual ownership. Goods were often traded between tribes to ensure and provide passage across or even the temporary use of certain lands. Or, territories were taken by tribal warfare. The lands were never sold.

It is a classic example of historical misunderstanding to read about Manhattan being sold for $24 in trinkets. Most Indian historians believe the tribes involved in the exchange of trinkets for Manhattan really thought they were only letting the foreigners use the land. The white man never understood the concept of not selling land and considered the taking of the land a "done deed."

This brief overview is not intended to be a lesson in history as seen through the eyes of the Indian people. It is,

Tim Giago, founder and president of The Lakota Times of South Dakota, gives this phonetic pronunciation of his Indian name (nab-weencha kegegee.)

Tim, who has just completed his Nieman year at Harvard, writes a syndicated column that appears in about 20 newspapers and is the author of two books: The Aboriginal Sin and Notes From Indian Country, V.I. He has won numerous awards, including two this year, one from the Harvard Foundation for Intercultural and Race Relations and the other, the first annual Minnesota-Dakotas Mass Media Award, presented by the regional branch of the National Conference of Christians and Jews.
instead, intended to point out the plain and simple fact that there are extremely different points of view based upon cultural differences that must be taken into consideration when reporting from Indian country.

Consider the fact that the federal and state governments have created a mish-mash of laws affecting Indian people and nations that can differ dramatically from state to state. Example: there are, within some states, Indian tribes that are governed by Public Law 280, a Federal law that gives states law enforcement jurisdiction. However, there are states where Public Law 280 was never involved and states therefore do not have law enforcement or judiciary jurisdiction on reservation lands.

There are states like Oklahoma where, although there are more than 100,000 American Indians, there are no reservations. There are states like South Dakota where Indian lands have clearly defined boundaries and borders and where the state has absolutely no jurisdiction.

A Two-Faced Land
I tried recently to explain to a black journalist from Nigeria that the Pine Ridge Reservation of South Dakota, the place of my birth, has its own police force, its own highway patrol, its own judiciary, and its own governing body. Since he was never taught this concept of American history, he found it very hard to comprehend.

He did, however, confirm what I have learned about many of the foreign journalists attending school in America, particularly those from nations that had once been colonized. He looked at the United States as a land of two faces: a land preaching freedom and justice to the world, but unable to fulfill those promises to its own indigenous peoples. He looked upon American Indians as victims of colonization.

One of the most elementary and basic rules of journalism is often totally ignored when reporting on Indians and Indian country. The rule as taught in every J-school in the country goes, “If your mother says she loves you, check it out.” If someone tells you he or she is Indian and a spokesperson for an organization or a tribe, check it out. If people sitting in your newsroom claim to be Native American, ask them for proof of enrollment in an Indian tribe. If they can’t submit proof then they are not enrolled members of a tribe and in the eyes of most enrolled Indians, they are not Indian.

It is a simple matter to check their status by calling the enrollment office of the tribe in which they claim membership. When one news chain claimed a larger number of Indian employees, I called each one and asked for proof of enrollment. Out of the 15 claiming to be Indian, only one was actually a legally enrolled member of an Indian tribe. The others, for whatever reason, were faking it.

If a person applies for a job claiming to be Indian, don’t take his word for it. As you would with any claim by a job applicant, check it out.

The other elementary rule of journalism that is lost when reporting on Indians is to be objective. Always remember that there are at least two sides to every Indian story, just as there are in the white communities.

In the last two years major newspapers and television networks have made it a practice to seek out prestigious journalism awards, literally over the bodies of American Indians. A New Mexico newspaper won a Scripps Howard award for its humungous series on alcoholism among the Navajos, particularly with its focus on Gallup, New Mexico, a notorious border town. An Alaskan newspaper won a Pulitzer for its windy series on alcoholism among the tribes of Alaska.


All these citations prove to me is that readers and those supposed intellectuals who present awards love to read about or see the misery of other races of people, particularly the First Americans. Never mind that the other side of the story was never told.

Of course, a series of articles on a wonderful man named Gene Thin Elk who started the Red Road to Recovery movement that is sweeping Indian country and is ripping down the walls of alcoholism by addressing the causes through the spiritual eyes of the afflicted is not news.

When a large tribe like the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of South Dakota, a tribe living on a reservation of more than two million acres, passes a resolution to end alcoholism by the year 2000, and passes a law to regulate the sale of all alcoholic beverages within its boundaries and then begins to enforce that law by shutting down white liquor stores and bars that refuse to purchase tribal liquor and business licenses, it is not national news. Why not?

Freedom to Fail
If every journalist worth his or her salt would read the comment made by a letter writer to The Wall Street Journal and apply it to Indian country, we would be on our way to achieving objective reporting. The sentence goes: “I have always thought that all Americans were free to find their own limitations. It is the freedom to fail that allows the hope of success and without hope anyone is disabled.” Until a few years ago, the Indian people have not been allowed the freedom to fail. Most of their failures have come at the hands of a paternalistic government.

The fact that the Indian people themselves are addressing and are on the way to solving many of their long-standing problems because they are, for the first time, being allowed to do it themselves, is not news.

Print and electronic journalists have played on the ignorance of their readers when it comes to reporting on Indians even though, I suspect, they know better. They realize that we are a very small minority and the repercussions to their inaccurate stories will therefore be miniscule. They believe they can turn in any article about Indians, no matter how inaccurate, with total impunity. In most cases they are right because their editors are also ill-equipped to edit their stories.

The media’s standard approach, nationally, is to check the calendar occasionally and then set aside a little
time and a report or two for the once­in-a-decade, epic Indian series. More likely than not, the epic is a labor to read and is usually a rehash of all that is bad in Indian country.

Who is the winner with this type of journalism? The medium reporting? Sometimes they do win large awards. The readers? Not if they are being fed stereotypical misinformation. Their ignorance is only being extended. Certainly the people of the Indian nations are not the winners. In fact, they are probably the biggest losers.

Do Your Homework

My advice to the eager reporters assigned to Indian country is basic and simple: do your homework. Look at these articles as a challenge. If you must go to an Indian journalist for leads, don't be so falsely proud that you ignore this knowledgeable source.

And for God's sake, don't find yourself a pet spokesperson. What Indian can speak for all 300 different Indian nations? That's like finding a European spokesman and allowing him or her to talk for all the nations of Europe.

If you are writing about health, find Indian professionals in that field. The same holds true for education, tribal government, justice and on and on. Remember, if you travel to Indian country looking for the worst, that is exactly what you will find. Don't report on the obvious — broken down cars, winos sitting in alleys — and don't be afraid to use the local tribal government as a source. After all, they are the elected governing body of the tribe.

Never forget that each Indian tribe has its own official spokesperson. Don't bypass that official just because you think he or she might be feeding you tribal propaganda. You have reporters attending news conferences for state governors and Presidents of the United States and you are able to cut through the baloney, for the most part. Tribal spokespeople are the same. They are employed by the tribe to give out political information. Take what they say with a grain of salt, but don't ignore them. They can often give you invaluable leads.

There are many Indian tribes where the children are taught that direct and prolonged eye contact is considered to be very disrespectful, so if the person you interview does not make continuous eye contact, that person should not be considered shy or possibly dishonest. It is a matter of cultural differences and nothing more.

This article may not be the media educator I would like it to be because after 20 years of being a media watchdog for the Indian people, I have become a skeptic, but it is a small beginning and as the old Indian saying goes, "When one sets out on a trip of 100 miles, it always begins with a single step." In the long run, whether the non­Indian press continues to report the party line of the bureaucracy to the detriment of the Indian nations, or chooses to put a little elbow grease into the stories they write about reservations, depends on management and hopefully, this article will reach into the ratified air of the editors and network moguls of the national media and cause them to assign reporters to Indian country who have the background and training to be knowledgeable and objective.

Educating America about the true history and factual contemporary history of Indian country will be a monumental task and it must begin with the media.

So far the media have failed this task quite miserably. Just keep in mind that Indian America has not been sealed up in a vacuum for 200 years, but has, in order to survive, progressed in keeping with its tradition and culture.

If you begin with the premise that we are not "your Indians," the vanishing Americans still living in teepees, that we are not all alcoholics, that we do not all live on welfare or get a government check each month, that we are people who do pay taxes; if you view us as a people who believe in our own sovereignty and a people who believe we can progress with the rest of America without losing our spirituality, culture, or traditions, you will then be able to approach a news story with much more objectivity and a clearer understanding of Native America.

Incompetence

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in history" and asks: "What does the press have to show for it? Mostly a big black eye" ("Why America hates the press," U.S. News and World Report, March 11).

What went wrong? Peter Braestrup, who covered Vietnam for both The New York Times and The Washington Post, observes a new generation of journalists ignorant of all things military: "Their use of military terminology is always wrong; they don't know the difference between a brigade and a battalion, between a machine gun and an automatic rifle... they're yuppies in the desert." (Columbia Journalism Review, March/April)

At the height of the war, 1,400 people showed up in Saudi Arabia, some of them — 100 or so — bona fide war correspondents. The bloated press corps performed accordingly. Why were so many sent by their home offices? Why were so many accepted as legitimate by the Pentagon?

In September of 1990, when armed conflict in the gulf seemed a distinct possibility, the U.S. military could and should have invited U.S. press and wire service organizations to nominate candidates for training in all aspects of war reporting. The maximum number allowed: a total of 150. One month in Fort Bliss and Holloman Air Force Base, including parachute jumps and survival exercises, would have prepared the chosen for assignment to U.S. combat units. Fluent in military lingo and at home with a hundred acronyms — from AGM (air-to-ground missile, such as the "Maverick") to ZAPPO (a direct hit) — these certified war reporters could no longer be taken for PONTS: "people of no tactical significance." No pools and no censorship would be found upon arrival in Saudi Arabia.

Then — no strings attached — the First Amendment could have been put to a fascinating test of professionalism.

Mr. Gartner might have been pleased.
Curator
continued from page 2

The international press corps at work in the recent war suggests how close we are coming to competition in this mastery of the psychological atmosphere in which wars are planned and executed.

Forrest Sawyer of ABC-TV became the only journalist from the United States to fly and record a combat bombing mission. He did so by flying with the Saudi Air Force. While American journalists were being told, and reported, that Kuwaiti troops liberated Kuwait City, a Portuguese reporter, Adelino Gomes of Pubblico, told how the U.S. Marines had actually liberated Kuwait City. He was able to do so because he attached himself to the Kuwaiti unit and circumvented the U.S. pool system. Along with Peter Arnett of CNN, British journalists remained in Iraq and reported from inside the embattled country.

A press corps from 15 or 20 countries as mobile as the new technology will allow and which is willing to see the war or the preparation for war from some side other than that of the homeland may become the first line of the next conflict.

Should war begin and should censors sit in the news rooms of the United States they will be no more able to control the flow of news than the crumbling socialist empires.

In the end what may have been the most important battle of the recent war was the one which began in August, 1990, and continued until the ground war was launched — the battle to control the context within which political decisions and military actions were taken by controlling the message transmitted. Technology development assures that the next such contest will be even more vital and intense.

Just the two possibilities discussed make it even more important for the press in the United States to think more broadly and deeply about its role in society and its obligations and responsibilities, especially in time of national stress and conflict. Unless the press can better articulate the common national interest of a free people and a free press one or the other — or both — may eventually give way to the power held by a transient political interest.

Is Staffing Worth the Cost?
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hour with my ear tuned to Radio Baghdad. By picking and choosing, we could provide readers with color and tone.

The case of computer technology has had a democratizing effect. Any paper that provides a laptop and a modem to its reporter in the field can compete with the speed of the wires and the largest national papers. This means the big challenge is to come up with original ideas. Having reporters on the scene allowed editors in Dallas to set the tone for each day’s report. One day the correspondent could be assigned a light piece about the total absence of tourists in Egypt (imagine the pyramids deserted) and the next day the piece could deal with an emerging alliance between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

The paper’s commitment to covering the Arab side of the conflict allowed me to write about the future of the Middle East for a comprehensive piece published the morning after President Bush declared victory. It provided a valuable counterpoint to the euphoria as it suggested that the political problems for the region would be formidable. This sort of piece would not have been possible without having spent time in Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt during the conflict.

My previous experience in the Middle East had been limited but intense. I had spent several weeks in Israel and the occupied territories and had spent long hours in Palestinian villages.

I have found that a reporter can save a tremendous amount of time on his second and third visits to a country, and my previous experience in Israel allowed me to get off to fast start. I had contacts at a kibbutz, for example, and was able to drop in unannounced and chat for an hour. In the process, I found a Sunday story when the kibbutz’s leader complained bitterly about an American rabbi’s decision to leave the kibbutz and fly to the United States for safety, just days before the expiration of the United Nations deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.

In retrospect, I perhaps gave too much credence to the anger expressed on the streets. A reporter based in the Middle East might have paid less attention to the mood of the “Arab masses.” I believed initially that this Arab hostility represented a serious political liability for the Bush Administration, but the threatened riots never materialized and it seems the anti-Americanism I found in Jordan and other countries does not threaten the Bush Administration’s objectives.

The time I have spent in Latin America covering various conflicts also helped me understand the importance of logistics. I always had several plans on how to file my stories and allowed extra time for unexpected problems. I know how to apply for visas and how to cross borders during times of tension.
supportive or dispassionate when what was really needed that night was at least one full voice of passion or anger. We tried to make up for it in following days, but of course the immediacy was missing. Much to the surprise of those of us who had covered Vietnam and its domestic fallout, even that bombing raid did not provoke the kind of widespread outrage we were anticipating. That was not because of faults real or imagined in our coverage. Shaped as some of us were by an earlier generation's experience, I am not sure we ever fully understood how public opinion was forming in this quick and decisive war. To get a handle on part of it, our Midwest essayist, Jim Fisher, sat down with two groups in Atchison, Kansas — one male, one female — who showed sharp differences on the war and on such questions as whether women should be participating in it.

Ten days after the raid on the Baghdad shelter, the war took the turn that everyone feared as much as they knew it was coming, to the ground assault. Again, shaped by experience, most of us were anticipating a fight of some duration, with high casualties, perhaps disproportionately borne by minorities. Our medical beat had done a segment raising questions whether the military was prepared to handle the casualties. We wanted to make sure that our military analysts during the ground war included black retired officers. That proved much harder than anticipated, even working with officers who had the best connections in that community. Parallel to civilian public opinion, retired black military officers were far more skeptical than their white counterparts about this war, but almost all of them were reluctant to go on national television and voice those doubts. (A week before the ground war began, a tape report from the predominantly Hispanic town of Villanueva, New Mexico, where 30 residents were in the gulf, showed doubts beneath the appearances of patriotic support for the troops. After the war, we aired Hunter-Gault’s package of interviews with black soldiers in the gulf and a four-way studio discussion around the question that the military seems to offer one of the few opportunities in this society for minority youth). Given the speed of the assault, the issues we were prepared to talk about did not directly arise. We spent only three nights discussing ground war tactics and strategy before turning our attention back to the diplomatic and political aspects of the war.

Less than 24 hours after President Bush announced a ceasefire, our viewers had a first hand indication that the war would not quickly produce a new world order in the Middle East. One of the guests was Kuwait’s Ambassador to the United Nations. In response to Judy Woodruff’s question, he made clear that his country had no intention of reversing policy and recognizing Israel. The war in the Middle East had not lasted as long as we expected; the conflicts of the Middle East may endure far longer.

But for the first time, that conflict produced a lengthy rolcall of American names. Every night, and for some nights after the official end of the war, we concluded the show with a silent display of the names and home towns of the American men and women killed in action. For a program that often is oriented to events and guests in Washington, it was a graphic but all too brief reminder that war means one thing in the capital and something very different in such places as the Bronx, Mayport, Florida, and Bedford, Indiana.

As for the lessons we are always in search of, there probably are not too many, just as Vietnam provided few for this war in terms of the performance of the American military or American public opinion. In the unfortunate likelihood of another war in our journalistic careers, we can realistically anticipate the military will try to exert the same kind of control of the coverage as they did in Saudi Arabia. Our effort to maintain detachment and skepticism without carping and moaning remains forever daunting. But most curiously for those of us in television, we find ourselves very much like the photographers and correspondents of the Civil War. They used the new technology of their time, photographs and telegraphed words, but still only partially portrayed that first of modern wars fought by an industrial nation. No matter how much television technology improves our capability to send pictures and sound instantaneously over thousands of miles, we probably never will be able to convey the full force and fury of 21st century warfare that was on preview for 43 day in the Middle East.
A Plan for TV
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ABC News about merging with WTN, ABC's partly owned international news gathering agency. The networks are turning into TV news packagers, rather than the premier TV news gatherers they once were.

The economic constraints of the new TV environment are also forcing the networks to replace high-cost entertainment programs on their schedules with "reality" shows that are comparatively inexpensive to produce. Even discounting several of the networks' frivolous and regrettable new tabloid news shows, they now have more programming vehicles available to carry thoughtful, interpretive news reports during times of crisis. The better network nighttime news series, Ted Koppel's Nightline, 60 Minutes, 48 Hours, 20/20 and Prime Time, have no competition from CNN, local affiliates or independent stations. When the next war comes, they can give network television an edge by providing authoritative, intelligent, follow-up reporting that will try to make sense of the breaking news and put it into perspective.

The changing role of network news, from news gathering to news packaging, could conceivably produce a reordering of television's coverage that might provide notable public benefits during the next world crisis. Under the best scenario for the future, a more journalistically sound and editorially disciplined CNN would concentrate on providing continuing live, real-time picture coverage from the scene of the action, wherever it may happen. The old-line networks, whichever of them is still in business, would emphasize the production of timely, thoughtful summary reports that put the news in perspective. Rather than compete head-on against CNN's continuing live coverage, these special network reports would appear in specific time periods on each network's schedule. They would feature interpretive reporting, expert analysis and important interviews. They would utilize the networks' beat correspondents, traditionally the best and most experienced journalists in television, as well as the networks' experienced anchors.

There would be some overlap, of course, between the networks' packaged coverage and CNN's ongoing coverage. The networks would certainly go live to report key events and developments of the next war as they did during the last one. But the networks' principal role would be to summarize and distill the news from the battlefield in produced programs, with independent reporting by their corps of experienced war correspondents as well as those assigned to the Pentagon, State Department, Defense Department, White House and Congress, and the major diplomatic centers throughout the world. The networks would put the various complex elements of the story in context after the fact and provide much-needed perspective, coherence and understanding. Such interpretive reporting on television would be a boon to viewers. From the networks' perspective, this approach would be far more economical and would do far less damage to their regular program schedule than the continuing live, on-the-scene coverage, which CNN would always have an edge in providing in any event.

Public television, in this ideal division of labor, would supplement and enrich television's war coverage by opening its programs to discussions by academics and other experts — historians, political scientists, economists and military and diplomatic authorities of every stripe — to provide background analysis and scholarly insight. PBS' "talking heads" would bring a valuable added dimension to television via its daily studio-bound MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, its weekly public affairs programs, its detailed interviews by Bill Moyers, William F. Buckley and others, and its Frontline documentaries.

In a famous passage in Public Opinion, published in 1922, Walter Lippmann described the press as "the beam of a searchlight that moves restless about, bringing one episode and then another out of the darkness into vision." Lippmann concluded, "Men cannot do the work of the world by this light alone. They cannot govern society by episodes, incidents and eruptions." In today's world of instantaneous telecommunications, his classic description of the limitations of the press is more relevant than ever.

The need to overcome the one-dimensional and episodic quality of live television has become increasingly evident in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. By providing thoughtful, intelligent journalism that emphasizes independent human reporting over the electronic wizardry of instantaneous coverage, the networks will have a major role to play in bringing the nation a clearer picture of the news of the next war than they did of the last one.

Bush's Policy
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the military was giving out the war plans. If you read our newspapers and magazines, the stories would show you the arrows, "here we're gonna attack this way and then we got the Marines coming in this way." You could hardly read a publication without seeing almost the very battle plan we were to use. And who were we getting these plans from? The reason why it's important not to deny the press access is precisely because governments are making mistakes all the time and it's very hard for the bosses to know about the mistakes from their subordinates. We in the media tell everybody about the mistakes even though we also make some mistakes in the process. I like that system. The second lesson I think we've learned for the press is that we really have to be extra careful about being cheerleaders. We're Americans, we're partisans, we feel good about actually winning something in a righteous cause, but it's not our business to forget our business. Which is "to know" and "to needle." Thank you.
From a military standpoint, it is now clearer that the relative freedom to report the war in Vietnam was an unfortunate exception. Since then, and from now on, all journalists most likely will experience the type of physical constraints on reporting seen in Panama and Saudi Arabia/Iraq because, again from the military standpoint, it worked fine. Along with other organizations, NPR will have to decide whether we will go along with any future pool arrangements, if the Pentagon does not lift or substantially ease its restrictions. Having reporters on the scene will clearly not be enough if they cannot report and file stories on what they actually see.

Conservatives have criticized the media for repeating Saddam’s propaganda without analysis and making the military’s job more difficult by revealing secrets. We disagree with both of these charges. Reporting what Iraq was saying and analyzing it was part of our daily broadcast, although it was difficult to get information on events and attitudes inside that country, except from people who had just left. There were at least two times when others in the media used locations the military would have preferred had not been disclosed. At NPR we know of many examples where the media, including our reporters, had intelligence information in advance on operations or clandestine missions that was not revealed because it might have jeopardized those involved.

In general, journalists at NPR believe we reached an important, higher level of news programming during the gulf war. We believe our audience now expects us to continue at that level in the future. That, too, is our hope. Our worry is that without the kind of additional resources we had during the war, we may not be able to meet those expectations over the long term. The postwar reality is that budgets at NPR News are very, very tight.

The dangers of pack reporting and limited sourcing is apparent in broadcast news programs as well, according to the media watchdog group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR). FAIR analyzed the guest lists on ABC’s Nightline and MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour during August, the first month of the crisis. The group found that whites made up about 98 percent of Nightline’s U.S. guest list and 87 percent of the NewsHour’s.

In January, FAIR conducted another survey of Persian Gulf coverage, this time of the evening newscasts of ABC, NBC and CBS and found that 47 percent of the sources used were representatives of U.S. or allied governments. About 37 percent represented non-Governmental Americans, 13 percent non-Governmental people in the rest of the world and 2 percent officials of non-allied Governments. The survey did not break down sources by race or sex, but clearly indicates that the press continues to fail to reach for diverse sources beyond those convenient and comfortable to the status quo.

More than 20 years after the Kerner Commission found that the press was guilty of discriminatory practices and was woefully unprepared to cover domestic events, the American press is still failing to diversify significantly in all its ranks, including foreign coverage. At a time when corporations and governments are devising competitive global strategies for survival, the press continues to be short sighted in devising strategies to make sure that is has a diverse workforce that offers a competitive advantage.

No news executive can claim excellence in domestic or foreign coverage if that coverage fails to reflect the fabric of society and diversity both in this country and abroad. Without offering the public divergent views with all the resources available to us, we are practicing self-censorship every day. As an industry, we are failing our First Amendment mandate.
Terrific — And Disappointing

The Patriarch
The Rise and Fall of the Bingham Dynasty
By Susan E. Tifft and Alex S. Jones
Summit Books, New York $24.95

by Mark Ethridge III

Not long after the first copies of The Patriarch: The Rise and Fall of the Bingham Dynasty hit the bookshelves, Mary Bingham fired off a letter to the editor of The Louisville Courier-Journal, the flagship of the media empire the family once owned.

The authors, the widow of Barry Bingham, complained, had misled her about the kind of book they were writing.

What she had expected, it seems, was a book about the building by her husband and family of one of the finest newspapers the country has known, The Louisville Courier-Journal. What she got, she complained, was "a psychobiography in which all the motives and even facial expressions of people dead 50 years are imagined by the writer."

In a sense, I share her disappointment. This is a terrific book. But it is not about journalism, although it might well have been.

The Louisville Courier-Journal and its sister paper, the afternoon Louisville Times, actually operated on the proposition that good, fair crusading newspapering would produce a satisfactory financial return — a notion to which today's dailies mostly pay lip service. It worked. While fighting poverty and the Ku Klux Klan and ardently supporting the New Deal, civil rights, and other social justice issues, the newspaper grew in profits and reach, ultimately saturating Kentucky, even the distant coal hollows in the east. The Bingham empire grew to include television and radio stations and the Standard Gravure Printing Co., the printer of many papers' Sunday supplements.

How these journalistic tensions played themselves out is a story that needs telling, and the authors are well-equipped to have done that. Alex Jones of The New York Times won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the end of the Bingham empire with the sale of the Louisville newspapers in 1986 to Gannett for $448 million. His co-author and wife, Susan E. Tifft, covered the event for Time.

But instead of a book about journalism, The Patriarch is a detail-rich book about the dramatic rise and tragic fall of a family — a family to which things seem to happen in the extreme. Even to someone who lived on the fringes of some of it, it is breath-taking and shocking, a real-life Dallas on the banks of the Ohio River.

Barry Bingham's mother dies in a car wreck with her son in her lap. His father remarries the widow of Henry Flagler, the developer of Florida's east coast. She dies of syphilis and he buys The Courier-Journal, which young Barry takes over at age 31. Aided by his accomplished wife, Mary, and key associates, Barry leads the paper to greatness.

But just below the surface, tragedy lurks. In the early 1960s, the eldest and youngest of the Bingham's three sons die. One is electrocuted preparing for a party at home. The other's neck is broken when a surfboard carried in a car slammed forward. These were to be the managerial heirs to the empire. Leadership of the newspaper falls to Barry Jr., who struggles against a reading disability and devotes his primary energy to wiping out any vestiges of ethical impurity in the newspaper.

The real tragedy is that this family in the communications business can't communicate with each other. Sisters Sallie and Eleanor demand roles in the operation and are resisted by their brother. Barry Sr. is unwilling or unable to offend either side and insists on a settlement. After years and months of maneuvering, there is only one choice: sell to the outsiders, dismantle the empire and be done with it.

Amazingly, the Binghams cooperated fully with reporters who have sought to chronicle the end of the empire — from the memorable interview Mary and Barry gave to Diane Sawyer when she was with 60 Minutes to the access family members have clearly provided Tifft and Jones for this book. Family members who could not talk to each other poured their hearts out to the authors, making the tale even more compelling and tragic.

Given that, it would have been difficult to resist writing the book that we have here. It is a classic tale and richly told.

But I understand why Mary Bingham was disappointed. Telescoped into 574 pages, the rise and fall of the Bingham dynasty seem like an inevitable downward spiral, an event with no redeeming qualities and no good outcome. By dealing so lightly with the quality journalism that went on, what was good about the Binghams and The Courier-Journal is understated. It might have been a downward spiral, but sometimes it was a pretty good ride.

Mark F. Ethridge III, Nieman Fellow 1986, is publisher of The Business Journal of Charlotte, N.C.
Atomic Engineer cum Journalist

The Truth About Chernobyl
Grigori Medvedev
by Larry Tye

Grigori Medvedev is a nuclear engineer, but he takes a journalist’s approach to the world’s worst nuclear accident in The Truth About Chernobyl, the new American release of a book first published in the Soviet Union in 1989.

First, he explores how attitudes within the Soviet nuclear establishment made the 1986 accident almost inevitable.

“Information about breakdowns and mishaps at nuclear power stations was rigorously sifted by the extremely cautious ministries, which divulged only what senior policymakers deemed it necessary to publish,” writes Medvedev, who served as chief engineer at Chernobyl when it was built in 1970. That secrecy meant that Medvedev and his colleagues never learned about accidents at other Soviet reactors that killed and injured dozens of people and almost certainly would provide lessons on how to upgrade safety at Chernobyl.

While that tightlipped approach may sound all too familiar to journalists who have covered the U.S. nuclear program, Medvedev makes clear that the secrecy and disinflation in his country was far more insidious. Even after the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island reactor — which he says “the whole world knew about” — neither he nor other Soviet nuclear experts received from the Soviet Government crucial details they needed to understand what had happened in Pennsylvania.

Having probed the accident’s precursors, Medvedev follows its unfolding and unmasks futile bids to contain radiation that spread for thousands of miles and transformed a local mishap into an international incident. Here, too, his questions and his graphic, highly personalized storytelling seem more suited to the journalist than the technician.

With 20 seconds left before the explosion, for instance, Medvedev zeroes in on the foreman of the infamous reactor: “Panic-stricken, his heart pounding wildly, realizing that something terrible and irreparable was happening, he ran on legs weak with terror . . . to report to Akimov on events in the central hall.”

Seconds later there is this from a watchman outside the reactor: “The whole place is on fire. What the hell is going on?”

And finally, the view fishermen have from a mile away: “Most of the people out fishing stayed there until morning . . . People had grown accustomed to such loud noises. As for the fire, someone would doubtless extinguish it. It was really nothing! Hadn’t there been fires at the Armyanskaya and Byeloyarsk nuclear power stations?”

In those and other passages, the Soviet author takes his readers deep inside the accident — and the mind of its villains and victims — in a way that rings as true today as it might have five years ago, when the name Chernobyl came to symbolize all that is wrong with nuclear power and other advanced technologies.

His most gripping portrait is of events at the plant on April 25 and 26, just before the accident. A highly unusual series of experiments was being conducted, he writes, in which “safety was neglected . . . the personnel were not ready for the tests and were quite unaware of its possible dangers.”

Even worse, government officials in charge were notified of the testing program but failed to question it.

“Irresponsibility and carelessness at those state agencies had reached the point where they all found it possible to say and do nothing . . . There was a conspiracy of silence,” Medvedev writes.

Operators at the plant were thus free to proceed with an experiment that, ironically, sought to test the operation of safety systems under simulated emergency conditions. In doing so they created their own, deadly emergency.

Medvedev reconstructs the scene, this time just before the explosion that ripped open the plant: “Could the disaster have been averted in this situation? The answer is yes. All they needed to do was categorically to scrap the experiment . . . This chance was let slip . . .

Seventeen minutes later, “the reactor was destroyed. A substantial part of the fuel, the reactor graphite and other structures from inside the reactor were blasted upward. But on the dials of the central control panel of No. 4 unit, as on the famous clock in Hiroshima, the needles were to be frozen forever in an intermediate position.”

The incompetence continued after the accident, Medvedev says, as confirmed in later testimony from plant officials. In one case, a senior engineer is told that radiation measuring devices are kept locked up. “You boob! You rav­ing halfwit. You keep your instrument in a safe! Idiot! That’s just incredible! So measure it with your nose!” the engineer, Anatoly Stepanovich Dyatlov, replies.

Medvedev’s account is the latest in a seemingly endless series of books on Chernobyl, many of which, like his, seek to capitalize on an anniversary of the accident. While no reporter is likely to be bored by this rendition, many will ask what it adds to earlier accounts and why they should care about Chernobyl other than as an interesting bit of increasingly ancient history.

The first answer is that “The Truth About Chernobyl” offers the kind of compelling descriptions that are exceedingly useful every time you write a story on the accident. Many readers have forgotten what happened, or may never have known the intricate details since they were hidden for so long and leaked out so slowly; Medvedev will take them back in a way that brings the accident alive.

Equally important, the nuclear debate today in the Soviet Union is hotter than ever, with an anti-nuclear movement at least as strong as those in the West and
From a more parochial perspective, nuclear power is undergoing a potentially radical transformation in the United States. The atomic industry—which seemed moribund since it has not ordered a new plant for more than a decade—is promoting a new generation of "fail-safe" reactors it says are the ideal alternative for a nation desperate to wean us from dirty coal and insecure oil.

Again, Medvedev offers an important context to consider that debate, writing that Chernobyl "demonstrated both man's immense power and his impotence. And it served as a warning to man not to become intoxicated with his own power, not to take that power lightly, not to seek to sit in it ephemeral gains and pleasures and the glitter of prestige." 

Larry Tye is a rising National Correspondent for The Boston Globe.

Taking the Summer Off

Stolen Season: A Journey Through America and Baseball's Minor Leagues

David Lamb

by John Carlson

Not quite 10 years ago, Los Angeles Times reporter David Lamb hunkered down in a Beirut hotel bomb shelter with a dozen other journalists. It was then, with the bombs falling and the whiskey running low, that Lamb decided it was time to reacquaint himself with a civil life.

"I'll tell you what," Lamb told his fellow reporters. "If we get out of here, I'm going to find something to write about that's a million miles from Beirut. Like baseball. Maybe I'll find some little ballpark in Montana and just sit there in the sunshine for a summer."

Lamb made it out of that Beirut bunker and found his little ballpark in Montana — and dozens of others in small cities and towns between Provincetown and San Diego.

He made good on his promise, spending the summer of 1989 traveling baseball's minor leagues and bringing back, if only for a few months, the dreams and heroes of his childhood. The result of his summer of solitude is this delightful book.

It represents a significant professional change for Lamb, a foreign correspondent whose past books have included The Arabs and The Africans, both serious works.

Lamb says he wrote Stolen Season to run away for a time, to steal a season from his adult life, alone, traveling the back roads of America in a reconditioned Winnebago he christened "49er."

His is a kind of generous look at an unsophisticated America, a mostly rural and often forgotten part of the nation Lamb refers to as "something old-fashioned and wonderful."

Stolen Season pretends to be neither a great work of literature nor the answer to why baseball holds its special place in the heart of America. No great truths are uncovered here. It is entirely anecdotal and makes for a fun summertime read, nothing more, nothing less.

Stolen Season is about baseball in the minor leagues. It is about an emerging crop of greedy team owners who are beginning to sack the charm and integrity from a beautiful summer game for the sake of a quick buck. Happily, it also is about a handful of other owners who see the honest operation of their teams as a public duty.

It is about the players, all of whom, for a while at least, truly believe they are one of the precious few who have a shot at the glory and riches of a career in the major leagues. And it is about the heroes and dreams of a boy in Boston, one David Lamb, who wanted nothing more than to be close to his beloved Braves who had packed up and moved to Milwaukee.

Every other kid in America thinks wistfully about such things. David Lamb, at age 14, picked up his father's best pen and his mother's finest stationery and fired off a letter to the sports editor of The Milwaukee Journal. Lamb proposed what he confessed was a "stupid idea." He would write a column about the Braves for The Journal. It would, he said, be a look at the team from the eyes of a teenage kid in Boston.

"This I would be more than glad to do free," he wrote.

A week later, Western Union phoned with the response from Journal sports editor Russell Lynch.

"Send special delivery airmail by Thursday three hundred words whether Dittmer or O'Connell should start at second. Lynch."

He wrote for The Journal of course, learning at age 14 of dangers of serious writing and discovering, to his horror, that a critical word written by a kid can send a god-like third baseman into a major league snit.

All of which is how Lamb came to the business of reporting and writing and why even though he became a respected foreign correspondent with The Los Angeles Times, baseball was where he sought refuge on his return from cover-
The Human Side of Nicaragua

Blood of Brothers
Life and War in Nicaragua
Stephen Kinzer

by Kevin Noblet

It can be frustrating, to say the least, to try to cover as complex and politically charged a process as the Sandinista revolution and government in Nicaragua for a daily newspaper. Your editors, no matter how good they are, want the truth in time for the morning's edition. And no matter that this sometimes plays right into the hands of the ideologues and partisans who want to color that truth in time for the morning's edition. It helps to keep this in mind when reading the book. Anyone expecting something like the "untold story," as Kinzer and co-author Stephen Schlesinger so artfully supplied in their book Bitter Fruit, about the U.S.-orchestrated coup in Guatemala, is likely to be disappointed.

Many stories about what happened in Nicaragua, the tiny backward country that loomed so large in the minds of Ronald Reagan and some of his Administration's most powerful officials, remain untold. Blood of Brothers only reminds us of this. Kinzer gives an intriguing account of how the CIA created the Contra army, using Argentine trainers at the suggestion of then-Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner, in the early 1980s. But many details remain secret and Kinzer can only make mention of the allegations, such as the apparent involvement of a Cuban anti-Castro terrorist, Luis Posada Carriles, in the illegal Contra supply effort.

Just as William Casey and Oliver North made their decisions and acted in secret, so did the Sandinistas. To what extent were they supplying arms to other revolutionary groups in Central America, and thus providing the pretext

Their time is short — a 25-year-old in the minors is an old man — and yet they stay, holding onto the dream.

Lamb finds men such as pitcher Steve Monson, mired in Stockton and vowing to his girlfriend he would give up the game if he is not promoted to El Paso, the next step on the ladder he knew would eventually take him to the Milwaukee Brewers.

Alas, a sore arm would keep him in Stockton yet another year. His girlfriend reminded him of the promise to leave the game and plan for a life without baseball.

"I know I said that," Monson told her, "but I can't just walk out on this opportunity. Baseball's all I have. It's all I can do."

Sad, one admits, but these are not tragedies here. After all, we're talking baseball, not Bangladesh.

Lamb merely found a way to enjoy himself — and to take us along — on his summer vacation.

John Carlson, a reporter for The Des Moines Register, has just completed his year as a Nieman Fellow.
for creating the Contras? Were they involved (or for that matter, was the CIA) in the deadly bombing of a jungle press conference by the maverick Contra, Eden Pastora? Who made such disastrous policy decisions as openly confronting Pope John Paul II during his 1983 visit, and persistently cracking down on civil liberties and press freedoms at moments when it was most important to show the world they favored freedom? To these and many other questions, we still lack the answers.

Nonetheless, Blood of Brothers provides a poignant and admirably even-handed tour through a shadowy, wartorn landscape. Often it is a hairraising ride, such as when Kinzer’s jeep rumbles down country roads believed to hide deadly mines. And, while not unearthing much hidden intelligence, Kinzer makes up for it with insights on the Nicaraguan people.

The country’s most powerful and most humble citizens make it into this book, and explain, often in their own words, what makes this feisty nation tick. Kinzer’s portraits of poorly educated outlaws finding themselves suddenly in control of their nation; of peasants trapped in a bizarre but very deadly jungle war of ideologies; of priests and farmers and businessmen suffering extraordinary trials — these are perceptively sketched. And they go a long way toward filling the principal gap in American understanding of Nicaragua.

As Kinzer points out, in the formulation of U.S. policy, Nicaraguans were never seen as people with a history and their own motivations, but as geopolitical pawns. Anyone who reads Blood of Brothers will no longer be able to see Nicaragua that way again.

Kevin Noblet, who covered Latin America for The Associated Press, has just completed a year at Harvard as a Nieman Fellow.

About Journalism


A Bible of Television and Radio News

Now the News: The Story of Broadcast Journalism

Edward J. Bliss Jr.
Columbia University Press. New York. 1991. $34.95

The former writer-producer for CBS News has given us a history of the first 100 years of broadcast journalism. With a useful chronology, some notes and an index, it runs 575 pages. Despite its size and weight (a little over three pounds on a kitchen scale), it is scarcely complete, treating many developments in a paragraph or two. Nevertheless, Now the News may be the closest we have to a bible for the industry.

In the final chapter, Mr. Bliss writes “that something is amiss with network news, once the shining goal of broadcast journalists.” He points to desertions by correspondents like John Hart of NBC and the sale of assets, notes the excitement at creating CNN and stresses increasing competition from other media. He says:

“One hopes that the networks will not only survive but continue to report the news. For if in great contemporary moments the networks, including CNN, are not there to report them, who will? Not local stations. The task of sustained coverage of stories like Watergate and the civil rights movement is too overwhelming. The same holds true with events like the assassination of President Kennedy and what happened in Tiananmen Square, Eastern Europe, and the Persian Gulf.”

Mr. Bliss points in the right direction, but unfortunately ends his suggestive cure for broadcast ills with only one short paragraph:

“Radio and television are tools. They have been, still are, and will be no better or worse than those who use them. The history of the first century of broadcast journalists ends here. Broadcast journalists, riding the tiger of new technology, are making new history. But the issues arising — standards and freedom to broadcast — will be the old issues. They are everlasting.”

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—1935-45—

We received a note dated April 9 from Elaine Bevan Graffy that we’d like to pass on to you.

"Today is the first anniversary of the death of my sister, DOROTHY BEVAN ERSKINE, who was secretary to Mr. Lyons at the Nieman Foundation from 1935-45 if my memory serves me correctly . . . She kept in touch with many of the early Nieman Fellows . . . her husband is still living at 4812 Weyland Drive, Hurst, Texas, 76053, in case any of them would like to write to him."

—1941—

HARRY T. MONTGOMERY, former deputy general manager and vice president of the Associated Press, died on April 4 at the age of 81 in Greenwich, CT. He served as deputy general manager from 1962 until his retirement in 1974; in 1972 he also assumed the position of vice president.

Prior to joining AP, Harry was a reporter for The Detroit Times and Detroit Free Press. In 1930 he joined International News Service in New York. His tenure at The Associated Press began in 1937 when he returned following his year as a Nieman Fellow, 1940-41. On his return, he assumed responsibility for its foreign report for morning newspapers during World War II.

In 1945 he was named chief of AP’s Ottawa bureau. He returned to New York two years later as general business editor and, in 1951, became traffic executive, responsible for AP’s communications system. In 1954 he was appointed assistant general manager in charge of membership, communications and business affairs. The position of deputy general manager was created for him in 1962 to enable him to focus on AP’s business affairs.

On learning of Harry’s death, Wes Gallagher, former general manager of AP and friend, said, “As deputy general manager he started the technical revolution in the AP, from teleprinters to Teletype to computers and laser photos. He ran the membership and business affairs of the AP with great skill and fairness.”

Harry is survived by his wife, Emily, and four children.

—1944—

Word was received at Lippmann House of the death last year of THEODORE ANDRICA, reporter and Nationalities Editor of The Cleveland Press from 1927 to 1972. He was 89 years old.

Andrica was born in Radna, Romania, and attended college there before coming to the United States in 1921. He received a degree at Western Reserve University in 1923, four years before joining The Press. When he was first hired by The Press, coworkers referred to him as the “broken English editor,” but within a few years he was proficient in English and had mastered four foreign languages in addition to Romanian.

According to a Nieman Note of July 1976, he had made 37 trips to Europe in 37 years. He wrote about families in the Cleveland area in and the Balkans. He also sponsored folk festivals and spoke at a score of meetings. For 15 years he was editor of a Romanian quarterly published in Cleveland.

Andrica is survived by his wife.

—1945—

A.B. GUTHRIE JR., died April 26 at his home near Choteau, Montana, on the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains, where he had been reared. The newspaper editor turned novelist was 90. He had been in declining health for several months.

Bud Guthrie, who wrote part of The Big Sky in his Nieman year, won the 1949 Pulitzer Prize for fiction for The Way West. He also wrote the screenplay for the 1955 motion picture Shane and for the 1955 film The Kentuckian. His final book, A Field Guide to Writing Fiction, was published in April of this year by HarperCollins. Altogether he published six novels, a book of essays, a children’s book, a book of poems and five mystery novels.

Alfred Bertram Guthrie Jr. was born January 13, 1901 in Bedford, Indiana. When he was an infant the family moved to Choteau, where his father became a high school principal. As a lad, Bud worked as a printer’s devil on the Choteau Acamba, where his father became an editor. After graduation from the University of Montana in 1923, Bud could not find a newspaper job, so he worked for a short time as a grocery clerk, in a flour and feed mill, and for the Census Bureau, in 1926 he found a cub reporter’s job with The Lexington (Ky) Leader. He was in a group of 10 Nieman Fellows in the 1944-45 class. He returned to The Leader after his Nieman year, but with the success of The Big Sky, resided as executive editor in 1947, and taught creative writing at the University of Kentucky until 1952.

He is survived by two children of his first marriage (to Harriet Larson; they were divorced), Alfred B. 3d, of Choteau, and Mrs. Helen Miller of Butte, Montana; by his second wife, Carol B. Luthin, and two step-children, Herbert Luthin of Clarion, Pa., and Amy Sakariassen of Bismarck, N.D.

Following are some tributes to Guthrie: By The New York Times, which described him as “one of the century’s leading Western historical novelists:”

"In his approach to writing about the Old West, Mr. Guthrie was markedly different from many of his contemporaries. There was nothing in his prose evocative of the pulpily approach to Western lore that was then in vogue. Mr. Guthrie said he wanted to avoid writing myths about the old West. ‘I have a sense of morality about it,’ he said. ‘I want to talk about real people in real times. For every Wyatt Earp or Billy the Kid, there were thousands of people trying to get along.’"

By Max Hall, Nieman Fellow 1950, a Boston freelance writer: "The Nieman Foundation does not look with favor on applicants who want a year off to write a book. That was not the case with Guthrie. His proposed course of study was to examine possible means of preserving world peace, which he considered the most important question in the world. And he did study international relations at Harvard, in particular the illuminating courses of Payson Wild, Herman Finer and Philip Bradley. But he also studied American history, did an immense amount of research on Western settlement, and began using his discoveries in the early chapters of a book. He also studied American Literature, and he campaigned for an improvement in newspaper writing.

"Guthrie discovered a writing course of Professor Theodore Morrison, decided that Nieman Fellows ought to devote part of their time to the craft of writing, and persuaded his classmates to join in. According to Morrison, Guthrie and his group ‘offered me the flattering but alarming privilege of presiding over a shop course.’ This was Morrison’s seminar for Nieman Fellows, which he conducted for years."

"In the introduction to a special issue of
By Bert Lindler (Nieman Fellow 1989) of The Great Falls (Mont.) Tribune:

After Guthrie had completed his first successful novel, he and his publisher were trying to come up with a title. Guthrie recalled his father’s words his first day after coming to Montana from Indiana: ‘By George, I’m free under the big sky.’

“The title stuck, ending up on the state’s license plates, promotional literature and many of the state’s businesses, including the ski resort south of Bozeman . . . He practiced and preached environmentalism long before the word was coined . . . Last year he donated 80 acres of his land to the Nature Conservancy’s Pine Butte Preserve. The preserve, set aside for grizzly bears, rare plants and dinosaur fossils, adjoins his land.

The family has asked that any donations be given to The Nature Conservancy or to further literacy efforts.

—1950—

Donald J. Gonzales writes the following appreciation of Clark R. Mollenhoff, who died March 2 in Lexington, VA.

America has lost one of its most decorated journalists, CLARK R. MOLLENHOFF. The nation has also lost its most abrasive, pugnacious, single-minded, determined investigative reporter. Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon couldn’t stand Clark. He operated from a front row seat at news conferences, firing and sometimes bellowing embarrassing salvos of questions at Presidents — and others.

At a January luncheon in his Lexington home, Clark was still inveighing against ‘those lying sons-of-bitches’ he had encountered over the years in government, labor and most everywhere. Then, parenthetically over dessert, he took only a moment to mention, ‘I have melanoma of the liver.’ Asked what kind of treatment he was taking, Clark declared (with a hint of contempt for the disease): ‘I’m not going to do a damn thing about it. I’m not going to try anything. I’m just leaving it all in the hands of the Good Lord, he’ll settle it one way or the other.’

Then he quickly told of his long-range plans to transfer from Washington and Lee to Wyoming, plans to speak at William and Mary, to travel more, to pen an autobiography, and to publish a book of poems later this year — among many other projects.

Clark was never intimidated by setbacks and he never had small problems. Once I visited him in a hospital after he had been hit by a dump truck in Iowa. He was in a Stryker bed with screws in a steel plate in his skull. Not too long ago fellow Nieman Hays Gorey of Time asked Clark, ‘How are things with you?’

‘Oh, I’m okay. But that eye had to go (cancer). I had to get rid of it. I’m fine.’

Once, when Clark was busy putting Jimmy Hoffa in jail and winning a Pulitzer Prize for doing the job, I asked Clark, ‘Do you ever worry about what could happen to you?’

‘Hell no,’ he replied. ‘The other day after a committee hearing, Jimmy came over to me and said, “Mollenhoff, what is your price?” I told him I didn’t have any price. Jimmy said, “You’re kidding. Everyone has his price.' Clark stood up to his 6’4” height, arranged his 250 pounds, leaned forward and declared, “Jimmy, you’ve finally met a man who has no price. Is that clear?”

In a more pensive mood earlier this year, Clark looked back over his life and recalled how his father drove a fuel truck to support his family. ‘We didn’t have any money,’ he said, ‘we were downright poor, p-o-o-r. But we always had plenty to eat. And I delivered newspapers and some weeks I’d put some quarters in a pile on my bedroom shelf.’

Meeting Mollenhoff for the first time at Harvard was an experience beyond belief. When our Nieman group arrived at Harvard, Clark, a captain of several sports at Drake University, set about organizing a Nieman basketball team of twelve over-the-hill, overweight, out-of-wind journalistic “athletes.” It was a funny idea. Undaunted, Clark had us thirty-plus year-old guys puffing up and down the court. One day at the point of exhaustion, I lost my bearings — the court turned completely around. Sitting on the floor trying to fight back to reality, I gasped, “Mollenhoff — no more, I quit. Why don’t you organize a softball team? We’ll play the Radcliffe girls and put a keg of beer on second base.” And he did. (The girls beat us badly.)

Winning prizes for his heroic work was easy for Clark. From the Pulitzer on, across the boards, he was cited many times for uncovering graft, fraud and wrong-doing in high places. He revelled in being the sleuth and pursuing the “S-O-Bs” to the bitter end.

But over the years even Clark changed from his earlier exuberance for athletics, games, any relaxing frivolity. ‘I don’t have time to play games,’ he said at lunch. ‘They take too much time.’ That wasn’t the old tenacious bulldog who earlier in life did play games and, at the same time, found time to become an investigative reporter without match in our time.

—1954—

BOB BERGENHEIM sees a lot of merit in the back to the future movement.

For starters, he and his former wife, Elizabeth, remarried after five lonely years of divorce. Their seven kids were happy to tell their friends that their parents just got married (again).
Also, Bob and son Roger bought back the 50 percent of the Providence Business News they sold five years ago, so they now own it all.

In addition, Bob and Roger bought the Ocean State College News, a monthly tabloid that reports on the 12 colleges and universities in Rhode Island.

—1959—

The U.S. House of Representatives received a tribute in April to JOHN SEIGENTHALER, chairman, publisher, and chief executive officer of The Tennessean and editorial director of USA Today. Representative Bob Clement of Tennessee made the following remarks which appeared in the extension of remarks section of the Congressional Record.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me today in paying tribute to a man who can only be described as a great — a great journalist, a great businessman, a great thinker and a great American — Mr. John L. Seigenthaler, of Nashville, TN.

This weekend I will join a group of people in Nashville who are gathering to pay tribute to John Seigenthaler at his high school alma mater, Father Ryan High School.

Rarely is an individual held in the esteem that John Seigenthaler commands in his hometown. When an idea or proposal is offered in Nashville, inevitably someone will ask, and rightfully so, “What does Seigenthaler think?”

In his role as a journalist and as a man whose opinion is respected nationally, John Seigenthaler has helped contribute not only to the betterment of his own community, but also our Nation. From his contributions to the advancement of civil rights, to influencing the political processes of our city, State and Nation through editorial opinion, Seigenthaler has helped contribute not only to the betterment of his own community, especially as a member of the Board of Trustees of the University of Miami.

—1968—

FLOYD MCKAY will begin his second year of teaching journalism at Western University in Bellingham in the fall.

After 28 years in the news business, 12 in print followed by 16 years with KGW in Portland, Oregon, he became administrative assistant to Oregon Governor Neil Goldschmidt in December, 1986. Finding politics “not to his liking,” Floyd left that position in December, 1988 and spent six months as a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu. Following his return to the mainland he spent the 1989-90 academic year at the University of Maryland, College Park, where he received an M.A. in journalism.

Since September, 1990 Floyd McKay has been enjoying the Great Northwest and teaching at Western.

—1978—

KAROL SZYNDZIELORZ writes to update his professional life since his Nieman year, a life that reflects the dramatic changes in Poland.

Currently Karol is the Foreign Editor of a leading political weekly Przeglad Tygodniowy (Weekly Review), which has a circulation of 115,000, is wholly owned by the employees, is politically independent and, he happily reports, is financially sound. He is also the moderato of several radio programs in Polish, German, and English on Polish Radio and is a frequent contributor to the BBC World Service. Karol helped to start a daily program called Radio-Sat which provides listeners with instant information based on satellite TV broadcasts.

Since September, 1990 he has served as the acting chairman of the Polish Peace Coalition, an organization whose honorary chairman is Lech Walesa. In 1989 he was elected President of the New Delhi based International Association of Economic Journalists. Previously he served as Editor of the US sponsored press supplement One World, which was printed in 16 countries with a circulation of 16 million. Publication of the supplement was suspended because of financial difficulties.

In 1989 Karol ran for Senator in his home state of Silesia. Running as an independent, he received 18.3 percent of the total vote but lost in the “Solidarity stampede.” Also on the political front, political controversies led to the suspension of his television program, “This Week in Politics,” which was broadcast live every Saturday to an audience of approximately seven million viewers.

Karol is married to an architect, Krystyna, and they have a 4½ year old daughter, Julia.

—1982—

ED WALSH left Washington last December to become Mid-West Bureau Chief for The Washington Post, based in Chicago. This assignment is a return to reporting for Ed after over 2 years of work as political editor on the national desk.

The new job covers a nine-state area from Ohio to Missouri and south to Kentucky. He'll be covering politics as well as anything else that catches his eye.

Ed and wife Michelle's son, Michael, was married in July of 1990 and is now a graduate student in education at the University of Vermont. Their daughter, Cathy, graduated from William and Mary College in Williamsburg, Virginia, in May with a major in theater.


Mother, father and child are doing well. Margot describes motherhood as "delightful but relentless," and plans to be back at work as New York correspondent for National Public Radio on July 1.

John is almost finished with his book on quantum physics, which is called The Garden of the Forked Paths...The Quantum Nature of Mind.

—1984—

BRUCE BUTTERFIELD, reporter for The Boston Globe, was named a winner in the Awards for Excellence in Business and Financial Journalism for a five-part series on child-labor abuses.

The series, “Children at Work,” documented the widespread exploitation of children and the government indifference and economic changes that led to violations. The series was also a finalist for national reporting in the Pulitzer Prize judging.

Butterfield and 3 other winners will be honored in the fall in New York at a program sponsored by John Hancock and Fordham University's Graduate School of Business.

—1987—

MAHA SAMARA, from Beirut Lebanon, was in Baltimore in June for a conference of the 203rd General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. She covered seminars organized involving national and international issues. After the conference she went to Washington to continue her work and visit friends.
In February, DALE MAHARIDGE quit The Sacramento Bee to take a job as Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University in New York. Dale will be teaching basic news writing and in the spring plans to teach a course on social issues reporting. This spring he taught a basic news writing course at Stanford University as a visiting lecturer.

Dale also just finished a novel 3 years in the making. He’s polishing it now, and plans to show it around in about two months. It’s all a “part of my new life.” He said it’s nominally a social issues novel about the homeless, but he’s being encouraged by friends to tout it as “an adventure story about 3 hoboes.” Dale will be moving to Manhattan on August 1.

In March ROSENTAL CALMON ALVES was promoted to executive editor of Jornal do Brasil in Rio de Janeiro, the number two position in the newspaper. Last year he returned to Rio after approximately ten years as a correspondent for Jornal do Brasil in Spain, Argentina (two stints), Mexico, and most recently, Washington. Rosental reports that “Jornal do Brasil is the most prestigious paper in the country. It has a national circulation of 300,000, about 400 journalists, offices in a number of cities and a news agency that supplies information to more than 100 local papers around the country.”

LINDSAY MILLER sends more good news: “This fall I will spend three months in Japan as part of the U.S.-Japan Leadership Program, which is sponsored by the Japan Society of New York.

Now, you might ask, how can I do this in light of a new job and a new husband, as reported in the last issue of Nieman Reports? Both of them are terrific. But I hadn’t heard of either when I applied.

Last winter, I was more or less miserable at public television. Our indefatigable classmate, Mitsuko Shimomura, suggested I apply for the Japan fellowship. So, this summer, when I was negotiating with both ‘World Monitor’ and Peter Ambler, the three-months off was part of the deal.

Peter will join me for part of the time. I’ll be based in Tokyo and travel around the country. I want to study traditional Japanese religion and culture and see whether and how these values are surviving in contemporary Japan.

It is a great opportunity, because the Japan Society helps provide introductions . . . .”

Lindsay is keeping her old name, but does have a new address she’d like to pass long: 15 Madison Street, Cambridge, 02138


A call early in June to WILL SUTTON caught him and his wife Cheryl on their moving day. Will has left The Philadelphia Inquirer to become Managing Editor of The Post-Tribune in Gary, Indiana. Will had been deputy city editor at The Inquirer since December, and before that assistant city editor.

Will is really excited about the move and looking forward to the challenge and opportunities although hating to leave his colleagues and friends in Philadelphia. This move is not only a great opportunity for Will, who just turned 36, it’s also good for Cheryl, who is an independent arts dealer who will be able to be a part of the Midwest arts market.

The Post-Tribune is an 88,000-circulation daily, 97,000 on Sunday. Will will be supervising a staff of 74 and will be in charge of the day-to-day operations of the newsroom.

His boss is Betty Wells Cox, executive editor, who had been managing editor. The Post-Tribune is a Knight-Ridder newspaper, as is The Inquirer.

Will also reports that he and Cheryl were feted in a series of going-away parties, which were exhausting but exceptionally nice and very appreciated.

Will is hoping that his Nieman colleagues will remember Gary when in Chicago and stop by for a visit. His office phone: 219-898-5158.

—1989—

In May NORMAN ROBINSON was awarded an honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters from Our Lady of Holy Cross College in New Orleans. It was given in recognition of his accomplishments through determination despite lack of formal education and to showcase his being a role model for his community. Note was made of his Nieman Fellowship. In his commencement address Norman built on the theme of Harvard Professor Benjamin Friedman’s book Day of Reckoning. He challenged graduates to break the trend of wanton greed of the 1980’s, to get back to the basic principles and ideals that made this country unique, to recapture the spirit of humanity and the commitment to family, community and country, and to think not only of themselves but also of the generations to follow.

Norman is a prime-time anchor with WDSU-TV in New Orleans, where he does three newscasts daily.

Commute fatigue drove CONNIE CASEY from The San Jose Mercury News in January. The commute from her home in San Francisco was sixty miles one way. It was an amicable separation and she misses the paper. In fact, she was nominated by her paper for a Pulitzer Prize in criticism and still does essays for them.

Connie is writing non-fiction book reviews every other week for the View section of The Los Angeles Times and is looking for work with fewer books and more human beings (newspapers or movies?)

She reports that the family is doing fine. Harold has the same old job. Jacob, 17, will go to the University of Iowa in September where his uncle John Casey taught, and Christopher, 13, will start high school.

—1990—

The San Antonio Light has hired DICK REAVIS to cover business affairs in Monterrey, Mexico, where it opened a bureau in March in expectation that the Free Trade Agreement will be approved. Dick reports that “There’s plenty happening down here right now. Monterrey is the leading manufacturing city after Mexico City, but the leading exporting city to the United States.” And on his new position — “The great irony is this is a left-winger working on a business page.” He urges people to visit him in Monterrey although “it’s probably the hottest city in Mexico. It’s now 90° inside and will be around 115° in July and August.”

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The Class of 1992

Twelve journalists from U.S. news organizations and twelve foreign journalists have been appointed to the 54th class of Nieman Fellows.

The American journalists are:

DEBORAH AMOS, 40, correspondent based in London for National Public Radio. Ms. Amos plans to study economic and political issues affecting Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the changing relationships in that region.

MARCUS W. BRAUCHLI, 29, Tokyo correspondent for The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Brauchli will concentrate his studies in the East Asian Studies Department, the Kennedy School, and the Government Department.

GEORGE DE LAMA, 34, chief diplomatic correspondent based in Washington, for The Chicago Tribune. Mr. de Lama expects to pursue studies in history, economics, and law which can be applied to understanding the forces at work in Central Europe and the Middle East.

SETH EFFRON, 38, state capital correspondent for The Greensboro News & Record. Mr. Effron hopes to design a course of study in American history and society to focus on the nature of creativity.

Stan Grossfeld, 59, associate editor of The Boston Globe. Mr. Grossfeld's study program will include various areas of world history as well as American and European literature.

ELIZABETH LELAND, 56, reporter with The Charlotte Observer. Southern history, literature, and politics are on Ms. Leland's study agenda for a better understanding of race relations in the South.

MELISSA LUDTKE, 59, correspondent based in Boston for Time-Life News Service. Ms. Ludtke plans studies in the areas of economics, government, and public policy as they concern current social policy in the United States.


MICHAEL E. RUANE, 42, reporter with The Philadelphia Inquirer. Mr. Ruane would like to develop a course of study to examine the evolution of urban conditions in policies in the United States.

Mark Seibel, 37, foreign editor of The Miami Herald. Mr. Seibel will pursue studies in history, literature, and economics of Europe and the Soviet Union.

Tom Witosky, 59, sports projects reporter for The Des Moines Register. Mr. Witosky's interest focuses in areas of law and business administration as well as contemporary social and racial issues.

NANCY WHITE, 57, political reporter for The Rutland (Vermont) Herald and The Times Argus. Barre-Montpelier, Vermont. Ms. Wright will concentrate her studies in economics and public policy with a special emphasis on how money moves through domestic and international political systems.

The international fellows are:

YAMOESTRI, 32, U.S. correspondent based in Washington, D.C., for Jornal do Brasil of Rio de Janeiro; intellectual history and philosophy and international affairs. His Fellowship is funded through a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

DAI QING, 49, editor of Echo de Chinese Folk Culture; international politics and world literature. She is the recipient of the 1991-92 Chiba-Nieman Fellowship in memory of Japanese journalist Atsuko Chiba, late columnist for Yomiuri Shimbun and Nieman fellow '88; funding is provided by The Asahi Chiba Foundation, Inc.

MARIA JIMENA DUZAN, 33, columnist based in Miami, Florida, for El Espectador of Bogota, Colombia; international diplomacy and conflict resolution. Her Fellowship is funded through a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

MARTIN GEHLEN, 34, political writer for Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, Germany; environment and population issues and artificial intelligence research. His Fellowship is supported by the Robert Bosch Foundation.

MASARU HONDA, 42, political correspondent for The Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, Japan; role of U.S. Government in international political and economic affairs. His Fellowship is supported by The Asahi Shimbun.

CHARLES ONYANG-OBBIO, 35, deputy editor of Weekly Times; Kampala, Uganda; human rights and European diplomacy and history. His Fellowship is funded through a grant from The Ford Foundation.

WALTER THOMAS (TOM) REGAN, 34, columnist for The Daily News, Halifax, Nova Scotia; English literature and political science. He is the recipient of the 1991-92 Martin Wise Goodman Canadian Nieman Fellowship in memory of Martin Wise Goodman, late president of Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. and Nieman fellow '62; funding is from the U.S. and Canada.

CARMEL RICKARD, 37, Durban bureau chief for The Natal Witness and The Weekly Mail and Natal reporter for the British Broadcasting Corporation's Africa Service; law and the courts and human rights. Her Fellowship is supported by the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program.

RAYMUNDO RIVA PALACIO, 37, reportereditor with El Financiero, Mexico City, Mexico; the history of democratic societies and institutions. As the 1991-92 Knight Latin American Fellow in the Nieman program, his Fellowship is supported by the Knight Foundation.

SHIN SUNG-EOON, 51, editorial writer with Joong-Ang Ilbo, Seoul, Korea; American economics and international economic issues. The Asia Foundation and the Sungkook Foundation for Journalism are sponsoring his Fellowship.

JAN STRNAD, 27, correspondentproducer with Czechoslovak Television, Prague; international affairs and economics, American literature. His Fellowship is supported by special funding available to the Nieman Foundation for the support of an international journalist in the 1991-92 program.

FRANCISCO SANTOS CALDERON, managing editor for El Tiempo in Bogota, Colombia, who was held by the drug cartel for nine months, was added to the class in late June.