

NiemanReports

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This Issue

Our special section on Africa is made possible by the assistance of the Fund for the Advancement of Education. Its issue coincides with a national conference of the United States Commission for UNESCO in Boston, October 22-26 on the theme: "Africa and the United States: Images and Realities."

Nieman Reports welcomes and congratulates the newly launched *Columbia Journalism Review*. Its first issue is a handsome professional publication which evidently has the resources, staff and talent to do for journalism what the law reviews do in their field.

Journalism Schools

Welcome Critics

Resolution adopted by the members of the American Society of Journalism School Administrators at the business session, August 31:

Whereas, certain journalism educators have expressed dissatisfaction with the criticism of journalism programs by newspapermen,

And, whereas these men do NOT speak for ASJSA and its 65 member schools,

Now, therefore, be it resolved, that ASJSA reiterate:

1. That it and its members welcome informal and constructive criticism of their professional programs and activities by one and all.

2. And especially, evaluation by working newsmen, whose function is to criticize all American institutions including education and education for journalism.

3. That, if as is sometimes the case, such criticism of education for journalism is based on misunderstanding, the responsibility lies with the schools as well as with the press.

4. That the doors of all ASJSA schools are open to anyone and all and they are invited to study and evaluate our programs critically.

5. That ASJSA schools keep in close touch with practicing newspapermen through the ASJSA liaison committee of 50 editors, one in each state.

6. That practicing journalists and journalism educators are working together to provide better journalists and they must cooperate to that end.

Freedom in the Press

The various available histories of the freedom of the press have concentrated almost exclusively upon the threats of governmental censorship and control. Important as these accounts are, their emphasis is misplaced; and the resultant simplification of a complex process may be misleading. Even had these treatments been broad enough to include restraints from other than governmental sources, they would still have been deficient. During the last century, at least, the most serious dangers to the liberty of American

journalism have not emanated from governmental interference. The influence of private groups, limitations on the access to news, and the process of consolidation have more effectively inhibited free expression through the medium of newspapers than has interference by the state or by other coercive means.

Significant issues thus remain, in the analysis of which the criterion of external compulsion offers little assistance. For instance, reporters are less free to express their own opinions than professors, not

because they are more subject to control from without, but because a newspaper is a different kind of institution from a university. To understand the difference it is necessary to know why the property rights of publishers and college trustees evolved along dissimilar lines and why an intricate social development has given the press one status in the community and the college another. . . .

—from *The Dimensions of Liberty*,
by Oscar and Mary Handlin.

The New Africans

By Lewis Nkosi

"What is Africa to me?"

When the American Harvard-educated Negro poet, Countee Cullen, asked this rhetorical question in the Twenties he was signaling a new mood of militant self-awareness among the colored citizens of this country, especially the intellectual class of Negroes, the result of which was a new literary movement whose hero was proudly proclaimed "The New Negro."

The main impulse of this movement was to eliminate, once and for all, the shoddy comical Negro stereotype which had proliferated in American literature, theatre and film: the bumbling, eye-rolling Uncle Tom butler or janitor.

This movement is noteworthy because it provides a close parallel to what is happening on the continent of Africa today. People who seek to deal with Africans had better understand the questions which are agitating their minds and the answers which they are trying to formulate to these questions. That Africans are going to prove difficult, aggressive, even irritating, while they search for these answers, goes without saying.

After a long gray nightmare of colonial rule during which the question of their humanity was gravely asked and negatively answered, Africans are once again rediscovering themselves, their dignity and humanity. Obviously this has called for more than the mere staking of the claim to self-rule through the length and breadth of the continent; it has necessitated a complete cultural as well as a political redefinition of Africans by Africans, and to formulate, however tentatively, the goals for their society.

Perhaps there is no one more noisy, more dangerously quarrelsome than he who is searching for roots. This is understandable. The African has discovered that the history of his past has been veiled, deliberately at times, in a shroud of gray mystery. Perhaps no single group of people has been more conscientious than the colonial powers in seeing to it that this shroud of mystery and ignorance remains intact.

It is against this background of appalling ignorance about himself, his history and his particular mould of personality, that the African is reacting so violently. For one thing, painstaking scholarship and research are making startling discoveries about African cultures, the complex nature of

the social texture of their communities, their aesthetic philosophies of art, about their moral and legal systems.

Africans are discovering—many for the first time—that as early as the 7th Century African professors were engaged in exchange programs with Moorish university scholars at a time when many white races were running like wild beasts in northern Europe. It was at this time that an African university was flourishing in Timbuktu. The unveiling of all these facts is making nonsense of many assumptions about Africa and Africans upon which colonial attitudes were founded to justify the conquest and maintenance of slavery in Africa and America. It is only now that Western scholars are seriously studying the social phenomena peculiar to African societies, instead of seeking merely to impose their own social and cultural values upon the peoples of Africa.

This is precisely where the "New Africans" come in. Moving easily between the old and the new worlds they are the only ones who can bridge the gulf between the old culture and the new technological civilization. While they readily agree that there is much that ought to be preserved from the old culture, they are, nevertheless, trying to achieve a synthesis between the old and the new. It is now patently clear that the new African states will not only be richer for being eclectic, but economic survival in the modern world demands such an eclecticism.

However, the younger Africans now huddled around the universities at home and abroad know that in order to make progress they need to have a coherent vision of themselves as a people. They must have a notion as to the general direction in which they are going; and in order to know where they are going they have to know where they come from. Hence the constant need to redefine themselves and to project a new refurbished image of Africa.

Young African leaders like Tom Mboya and Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Sekou Toure, and a host of others who can be truly categorized as "The New Africans," are now militantly asserting their right to speak for Africa and to project her image. "Africa," says Tom Mboya pug-naciously, "no longer desires to be spoken for by self-appointed spokesmen. Africa desires to speak for herself."

The first thing to learn—which might seem easy enough but proves difficult to Westerners—is that a new African is abroad, and that the world being what it is, failure to sight him is going to bring all of us to perilous times. This is no idle talk. Dr. Verwoerd is at the moment sitting on a powder keg. Beneath that powder keg is a vast mineral wealth.

Lewis Nkosi, South African journalist on the staff of *Drum*, is on an Associate Nieman Fellowship at Harvard on a grant from the Farfield Foundation.

If the keg should blow up there is going to be the biggest tussle between world power groups ever seen in the sub-continent of Africa.

This new African I am talking about then emerged more clearly after the World War, not because he hadn't been there in the Thirties, but because the terrible events during the World War and a new political awareness had helped to bring him more clearly into focus. Many Africans who had dug trenches in the battlezones of North Africa and Europe came home talking exuberantly about democracy, and it soon became clear—perhaps hideously clear to colonialist powers—that in fighting a war which was supposedly waged for democracy the African had also come by a powerful weapon which he might use to lever up the colonialist grip in Africa.

Moreover it was not going to be easy so soon after that heinous war for any one to stand up and proclaim his superiority over another man on grounds of biology. It was at this time, when it was most embarrassing to colonialist powers, that the African stood up and staked his claim to rule himself in Africa. It was soon after that war, you will remember, that Dr. Nkrumah led the then Gold Coast, now Ghana, to self-rule and independence. All over the continent impatient young men were getting up, defying guns and arrest, and telling colonial powers to "go to hell." This was a new mood. "The New African" had arrived upon the world scene.

How to deal with this new man becomes now the biggest problem facing the West. There are those who wish that "The New Africans" were less pugnacious, more diplomatic, and less harsh in judgment and in speech. When Lumumba told the King of Belgium that the Congolese would never forget the atrocities perpetrated by the Belgians upon the people, all within earshot of the world, many ground their teeth in chagrin and wished that the man had been less outspoken. To understand this kind of speaking, however, non-Africans still have to understand the rage that is still eating into the heart of the African people when they remember the ravages of colonial rule, and the most eloquent of the "New Africans" will not tire to remind the Western world of the damage it wrought in Africa.

There are those, of course, who think that they can talk only with the respectful, the so-called moderate Africans, and bypass those who are considered "Red-lining" by *Time* magazine and its sister publications. This goes to show how hard colonialist attitude dies. People will not give up the idea that they can appoint leaders for the Africans and impose them upon the populations of Africa. There is no surer way of bringing an African leader into disrepute than making him the "voice" of some world power.

It was to avoid precisely this predicament that most of the African leaders chose to remain neutral. They are those

who see in this neutralist stance an attempt to economically exploit both worlds while remaining committed to neither. Africans are quick to point out that they would take economic aid from the West anyway. The West has taken so much from Africa that it is high time it put something back. However, there is more to this than a mere desire to play the East against the West for economic gain.

Neutralism in Africa today is a living ideology tied up very closely with a new spiritual dedication directed to seeing to it that the big powers should not blow each other up. There is reason to believe that even Khrushchev is very mindful of a potent neutralist opinion that Africa together with neutralist Asia exert against the world's big powers. However, in order to be truly influential the new Africans feel that they must remain unaligned to either of the two biggest world powers. They must achieve their own identity and self-respect. This is not possible for those African leaders who remain tied to the apronstrings of colonial powers. Neutralism in Africa is one way, therefore, of serving notice to the entire world that Africans do not want to be in anybody's pocket, that they seek to achieve their own identity, and a respect in the world.

Sekou Toure said as much when he declared that Guineans would rather "starve in liberty" than continue to take orders from Paris.

To this writer, the conclusion is inescapable that whatever conflict exists between African leaders and the Western countries at the moment, is due mainly to the failure of the Western peoples to realize that Africans mean business when they say they demand to rule themselves; when they say they will no longer tolerate white domination in Africa; when they insist that the old colonial attitude toward Africans needs an urgent overhaul. Occasionally, these days, one is asked: "But do you think Africans have had enough preparation to rule themselves?" This question is often asked by people who are armed with the latest facts about a new Congo massacre. It is to the credit of Moscow that such a question never arises there over the issue of freedom for the African people and their independence. For this much, the whole world knows, that the right of a people to rule themselves does not depend on the generosity of the overlords, nor does it depend on the preparedness of the people. The truth, and this truth has never been seriously repudiated, is that any man has a right to break crockery in his own house. If he bungles he will soon learn how to set up things right. But the issue never arises whether any other man has any right to take occupation of the house on the grounds that the owner is unable to take good care of it. That would be a ludicrous suggestion.

I like the story told often by settlers in Africa. It is said that an African traffic inspector was addressing a black

audience on road safety regulations, whereupon he was asked why we have to drive only on one side of the road. To which the African inspector is alleged to have replied: "This is just one of the impositions by the white man. When we get independence you will be able to drive on both sides of the road."

This may elicit a few laughs from the whites who are out to prove that Africans cannot now rule themselves. I am prepared to participate rudely in their laughter, but for other reasons. The truth is—and this is an outrageous truth—the traffic inspector was right. If self-determination must mean anything it must mean that the people must

have a right to drive on both sides of the road and get killed if they so desire. Conceivably after a few accidents they will change their minds and find it convenient to juggle the regulations around. But there is no way they can learn unless they are able to do their own driving.

The New African insists that he wants to do his own driving now. Only a massive collision can result in those areas where an attempt is being made to stop him. The New African will also know his friends by the kind of assistance they give him while learning to drive. He will also remember those who were only prepared to stand by and ask: "Can he drive?"

Congo: Reporter's Nightmare

By Henry Tanner

Leopoldville September 3.

The Congo is a reporter's nightmare—mostly because the English language is woefully inadequate for describing Congolese affairs.

Words like "strongman," "general," "minister," "offensive," "Communist," or "civil war" all have a generally accepted meaning and presumably evoke a fairly precise image in the reader's mind. Well, let the reader be disabused. Any resemblance between the things he visualizes, when reading such words in a dispatch from the Congo, and the things the reporter has seen is strictly co-incidental.

"General" Mobutu once was the Congo's "strongman" and is still to be reckoned with. But take the quotes off his titles and what remains? A general in the sense of West Point? A strong man? Certainly not. He was a non-commissioned officer in the Force Publique, the pre-independence army, serving in the "department for secretaries, accounting and stenography." For a while he worked on the fringe of journalism. He is a personable young man with an intelligent face and an attractive ready smile. And lately, especially when he has had a glass of champagne or two, he has been effecting a carefree military swagger.

But a year ago, when he held the Congo's fate in his hands, he was forever bemoaning his ill-fortune, complaining about over-work and ill-health. "Do you want to kill me? Can't you see I am sick?" he asked reporters who went to see him at his heavily guarded residence. Then, having set the tone, he dropped onto a sofa and held an hour-long press conference. Recently, as the capital was

buzzing with reports of another "Mobutu putsch," the general held a meeting with reporters in his headquarters when Adoula, then defense minister, stormed into the room and curtly ordered the general "to terminate this conference." "The 'strongman's' reaction? A nervous giggle, then silence.

The evening of Mobutu's putsch on September 14, last year, the Telex broke down earlier than usual, while Mobutu was still talking. There was barely enough time to type out a few lines on the live line to London. That night I woke up in panic, remembering my lead: "The army took over the Congo tonight." Of course the army had done no such thing. Mobutu had climbed on a table in a local cafe and there, to the surprise of the assembled guests, had *said* he was taking over the country. Once the announcement was made he went home and callers were told that the colonel had retired for the night and that further inquiries should be made in the morning. How could an experienced reporter be stampeded into confounding the colonel's statement with an accomplished fact? But a few days later the putsch seemed real enough. Mobutu was taken seriously, on even flimsier evidence, by the world powers. While standing on his cafe table the fledgling "strongman" had proclaimed that the "Russians must leave the country." Three days later the Soviet and Czech ambassadors staged a disorderly, hasty exodus, taking with them scores of "technicians," a dozen-odd planes and tons of radio and other equipment that had been intended to help Lumumba stay in power.

Or take parliament. Newspapers have always made politicians look more intelligent than they are by improving their grammar and compressing their rambling statements. But what do you do about a senate which solemnly decides that "the events of the last three days are void and have not occurred," and where a member gets

Henry Tanner, a Nieman Fellow in 1955, was New York *Times* correspondent in Algiers when the trouble began in the Congo. He was one of the first correspondents to reach the Congo and has dealt daily with all the nightmarish aspects of its story.

up in the middle of a crucial debate and announces that he has to leave the chamber because he "has something to do."

What do you write about a prime minister who holds clandestine press conferences in private homes and reporters' apartments as did Ileo during the crisis last year?

Or how do you report the economic policies of a government, whose working habits are these: A minister calls in his adviser and tells him that a plan must be worked out to give employment and decent salaries to 100,000 unemployed. The adviser promises to mobilize the experts of various ministries and to have a detailed project ready within two or three weeks. "You don't have two weeks," the minister replies, "I need it by three o'clock this afternoon; I have a ministers' council and must submit the project."

How can you explain, in the single paragraph that such an occurrence merits in a news story, that the project was submitted that afternoon; that of course it was totally unrealistic; that the minister, who is a highly intelligent man, knew it was unrealistic; but that the fact of having a project in writing and being able to adopt it in a formal meeting, solved the entire problem of unemployment in the country and disposed of it, because the government had "assumed its responsibilities" and that was all that was needed.

"To assume one's responsibilities" is a favorite phrase in the Congo. It means that an official, a minister or a general, has recognized the existence of a problem and has perhaps discussed it with other ministers or generals—and that therefore the problem is taken care of.

How can a reporter write about the "Cold War" and "communism" in a country where the representative of the Ford Foundation hears a furtive knock at the door of his hotel room one morning? The man who enters wears the well-pressed dark suit and white shirt that is the uniform of the successful politician and, of course, carries a briefcase. He identifies himself as a political leader from the interior and explains that his purpose is to solicit financial assistance from the United States and particularly from the enterprise directed by Mr. Ford. When the man from New York asks what the funds would be used for, the provincial leader, unfazed, answers in an urgent, conspiratorial whisper: "To establish Communism."

Or, how can a reporter make it plain that a "coup d'etat" in Leopoldville is not like a coup in Algiers? Why? One day a prominent foreign diplomat makes a routine call to the residence of one of the highest ranking men in the country. "Tell me," the host says after the preliminaries, "you have been here several months now. How many provinces do you think we should have?" The foreigner answers that if there were a request from the Congolese

government a team of experts might be organized to make a survey and come up with a solid answer. The high ranking Congolese has lost interest. "More urgent," he says, "how do you go about making a 'coup d'etat'?" The visitor, knowing his host's sense of humor, answers easily: "Well, you'd get hold of the airport first, then the radio station, the post office of course, and you might want to. . . ." Then he sees the gleam of keen and totally unhumorous interest in the questioner's eyes and breaks off the conversation. Next day the Congo is frontpage news. There has been a "coup d'etat." Kasavubu has dismissed Lumumba and Lumumba has deposed Kasavubu, and the airport, the post office and the radio station are focal points of the power struggle.

So it's all a comedy—a Marx brothers movie in an African setting. Or is it? I have heard it argued, before censorship on outgoing news was lifted in the Soviet Union, that in fairness to the American reader every dispatch from Moscow should be preceded by a box saying that it had been passed by censor.

* * *

Perhaps, by the same token, every dispatch from the Congo should be preceded by a box to this effect: "When the Belgians left on June 30, 1960, this country did not have a single Congolese officer or a single Congolese physician. There was one Congolese lawyer and perhaps half a dozen young men with some training as economists, administrators and technicians. These men had to run a country as large as the United States East of the Mississippi."

Whenever the dispatch contained a reference to "ram-paging soldiers," the box might well include a passage like this: "These Congolese soldiers belong to the Force Publique which lost all but a dozen of its officers, all Belgians, at the start of its mutiny immediately after independence. Before that the Belgians kept the Force Publique like a good police dog on a short leash but lean, mean and hungry. Whenever there was trouble in the villages, they let it loose to deal with offenders in its own unceremonious way." The box might add that what happened after independence was that the dog broke his leash and jumped his master in the way he had been trained to attack others.

Furthermore, if the dispatch referred to people being kicked and beaten with rifle butts upon being arrested, a bracketed insert might explain that beating a prisoner, whether he is guilty or innocent, a thief or a political offender, is a reflex that in this country comes as automatically to the arresting soldier or policeman as the pangs of hunger came to Pavlov's dog when the bell rang. The insert might add that Congolese soldiers and policemen got their training before independence.

There are many more contradictions and incongruities in the Congolese story which defy description in a newspaper

dispatch of printable length. How can one explain a scene in South Kasai where a group of us saw a charge of Baluba tribesmen, eighty or one hundred of them, emerge from the bush and bear down on us across a field brandishing spears and bows and arrows? How, without taking half a column of unavailable space and confusing the reader more than would be fair, could we explain that the tribesmen were not naked, not wearing feathered headgear, weird masks or rings in their noses, but dark pants and white shirts which, had they been clean, pressed and without tears, would have looked every bit as proper as the traditional garb of a U.S. office worker out for a coffee break?

How could one make it plausible, in a few well-chosen words, that many of these "savages" hundreds of miles from the nearest urban center actually were young office workers who a month or two earlier had been employed in the administration of the principal capital, where tribal and family ties had over the years given the Balubas a near-monopoly on office jobs, and had left the city in obedience to the orders of their "King" who wanted his "nation" regrouped in a separate state?

How could we explain that the handful of tough and reasonably well-trained Congolese soldiers who were with us failed to fire a single shot from their modern rifles and submachine guns to halt the charge of spear-wielding tribesmen. How does one describe the terror in the eyes of these soldiers as they scrambled aboard our truck to seek safety from the tribal charge? We couldn't ask the soldiers why they were paralyzed with fear. They spoke Lingala only, and even if they had understood our questions, they would not have known the answer. We could only guess that an attack like this, a band of tribesmen caught in an outburst of mass anger and mass hysteria, was to these Africans an elemental force like lightning or a tidal wave. One doesn't argue with the elements, one doesn't fight them; one runs and seeks shelter.

So there you have the picture of these Congolese who kick and beat their prisoners, who burn villages and push their tribal enemies back into the flames of a burning hut, who massacre each other and maim women and children when caught in a frenzy of tribal hatred. Here are the

"savages" of whom Conrad wrote only fifty years ago that the "worst of it (was) this suspicion of their not being inhuman."

How, having reported this picture, can one explain to the reader that these same Congolese are one of the gentlest, most sensitive people you ever met; that to an amazing degree they are capable of human kindness, of graceful generosity and that in their reactions toward strangers they are thoughtful in a way that Europeans like to attribute to "breeding" and to good manners being taught in kindergarten?

How can one explain that the tape recorder carried by a radio reporter might cause a group of soldiers to panic in fear and then to attack with rifle butts and bayonets, just because the gadget which looks mysterious and therefore dangerous, trips a mechanism of fear and, hence, aggression? How does one explain that the soldier approaching you with his finger on the trigger is actually trembling with fear even though you are not armed, and that he doesn't know yet, as he steps forward, whether he will shoot at you, crash his rifle butt against your ribs or pump your hand in a friendly welcome? How can you explain that moments later, having overcome his fear and his urge to attack you, he will thank you earnestly for having talked to him so kindly and explained the business that brought you here?

So, old Congo hands among reporters are inclined to admit defeat and to refer the reader to the one writer who did justice to the Congo—Conrad, in *Heart of Darkness*—who described the "general sense of vague and oppressive wonder"; who felt the "great demoralization of the land" where "there is no joy in the brilliance of the sunshine"; who travelled "back to the earliest beginnings of the world when vegetation rioted on the earth and the big trees were king"; who glimpsed "a burst of yells, a whirl of black limbs, a mass of hands clapping, of feet stamping, of bodies swaying, of eyes rolling, under the droop of heavy and motionless foliage"; who knew he was "cut off from the comprehension of our surroundings"; who felt the "great silence," and who summed it up as "the stillness of an implacable force brooding over an inscrutable intention."

The English Press Under Apartheid

By Aubrey Sussens

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the South African political picture is that the press, after 13 years of Nationalist rule, remains basically as free as that in Britain or America. People who live in untroubled democratic states tend to take it for granted that a Government such as that of Dr. Verwoerd would automatically impose press censorship. But it has not.

Yet the English-language press in South Africa constitutes a body of opposition such as few governments have had to suffer in any country.

At the time of the Sharpeville troubles last year the *Rand Daily Mail*, the biggest morning paper in the country, ran a front page editorial entitled, "Verwoerd Must Go." Within a week, a maniac fired two shots at Dr. Verwoerd, coming very close to killing him.

The Afrikaans (Government) papers made no bones about their belief that the man had been influenced by the attitude of the English press.

And it is possible that he had been. Journalists visiting South Africa are often struck by the completely subjective approach of the newspapers to party politics. This entire lack of impartiality is so taken for granted in this country, and runs so smoothly along the grooves of conventional political thought, that it requires considerable courage for an editor to attempt an essay in objectivity. An Opposition editor would, in fact, think a good deal more before supporting the Government than about writing an editorial such as the one entitled, "Verwoerd Must Go."

And the Government has not borne these many attacks with fortitude. It is seldom that a Minister or other Government spokesman makes a speech that does not contain an attack on the English press. The English press, in fact, has long been the main whipping boy.

A Nationalist member of Parliament recently summed up his party's attitude to the English press in one sentence. He said the Opposition newspapers were the main stumbling block to the survival of the White man in South Africa.

This makes it all the more remarkable that the Government has not yet clamped down on the press. The theorists in the Nationalist Party have long maintained that the policy of apartheid can never be successfully and

fully applied so long as the English press has a free rein.

Although more than sixty per cent of the white population is Afrikaans-speaking, eighty per cent of all newspaper circulation in the country is in the English language. These newspapers are in the main conservative and representative of big interests, but they have, by a process of almost unconscious evolution, become more and more liberal in their color approach.

Their chief clash with the Government lies in the fact that apartheid is essentially a policy of injustice, economically and physically as well as politically. And the newspapers have all through the years regularly picked out individual instances of injustice and presented them dramatically to their readers.

This has meant that though the Government has had its way with legislation in Parliament, it has never been able to operate in secret. All, or most, of its actions have been subject to the glaring light of tremendous newspaper publicity, both in South Africa and overseas.

One of the Government's most bitter complaints against the English press is that it is largely responsible for the bad publicity received overseas. And to a certain extent this is true. There are very few resident foreign correspondents in South Africa and most of the day-to-day news is sent overseas by staff men on local papers who string for the bigger papers and news agencies. The stringers normally send items that have already appeared in their own papers. The Nationalists regard this sending of news stories overseas which tend to show the country in a bad light as the height of treason. This attitude enables them to lay the economic ills which derive from the political situation at the door of the English press.

The Nationalists can never see any wrong in their own actions. They see the crime only in the reporting of those actions.

The English press is fully aware that by reporting many of the actions of the Government it is doing the country harm in the way of a loss of overseas economic confidence. But, for all its shortcomings, its view of its own functions as a free press is clear. Its duty is to present to its readers all that is happening in the country, with as great an accuracy and a sense of responsibility as it can muster. A newspaper is after all merely a mirror of the nation it serves. If the reflections are bad, then it is the nation (or its Government) that is bad, not the newspaper.

There is no doubt that serious efforts are being made within the Nationalist Party to begin a series of steps that

Aubrey Sussens is on the staff of the *Rand Daily Mail* in Johannesburg. Last year he held an Associate Nieman Fellowship on a grant from the African-American Institute.

will eventually lead to plain newspaper censorship.

A small but growing group of younger nationalists of the more fanatic kind have long pleaded that South Africa is engaged in a war of life and death in so far as the survival of the white man is concerned. They point out that all democratic states have in times of war accepted censorship of the press and that in the same way white South Africans should be willing to forego the freedom of their press in the interests of the survival of their race.

So far this group has not had its way. But it is clear that many agencies, including the Government press, are paving the way for the time when some form of censorship will be imposed.

The Government press has played a conspicuous part in this campaign. These newspapers are for the most part purely party organs, controlled by Cabinet Ministers, and they have always followed the party line with meticulous care. They have always envied the enormous circulations of the English papers and it would clearly be in their interest if these rivals could somehow be crippled.

Thus they have persistently campaigned against the English press, the most common line being an attempt to show them up as being something foreign to the Afrikaans way of life.

One notable exception has been *Die Burger*, one-time chief organ of the Nationalist Party, which no longer toes the line obediently. The *Burger* has been particularly courageous in the past year or so and it has done a good

deal of independent thinking. Several attempts have been made in the Nationalist Party caucus to unseat the editor, but to no avail.

The *Burger* has not lent itself to the campaign to prepare a way for press censorship and it is likely that this newspaper is the main stumbling block to such an end at the moment. It has enormous influence in the Cape and could do the Government a good deal of harm if it openly campaigned against it in any struggle for press censorship.

Many people in this country hope that newspapers like *Die Burger* and the many courageous individuals in the Afrikaans camp who are tending to break away from the narrow ideology of the Nationalist Party will in the end save the country from press censorship. It certainly says much for the leaders of the Nationalist Party that they have thus far resisted the efforts of their extremists to put a clamp on the Opposition press. Curiously, and ironically, it is this very free press which, though it shows the Nationalists up in the very worst light, remains their finest testimonial.

It is South Africa's free press and its outstanding—and unchallenged—judiciary that prevents the country from sinking entirely in the international abyss. So long as these two estates are free and untrammelled there is always the chance of a better future for this country than many of the less courageous can perceive—or than many of its enemies hope for.

The Afrikaans Press: Voice of Nationalism

By Sebastiaan J. Kleu

An outsider viewing the South African press would immediately be impressed by the fact that although the Afrikaners form about sixty per cent of the population of South Africa, the Afrikaans press is considerably smaller than the English language press of that country, in the number of publications as well as in their circulations.

One of the reasons for this is that, until the rapid industrialization started in South Africa in the Twenties, the Afrikaners were mainly in the rural areas and the English speaking South Africans in the cities. The habit of reading a daily newspaper is of course more firmly rooted in the city dweller. (On top of this the British are great newspaper readers by any standards.)

To the Afrikaans newspaper, with its potential readers spread over a large area, this problem of getting the news to the reader while still news, is sometimes a formidable task indeed.

It is also a feature of the South African scene that most Afrikaners would at some time or other read an English paper, while few English speaking South Africans would bother to take up an Afrikaans paper. This may eventually change as more and more English speaking persons are reading Afrikaans.

While a newspaper's advertising income is a function of its circulation, it is of course also true that the size of the advertising income is important to the growth of the paper generally. The growth of the Afrikaans press has been and still is being retarded by the fact that many advertisers and advertising agencies give preference to English language newspapers, sometimes even regardless of economic realities. This is due to the dominant position of the English speaking element in business generally, to deep-rooted prejudices between the two language segments of the community, which are not easily overcome, as well as to a lack of

knowledge of the Afrikaans language and press—since English speaking persons are on the whole not over-eager to read Afrikaans.

Observers from outside sometimes remark on the close relationship between the Afrikaans press and the National Party.

Practically all the Afrikaans newspapers do support the governing National Party, while all English language papers are aligned on the side of the Opposition: United Party, Progressive Party, Liberal Party, etc. This focuses attention to the fact that the political division in South Africa is almost solely on language lines. This is a significant fact, since it shows that South African politics has much more the character of a clash between nationalities than a mere political division such as one would find in the United States.

While the Afrikaners were striving to gain political independence, they also had to fight for the recognition of their language, for the right to have their children taught in their mother tongue and for the social and economic rehabilitation of a large number of their people. Most of these national aspirations met with indifference or active opposition from the English speaking group.

To the Afrikaners the National Party was more than a mere political party. It was part of a great national movement working on many fronts. Thus the Afrikaners' churches, the Dutch Reformed Churches, also had significance as a safe haven for the Afrikaners' language and for the preservation of their national identity, while the educational, cultural and economic leaders were often the same people as the political leaders.

The national-minded Afrikaans newspapers met with the same opposition as the other Afrikaner aspirations. So the Afrikaner journalist could hardly be expected to stand aside in barren "objectivity"; it was the most natural thing for him to join in the national movement.

So it happened that Dr. D. F. Malan, a parson from Graaff-Reinet, became the first editor of the leading Afrikaans newspaper, *Die Burger*, and later leader of the National Party. In a similar way Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, a professor in psychology at Stellenbosch University, who also took an important part in the movement for the social and economic rehabilitation of impoverished Afrikaners, emerged as editor of *Die Transvaler* in Johannesburg and, like Dr. Malan, eventually became leader of the National Party and Prime Minister.

The Afrikaans newspapers which chose to oppose this broad Afrikaner movement, failed one after the other. Even *Die Volkstem*, once a respected and influential Afrikaans paper, met its death because it took the opposite course to the main national movement.

Today the United Party, the official Opposition in South

Africa, has almost no Afrikaans press supporting it. Those papers can simply not find enough Afrikaner readers to exist.

The solidarity of the Afrikaner press and the Afrikaner political party should not be seen as domination of that press by politicians. If there was any such attempt at domination it would meet with strong opposition from the Afrikaans journalists, who are as strong protagonists of press freedom as any you can find. Press and Party are simply fighting the same battle, and it could equally well be said that Afrikaner journalists made an important contribution to the political thinking of the National Party.

Dr. Malan and Dr. Verwoerd have been mentioned as examples of the journalist-politician. One should, however, remember that they are in some respects products of a passing period in the Afrikaner's history. They were not "true" journalists in the same sense as men who start and end their career on a newspaper. Most of the Afrikaans papers are today directed by professional journalists who have no desire to enter politics.

Now that the Afrikaner national movement has reached fulfillment with the attainment of an independent republic, it will be interesting to see what the future relationship between press and Party will be.

With the growing political strength of the National Party and the Afrikaner, the Afrikaans press has a particularly important task in keeping its readers well informed and contributing to responsible political thinking.

The United Party, lacking strong leadership and the national appeal to attract large numbers of Afrikaners to its side, and incapable of formulating an alternative to the National policy of separate development of Black and White, has proved an ineffective opposition.

While maintaining a high standard in the news field proper, the South African English press has not been a source of great strength to the political opposition.

To my mind the two main forces which will mould the future of South Africa are Afrikaner nationalism and Black African nationalism. This is a question of numbers. While the minority groups of English speaking Whites, Coloreds and Indians may play important roles, they will probably not be able to decide the final issue on their own.

The English press reflects the feeling of frustration of a group that no longer holds the reins. They are also uncertain of the position they should take regarding Afrikaner and the Black nationalism. They seem to vacillate between a feeling of wrath against the Afrikaner and an awakening South Africanism, which opens new vistas of cooperation between the two White elements.

With an ineffective Opposition and a wavering English press, the responsibility for constructive political thinking

is coming to rest more and more on the shoulders of the Afrikaner.

Many thinking Afrikaners recognize the frustration of the English speaking section. And the English section is being steadily pushed nearer to the Afrikaners by foreign hostility towards the country's policies. Thus both the English and Afrikaans press may eventually reflect a broader South Africanism.

The relationship between Afrikaans and English speaking South Africans presents a strange mixture of centrifugal and centripetal forces which may well puzzle outsiders and which South Africans themselves often fail to fathom.

While the Afrikaans press has the unhappy task of presenting a hostile world opinion to its own people, it has an even more formidable task in presenting the Afrikaner to the world. Due to the language barrier it often cannot

even reach its English speaking fellow South Africans, let alone foreigners. Thus the Afrikaner is largely without a voice in the outside world, and the picture of his country and his policies presented to foreigners is mainly that painted by his critics.

But however restricted the number of people it reaches, the Afrikaans press may be relied upon to stand fast in trying to uphold the principles of reliable reporting, freedom of the press, and social and political justice.

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Leave Them Alone and They'll Come Home A Foreign Policy For Africa

By Clark R. Mollenhoff

From Dakar to Dar-es-Salaam, the new nations of Africa are asking the United States for foreign aid. Some African political figures are making quiet requests, while others are noisily demanding that the United States fill all demands or risk having them develop economic ties with the Communist nations. Most of the leaders of these new nations are willing to accept, as well as reiterate, the comments of some of our own political leaders on America's "responsibility" to finance the economic and political development of more than a dozen new African countries.

At the same time, the older nations of Africa are insisting on more and more millions of dollars to aid industrial development from Monrovia to Addis Ababa.

There is, and will be, considerable division of opinion on the degree of responsibility the United States has to give financial assistance to the new African nations. However, it is a fact that a majority of the members of both the House and Senate feel that it is in the best interest of the United States to contribute greater sums to economic, educational and political developments in Africa. The idea was accepted by the Eisenhower administration, and is being carried forward by the Kennedy administration.

Some political figures are opposed to the principle of foreign aid, but are supporting limited assistance on grounds it is a good investment in public relations in the Afro-Asian bloc that has so much weight in the United Nations.

At the other extreme are those who say they believe the United States and the other Western nations have a deep "moral responsibility" to bring the underdeveloped nations to the point where hunger and disease are wiped out and education is available to everyone. They will argue that the United States cannot afford to delay in spending the billions necessary to bring these nations to the point where the standard of living and educational level is conducive to establishment of a true democracy. It is argued that anything short of this all-out effort is giving the continent of Africa to the Communist camp. Many in this group will also argue that there must be "no strings attached" to the United States aid.

It is obvious why this latter view is applauded by political leaders of African states. It is a view that makes the United States financially responsible for developing viable economies where only the poorest economic conditions exist today. This view might be interpreted to commit the United States government to finance schools, hospitals, roads, and industries, without giving the United States any effective means of policing the specific use of the money.

It is equally obvious why this philosophy of major financial responsibility with "no strings" will not be highly popular with the American people or with Congress. In the first place, it makes the program totally dependent on the political morality of the recipient nation. Also, Congress has been unwilling to embark upon comparable aid programs in the United States.

It is certain the United States will undertake a substantial aid program for Africa, but it will not involve a sum large enough to take care of what is being requested by the stream of African officials who have been making the pilgrimage to Washington. Our foreign aid resources are still going to Europe, and there are increasing demands for more aid to Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.

From this background emerges the basic political-financial question of our African program: Should we spread the available funds over all of the new nations of Africa without regard for the Marxist political complexions of some of these nations, or should we concentrate our aid on a few West-oriented areas?

There are many in the diplomatic and political world who argue that the Communist-influenced governments of Ghana, Guinea and Mali can still be won for the Free World by a little understanding and extensive foreign aid with "no strings attached."

Travels from Cairo to Cape Town and from Dakar to Mombasa have persuaded this writer that any financial aid the United States gives to Ghana, Guinea or Mali will tend to undermine our own interests in Africa. I would disagree with the idea that extensive financial aid may win these nations for the Free World side. The only thing that will persuade these nations to abandon the Communist camp will be thorough disillusionment with the Soviet system as a means to economic development and a place of prominence in world politics.

Look at the backgrounds of the two men leading the anti-American force in Africa below the Sahara. Sekou Toure is a long-time Communist labor leader, and he was tied to a pro-Russian philosophy long before he became head of state in Guinea. Ghana's president, Kwame Nkrumah, is an admitted "Marxist-Socialist," who has been pushing a consistent Communist line across Africa even though he denies being a Communist. Mali has tossed its chips in with Ghana and Guinea in a political and economic alliance. Nkrumah and Toure have established an anti-American Pan-African Trade Union organization with a long-time Communist, Abdoulla Diallo, as the General Secretary.

While Nkrumah is seeking more financial aid from the United States and Russia, he is spending millions of pounds for an organization that spreads anti-American propaganda across Africa, through the Middle East and across Western Europe. Many African leaders resent Nkrumah's efforts to set himself up as the spokesman for all Africa, and they are even bitter about some of his activities in their countries which they consider to be "subversive."

Financial aid to Ghana, Guinea and Mali will work against the foreign policy goals of the United States in the following ways:

1. It will go to bolster systems of government that are already committed to the Soviet Union in their anti-American activities, despite any words that wishful thinkers may say to the contrary.

2. It will go to bolster the regimes of two leaders—Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah—who head one-party governments that are totalitarian as well as corrupt in their operations. There are enough friendly governments with the taint of totalitarianism or corruption, without helping corrupt totalitarian governments aligned with the Communist world.

3. It will go to bolster nations that are now engaged in activities to subvert such pro-Western nations in Africa as Liberia, Nigeria, Tanganyika, Ivory Coast, Senegal and French Congo. Money to Ghana, Guinea or Mali, will work against any money we may give to friendly nations.

4. It might demonstrate to friendly African nations that they may be able to obtain more substantial aid from the United States by giving the impression that they are friendly to the Soviet Union. This creates a political problem for leaders friendly to the U. S., for the opposition can point out that clever African politicians such as Nkrumah and Toure can maneuver to obtain aid from the U. S. and from the Soviet bloc. This is a philosophy that should be stopped at the earliest moment.

5. It will bolster governments that are spending millions of dollars for embassies, for labor attaches, and for elaborate entertainment to boost the prestige of anti-United States leaders. There is a chronic complaint among in the United States diplomatic corps over the fact that they do not have a large enough representation allowance to keep up with the free spenders who represent the so-called "underdeveloped" nations. Nkrumah and Toure are supporting a Pan-African Trade Union for the express purpose of destroying the influence of the Western World—the AFL-CIO and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)—in Africa. General Secretary Abdoulla Diallo, of Guinea, is a former vice-president of the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

6. It will bolster the financial progress of Marxist governments in Ghana, Guinea and Mali, and make those governments appear to be more successful than they would be if left to their own know-how, resources, and the aid they are able to obtain from Russia. It does little good to build friendly nations if we are at the same time destroying any possible favorable contrast by pouring funds into nations that are billing themselves as Marxist-Socialist in their economic policies.

The new nations of Africa represent as many difficult problems as there are nations. However, there is one problem these nations have in common: The need for

sound economic development through education and industrialization.

The Communists have some little initial advantage in dealing with African politicians who are obsessed with fast economic development. The Soviet bloc idea of a tough totalitarian government and complete economic planning is appealing to many Africans as the fastest way to development. The authoritarian tribal rule and the communal living tradition have so conditioned many Africans that the Communist philosophy seems only a short step.

The Western World must have one basic goal: It must demonstrate that those nations friendly to the West can make better economic progress than those aligning themselves with the Soviet bloc. It is only a bonus gain that Africans following the Western nations can also develop political institutions that are much more free.

In short, we must work on a long-time program that will dramatically show the advantages of working with the West. In Europe, the experiences in Austria, Western Germany and other nations have demonstrated that more consistent and greater economic progress is possible in a free society than in the controlled society of the Communist bloc neighbors. The same thing can be done in Africa.

The Soviet Union has not been highly successful in making friends with the use of aid programs. The Soviet Union is stingy on its aid, and where it gives aid it invariably pushes political ideas and engages in other activity that creates problems with the local political figures. We are as well off to stand back and let problems develop for the Soviet Union as they developed in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. From a standpoint of geography, the Soviet Union is not in as good a position to grab a full control in African nations as it has been in Europe and the Middle East.

Our program for Africa should concentrate on aid to friendly nations—Nigeria, Tanganyika, Liberia, Ivory

Coast and others. Only in this way can we be successful in showing the advantage in being aligned with the Western World.

Our program for Africa should eliminate all aid to Ghana, Guinea and like minded countries, until a sufficient time has passed for these nations to learn from their own experiences that alignment with the Soviet bloc is foolhardy.

If the experiences in Egypt and in Iraq are meaningful, the dealings with the Soviet bloc will create frictions. In short order independent leaders will feel compelled to take strong action to jail Communist labor leaders and political agitators.

In Western Europe we have the examples of what we wish to achieve in Africa. Austria's thriving economy stands out in sharp contrast to the economy of Hungary with its tight police control. West Germany is our show-room of prosperity against the bleakness of East Germany.

It is necessary, and even vital, that such a contrast be developed in Africa. It would not have been accomplished if the United States was trying to finance economic progress on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It cannot be accomplished by financing Marxist-Socialist governments in Africa that have an open preference for the Communist world.

When we have developed our contrast in Africa, any African leaders with a true independence will swing to the Free World side by their own choice. If some of these leaders are not free of the Communist organization, then no amount of argument or aid could win them.

Clark R. Mollenhoff, Pulitzer prize Washington correspondent of the Cowles papers, recently returned from a tour of most countries of Africa, on an Eisenhower Fellowship. He was a Nieman Fellow in 1950.

How the French Came to Algeria

By Edward Behr

This is an excerpt from the forthcoming book, The Algerian Problem by Edward Behr, soon to be published by W. W. Norton & Company, New York, which has given permission for this advance selection from the book. Edward Behr is a veteran correspondent of Time Inc. in Algeria. It is published in England by Hodder and Stoughton.

Captured from Spain by Barbarossa and placed under Turkish suzerainty in the sixteenth century, the hillside port of "El-Djezaïr" (later known as Algiers) grew into a noisy, prosperous, motley anthill of Arabs, Berbers, Turkish merchants, half-breeds, Negroes, Jewish merchants and moneylenders, Sicilian adventurers and a changing population of Christian slaves. Miguel Cervantès lived in bondage there for five years. Turkish authority was represented by the Dey, the Turkish Sultan's representative and his Janissaries were supposed to control the territory from the Moroccan to the Tunisian borders. In fact, real Turkish authority hardly existed: in typical Berber fashion, mountain and desert tribes and brotherhoods lived by their own laws and customs, and attempts to tame them provoked insurrection. Between 1815 and 1825, the Dey's army was constantly at war with Flissa. . . .

At regular intervals, throughout the eighteenth century, various maritime European powers, declaring themselves fed up with Algerian piracy—the city's most lucrative activity—considered going to war. But in the end, Europe found it was cheaper to pay protection. It was not until late in the 1820s that France seriously considered Algiers as a possible trans-Mediterranean prize, and her excuse for an invasion expedition grew out of a complicated commercial tangle.

During the French Revolution and after Napoleon's rise to power, the French had bought cereals from the Dey of Algiers, and even borrowed money from him to pay for wheat purchases. Eventually, however, Algiers' wheat commerce had passed into the hands of two Jewish merchants from Leghorn, Joseph Bacri and Neftali Bussach, who had built up a commercial empire that spread from Marseilles to Alexandria, even controlling the financial life of the Dey himself: Talleyrand, while he was Minister of Foreign Affairs for Napoleon, was an invaluable (and presumably suitably rewarded) ally. "I could count on nothing," wrote Jacob Bacri, the partner's agent in Paris, to his brother in 1803, "if I did not have the lame one in my hand."

As the years passed, France's debt to Bacri and Bussach increased, and knowing France could not pay, they did not

press for reimbursement. By the time France was ready to repay its debts—after scaling down the figure considerably—Bacri and Bussach had themselves fallen on bad days, and themselves owed money to the current Dey of Algiers, Khodja Hussein, who insisted on direct and immediate settlement by France. He wrote to Paris and pestered the French Consul in Algiers, Pierre Deval, but got nowhere. Perhaps Talleyrand's influence was still strong, for Bacri and Bussach did receive some payment, while all the Dey got was a note from the French Government protesting against the piratical habits of Algiers' seamen. On April 29, 1827, Deval called to present his compliments to the Dey on the occasion of a Moslem feast. Hussein asked him point-blank why he had not received his money. "My Government will not reply, it is useless to write," Deval answered. Hussein flew into a rage, hitting Deval repeatedly with his ivory, peacock-feather flywhisk, and shouting: "You are a wicked, faithless, idol-worshipping rascal."

It was three days before Deval sat down to report that he had been insulted, and it took France three years to avenge the flywhisk incident. There was no popular enthusiasm, in France, for an Algiers expedition. France was in the throes of a reaction against military glory—the logical result of Napoleon's conquests, which had bled the country white in manpower and ended in disaster. Most Frenchmen felt that France should concentrate on winning back the regions lost at the Congress of Vienna, and the deputy Hippolyte Passy summed up their feelings in the National Assembly: "I would gladly," he said, "exchange Algiers for the most wretched hole on the Rhine." But Charles X's régime was weak, unpopular, its people unhappy; and it was not the first, nor the last Government to seek an outlet in some "foreign adventure." . . . In May 1830, a French force of some 35,000 men and 600 ships prepared to sail from Toulon.

Less than three weeks later, Algiers fell, the Dey's Treasury—which more than covered the cost of the expedition—was in French hands, and France's military commander, Marshal Louis de Bourmont, predicted that "the whole kingdom of Algeria will probably surrender within fifteen days, without our having to fire another shot." Bourmont's optimism was symptomatic of French ignorance about Algeria. Three weeks after the capture of Algiers, a French-reconnaissance column to Blida, about thirty miles south, was attacked and almost wiped out. . . .

Soon the divided, anarchical Moslem tribesmen had found themselves an uncontested leader against the French:

in 1832, at Mascara, they united behind Abd-el-Kader, the handsome, intelligent, warlike son of an influential local "marabout."

Abd-el-Kader had definite plans for organising Algeria, and by 1838, with roughly two-thirds of the country under his control, he tried to create a kind of federal government based on tribal equality, with regular troops, assisted by locally enrolled militiamen. He set up Khalifaliks (provinces) with a hierarchy of officials to collect taxes, dispense justice and stock granaries for the Emir's armies. He failed because Algerian tribesmen were willing enough to fight a jihad against the French, but were no more willing to submit to Abd-el-Kader's organised, centralised government than they had been to previous Turkish and Roman rulers. . . . In 1841 the Molé Government of France cast round for a likely commander-in-chief, and gave the task of ridding Algeria of Abd-el-Kader to Bugeaud.

More than any other single Frenchman, General (later Marshal) Bugeaud left his imprint on Algeria; many of Bugeaud's own theories and policies were implicitly embodied, often unconsciously, by French army officers fighting in Algeria over a hundred years later; until Bugeaud's appointment as Commander-in-chief and Governor-General, colonisation had been haphazard and sporadic. It was thanks to Bugeaud that an increasing number of Frenchmen moved to Algeria, confident that his pledge to protect their homes and interests would be honoured. He not only laid the basis for "l'Algérie Française" but also for most of the problems implicit in the nation of a new densely-populated colony, for unlike Morocco's Lyautey he lacked both foresight and imagination. A conservative with no great breadth of vision but an instinctive understanding of the small farmer class of which he was a member, he possessed to the full the solid soldierly qualities of loyalty, doggedness and commonsense. He was popular with his own troops, despised by the intellectual writers and politicians of the day. He embarked on his new task with self-confidence, in spite of earlier misgivings about this "deadly Restoration present" (as he had once described Algeria) and never indulged in the literary histrionics of a Clauzel or a Changarnier. "Since we happen to be in Africa and want to stay there," he wrote, "we must see to it that the sacrifices this country has cost us have not been in vain." In a speech to the National Assembly before taking up his new appointment, Bugeaud explained why he had become a convert to Thiers' earlier policy of total conquest: partial occupation of Algeria had proved a "dangerous illusion" and the Tafna Treaty, for which Bugeaud himself bore part of the responsibility, had led to renewed fighting. Only the "complete domination" of Algeria would enable colonisation there to take place, and this alone would ensure that the conquest would be maintained.

"We must lead a great invasion to Africa, in the style of the Franks and the Goths." . . .

The *razzia*, or scorched-earth policy, had already been used sporadically by the French army as a means of revenge over an elusive enemy. Bugeaud turned it into a doctrine of war. "We have burned everything, destroyed everything. How many women and children have died of cold and fatigue!" wrote Saint Arnaud, later a Marshall of France, then a young officer. "The carnage was frightful," another officer described. "Houses, tents, streets, court-yards littered with corpses . . . in the disorder, often in the shadows, the soldier could not wait to determine age or sex. They struck everywhere, without warning."

The conventions of war were ignored by both sides: in reprisal against the *razzia*, Abd-el-Krim's followers mutilated captured French soldiers, and a French colonel, Pelissier, described how Algerian women themselves beheaded wounded French soldiers "then allowed themselves to be massacred, with a child at their breast, with the most awful resignation." Not for the last time, France lived in ignorance of the kind of conflict being fought in Algeria. Pelissier himself lighted fires at the mouth of a cave in which five hundred men, women and children had taken refuge, and all but ten were asphyxiated. *L'affaire des grottes* reached Paris, and became a scandal, denounced in the French Senate as "the calculated, cold-blooded murder of a defenceless enemy" and in *Le Courier Français* as "this cannibal act, this foul deed which is a blot on our military history and a stain on our flag." The Army in Algeria quickly learnt its lesson: barely two months later, Saint-Arnaud suffocated fifteen hundred Moslems in another cave, carefully left no survivors to tell the story, and in a confidential message reported to Bugeaud: "No one went into the cave; not a soul . . . but myself." Following Bugeaud's advice, the Government agreed that French newspapers should not have access to "too precise details, evidently easy to justify, but concerning which there is no advantage in informing a European public."

"It was not a pretty war, not an amusing war," wrote Saint-Arnaud five years after Bugeaud assumed command. Neither was it a popular war. French public opinion was impatient both at its length and cost, and suspected that France's professional army was deliberately spinning it out, for "how else is one to become a general in peacetime?" Beaten in Algeria, Abd-el-Kader surrendered in October 1847. Taken to France, treated with honour and respect, he spent the rest of his life in comfortable exile in Damascus, on a sizeable French Government pension, where he became a close friend of Richard and Isabel Burton and, in 1860, saved some 12,000 Christians from being massacred by the Turks.

The "serious war" was over after seventeen years of intermittent but hard fighting. . . .

The long, bloody conquest of Algeria had established a pattern of violence that would be evoked a century later with astonishing similarity. Despite the claims of contemporary nationalists, the legions of Abd-el-Kader were not in any modern sense a national movement. His people were more united by their religion than by any feeling of common destiny. But even in fighting for individual freedom, they betrayed signs of solidarity that were perhaps the seeds of later nationalism. "You are merely passing guests," Abd-el-Kader's men told the French. "You may stay three hundred years, like the Turks, but in the end you will leave." It would take generations of modernisation, a breakdown of the primitive tribes, before this xenophobic instinct could give way to a contemporary desire for a unified, self-governing state. Intentionally and inadvertently, France was responsible for this transformation.

* * *

THE presence, on Algerian soil, of 1,070,000 non-Moslems is at the heart of the Algerian problem. Were it not for this large and vocal European minority, it is fairly certain that France would either have reluctantly capitulated before the surge of nationalism (as in Tunisia or in Morocco) or itself have prepared the way for self-government and later independence (as in France's former colonial territories in Black Africa). French liberals—and North African nationalists themselves—often contrast French stubbornness over Algeria with British common sense over India. But India and Algeria are not really comparable: Britain, in 1947, had retained only a skeleton British-staffed administrative apparatus in India, and "Indianisation" of the administration, the armed forces and all other essential services had been going on apace for years. Indian generals of the rank of Brigadier headed mixed Indian and British brigades in Burma as early as 1943. In Algeria, the French Army proudly announced the appointment of its first Moslem colonel commanding a regiment (French equivalent of a battalion) in 1959. Unlike Algeria, Indians were not only present but predominant in all walks of life. Nor was there, in India, a large "poor white" European minority, insecure and vociferous. Algeria can be compared more accurately with South Africa, where the Europeans are completely predominant, or with Kenya, where a white minority has acquired large estates through the legal spoliation of primitive Africans. Yet Algeria is neither South Africa nor Kenya. . . .

The "présence française" in Algeria is thus the outcome of more than a century of haphazard and unregulated colonisation, tempered less by French policy changes than by political and economic vicissitudes in France—and later in Europe—which forced an increasing number of Euro-

peans to seek their fortunes in Algeria. The first settlers were, naturally enough, the officers, soldiers and camp followers of the French expeditionary force which landed at Sidi Ferruch in 1832. While the fate of Algeria was still in doubt, a number of speculators were already buying up property in and around Algiers from the terrified Moslems.

As early as 1832, some 400 Frenchmen, refugees from the banks of the Rhine, embarked at Le Havre, bound, as they thought, for the United States. After they had been at sea for several days, they discovered that a dishonest shipping agent was taking them to Algeria instead. Landed at Kouba and Delly Brahim, near Algiers, they lived for a while on army charity, petitioned unsuccessfully for their return to France, then made the best of it and settled on plots of land given them by the French army.

Like immigrants the world over, the Europeans who settled in Algeria in the nineteenth century came from the least privileged strata of society. Some were sent to Algeria straight from state orphanages; in the early years of his rule, Napoleon III used Algeria as a convenient place to send political opponents, and Left-wing revolutionaries joined a motley collection of juvenile delinquents, prison offenders and refugees from France's eastern provinces. Successive wars and economic depressions brought more settlers throughout the nineteenth century and up to the present time: a large contingent of Frenchmen came to Algeria after the 1870 Franco-Prussian war; steadily, a trickle of France's poorest peasantry—from Corsica, Auvergne and the Cevennes—joined political refugees from the richer Alsace Lorraine provinces. Later European crises brought other, non-French immigrants: Spaniards and Italians, fleeing poverty and later political oppression; Greeks, Cypriots and Maltese, eager to turn to commerce on French-held soil and acquire French nationality; settled Foreign Legionnaires and a sprinkling of political undesirables expelled from France because of their "royalist" views. . . .

Between 1871 and 1880 French authorities set up 264 new "colonisation settlements" and Algeria's non-Moslem population rose steadily. By 1912 there were 781,000 Europeans, and a French Government report, compiled in 1917, came to the conclusion that only one European in five in Algeria was actually of French descent. But by that time France had granted all Europeans (and Algerians of Jewish origin) the privilege of acquiring French nationality automatically, and the number of European non-French nationals steadily declined, until today, out of the European population of just over a million, only some 200,000 have retained their previous nationality. But a glance at any telephone directory of any Algerian town will mirror the complex national origin of its European population. . . .

The European living in Algeria is, most of the time, both envious and resentful of the French of metropolitan France, afraid, even in day-to-day business dealings, of being humiliated or swindled by his quick-thinking fellow countrymen from across the Mediterranean. Probably the most revealing comment on the mentality of the Europeans in Algeria comes from a report by Jules Ferry, who helped to establish France as a great nineteenth century colonial power. Writing in 1892, Ferry penned this judgment: "We have taken a close look at him, and have studied his private and public behaviour. We have found him very limited. Assuredly it is not his intellectual disposition which enables the colon to act, even in a limited capacity, as an arbiter where the fate of the natives is concerned. He has many virtues—all those of the hard worker and the patriot. But he lacks what may be described as the virtue of the victor, the balance of the spirit and of the heart, and the regard for the right of the weak which is in no ways incompatible with firm leadership. It is difficult to try and convince the European settler that there are rights other than his own in Arab country and that the native is not a race to be taxed and exploited to the utmost limits . . . the settlers proclaim that (the conquered Arabs) are totally

incorrigible and utterly incapable of education, without ever having attempted, over the past thirty years, to do anything to drag them out of their moral and intellectual misery . . . The settlers are governed by no general policy in their attitude towards the natives. They fail to understand any other policy than that of containment. To be sure, there are no thoughts of destroying them; it is even claimed that there is no urge to drive them back. But there is no concern for their complaints, or for their numerical growth which seems to increase with their very poverty." The Europeans who settled in increasing numbers in Algeria provided France with a problem which, in the course of some 140 years, has never been satisfactorily solved: their existence precluded the establishment of a nakedly colonial government apparatus, and as early as 1848 Algeria was divided into three departments, each headed by a Prefect as in metropolitan France. But the social, cultural and economic differences between Moslems and settlers were so great that "assimilation"—the declared goal of a whole succession of French political leaders from 1847 onwards—was regarded even by French liberals as a very remote goal indeed, and by the settlers themselves as a huge joke. . . .

New Books on Africa

THE NEW FACE OF AFRICA. By John Hughes. Longmans, Green., N.Y. 296 pp. \$5.

When John Hughes set out for Africa in 1955, as correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, the dock hand asked "Ya missionaries or something?"

In these six years Africa has become bigger than a missionary field. John Hughes has distilled the observations of a hard-working correspondent to tell what has happened there in this time and what is happening now. It is as lively as it is informed, a most substantial and interesting introduction to the many new countries and the few old ones in the newest continent to burst upon the consciousness of the world. Hughes takes the area south of the Sahara, to describe 13 countries, dividing them sectionally under West, Central, South and East Africa. South Africa has been his base as a correspondent and commanded his most continuous work. It takes a fourth of the book. But he has covered the Congo in its turmoil and has got around through the

other countries. Ghana takes two chapters, Kenya two, the Congo three. Hughes has got thoroughly inside Africa and his essays have the feel and the color of the infinite variation and contrasts in the many faces of the continent now in vast upheaval. John Hughes has just returned from Africa for a Nieman Fellowship year at Harvard.

THE EDGE OF FREEDOM. By John B. Oakes. Harper & Bros., N.Y. 130 pp. \$3.50.

Just before he assumed the editorship of the *New York Times*, John B. Oakes made an extensive tour of the new nations of Africa and in Eastern Europe. He was studying chiefly the forces that lead to political neutralism in Africa and such countries as Yugoslavia. He examines the political factors that connect these two widely separated areas in their common "neutralism." The key purpose of the book is to help Americans to understand and accept neutralism in those countries where it is an inevitable consequence of their primary concern for their own national development. But most of the book

deals with the new African nations south of the Sahara. It is a sympathetic exploration of the problems and prospects of so many nations recently freed of outside control. In a short space, these dozen essays on the new African nations are illuminated by the fresh eye, the conscientious reporting and the distinction of style that characterizes all the work of the new editor of the *Times*.

AFRICA A TO Z. By Robert S. Kane. Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N.Y. 400 pp. \$4.95.

This is a lively guide for the tourist, or, as Mr. Kane suggests, for the armchair traveler through Africa. For the actual traveler it is full of practical information for each country, such as entrance requirements, distances, travel facilities and costs, climate, best season to visit, transportation and hotels, language, currency, even film available for cameras. But it is also a very readable account of the vast diversity of the African continent, and descriptions of each country, informed by the inveterate and enthusiastic traveling of Robert Kane himself.

Leads Grow Shorter

By Max Hall

This newspaper reader, spending a lazy August vacation reading newspapers, found the following London story in a Philadelphia sheet:

On Monday the Court of King's Bench at Westminster gave Judgment on the four Persons convicted for printing and publishing Mist's Journal of the 24th of August last, viz. John Clark the Pressman, for printing and publishing, was sentenced to stand three times in the Pillory, viz. at Charing-Cross, Temple-Bar and the Royal-Exchange, and to suffer six Months Imprisonment; Robert Knell, the Compositor, to stand twice in the Pillory, once at the Royal Exchange, and also to suffer 6 Months Imprisonment; Joseph Carter (the Apprentice and a Pressman) to walk round the four Courts in Westminster-Hall, with a Paper on his Forehead, denoting his Offence, and to suffer one Month's Imprisonment. Amy Walker (Mist's Maid) for publishing the said Paper, to be sent to the House of Correction for six Months, there to be kept to hard Labour, and to be stript down to the Waste, and receive the Correction of the House.

The item appeared in Samuel Keimer's *The Universal Instructor in All Arts and Sciences: and Pennsylvania Gazette* for August 21, 1729, and evidently originated in some London paper of the previous May 24. I am resolved to learn more about this curious case if it's the last thing I ever do (and it may well be the last, for I am saving up a lot of things like this until my retirement). But the piece is quoted here not because it is intriguing but because its opening sentence contains 115 words.

Two hundred years later, news writers still had not shaken loose entirely from the "summary lead." For example, the New York *Times* of January 19, 1930, took 89 words to open one of its top stories of the day:

WASHINGTON, Jan. 18—Routing the wet forces in a turbulent session of fire and counter-fire on the prohibition question, the House dries today forced the adoption in the Treasury-Postoffice appropriation bill of an allotment of \$15,000,000 for the prohibition unit, defeated an effort to change the method of denaturing industrial alcohol, refused to vote \$300,000,000 for enforcing the Volstead act, put through an allowance of

Max Hall is an editor of the Harvard University Press after a good many years of newspaper work. He was a Nieman Fellow in 1950, has contributed other articles to *Nieman Reports*.

\$50,000 for government dry propaganda and squelched an amendment aimed to prevent the employment as prohibition agents of persons under indictment or convicted of a felony.

Even in 1930, and in fact throughout the centuries, some news writers knew how to lead with a short jab. Just one week after the dries and wets had fired and counter-fired on each other, the *Times* came up with:

LITTLE AMERICA, Antarctica, Jan. 25—Our front yard was full of whales this morning.

Nevertheless, the average lead was much longer in those days than it is now.

All newspapermen and maybe even a few lay readers are aware that the short, solid, matter-of-fact lead has been adopted as a regular policy by wire services and newspapers. This is easy to say; but if one is interested in *measuring* the change, there is nothing to do but count words. In the spring of 1950, when the Nieman Fellows were working on a special issue of *Nieman Reports* entitled "Reading, Writing and Newspapers," it seemed a good idea to find out whether the conservative New York *Times* had gone along with the trend. Accordingly, as a member of that group, I counted the wordage in all the front-page opening sentences written by *Times* staff members during January 1940 and again in January 1950, and reported that the average had dropped from 39 to 32. When January 1960 arrived (somehow it didn't take long), I wondered whether the average had dropped again. Nineteen months later, still wondering, I finally got time to satisfy my curiosity. The average for January 1960 was a little under 24 words.

Here is what a 24-worder looks like:

Mayor Wagner announced yesterday that he had ordered the City Administrator's office to prepare "a comprehensive plan for dealing with the city's transportation problem."

And, of course, since that was the average length, a great many were shorter. Leads like this were no longer rare:

An entire armory of new weapons for the exploration of man's past has been disclosed.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2—Senator John F. Kennedy made it official today.

* * *

ALBANY, Jan. 3—The 183d annual session of the New York legislature will convene at noon on Wednesday.

* * *

An orchestra from the Soviet Union played for the first time in the United States last night.

NEW VERNON, N.J., Jan. 3—Consternation has swept this idyllic countryside.

* * *

PARIS, Jan. 4—Albert Camus, one of France's leading literary figures, was killed today in an automobile accident.

* * *

NEWARK, Jan. 12—Newark residents gave a vote of confidence today to the present form of municipal government.

* * *

WASHINGTON, Jan. 19—The United States and Japan signed a treaty of mutual cooperation and security today.

The longest front-page opening sentence of the whole month (there were 377 in all) was only 42 words, pretty close to the *average* of twenty years ago.

To bring the data up to date, I counted the words during one week of August 1961 and found that the week's average was still between 23 and 24, and the daily average was quite consistent, running 23.1, 23.9, 22.9, 23.8, 24.7, 22.4, and 22.5. One wonders whether the *Times* has gone just about as far as it intends to in shortening its leads.

I also traveled back to January 1930 (well, the library was air-conditioned) in order to get a rough idea what hap-

pened during the 1930's. The January average was practically the same at the beginning and end of the decade, being 38.82 in 1930 and 38.97 in 1940. Of course that doesn't prove there were no fluctuations during the ten years. But clearly the Big Squeeze took place during the forties and fifties.

The accompanying table shows the changing average over the thirty-year period. It shows some other things, too, such as how many leads were under 10 words, how many were 10-19, 20-29, and so on, in case there are any word-counters who would like to compare other groups of stories with those we counted.

All this is by way of documenting a well-recognized trend in journalistic history, and not at all by way of wishing to emphasize an arithmetical approach to news writing. The present word-counter liked to write short leads during his own news writing days, but has never favored ironclad rules on the matter. A given long sentence may be much better than a given short one. The mere number of words is not important in itself. The qualities that are important include, of course, such things as fairness, accuracy, clarity, vividness, and felicity. Whether the *Times* opening sentences are fairer and more accurate today than they were in 1930 is a question I can't answer. Can anyone? As for clarity, vividness, and felicity—qualities of the kind usually associated with good *writing*—I emerge from the library with a strong impression that the modern-day leads in the *Times* are, by and large, far superior to those of 1930.

Length of Page-One Opening Sentences by New York *Times* Staff Members in January 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1960, and in Week of August 13-19, 1961

	Number of opening sentences	Total wordage	Average wordage	Under 10	Number of opening sentences with wordage of:										Percentage of opening sentences under 30 words
					10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-99	100-109	
January 1930	358	13,896	38.82	6	23	71	90	92	45	19	9	3	28		
January 1940	291	11,339	38.97	1	14	44	100	80	42	7	3	0	20		
January 1950	305	9,735	31.92	1	19	101	130	43	11	0	0	0	40		
January 1960	377	8,922	23.67	4	93	216	62	2	0	0	0	0	83		
August 13-19, 1961	83	1,935	23.31	1	21	48	12	1	0	0	0	0	84		

NOTE ON WORD-COUNTING: Datelines were not counted. Middle initials were ignored, but "C. P. Cabell" was counted as two words. The "de" in names, as in "de Gaulle," was ignored. "Feb. 6" is two words, and "10 per cent" is three words. For some reason now hard to remember, votes and scores ("10 to 3," "5-to-5") were counted as though the whole expression were one word. Hyphenated terms were often troublesome. What seemed to be "manufactured" expressions ("self-determination," "crop-producing," "34-year-old," "German-American") were counted as though their components were separate words. Expressions containing prefixes ("inter-American," "quasi-judicial") were treated as one word, and so were many expressions commonly thought of as a single term ("air-line," "world-wide," "forty-five"). The distinctions sometimes got

pretty arbitrary.

NOTE ON WIRE SERVICE STORIES: This table does not include the wire-service stories occasionally used on the *Times* front page (32 of them in January 1930; 51 in January 1940; 34 in January 1950; and 25 in January 1960). These stories can hardly be considered a reliable sample of all wire-service stories, but anyhow, for what it's worth, a separate count of the opening sentences showed them to be generally shorter than the *Times*-written leads, but the *Times* has narrowed the gap. Here are the wire-service word averages for the four Januarys: 29.22, 32.78, 25.88, and 22.24. The majority of these stories were from the Associated Press, whose leads on the *Times* front page during the four Januarys averaged 29.22, 30.72, 24.92, and 18.46.

Bias in the 1960 Presidential Election Campaign

By Robert E. Blackmon

A decent interval having passed since the end of the excruciatingly close 1960 presidential election, it now seems a proper time to bury the quadrennial charge that press coverage of the campaign was biased. The charge, aired increasingly and vehemently by the Nixon camp in the latter stages of the campaign, indicted newsmen for unfairness to the former Vice President.

The vinegary New York *Daily News* spoke for this belief in an editorial last November 14. Seventy-five per cent or more of the reporters assigned to cover Nixon's campaign were Democrats, asserted the *Daily News*, adding:

They slanted their dispatches against the Republican candidate. They left out incidents and sidelights which might have been helpful to him. They frequently underreported the size and enthusiasm of the crowds that gathered to hear him speak.

In campaign press conferences with Nixon himself, some of these crooked crusaders for Sen. John F. Kennedy insulted and badgered Nixon instead of asking him honest and pertinent questions.

The charge was watered down a bit by Herbert G. Klein, former press secretary to Nixon, at the national meeting of Sigma Delta Chi in December. Klein said that his office had received many letters, wires and telephone calls after the election to the effect that the news coverage had been biased against Nixon. But he, himself, Klein said, did not know whether the press had been fair or not. He thought it would be advisable for the press to "stop and take a good look at itself on the subject." Klein suggested a national study to investigate whether reporting had strayed into the realm of editorial writing and personal bias.

Reports of such organizations as the Associated Press Managing Editors and articles in *Editor & Publisher* bear witness that the charge has been the subject of many post-mortems by the professionals. The public's attention, however, has been diverted by the advent of the New Frontier and the latest cold war developments.

As middleman between the reporter and the public and also between reporter and publisher, as guardian over the news, the editor has a vital stake in this matter. With this in mind the question of bias has been put to 107 editors

since the election. Approximately 90 per cent of these men were managing editors. Sprinkled in were a few news editors, city editors, telegraph editors, executive editors and those who hold the title of editor-publisher.

Forty-three of the editors held posts in cities of less than 100,000 population; the others were situated in larger metropolitan areas. The geographical spread was fairly even. Thirty-one of the editors were from the East, 30 from the Midwest, 28 from the West and 18 from the south.

They were asked if they had detected "bias for or against political candidates or parties" in the straight news stories appearing in (1) their own newspapers, (2) other papers that they read regularly and (3) the reports of the major wire services and syndicates.

Their answers ran nearly 5 to 1 in the negative. Only 12 admitted bias in their own papers. Twenty-seven thought they saw it in other papers, 28 in wire service or syndicate reports.

The majority of the editors exhibited pride in their traditional role as guardians of the purity of news copy. One editor of a small Eastern paper remarked after explaining that his paper supported Kennedy editorially, "Once that support was decided upon and before it was announced, we redoubled our efforts to make sure that no bias one way or the other crept into our reporting."

Another editor of a large Western newspaper detected "considerable bias" in the reporting by one member of his staff during Kennedy's tour of his state. "He was promptly edited accordingly," the editor said, "and since then has written no politics, nor will he ever again, if we in power can do anything about it."

These two editors—their sentiments were echoed by others—typify the editor ever-vigilant against forays into subjective reporting by members of his staff. Others, however, as exemplified in the remarks of this executive editor of a medium-sized Midwestern newspaper, were satisfied that they detected prejudice in the campaign reports:

It seemed to me that AP correspondents and some others traveling with the two major candidates were inclined to be more critical of Nixon, and to reflect it in their writing, and more sympathetic to Kennedy. They were likely to "argue" with Nixon's statements—by the use of such phrases as "He didn't say how he was going to accomplish this," or "This was somewhat different than the position he took in the debates." Writers seemed to feel that Kennedy "won" the TV debates, al-

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though there could be no official way of determining who won or who lost. In matters of crowd estimates, enthusiasm of crowds and other intangibles, I got the impression the reports were weighted for Kennedy and the "liberal" view.

This critical theme was representative of the line of thought of a solid minority of editors who thought some newsmen displayed partiality in the campaign. In all but a few instances these editors thought the biased coverage worked to the detriment of Nixon. In general, these same editors were also critical of the concept of interpretive reporting. (This concept, its adherents claim, furnishes explanation and background, places an event in the larger flow of events, and gives the news its proper setting, sequence and significance.) These same critics were consistent in stating that the assessments of the "climate" of the political camps and the evaluations of crowd size and reaction worked in Kennedy's favor.*

A managing editor of a newspaper in a large West Coast city typified this point of view:

The bias was on both sides of the political fence. I think it was occasioned by the reporters writing—or more correctly, trying to write—interpretive stories.

Some of this writing was very subtle. I do not say it was done on purpose. I do not know. There were such things as crowd estimates, crowd reaction, comments by the reporter aimed at giving background to a remark by the Vice President, etc. It seemed to peck away at the integrity of Mr. Nixon in a manner that at times could almost be called harassment.

An executive editor for a well-known Southern newspaper believes that some reporters contributed to a bandwagon effect:

The bias was most evident, and could be tracked easiest, in the stories carried in mid-October about how overwhelming numbers of newsmen covering the campaign saw a Kennedy landslide. Though supposedly impartial reporters of news, they became a psychological task force attracting a bandwagon following for one candidate.

Even if true, it would be difficult to prove the thesis that

reporting of crowd size and reaction and of the "climate" of the rival camps was of substantive importance in the outcome of the election. It is even debatable that this kind of descriptive writing is a bad thing. A long time before interpretive reporting became a boggy for its critics, editors were hammering at their staffers for descriptions of crowd size and reaction in speech and parade stories and the like. In a different context and with the use of a different term (the "color" story) the technique presumably was less harmful.

A larger group of editors took the tack that reporters showed no inclination to favor Kennedy in their reports. These editors believe that the assessment the reporters made of the campaign was an accurate one, that Kennedy simply ran a more effective campaign. Some examples of this point of view:

An editor of a medium-sized Eastern daily:

Frankly, in the recent campaign I think Kennedy simply outsmarted Nixon and some people misinterpreted straight reporting of the candidates as "bias."

A managing editor of a New York City paper:

On several occasions some of our columnists traveled with the candidates. They interpreted, and analyzed their speeches and campaign methods, and I am sure they could have been accused of bias. The partiality of one, however, was offset by the partiality of the other, so they canceled each other out. We supported Nixon editorially. Kennedy made a more vigorous campaign in this area, and as a result received more space in our news columns.

A managing editor of a Washington, D.C., daily:

Kennedy ran a more exciting, effervescent show and newsmen would have been less than competent had their copy not reflected this fact. There was a certain gaiety and sparkle to the coverage of Kennedy's affairs which was lacking in the stories about Nixon. I suspect it is this fact that has given rise to so much comment this year about newspaper bias. For my money, it was not bias, merely sensitive and accurate reporting.

A managing editor of a medium-sized Midwestern daily believes that the bias charge was a rationalization for defeat:

In the past the charge has come mostly from the Democrats. I think they have used this to political advantage. Sometimes it's advantageous to be the underdog. I think the Republicans now are trying to discredit the Democratic victory and the bias charge is one way to explain defeat.

*The New York *Times*, generally accorded to be the top American newspaper and also a proponent of interpretive reporting, was charged with bias by 10 editors. The Chicago *Tribune*, prominently mentioned in this connection in other elections was tabbed by five editors; the Milwaukee *Journal*, also a highly regarded newspaper, was charged with bias by one Midwestern editor. These were the only newspapers censured by name. The Associated Press, until recently a citadel for the concept of objective reporting, was tarred with the bias charge six times; the United Press International was mentioned in this connection by three editors. One editor—the only one—said that the UPI. was biased against Kennedy.

To sustain the charge of bias in the 1960 election campaign reporting one would have to accept one of two assumptions that should be equally distasteful to the editor because they cut right to the core of his reason for being. The assumptions are (1) that editors aided and abetted their reporters in hand-carving biased, inaccurate news reports, or (2) that editors stood by passively while their own staffers and those of the press agencies polluted the news stream. Neither of these poses fits the popular image of the dedicated, hard-headed and impartial editor.

More in keeping with this image were the remarks of a managing editor of a Southern newspaper who indicated he had no doubts about how an editor should handle election copy:

We made sure in our tight editing procedure that none of our local or state stories written by our reporters reflected any bias. This was not difficult because the staffers take pride in their straightforward reporting no matter what their own personal preferences may be. Well-edited papers should have no problem on this account.

Actually, some editors redoubled their efforts to prevent the intrusion of biased reports. This was best illustrated by the words of a managing editor of a Washington, D.C., paper:

If our staff is any yardstick, there is no doubt that most of the reporters were personally for Kennedy. There was no secret about this. But in the policing of their stories to make certain that none of this bias crept in, I found myself suspect of looking for it in places where it did not exist. For instance a reporter known to have preference for one candidate had passages in news stories subjected to closer scrutiny in many cases than they deserved. Such passages would have been accepted without question from a reporter known to have opposite views.

If history is any comfort, newsmen can take solace from the fact that the charge of unfair political news coverage is not a new one. In their swaddling years the charge was accurate as newspapers drew most of their financial support from subsidy by political parties and splinter groups. The penny papers changed all this. These papers successfully sought an audience among the urban masses and their income from the advertising dollar. They showed that a paper with a large circulation could exist without party subsidy—and control.

Independence overturned one reason for coloring the news. Penny papers also began to separate comment from

news and segregate the former on the editorial page. These reforms paved the way for the slow evolution of the doctrine of the objective news report. According to this 20th century theory, the reporter was supposed to report only the facts. He was not to be influenced by his own opinions or those of his superiors. Argument, opinion was left to the editorial page. If the subject matter was controversial both sides of the issue were to be printed. The reader was to make up his own mind.

This noble theory has not gone without challenge in the past 40 years. The chief criticism is that shrewd and unscrupulous men used the concept as a straitjacket to exploit surface half-truths for their own advantage. As a counterpoise the theory of the interpretive news report was given birth. The two theories have been in combat since World War II with the younger, until last year, seemingly in the ascendancy.

In two marked ways, the latest version of the bias charge is different from those uttered in the 1930s, 40s and 50s when the great majority of editorial pages supported the Republican—and losing—cause five times in a row before coming up with a winner. First of all, the charge this time was made by Republicans instead of Democrats; second, the villain of the piece is not the newspaper owner but the working newsman. Editorial page imbalance is taken into account in the newest version of the bias charge.**

This phenomenon was described by some editors in this study, but it is perhaps best symbolized by the answers given by several students of a large West Coast college last fall to the question, "Are newspapers fair in their reporting of political campaigns?"

The tenor of their answers was: "No, most reporters are Democratic," and "It evens out. Democrats get the first page and Republicans the editorials."

The charge of bias has not been proved. This much is a certainty. But this does not mean that the case is closed. There remains a possibility that there has been a change in public attitude that augurs ill for the newsman. It is possible that the public has lost its trust in the newsman and his ability to write impartial reports of politics. This is not a certainty, of course, and needs further inquiry. Any such belief is most probably inaccurate and unrealistic but nevertheless important because in this instance it is not the truth or lack of it that is important but rather what the public accepts as truth.

** *Editor & Publisher* reported last November that 57.7 per cent of American dailies with 70.9 per cent of the circulation were editorially for Nixon, 16.4 per cent with 15.8 per cent of the circulation were for Kennedy.

Reporting the Campaign

The men assigned to cover a Presidential campaign are, normally, the finest in the profession of American journalism—men of seniority and experience, some of them men of deep scholarship and wisdom, all of them full of dignity and a sense of their own importance. Yet for weeks and months they must live like tramps—shaken, rushed, fighting with police at police lines, dirty and unbathed for days on end, herded into buses like schoolboys. Physical care and handling of the correspondents were much alike in both revolving headquarters—the same instantaneous telegraphic and telephonic communications, the same box lunches, the same baggage-laundry-feeding-hotel arrangements. But none of this meticulous, logistic care could erase the turbulent reality of reporting, the insane jet-flight quality of the 1960 campaign—or protect the simple individual dignity of men who had to combine the qualities of roustabouts and philosophers under circumstances that inexorably deprived them of the last shreds of dignity.

What happened, I believe, in the press reporting of the campaign of 1960 was that the sense of dignity of these men, their craftsmen's pride in their calling, was abused by Mr. Nixon and his staff—and not by accident, but by decision. The brotherhood of the press was considered by Mr. Nixon and his press staff, not a

brotherhood, but a conspiracy, and a hostile conspiracy at that; it was as if he accepted them permanently in their uncomfortable and unpleasant campaign role—as vagabonds.

The decision that the press was a conspiracy had been taken long before Mr. Nixon was actually nominated. One of his aides declared to me in June in flat words, "*Stuff* the bastards. They're all against Dick anyway. Make them work—we aren't going to hand out prepared remarks; let them get their pencils out and listen and take notes." . . .

Nixon's personal distrust of the press colored the attitude of his press staff, too. His press secretary, Herbert Klein of San Diego, was an honest and kindly man—yet elusive, uninformative, colorless and withdrawn; he, too, appeared to be talking to the press with a sense of deep suspicion. Indeed, it was more difficult to elicit information from Klein than from John F. Kennedy himself. As much as any man, Klein was responsible for Nixon's bad press. . . .

To be transferred from the Nixon campaign tour to the Kennedy campaign tour meant no lightening of exertion or weariness for any newspaperman—but it was as if one were transformed in role from leper and outcast to friend and battle companion. . . .

One of the graces of the Kennedy cam-

paign was the nearly immediate availability of a stenotype transcript of what the candidate had said, whether in mine, factory, village square or New York Coliseum. . . . Thus reporters were able to relax and enjoy the Kennedy oratory, knowing that in an hour they would have an accurate transcript . . . the Nixon campaigners did not make such a service available until much later in the campaign.

The difference in attitudes to the press corps that one found on the Kennedy side reflected the attitude of its principal, too. For Kennedy, who enjoys words and reading, is a Pulitzer Prize winner himself and a one-time reporter; he has an enormous respect for those who work with words and those who write clean prose. He likes newspapermen and likes their company. Kennedy would, even in the course of the campaign, read the press dispatches, and if he particularly liked a passage, would tell the reporter or columnist that he had—and then quote from it phrases, in an amazing performance of memory and attention. . . .

There is no doubt that this kindness, respect and cultivation of the press colored all the reporting that came from the Kennedy campaign.

—from *The Making of the President 1960*
by Theodore H. White

Journalism Education: A Student's View

By June Gladfelter

Many newspaper editors dutifully warn high school seniors not to major in journalism at college but in a traditional liberal arts field that will give them a broad background for their later work as journalists.

"We can teach you the technical side in six months on the job," they say.

As a recent graduate from a school of journalism I can say for myself and my fellow students that it would take much more than six months to duplicate the liberal side of our journalism education.

The people, places and ideas we have come in contact with while reporting for the school paper, the *Ohio State Lantern* (circulation 15,000 daily), and on class assignments have given us invaluable insight and knowledge that we would probably have missed altogether had we limited ourselves to the conventional areas of study.

Don't misunderstand. I'm not against the liberal arts. In fact, at Ohio State, all of us in journalism are liberal arts majors, for the School of Journalism is firmly entrenched in the College of Arts and Sciences.

For example, in my own schedule out of 231 hours only 57 were in journalism. The other 174 hours were scattered over courses ranging from chemistry to philosophy with over 20 hours each in political science, German, history and literature.

Neither were these 57 hours in journalism wasted on purely technical courses. Besides courses covering all the types of writing found in newspapers, we studied magazine writing, public relations, radio-television news and writing of reviews. Through the assignments in these classes and through the many hours spent in lab work on the *Lantern* we were given the chance to learn about many things.

In fact, at Ohio State the School of Journalism is firmly entrenched in the College of Arts and Sciences, and all journalism majors take many hours of political science, history, English, sociology, etc. I'm just saying that journalism isn't a purely technical field of study; it gives the student a chance to learn about many things.

A friend of mine, a senior reporter on the *Lantern*, recently accompanied a group of Ohio State Peace Corps enthusiasts to Washington on a fact-finding mission. During her several days there Anne learned a great deal about how Congress works, knowledge that supplements the many political science courses she has taken.

"I realize now why making decisions and getting bills through Congress takes such a long time," she said. "Every

detail has to be reasoned out. The top people *do* work to their capacity."

If another reporter who is a five-year veteran of the United States Navy were to walk out of our School of Journalism and be assigned to the Cape Canaveral beat, he wouldn't have to push the panic button. Chuck started out as the *Lantern* science reporter two years ago with little more than the average background. On one of his assignments last year, he did an article on a huge radio telescope at Delaware, Ohio, owned jointly by Ohio State University and Ohio Wesleyan.

"I've learned that radio telescopes aren't things you look through," he told me as he drew a little map of the whole layout and explained in some detail how it worked.

The day Yuri Gagarin broke into the new frontier of space the *Lantern* published the first in a series of articles our Navy veteran had written on problems of space flight as described by the director of the aviation physiology lab at the University.

As a journalism student, Chuck had priority when the Engineering Experiment Station was looking for an information assistant. Here again, journalism helped him to see practical application of classroom theory.

From my own experience of talking with a rocket expert at Ohio State about the Russians' Venus probe in February, I know that a reporter learns much more about a subject than is told in the final article. Before I could write about why Russia is ahead in rocket boosters I had to know what rocket boosters are and how they work.

One of the most terrifying assignments the average reporter can get is to review a music concert.

"I didn't know anything about it," said Denise, a former city editor, "when I was assigned to review a jazz concert. Before the concert I read three books on jazz to learn the technical terms and the theory of jazz."

While doing a series on jazz at Ohio State, I myself developed an interest in it that lasted long after the project was forgotten. Through this I became a member and officer in the Jazz Forum, read books, and learned where to begin in building a record collection.

Another time, I spent an afternoon on a feature story assignment delving into pharmacy books trying to find what the ingredients in lipstick and powder are. I never realized before how grateful women should be for beeswax, talc, and castor oil.

Nancy, a Junior reporter, has a better understanding of

progressive education, how it works, and what effects it has on students because she talked with one of our outstanding education professors on the subject.

"After spending hours talking to two young politicians I learned what tremendous organization is necessary in a campaign. It really is a matter of ringing doorbells." This insight into political thinking came from a reporter who did an article on two Ohio State students in politics.

The flow of news from the Eichmann trial in Israel has more meaning for me since I talked with a lawyer, a rabbi, and a professor on three different views of the trial for a series of articles for the *Lantern*.

Many reporters, including myself, have had the rather dubious advantage of learning how student government works. By regularly attending the meetings and working closely with the officers and representatives we can learn first-hand the problems and pitfalls of student government.

A former editor of the *Lantern* credits his work on our paper with enabling him to have closer ties than most students with University and State administrations.

"I gained a lot of insight into how the government operates by covering the press conferences of Governor DiSalle," Myron said. "The door of his office is always open to us. I also learned a lot about the role of the University administration by covering important meetings such as those of the Council on Student Affairs, the Faculty Council or the Board of Trustees."

Myron had an honors program project for which he compiled a brochure to be used as a high school teaching aid. He examined eight stories of different types that have appeared in the *Lantern* over the past two years and analyzed them in terms of where they originated, how the information was gathered, how the lead was developed and how the story was constructed. Of the story types, the interview is probably one of the most important. Our student reporters usually get many opportunities to learn to talk to people, all kinds of them.

The *Lantern* has a persistent practice of calling on the leading professors on campus for comment on the top news-breaks. The chance to meet and talk with the professors in all departments rates among the most rewarding experiences for many *Lantern* reporters.

The reporters who talked to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Mischa Elman, James Thurber, Hubert Humphrey, Willard Kiplinger, John Crowe Ransom, and Robert Frost won't forget for a long time the world they were part of for a few minutes. What better way to learn about history than to talk to the person who helped make it? What better way to learn about poetry than to talk to the poet himself?

Randy, a graduate reporter, talked to William Mandel, California radio commentator and critic of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and said of him:

"He greatly strengthened my impression that a person should have the right to speak freely even though we may not agree with what he has to say."

Martin Luther King, Tom Dooley, and Norman Thomas are a few of the men one recent graduate had the privilege of interviewing.

"I learned the socialist platform inside out before talking to Thomas," said Jaan, a Barry Goldwater-type conservative. "I would not have had much interest in it otherwise."

An aspiring sophomore reporter on the staff still beams when he talks about interviewing Jill Haworth, the young star of "Exodus."

The sportswriters also have their share of worthwhile experiences. As a reporter Ken has been to most of the Big Ten schools on game assignments, and worked in the press box at the 1957 Rose Bowl game with Bill, another Ohio State sportswriter.

Mike covered part of the 1960 World Series in Pittsburgh for the *Lantern*—"An opportunity I would never have had if I were not here." He also went to the Ohio State NCAA tournament games in Louisville and Kansas City.

Bill has been working part-time as a radio newsman for two years and is editor of the *Sundial*, our humor magazine. The people he has met as a journalist include Senator Henry Jackson, Woody Herman, Adolph Menjou, Huntley and Brinkley, Richard Nixon, Irene Dunne, Les Brown, and George Shearing.

As student journalists, all three credit journalism with giving them much more than this. Bill said he has developed an interest in what is happening in the world, and even more important, he has learned how to express himself.

"It has given me a better insight into all the news—not just sports," said Ken, "by inspiring me to follow the news through, to look beyond the headlines. It has definitely broadened my outlook on life."

As assistant city editor for two quarters, I learned quite a lot about the business of news and the nature of people.

One of our most rewarding experiences came during the presidential election week in November, 1960. The whole staff joined in, above and beyond the call of duty, to put out an issue of the *Lantern* which will long be remembered as one of our very best. During a staff meeting on the day before the election, the idea of having a special election issue was kicked around and finally agreed upon. We picked the topics to be covered and on the same day began calling the top professors in all departments on campus to ask if they would write a 200-500 word statement on what the election of Kennedy (or Nixon) would mean to the country. Very few flatly refused, and most of those who couldn't suggested someone who could. By Wednesday afternoon we were able to gather eighteen statements. Many staff members

stayed late Wednesday night to proofread and write heads and at midnight the sixteen-page special edition (the usual size is eight pages) went to press. Months later, we were still hearing favorable comments. This issue received special praise from the judges who rated the *Lantern* an All-American daily in April.

We come into contact with just about every type of person while working on the city desk. We are continually explaining to someone over the phone or in the office why their announcement can't run three days in a row, or why a fraternity party can't be our lead story, or that we are not left-wing just because we ran a story on Norman Thomas, or that we do not hate University Theatre, or that we are not anti-Greek because we made fun of the sorority rushing rules. We learn how seriously people really do take a newspaper and the importance of the phrase, "responsibility of the press."

What is still surprising to me is the number of people who think they can run the newspaper. Sometimes it is pretty hard to find a polite way of telling them to go jump in the lake. From these experiences, though, I think we learn a lot about editorial independence.

I'm confident that journalism majors have become better able to live in the cruel cruel world when they graduate. As Chuck, the Navy veteran, aptly put it:

"We know pretty much what is going on. We aren't going to be taken in by advertising and public relations people who are out to fool the world. We know how seriously to take political speeches and, in general, newspapers. A journalist doesn't have to be a cynic, just a realist."

Many of my friends in journalism have told me that journalism has helped them gain more self-confidence and more insight into how people react in various situations. Also, working on the *Lantern* staff has certainly helped us learn how to work as a team and to get things done.

It can perhaps be summed up best by the remarks of a sophomore reporter who worked on the *Lantern* for a year as an extra-curricular activity. He credits journalism with changing his sense of values.

"I used to be quite materialistic," he said. "Now, I have found that doing what I like is more important than making the most money."

He recently changed his major to journalism.

Canada Reads American—and Worries Over It

By Louis M. Lyons

Canada, deeply concerned to guard its "identity" from absorption in the American economy, has sounded a national warning against the invasion of American magazines.

It sees its national character threatened by the big slick American publications that have won most of Canadian readers and skimmed the profits off Canadian advertising. Canadian magazines complain that they are being starved out and in danger of extinction.

A Royal Commission was charged with finding ways to further "a genuinely Canadian periodical press" that they can count on "to interpret Canada to all Canadians." The Commission reports the American threat so critical that it urges complete exclusion of all foreign magazines which carry Canadian advertising. The Commission finds they are sapping the economic sources of Canada's home publications.

"The communications of a nation are as vital to its life as its defenses" the Commission declares. It asserts "the principle that the advertisement of domestic goods and services to a domestic consumer should be through a Canadian medium."

The Commission affirms also the obverse of this: "that a nation's domestic advertising expenditures should be devoted to the support of its own media of communications."

It is brought to these drastic conclusions by discovery of a communications invasion from the United States that has been achieved by an economic blitz in the last decade. Its superior weapons have been the special techniques of "split runs," "regional editions," "special sections" and "Canadian editions." All of these the Commission calls "inequitable competition" as by-products of parent publications, which consequently do not have to bear full costs of publication. Their greater resources produce a more attractive magazine, with greater appeal not only to the Canadian reader, but even to the Canadian writer, and secure so great a part of Canadian advertising that not enough is left to support the local enterprises.

The Commission focuses on the Canadian editions of *Time* and *Reader's Digest* as the chief threats, because they directly exploit Canadian advertising and have had a tremendous growth in advertising revenues, double the rate of growth of all advertising in Canada, four times that of the Canadian magazines that have survived. "Canadian editions," says the Commission, "are the ultimate refinement in the re-use of second-hand editorial matter to provide a vehicle for a new set of advertising messages."

The inequity of this, the report says, is that *Time's* Canadian edition pays only two per cent for the cost of its

editorial content, while Canadian magazines have to figure ten to twenty per cent of total publication costs for it. The Commission feels it necessary not only to recommend complete exclusion of such publications, but to deny Canadian advertisers income tax credit as business expense for anything spent in advertising in "foreign publications wherever published." The last phrase hits directly at these two magazines, which are published in Canada.

The Commission makes a special point of no interference with those American magazines which circulate in Canada in their original form, for they do not seduce the Canadian advertiser.

The Commission is at pains to disavow any "anti-Americanism" and it condemns "bigoted nationalism." "The only aim is to preserve for Canada publications essential to her existence as a distinctive entity."

The report is nevertheless a vivid illustration of Canada's self-conscious struggle to avoid economic and cultural submersion in the mammoth across its border.

"Canada is naked to the tremendous expanse of communications in the United States," the Commission says. "American words, images and print batter unrelentingly at our eyes and ears."

The Canadian magazine had rather thin pickings before "the vast network of American communication reached to every corner of our land." Canadians are not the magazine readers Americans are. Per capita they read only two-thirds as many. The magazines have not been as heavy carriers of advertising; per capita advertising expenditures in magazines have been only one-third that in the United States. Even in 1950, before television and the "Canadian editions" were skimming the cream, Canadian general magazines got only three and one-fifth per cent of national advertising expenditure. By 1959 it was down to two and a half per cent. Of the \$270 million growth in their national advertising in the decade, general magazines got only five million. *Time* and *Reader's Digest* had gained as much advertising gross in the decade as all Canadian general magazines had in 1950. *Time* gained 235 per cent in the ten years, *Reader's Digest* 196 per cent. Between them they grossed 41 per cent of all magazine advertising revenue by 1959. The total spent in advertising in Canada had reached \$503,000,000 by that year, a growth of 115 per cent in the decade. But Canada's general magazines had increased their advertising at only half that rate to a total of \$12,300,000.

Canada's struggle for "identity" is of course largely a battle against its own geography. The great part of the population occupies a narrow zone along the American border, easily accessible to American mass producers, whose advertising in American magazines has readily overflowed the border. American television is equally familiar in the Canadian air. American business has set up Canadian

subsidiaries and now the more aggressive American magazines have exploited the Canadian advertising market.

The Commission recites the plight of the Canadian magazines: three out of four magazines read in Canada are from the United States. Forty-one per cent of all Canadian advertising is in American-owned magazines. Distribution of 40 per cent of the magazines sold on Canadian newsstands is controlled by two American companies. Their slick high-circulation magazines get preferred position on the newsstands, forcing Canadian publications to a profitless search for subscriptions at cut rates. They have been falling behind. They had 29 per cent of Canadian circulation in 1950, only 23 per cent by 1959.

The Commission seeks to show a direct relation between the increasing losses of Canadian magazines and the rapid gains of the American publications. *Saturday Night*, for example, called particularly vulnerable to the competition from *Time*, lost five per cent advertising gross while *Time* gained 235 per cent in ten years. The greatest of Canadian magazines is *Maclean's*. But *Reader's Digest* passed it in Canadian advertising revenue in 1959.

The Commission has a special bone to pick with *Reader's Digest*, which has French as well as English editions and a combination advertising rate that costs only about eight per cent more for both language editions than for the English alone. *Reader's Digest* earned 88 per cent of its Canadian advertising revenue that way in 1959, the Commission reports, thus threatening the French periodicals of Quebec as well as those in English. They recommend prohibition of combined rates.

The Commission has to make a few embarrassing admissions. Canada has no such journals of opinion as the British, nor any such "quality" magazines as the *Atlantic* and *Harper's*. For interpretation of Canadian culture, it depends heavily on the "little" magazines; but writers can't live on writing for them and the larger Canadian magazines are largely staff written, a condition the Commission feels is a consequence of the "inequitable competition" of Canadian editions that don't have to pay much of anything for their "re-use of second-hand editorial content" from New York. The American editorial product is admittedly superior; they can outbid Canada even for the best Canadian authors. "Most Canadian magazines have complained to the Commission that they are threatened with extinction because of inequitable competition in circulation as well as in advertising."

The Commission asserts it has "no desire to create a haven for mediocrity. Its only aim to to secure a climate of competition in which Canadian publications . . . shall have a chance to survive." It recommends free mailing for the little magazines.

But the Commission lets drop one perhaps key admis-

sion: "There are no direct editorial competitors to either *Time* or *Reader's Digest*. The Canadian market is probably too small for the development [of the news magazine]."

It might be mean to ask if this does not come close to begging the whole question. The phenomenal growth of these two American subsidiaries suggests that they have created a new market which the less seductive Canadian magazines could not reach. The figures of the report itself indicate the dynamics of this new colonization in publication. The report says nothing of how much of the newly created advertising market is supplied by the Canadian subsidiaries of American business, whose growth is right now a primary concern of Canadian economic policy. Doubtless the Commission would say the Canadian editions, by preempting this new market, are shutting off future development from the home magazines.

A particular embarrassment that calls for a supplementary report by the chairman is the secondary dominance of the Canadian market by one big publisher, Maclean-Hunter, which has the three biggest magazines in Canada (*Maclean's*, *Chatelaine*, *Canadian Homes*). American magazines get 41 per cent of Canadian advertising, Maclean-Hunter 46 per cent, and the rest of the general magazines, just 13 per cent. The Commission insists it does not want to promote Canadian monopoly any more than American take-over. But it says that actually Maclean-Hunter is the only Canadian publisher strong enough to live with the American competition. Check that and the weaker magazines may have a chance. Continuance of the present situation would further increase the local dominance of big Maclean-Hunter, the Commission finds.

The Commission's report explores the techniques of "by-product" publication to exploit Canadian advertising.

First the "split run." This stops the presses after the American circulation is run off, to permit the advertiser to substitute a special appeal to the Canadian reader in the circulation going to Canada. Seventy-six American magazines use split-run, notably the *Saturday Evening Post*. "Split runs are a serious threat, but not a present danger." They cost more.

The "regional edition" is a variation of the split run. In it the advertiser can buy space in just the circulation going to Canada. The "special section" adds a few pages of local-interest content to carry Canadian advertising.

But the "Canadian edition" is a separate enterprise, a

subsidiary of the American publication, using much of the parent's editorial content to carry Canadian advertising. "Two Canadian editions, *Time* and *Reader's Digest*, have been getting 40 per cent of the total spent on magazines in Canada."

The main complaint of "inequitable competition" is leveled against these two magazines. The Commission finds the rate of profit on these two Canadian editions is greater than for their parent magazines.

This to the Commission constitutes the chief menace to the survival of Canadian magazines.

To a kibitzer from across the border, the Commission seems to exhibit some fairly gymnastic rhetorical exercises to justify its drastic exclusion recommendations.

"The effects of modern communication carry enormous social and political implications," its report says, and paraphrases Macaulay, to declare that "democratic government is government by communications." "Every nation must provide within itself the means of maintaining stability. In North America, this function is largely directed through the communication media.

"Reliance has been placed in the market place of ideas. But what may happen to our future social action, if this competition of voices should disappear?" The mortality of Canadian magazines the past two decades suggests they face "the possibility of there being no Canadian voices at all."

With no national newspapers and no powerful weekly journals, "it is largely left to our magazines to try to interpret Canada to all Canadians. The deluge of United States periodicals on Canadian newsstands, submerging Canadian prints, threatens the possibility of this task. It is a matter of national concern. Canada's own sovereign society demands a truly Canadian press."

The Commission insists it would never infringe the freedom of the press, but—"Freedom of the press is not an end in itself, but only a function of general intellectual freedom. New limitations may be necessary because the increased power of the relatively few people who control the media means a decrease in certain rights of others. The changing nature of communications requires a restatement of national policy."

My Canadian friends say there is no prospect the Commission proposals will be enacted. But, they say, "something needs to be done."

Wire Service Nationalism and Its Consequences

By Robert H. Sollen

"Nationalism," says Erich Fromm in *The Sane Society*, "is our form of incest, is our idolatry, is our insanity. 'Patriotism' is its cult. It should hardly be necessary to say, that by 'patriotism' I mean that attitude which puts the own nation above humanity, above the principles of truth and justice; not the loving interest in one's own nation, which is the concern with the nation's spiritual as much as with its material welfare—never with its power over other nations."

The American wire services' contribution to nationalism has been substantial and ignoble.

Particularly since the end of World War II, the wire services have tended heavily to report world affairs almost exclusively within the context of the cold war and in cold war terminology, and have placed the blame for most of the revolutionary post-war problems on the Soviet Union. They have failed to explain adequately the forces at work which have little or nothing to do with the "Communist conspiracy," and have assumed that the American stand-firm policy is fully justified and without rational alternatives.

This is no plea to assume the opposite—that the West is responsible for all the world's ills and that the Soviet bloc is blameless. It is a suggestion that when words or deeds are noble or infamous, the point should be made by analysis and explanation, not by glibness or unsupported assertions.

In the case of Berlin, which at this (September) writing is the current crisis, the wire services referred repeatedly to Khrushchev's threats against the freedom of West Berlin and his threats to annihilate much of the world if he doesn't get his way in Berlin.

Khrushchev has asked the West to join him in negotiating a German peace treaty which would guaranty the freedom of West Berlin and Western access to it, and help stabilize conditions in Germany and Central Europe. Khrushchev has a legitimate concern here.

His war threats amounted to statements that, if attacked, he would fight back. His graphic descriptions of the results of nuclear war, reported by wire services as belligerency and threats, are a more realistic appraisal of the consequences of nuclear war than ordinarily are heard in the West.

The American position of standing firm on the status quo is reported as the only alternative to surrender. The many proposals offered as a basis for negotiating a German treaty have been discussed widely by many responsible experts in

the United States. None proposes capitulation to tyranny. Many seek a firmer legal position for the West in West Berlin. But they and their views have been virtually blacked out by the wire services.

The news agencies have failed to report the basic fact that U.S. terms for a German peace treaty have long ceased to be relevant. A unified and rearmed Germany allied with the West is universally understood to be impossible for Khrushchev to accept. The only UPI report of the hopelessness of this position during the crisis was a B wire (regional) report of an address in San Diego.¹

Walter Ulbricht's address and peace plan, presented to the East German Parliament on July 6, were, to my knowledge, ignored by the wire services. They were reported by the *Christian Science Monitor*² and Reuters.³

The peace plan offered a free status for West Berlin and free access to it. Whatever one thinks of Ulbricht, there was more of an obligation that day to report his proposals than to continue the drum-beat of "threats" from the East.

It is no exaggeration to say, as Professor H. Stuart Hughes of Harvard did in July, that "A reading of the newspapers over the past few weeks unmistakably suggests that the American Administration and press are making a conscious effort to build up a war scare."⁴

The wire services have reported the Cuban situation in an even more distorted manner.⁵ They have given almost no recognition to the significant influence of Cuban-American relations before the Castro revolution, nor do they acknowledge any U.S. provocation since the revolution.

Wire service analysts accused Castro of the "big lie" when he charged the U.S. with direct involvement in invasion plans.⁶ Even after other magazines and newspapers reported that this was not a lie, the wire services continued to ignore U.S. participation in preparing an invasion.⁷ After the invasion, the wire services still defied reality. UPI sent this lead from Detroit on June 3:

"Cuban Premier Fidel Castro today had until next Wednesday to agree to a take-it-or-leave-it ransom of 500 agricultural tractors for 1,214 prisoners captured in the abortive, U.S.-backed invasion in April."

Within a half hour a "correction" moved on the same wire, instructing editors to delete "U.S.-backed."

Wire services were even less willing to discuss the im-

too, breaks international agreements. If the wire services felt it was not their responsibility (it was) to dig up this fact on their own, they might have reported Senator Wayne Morse's address on this subject on April 24. But they ignored Morse.⁸

Nowhere in the wire service reports, to my knowledge, was there mention of the possibility that popular support for Castro helped doom the invasion, or at least that a lot of informed people thought so. The reason people didn't revolt, it was reported, was that Castro had too effective and terroristic a police force.

Except to report scornfully from time to time that the economy is about to collapse, that freedom has disappeared, and that the people hate Castro, there is virtually no report on social and economic conditions in Cuba from the wire services.

"For what it seems to want out of Cuba, the American press would do better to staff its Havana offices with police reporters rather than with foreign correspondents," observes *Progressive* Editor Morris Rubin after a visit to Cuba.⁹ The anti-Castro "police beat" should not be ignored, but it should not be the substance of the news, particularly when indications are that these reports are quite exaggerated and inaccurate.¹⁰

Last Jan. 7, shortly after the second anniversary of the Cuban revolution, a UPI's editor's note on the chronology of the revolution stated:

A prosperous and generally happy island in the sun has been transformed into a totalitarian outpost of the Communist world, plagued by shortages and fear, where terrorism is the only recourse of opponents of the regime.

In the anti-Castro indoctrination process, Batista becomes increasingly noble.

And when the adversary makes a democratic or human move, it is no trouble to impute a negative motive:

HAVANA, Feb. 17—(UPI)—Premier Fidel Castro today was reported planning to counteract adverse reaction to his recent threat to export the Cuban revolution to the rest of the hemisphere by allowing more than 80 political refugees to leave the country."

Similarly, from AP (undated) in the Aug. 14 Washington *Post*:

U.S. sources guessed yesterday that Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro is returning the hijacked Eastern Air Lines plane because it has brought him little more than propaganda headaches.

As nationalistic anti-Castro indoctrination achieves its purpose, American righteousness and Castro's pure devilry

are taken for granted. This leaves Castro without rights and America without legal or moral limits in its policy toward Cuba.

Discussing the Cuban situation on Aug. 12 during the hijacking panic, UPI reported that "many angry members of Congress called for what amounted to war action against Cuba." Some demanded the U.S. send Marines; others called for a blockade.

"What about a blockade?" UPI asked itself. "Would it hurt Castro and Cuba?" The UPI report assumed that in so far as a blockade would cause a shortage of food, medicine and machinery, it would be a good thing. The only problem, according to UPI, is that it would cause "dangerous complications."

Little did it matter if people abroad suffered for what someone thinks are American interests. It was the "practical" matters that had to be considered.

And for anyone who does not hate Castro, UPI warns:

WASHINGTON, May 30—(UPI)—A Communist-infiltrated organization called the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" (FPCC) is actively recruiting members in many parts of the United States, especially on college campuses. . . . The FPCC is heavily infiltrated by Communists, although all members are by no means Communists. It is increasingly active on Castro's behalf. . . ."

The report was concerned almost solely with some committee personnel and their connections, and not with its policies.

After all the words in the Cuban report, we have not learned from the wire services what is going on in Cuba. We have not been told of the social consequences or the aims of the revolution. We can only, if we do not resist or doubt, feel that hell on earth is only 90 miles from home and that it poses a deadly threat to American survival.

In the year of turmoil in the Congo, the wire service reports were only somewhat less slanted than they were in the case of Cuba. I do not know how great or how diabolical Lumumba was or might have been, or specifically what Russian designs were. But there was more wrong in the Congo than Lumumba and the Russians. The wire services, accustomed to reporting foreign affairs almost purely within the context of the cold war, all but ignored the problem caused by the desire of the West, particularly Belgium, to retain its economic advantage by any possible means after Congo independence.¹¹ This was a major obstacle to unification, order, independence and economic development, but it was all but overlooked in the campaign to castigate the "goateed former beer salesman," as UPI referred to him. UPI cheered when Lumumba was jailed.¹²

Near the end of the first year of independence, AP called unemployment, creeping inflation, stagnation and misery "the legacy left by Patrice Lumumba . . . the postal clerk-turned premier, who valued power above prosperity."¹³

This was the assessment of the first two paragraphs, and it was not until the 14th paragraph that AP reported that a "major source of the difficulties was the refusal of the copper-rich Katanga Province to recognize the central government."

This was Belgium's doings, not Lumumba's.

Wire service failure to explain adequately foreign developments has been evident in many other areas.

The 1960 Japanese demonstrations against the new Japanese-American military treaty, for instance, were almost solely Communist inspired, judging from wire service reports. This ignored far more basic motivations: the desire not to be a nuclear target again; the memory of a fascist military police state, and the desire for full national independence.

Conditions leading to the student ouster of the Rhee regime in Korea and the military coup a year later were explained only *after* the upheavals. The wire services had reported the Korean situation in terms of a strong military line of defense against Communism; they largely ignored economic, political and social conditions.

Iraqi reports before the July 1958 revolution also were primarily cold war narratives. The Soviet-American power struggle and the Baghdad Pact, which were apparently the only items of interest to American wire service correspondents in Iraq, were of the least possible interest to the Iraqi government, its opposition and the people. Social conditions, again, were ignored by the wire services, and the coup was a big surprise. We got virtually no more information about Iraq after the revolution except that it was about to go Communist. When it didn't, interest died down until the recent British-Iraqi-Kuwait dispute. But virtually nothing since July 1958 on the human developments of the revolution.

In Turkey, the May 1960 student demonstrations against the Menderes government surprised American newspaper readers. They had been told only of Turkey's reliability in the cold war, and not of unstable internal conditions. During the fourth week of May, while the demonstrations continued, UPI moved a story for release on Saturday, May 28:

ANKARA, Turkey, May 28—(UPI)—Will Premier Adnan Menderes be swept from office in Turkey by popular demonstrations the way Syngman Rhee was in Korea? Diplomats here say: probably not—yet.

Before Saturday—the day for release of this "background" article—Menderes was out of office.

In Iran, not much was reported about social conditions which threatened to topple the Shah's regime until Khrushchev's comments to Walter Lippmann¹⁴ received widespread attention. Khrushchev told Lippmann that the Communist Party is weak in Iran, but that the people will overthrow the Shah. The West, as usual, would blame the Communists, Khrushchev said.

During and after the August election campaign in British Guiana, the wire services reported little more than the cold war implications. The candidates and the people appear to have found this not very important. There were undoubtedly other and more significant issues, but the wire services dwelled endlessly on the threat posed by Dr. Cheddi Jagan as a leftist, a socialist, and maybe even a Communist.

Although international relations today involve unprecedented developments, they are being reported in traditional diplomatic concepts of national defense, national sovereignty, national security, unilateral intervention, show of force, position of strength, etc. Among these terms which still have relevance, many are used in an irrelevant context. Even in the pre-Marxian and pre-atomic era these terms often were inadequate, but the inadequacy then was not potentially catastrophic except occasionally and on a regional basis. Today the inadequacies of concepts brought daily to the public leave us most direly victimized.

The new conditions prevailing in the world community are of deep and universal consequence. They are most cruel in their oppressiveness because they are interrelated and they seem to reinforce each other in their seriousness. Moreover, because they are unprecedented, the world lacks the experience and the institutions to cope efficiently with them. This is particularly true in the United States and in the Soviet Union, both with relatively little experience in world leadership, but to whom the world looks now for a means of dealing with these momentous problems.

The problem involves a population explosion about which much has been written in recent years but the consequences of which still elude most minds. The rapid population growth increases the spread between the have and the have-nots throughout the world. The hungry not only are increasing rapidly in number, but they are demanding urgently and universally a far better living standard and national independence. The question no longer is how to control them or subdue them. They will get—or at least go after—what they want. The question is how—peacefully or violently?

Demands of undeveloped areas have caused unstable

plications of the invasion. Other media pointed out what the wire services, I think, never conceded: that the U.S., conditions and new political leaders and alignments and concepts. Both the Soviet Union and the United States seek to gain dominance in these areas, or at least to keep the other out. It frustrates many Americans that the U.S. and its Western allies no longer can control "backward" areas at will. If there is not a challenge from another great power bloc, there are negotiations with the state concerned.

The Soviet and American press, under different arrangements but with roughly similar results, each backs its nation's interests. Neither is as concerned about telling the entire story objectively as it is with justifying its own nation's position and rallying public support for it.

As Lewis Mumford has recently written:¹⁸

The American people still show no sufficient reaction to this situation (lack of opposition to cold war policy) for precisely the same reason that the Russian people show so little independent reaction to the Kremlin's behavior: they have been conditioned to believe what they are told, as a patriotic duty, and they have no alternative, for they are protected from objective thought and effective action by the "party line"—in our case, the bi-party line, abetted by a press that sedulously avoids reporting opinions, movements, or meetings that would cast a doubt upon the unity of sentiment that the government seeks to maintain.

This intensifies the cold war, contributes in no way to an understanding of the problems, and helps freeze each nation to its original position from which it can back down, compromise or negotiate only at the risk of arousing the devastating wrath of the stand-firm and get-tough elements at home.

(The immobility of the impossible U.S. China policy is an example.)

The situation deteriorates to catastrophic potential as two blocs of sovereign nations, each possessing total weapons, face each other in hostility, intransigence and irrational nationalism.

As the public fails to understand the nature of other nations' problems, so it will fail to anticipate their consequences. And when the crises occur, the public demands panic action, usually aimed at the Soviet Union or other "Communists."

We know about the totality of war, yet we read with considerable credulity and even enthusiasm about plans to "defend" territory or principles by military means, hoping, of course, to limit war to conventional weapons, or "small" or "clean" nuclear weapons. But always prepared

for total war if necessary.

Obviously, world order and not world war is the answer to the threat posed by the possession of nuclear arms by the antagonistic nation-states. Yet efforts toward world order are virtually ignored except for some test ban or disarmament conference reports, while military strategy is discussed in great detail.

The efforts of such men as Kenneth Boulding,¹⁶ Professor Charles E. Osgood,¹⁷ W. H. Ferry,¹⁸ Walter Millis,¹⁹ Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn,²⁰ William O. Douglas,²¹ and others are seldom reported. They are admittedly "far ahead" of governments and the public in their thinking on the issue of world order. But they are not far ahead of the problem. Governments and the public are simply lagging. It probably was impossible, but effective institutions of world order should have preceded the Bomb. The fact that they didn't illustrates the cultural lag which, if allowed to continue, probably will destroy civilization.

It is not my purpose here to plead for a specific foreign policy. It is rather to open the press to the facts and ideas upon which a full discussion may be heard and a realistic foreign policy can be formulated, understood and demanded by the American people.

I believe the effective demand for a change will come from outside the ranks of journalism. There has been excessive intellectual in-breeding in the profession. Editors and publishers are in general self-satisfied and/or unaware or afraid of the new realities.

Establishment of a private national commission, preferably of non-newspapermen, to report periodically on what the facts are and what the press said they are, would be constructive. The problem would be to reach enough newspaper readers with sufficient impact to move them to demand better performance of their newspapers. Informed persons everywhere should make this demand.

If editors and publishers want to face realities, they will invite fewer newspapermen and State Department personnel to speak at their conventions. Judging from what I have seen and heard, news ideas exchanged at most press conventions are self-assuring, uncontroversial, trivial and/or irrelevant. Outsiders should be invited to speak, including those whose ideas are not guaranteed to fit the hardening mold, intellectual pioneers whose thinking goes beyond the cold war psychology, and foreigners.

Will the public support a relevant newspaper, largely devoid of stereotyped news and non-news trivia? If the revolutionary developments of today's world were presented by competent journalists and non-journalist experts, today's newspaper would be eagerly sought after for its substance rather than glanced at for the day's TV log.

Notes

¹"U.S. Policy on Berlin Criticized," *Press-Courier*, Oxnard, California, Aug. 10, 1961.

²Ernest S. Pisko, "Behind the Berlin Agitation," *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 12, 1961.

³Adams Kellett-Long, "Peaceful Pact on Berlin Is Predicted by Ulbricht," *Washington Post*, July 7, 1961.

⁴H. Stuart Hughes, "The Grounds for Compromise," *Committee of Correspondence Newsletter*, P. O. Box 536, Cooper Station, New York 3, N.Y., July 21, 1961, p. 12.

⁵James Reston (New York Times News Service), "Misuse of the Press in the Cuban Fiasco," *Los Angeles Times*, May 12, 1961.

Leslie Dewart, "What We Don't Hear: From Canada," *Committee of Correspondence Newsletter*, June 19, 1961, pp. 16-18.

⁶Phil Newsom (UPI), "The Big Lie Much Used in So-Called Diplomacy," *Press-Courier*, Jan. 11, 1961.

⁷Reston, "The Free Press in the Cold War," *Los Angeles Times*, April 27, 1961.

⁸*Congressional Record*, 87th Cong., 1st session (April 24, 1961).

⁹Morris H. Rubin, "The Tragedy of Cuba," *The progressive*, (Madison, Wis.), June 1961, p. 10.

¹⁰Leo Huberman, "Eyewitness in Havana," *The Nation*, May 13, 1961, pp. 406-7.

¹¹Russell Howe, *Washington Post*, Jan. 28, Feb. 1, and March 7, 1961.

Henderson Gall (Reuters), "Katanga 'Foreign Legion' Reporter Being Trained," *Washington Post*, Jan. 24, 1961.

Lindsey Parrott, "U.N. Gets Report on Mercenaries Aiding Katanga," *New York Times*, April 16, 1961, pp. 1 & 16.

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Waldo Drake, "U.N. Hopes in Congo Crushed by Tshombe," *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 22, 1961.

¹²Phil Newsom (UPI), "Lumumba Is Caged; Congo Outlook Improves," *Press-Courier*, Jan. 25, 1961.

¹³Lynn Heinzerling, "Congo Counts Legacy of Stagnation, Misery," *Los Angeles Times*, May 18, 1961.

¹⁴Walter Lippmann, "Khrushchev: 'History on Our Side,'" *Los Angeles Times*, April 18, 1961.

¹⁵Lewis Mumford, "The New Brink," *Committee of Correspondence Newsletter*, May 12, 1961, p. 6.

¹⁶Kenneth E. Boulding, director, Committee on Research for Peace, the Institute of International Order, 11 West 42nd Street, New York 36, N. Y.

¹⁷Charles E. Osgood, *Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction: A Key to Initiative In Foreign Policy*, (University of Illinois, Urbana, Dec. 1960).

¹⁸W. H. Ferry, *Disarm to Parley: A Case for Unilateral Disarmament* (Peace Education Program, American Friends Service Committee, 160 N. 15th Street, Philadelphia, Pa., February 1961).

¹⁹Walter Millis, *A World Without War* (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Calif., 1961).

²⁰Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2nd edition [revised] 1960).

²¹William O. Douglas, *The Rule of Law in World Affairs* (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, 1961).

Robert H. Sollen has been for five years wire news editor of the *Press-Courier* of Oxnard, California. Since graduating at the University of Wisconsin in 1948, he has been reporter on the *Milwaukee Journal* for three years, a freelance writer in the Far East, and a graduate student in international relations at the University of Southern California. He has been a frequent contributor to magazines.

The Luckiest Fellow

By Charles-Gene McDaniel

For the past fifteen years cartoonist Walt Partymiller has worked for publisher J. W. Gitt in York, Pennsylvania. It has been a happy association of like-minded liberals. Partymiller has had complete freedom to draw how and what he likes. And Gitt, publisher of the *Gazette and Daily*, the country's most liberal daily, has liked what Partymiller has produced. His cartoons appear on page one.

The forty-nine-year-old cartoonist, who lives with his artist wife and two sons on a farm in York County in Pennsylvania Dutch country, has stayed with the *Gazette and Daily* in spite of opportunities to get into the "big time," because no place else could he find a newspaper publisher with whom he is so much in agreement. And no place else could he find another paper of the quality of this 164-year-old prize-winning tabloid (circulation 35,800).

In the 1948 Heywood Broun competition, William L. Shirer, one of the judges, described Partymiller as "cartoonist of one of the most remarkable small daily newspapers in the U.S.A." and said he is "as remarkable as his newspaper."

Partymiller shares a common heritage with the Pennsylvania Dutch (*Deutsch*), though not the conservatism traditionally ascribed to them. Like the hybrid newspaper for which he works, Partymiller is a thorough-going liberal. The *Gazette* was the only daily to support the Progressive Party in 1948. Partymiller ran for school board in York and lost, in what has been his only venture into politics. Both the newspaper and its cartoonist have a reputation for espousing the most advanced thinking for the community, the nation and the world—to the chagrin of many but the delight of more. The *Gazette* has the disadvantage, from the circulation point of view, of being a morning publication. Yet it retains the edge over its afternoon competitor, the *York Dispatch*, the very antithesis of *Gazette* thinking. Liberals in far-reaching parts of the country subscribe in order to have a newspaper not beholden to advertisers and the Republican Party.

At an early age Partymiller became enchanted with newspapers and cartoons. His father, Maurice, who migrated from Germany, was a typesetter for the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* for forty-three years of the seventy he actively worked. The elder Partymiller brought home magazines and discussed the cartoons with his son.

Partymiller recalls that he was particularly impressed with the cartoons of Art Young in *The Nation* and John Baer's cartoons in *Labor*. Years later, in 1939, Partymiller

met Young in New York and came to know him as "one of my dearest friends."

"I like Art Young's social viewpoint. He liked people," Partymiller says. A similar viewpoint is evident in Partymiller's work, which has been reproduced in *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, the *New York Times*, the now defunct *Labor's Daily*, the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, the old *Chicago Times, PM*, the *Chicago Sun-Times*, the *New York Post*, and *Crisis*.

The most important issues before the world are war and peace and health, Partymiller says. "If you don't have peace you can't exist, and if you don't have health you can't enjoy living." This philosophy takes form on Partymiller's drawing board.

For a "minor league" cartoonist, Partymiller's work has attracted wide attention. He is represented in the Jane Addams centennial commemoration calendar put out by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The American Friends Service Committee recently reproduced one of his cartoons in one of its publications. And the American Cancer Society utilized one of his cartoons as part of a national fund drive.

In addition, his cartoons have been reproduced as far away as Sweden and China. Harry Truman received at his request an original of one of Partymiller's cartoons to hang in his library at Independence. And, ironically—because Partymiller and his newspaper are strongly pro-labor, Henry Ford asked for and received an original. Bernard Baruch is another who possesses an original.

Starting as a cartoonist for his high school newspaper, Partymiller later did drawings for the University of Washington humor magazine. During the lean years of the Depression he took any kind of job, including one for 25 cents an hour at a silk screen company, and spent endless idle hours reading in the public library about artists and cartoonists, "trying to find out what made them tick."

He studied at the Cornish School in Seattle on scholarship and worked for window trimmers and sign painters and taught arts and crafts as a counselor at a boys camp.

Just after the Depression he began drawing cartoons for labor publications, including those of the Woodworkers, Longshoremen and Cannery Workers.

Since 1936 Partymiller has been a member of the American Newspaper Guild, joining when he went to work for the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* as a member of the art staff. The next year he lost the job in an economy drive by the newspaper.

A couple of years later he traveled to New York, stopping en route to meet well-known cartoonists of the Thirties. These included Boardman Robinson in Colorado Springs, who had been with the *New York Herald Tribune*; Thomas Benton in Kansas City; Fitzpatrick at the St.



DEEP ARE THE ROOTS

Louis *Post-Dispatch*; Ross Lewis in Milwaukee; Herblock, then with NEA in Cleveland, and Edmund Duffy in Baltimore.

Free-lancing in New York for labor papers and other periodicals, Partymiller continued to go to art school at night, where he "had the opportunity of studying with top men in social art." Among these were Gropper, Ellis, and Groth.

Cartoonist Rollin Kirby advised Partymiller to stay out of the big time.

Partymiller adds, "I plan to stay in the minor league because I can't express myself according to big cash registers."

Selden Menefee, columnist for the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Washington Post*, is indirectly responsible for Partymiller's being at the *Gazette and Daily*. The cartoonist had known Menefee as a teacher of social work at the University of Washington and he later dropped by Partymiller's studio in New York and told him of the liberal York newspaper.


The cartoonist then started sending drawings to the paper, practically all of which were used on the front page. He tried to get a job on the newspaper but was not taken on right away and returned to Seattle. Then in 1945 he became the paper's first cartoonist—"the greatest honor I ever got."

Gitt told Partymiller that "a lot of these cartoonists try to please everybody and end up not pleasing anybody." He does not want that. And he has not got that from his cartoonist. Partymiller as a cartoonist represents what is all too rare in the nation's Fourth Estate—an independent point of view. While his point of view is almost without exception the same as that of his newspaper, it is his own, independently arrived at; he is not told what and how to draw, and he does not—as do so many cartoonists—draw to illustrate the day's major editorial.

Partymiller is a soft-spoken Quaker with passionate liberal, humanitarian convictions in the tradition of his faith. He believes strongly in the United Nations as a force for world peace; he is deeply concerned about nuclear testing and its effect on the health and lives of individuals; throughout the years he has stood up strongly and unequivocally in opposition to those who would abridge the civil rights and civil liberties of citizens; he deplores bigotry, and he always has sought to arouse sympathy for those in want, pain or need. With his pen and brushes he speaks loudly.

"There is no use existing if you can't help your fellows out," he says. "I am trying in some way to make this a better world in which to live."

And, he says, "I am about the luckiest fellow in the world because I am expressing myself."



Continuing Criticism of the Press

By Frank K. Kelly

In the July issue of *Nieman Reports*, Nathan Blumberg made some good points about the critics of the press and came up with a good recommendation—to establish a board of vigorous, competent critics “who will examine and investigate the press on a national scale, independently, without fear or favor.”

“These men cannot be beholden to state legislatures, to the federal government or to the newspapers themselves,” Mr. Blumberg declared. “They must be free to report what they find. They must report regularly, preferably weekly or twice a month. They must defend the press against uninformed or misinformed attacks as well as point out the shortcomings of individual newspapers. They must work together in a central office, but deal with the press on a national scale.”

“This National Board of the American Press—if it requires a title this might serve as a starting point—would be ready to receive information from journalists and educators and the general public throughout the United States. It would allow space in its reports for replies or for dissenting opinions. But most important, it would provide the central point for a continuing study of the American press, and the critics would know where their headquarters are located.”

Mr. Blumberg expressed confidence that the number of citizens willing to subscribe to a periodical containing reports of the National Board would be fairly large. He voiced the hope that a foundation would contribute some substantial support. He felt that most of the journalism schools would offer cooperation.

“If we had had a board of this kind . . . we would have had a focal point for the study of the role of a free press confronted by the problem of national security in the Cuban fiasco,” Mr. Blumberg asserted. “Instead of operating in the fog in which we now find ourselves, we could have cut through the conflicting reports and come up with a valid assessment of the newspapers and our intelligence system. We would be much closer to knowing whether we need more self-censorship on the part of newspapers, as the President suggested, or whether we should improve our intelligence system to prevent another failure.”

“The good newspapers have nothing to fear. Our poor

newspapers, the sensational and the shoddy, have much to fear. They are the ones which will scream most loudly against an undertaking of this kind, rising in righteous indignation and editorial vehemence to denounce these people who come to tell them how to run their business. But under this proposal no one would be trying to tell anyone else how to run his business; the board would simply report on how business is going. The facts have been locked in a safe for too many years. . . .”

These suggestions of Mr. Blumberg deserve discussion and consideration by the editors and publishers who read *Nieman Reports*, and by foundation officials and civic leaders who should realize the need for the establishment of a National Commission to conduct a continuing review of the mass media of communication. I am giving my own comments because I have been seeking to stimulate discussion of similar ideas for some years, and because Mr. Blumberg makes some statements about the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions which require amplification and correction.

Mr. Blumberg has recognized the fact that the Center is the only educational foundation persistently attempting to foster thoughtful evaluations of the mass media. He has described our publications as “cogently assembled, oftentimes brilliantly written, and typographically magnificent.” But he indicts our efforts on two counts: (1) our evaluations are supposedly couched “in the most general terms,” and (2) the publications “find their way to libraries, to colleges and universities, to the desks of editors and publishers—in short, to everyone except the public.”

He is wrong on both counts. Our examinations of the problems and deficiencies of the press and broadcasting industries have not been done “in the most general terms,” although we have not hesitated to consider the general questions along with very specific ones. Our first publication in this area, “Freedom to See,” was a study of the press treatment of the first Khrushchev interview presented by the Columbia Broadcasting System. Our other publications include “Taste and the Censor in Television,” containing specific citations of numerous cases; “To Pay or Not to Pay,” a detailed analysis of the controversy over subscription television; “The Relation of the Writer to Television,” with many specific examples of the difficulties encountered by writers; “Broadcasting and Government Regulation,” a discussion of the principal issues encountered by the FCC, conducted by present and former members of the FCC in very clear-cut terms; and the transcripts of a television

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series called "The Press and the People," moderated by Louis Lyons and dealing with the press in concrete cases.

His statement that our publications "find their way to libraries, to colleges and universities, to the desks of editors and publishers—in short, to everyone except the public" seems to imply that libraries, editors, publishers, and schools are somehow separated from the public. Our publications are used by hundreds of libraries and hundreds of educational institutions across the country, and consequently stimulate the minds of hundreds of thousands of people. The pamphlets published by the Center in all the fields of its studies thus far have reached a total circulation of 2½ million copies and our mail from readers runs at a rate of 50,000 to 60,000 letters a year. Our mass media publications alone have exceeded a total of 500,000 copies in circulation.

"The Press and the People" discussions were produced for educational television by WGBH-TV in Boston with the cooperation of the Center. Prints were made available to all the educational television stations in the nation, and ten commercial TV stations used them along with 40 ETV stations, reaching an estimated audience well up in the millions. Perhaps Mr. Blumberg suffers from the "ratings obsession" which afflicts many broadcasters; he may feel that programs which fall short of an audience of 50 million are not reaching the public.

Among the specific topics covered by "The Press and the People" series were: "News from China"; "Washington and the Press"; "Secrecy in Government"; "The Bomb and the Press"; "The Economic Facts of Life"; "The Photo Journalist"; "The Television News Commentator"; "The Responsibilities of Television"; "The Berlin Story"; "Labor and the Press"; "Report on the Soviet Challenge"; "The Publisher and the Public," and "Foreign Policy, the Press, and the Citizen." More than 175,000 copies of the transcripts were distributed, and some of the transcripts were later reprinted in textbooks, reference works, magazines, etc.

With the cooperation of Mike Wallace and the American Broadcasting Company, we did a television series titled "Survival and Freedom" in which the role of the press and the broadcasters was freely discussed. These programs were carried by 50 commercial stations to an estimated audience of 8 to 10 million persons, and 175,000 copies of transcripts of the discussions were distributed.

The article on the mass media by Harry Ashmore which appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post* (circulation: 6 to 7 million copies) was written while Ashmore was serving as a consultant to the Center's study of the media of communication. In the article Ashmore called for the establishment of a National Commission to review the work of the press along the lines suggested by former Senator William Benton.

In my testimony before the FCC in January of 1960—testimony which summarized the Center's efforts in this field and was later reprinted in part in *Nieman Reports*—I said: "I would call attention to the recommendation of Senator Benton and others for the creation of an independent citizens' commission to carry on a continuous review and appraisal of the mass media.

"Whether this be done by Presidential appointment or other official act, as Mr. Benton has proposed, or be created and supported by purely private means, it should be made up of interested, informed and concerned citizens completely independent of the industry. Having no regulatory or coercive powers, such a commission would encounter no conflict with the First Amendment. It could perform a critical function in regard to program content properly denied to the FCC—but clearly needed by a developing industry which has demonstrated that it cannot sustain its own declared standards of responsibility and taste in the face of the commercial pressures which dominate it."

Whether it is called a National Board of the American Press, as Mr. Blumberg has suggested, or a National Commission on the Mass Media, as Mr. Ashmore and I have suggested, the steady increase in criticism of the media and the steady increase in public awareness of the necessity for improvement makes it inevitable that a national group will be established within the next two years to conduct the continuing criticism and evaluation which is urgently needed. When the national organization is established, it is my belief that the members and staff will find the groundbreaking work of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions extremely useful. The response to our publications has proved that there are hundreds of thousands of citizens actively concerned about the future of the American communications system—and millions of others interested in the role of the press in a free society.

Britain's Experience with a Press Council

(The British Press Council has been described before in *Nieman Reports*. But in view of current proposals of an American Commission on the Press, the eight-year British experience of a Council within the industry itself is of interest. This report ran in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, August 17 and 24.)

By R. L. Leonard

Eight years ago this month the Press Council [established by the British newspaper industry in response to a recommendation in the 1949 report of the Royal Commission on the Press] set up shop in Bell Yard, a small backwater off Fleet Street. Some would perhaps feel that its address is symbolic of the unimportance of the rôle which it has assumed. This is not, however, a valuation which the council itself would accept. In its first annual report it described its inauguration as "a new departure in the democratic institutions of this country. For the first time in our history the free press of Britain was to be given ballast by a self-elected body which would both safeguard its liberties and rebuke its excesses."

Nor has the council lacked admirers. The London correspondent of the Copenhagen *Berlingske Tidende*, for instance, has written: "The British Press Council, which was received with scepticism, has become an important factor as a protector of journalistic ethics and as a defender of the freedom of the press—and thereby of civic rights. . . . There was something to be said in favour of our waiting to see how the British experiment got on. We know now. It is a success." On the other hand the council's critics have been legion, though not all would go so far as the *Spectator* which described it as "an entirely comic body."

Sufficient time has now elapsed to test these conflicting evaluations against the council's record. From the beginning it has had no shortage of work. A steady stream of complaints has poured in. Some, of course, are wholly frivolous. These receive merely a formal acknowledgment.

But complaints of some substance arrive at the rate of about two a week. The council insists that any complaints about individual publications should first be taken up directly with the editor concerned. Perhaps a majority of cases are settled amicably in this way. But if satisfaction is not obtained the council itself takes up the case. At the present time, the council's secretary—Colonel Clissitt—informed me, there are 19 cases "in the pipeline."

In the greater number of such cases the council either finds the complaint unsubstantiated or manages to arrange a mutually satisfactory settlement without the necessity of pronouncing on the rights and wrongs of the affair. A fairly typical example was a complaint by Mr. George Jeger, MP, that the *Daily Express* and the *Evening Standard* had wrongly described the report of a Select Committee as being in favour of granting free railway vouchers to the wives of MPs. The newspapers, when approached by the Press Council, claimed that the wording of the report was ambiguous on this matter and agreed to print an authoritative interpretation if one were provided. On the suggestion of the council the chairman of the Select Committee, Mr. Clement Davies, MP, supplied an appropriate statement which was published by both newspapers. In a minority of cases, however, the council has failed to be satisfied and has handed out a rebuke to the newspaper concerned. Sixty-one such rebukes, of varying severity, have so far been administered.

In the council's eyes the national press have been worse and more persistent offenders than have provincial and local newspapers who together received only 10 of the council's reprimands. Leading the field is the *Daily Sketch* which has been censured eight times, closely followed by the *Sunday Pictorial* with seven reprimands. The next worst offenders have been the Beaverbrook newspapers with a collective score of 10. But none of the national dailies, with the exception of the *Daily Worker*, has entirely escaped the scourge of the council's whip. The daily *Guardian* was the last to fall from grace:

it had a clean sheet until the printing of a "four-letter word" last winter.

The offences have ranged over a wide area, but the majority of them fall into one of the following categories: unwarranted intrusion into people's privacy, irresponsible or sensational treatment of crime and sex, bad taste in dealing with the private life of the Royal Family, and failure to publish corrections of untrue or misleading statements. Newspapers tend to specialise in their field of transgression. Thus the *Daily Sketch* has attracted most rebukes for intrusion, the *Sunday Pictorial* for crime reports, the *Daily Mirror* for overfrank comments on royalty, and the Beaverbrook newspapers for refusing to publish corrections.

As the council has no sanction other than that of public rebuke, wide publicity for its pronouncements is clearly necessary if it is to have any hope of being effective. Colonel Clissitt expressed himself satisfied with the coverage which the council had received, and told me that in nearly every case when the council had criticised a newspaper that paper had reported that criticism.

Papers have, however, at times sharply dissented from the council's criticisms and have on occasions accompanied their reports with attacks on the council which has more than once been dismissed as a group of self-important busybodies.

Any judgment on the effect of the council must be speculative since there is no way of telling what would have happened if the council had not been in existence. Two beneficial developments may, however, be ascribed with reasonable certainty to the influence of the council. First, a greater willingness on the part of newspapers to publish corrections. In a large number of cases newspapers have voluntarily agreed to do so when approached by the council, in others they have noted criticism by the council for refusal to do so and the misstatements have been published in other papers. Secondly, there has been a marked reduction in cases of intrusion. In its early years the council received a large number of complaints of this na-

ture, it has had only one in the past nine months. (Some of the credit for this improvement, however, undoubtedly belongs to the National Union of Journalists which has imposed quite large fines on members for breaking the union rule that "nothing should be done that will cause pain or humiliation to innocent, bereaved, or otherwise distressed persons.")

Then there are a number of unpublicised activities of the council of undoubted value. For instance, in 1956 the council persuaded the Home Secretary to send a circular to clerks to justices of the peace, chief constables, and clerks of assize urging that full use should be made of Section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act which gives a Court power to direct that no newspaper report should identify child witnesses in criminal cases involving offences against morality or decency. And the council is currently engaged in a study of the apparently widespread practice of local authorities to circumvent the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act by appointing committees containing one member less than the full council and thus enabling them to exclude press and public.

In other respects the effect of the council has been less easy to discern. Certainly there has been no magic transformation in the tone of the press, but it is reasonable to assume that it may have effected a marginal improvement or at least have prevented a further decline. But it is still a long way from establishing a code of conduct generally acceptable to the industry.

The record of the Press Council, therefore, is one of only modest success. It is arguable, however, that it could both have won more respect and have had a greater effect upon the press if its procedure had been different and its powers and composition altered.

But the most important respect in which the council diverged from the commission's recommendations was in its composition. The commission recommended that the council should have "lay members amounting to about 20 per cent of the total, including the chairman, nominated jointly by the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord President of the Court of Session, who, in choosing the other lay members, should consult the chairman." The coun-

cil, however, consists entirely of representatives of the newspaper industry and chooses its chairman from among its own members. The commission's recommendation that the chairman should be paid has also been ignored.

When the Press Council was established the representatives of the newspaper proprietors were adamant against lay representation and their viewpoint prevailed. This has undoubtedly had the effect of diminishing the influence of the council which has found it difficult to overcome the suspicion of being an apologist for the press rather than an impartial arbiter.

But perhaps the council was never intended to carry much weight. It is known that, from the outset, many newspaper proprietors were extremely lukewarm about the project. This probably explains their meanness in contributing to the costs of the council. Its budget was initially limited to £2,500 and, though this has now grown to £4,100, this has barely sufficed to make good the fall in the value of money. The scope of the council's work has inevitably been severely restricted. References are often made to its "secretariat"; this consists only of the secretary, Colonel Willie C. Clissitt, and his own secretary.

The council has been much criticised for excluding the public from its meetings. Inevitably, decisions arrived at behind closed doors excite suspicion and it is especially invidious that newspapers who claim the right of free reporting in the public interest should not be prepared to apply the same principle to their own affairs. But the Press Council can adduce weighty reasons for meeting in private. The council is not a privileged body, and is unprotected against legal proceedings which might arise if it met in open session. Its work consists largely of the investigation of charges and countercharges and the council feels that these could not be discussed with the same frankness and freedom if it met in public.

But if the council is to continue to meet in private it is all the more necessary that interested parties should be crystal clear about their rights and the procedure to be adopted by the council in considering complaints. A number of recent cases have raised considerable doubt about this. The

procedure adopted by the council was explained to me by Colonel Clissitt. He distinguished between two types of newspapers and general issues which have a bearing upon the whole of the press.

Under the first category complaints are submitted to the editor of the newspaper concerned for his comments and the council may, in addition, ask for statements from reporters, photographers, independent witnesses, and so on. When the secretary is satisfied that he has got a "full picture" from both sides he prepares a memorandum of evidence which sets out the known facts about the case and summarises at length (and with extensive quotations from their correspondence) the submissions of both sides in the dispute, together with the observations of any other parties or witnesses involved. Colonel Clissitt said that on occasion the council interviewed people personally but much preferred to have all the "evidence" in writing. The memorandum of evidence is considered by the complaints and general purposes committee of the council who make a recommendation which is then considered by a meeting of the full council. Where there is conflict of evidence the committee or council may call for oral evidence, but neither complainants nor defendants have the "right" to appear before the council, though on occasion they have been allowed to do so.

The council defend this practice on grounds of convenience, saying that the different parties often would not be available on the same dates and that the council meets only in London, usually only five times a year. There is little doubt that if personal appearances were made it would greatly prolong the time taken to consider cases. As the council members are unpaid and receive no expenses other than rail fares their attitude is understandable. Within the severe limits of the council's present constitution and budget there is probably no practical alternative. But under the present procedure a complainant has no assurance that his case has been adequately presented, no inkling of the reply which has been made by the defendant, and no opportunity of challenging such a reply. The minimum concession required for justice to be seen to be done would be for both complainant and de-

BOOK NOTES

Viewing the Press

fendant to be sent a copy of the memorandum of evidence *before* it was considered by the complaints committee and to be given the opportunity of adding their own comments to it.

The procedure adopted by the council in considering so-called "general" issues is even more open to criticism. In these cases no warning at all is given to editors that certain matters are to be discussed by the council and no opportunity exists for them to make their views known. On a number of occasions, however, such discussions have led to individual newspapers being censured for specific offences which they were alleged to have committed. Thus in 1960 the *News of the World*, *People*, and *Sunday Pictorial* were held to "have permitted their standards to be debased to a level which is a disgrace to British journalism" in publishing articles about the sex lives of Diana Dors and Errol Flynn. And last February the *Guardian*, *Observer*, and *Spectator* were reprimanded for the "objectionable and unnecessary" use of four-letter words in reporting the "Lady Chat-terley" case. The first indication any of these papers had that the matter was being considered by the Press Council was when the news of their censure appeared on their teleprinters.

There is no justification whatever for denying newspapers accused of "general" breaches of press standards the courtesy of being informed that their conduct is to be discussed and the same opportunity to justify their actions as papers against whom specific complaints have been lodged.

Such reform is urgent if the council is to preserve the limited influence it has so far established.

The council has been described as a "tiger with rubber teeth" and several of its critics have demanded that it be armed with sanctions more powerful than its verbal rebukes. A good case can be made out for compelling newspapers to print corrections of inaccurate reports, though it is questionable if any other sanctions are desirable. But the Press Council probably will never be in a position to command sufficient respect to ensure ready compliance with its standards until it is reconstituted to include a strong element of lay membership.

THE PRESS. By A. J. Liebling. Ballantine Books, N.Y. Paperback, 284 pp. 75 cents.

THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPERMAN. By Bernard A. Weisberger. Univ. of Chicago Press. 226 pp. \$4.50.

Weisberger's candid history and Liebling's lampoons combine to present a portrait of the newspaper publisher that he is not apt to hang in his library. They supplement each other. Each laments current conditions of newspaper production that have squeezed so much of the vital juice out of journalism.

Liebling's caricatures of newspapering are familiar to *New Yorker* readers, and much of this book is culled from his "Wayward Press" pieces in that magazine. But here for the first time, in paperback, he is published in a form calculated to reach large numbers of readers of the papers he has so long needled for a more sophisticated audience. He has brought his earlier pieces up to date by connective chapters and footnotes that include the latest mergers and recite recent instances of manhandling the news, as lugubrious as those he found worth exploring a dozen and more years ago.

Weisberger follows the history of newspapering through the changing forms of our changing society from colonial times to the current columnists, a brisk informed chronicle.

But his history comes to focus sharply on the contemporary journalistic scene which he finds bleak in contrast to the brave days of the independent editors, the muckraking days of reform reporters, and the rowdy days of competition for massive circulations. He locates the era of greatest vitality in the press in the half century after it became independent of political parties and had not yet become the handmaiden of mass advertising, committed to a bland fatness.

This period also saw the rise of the city, and Weisberger relates the decline of the newspaper's hold on its readers to the dispersal of those readers through the suburbs. Its problem, as he sees it, is to

create again a community to serve. "Develop a distinctive character. Return to a more honest and direct relation to the reader. A newspaper does not have to be all things to all men."

The historian refuses to despair of a press fashioned largely to market acceptance, or accept the present as the end product of our journalistic history.

"A new American newspaperman may yet emerge, wielding some unforeseen cost-cutting mechanism, reaching for some as yet unsuspected audience, shouting, shaping, innovating, and carrying on the tradition of a calling, which all-in-all has had many things to boast of."

Leibling of course allows himself no such burst of optimism. His mordant comment on the recent merger in Albany: "Now the reader can either like Westbrook Pegler and Cholly Knickerbocker or move to Schenectady." But what both lament in their separate ways is the loss of diversity in the press and of independence and individuality in newspapering. A provocative pair of books.

Inside American Politics

THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1960. By Theodore H. White. Athenaeum Publishers, New York. 400 pp. \$10.

The sub-title, A narrative history of American politics in action, is more than justified by the breadth and depth of this extraordinary chronicle of the last Presidential campaign. It has been so universally hailed by reviewers and readers that a further review would be wasted. All reporters should read it for its great reporting, and all voters for its great story and to understand their own politics. They will know how and why Kennedy and Nixon were nominated and why and how Kennedy won. They will learn also the anatomy of American politics and a vast amount about the American society. Just as a reference, it is invaluable. All the statistics are there and the answers to nearly all the questions, including the question, why the election of President Kennedy has yielded so little result against the Congress elected with him.

American Liberty

THE DIMENSIONS OF LIBERTY. By Oscar and Mary Handlin. Belknap Press, Harvard University Press. 204 pp. \$3.75.

"The preservation of liberty is the pre-eminent problem of our times" the Handlins start off their book. Oscar Handlin teaches social history at Harvard, and with his wife, Mary, writes books on social history. They do not hesitate either to tackle the most vital contemporary issues. This book on the nature of our American liberties is both historical and current. It evidently stems from the recent establishment at Harvard of a Center for the Study of the History of Liberty in America. Oscar Handlin was named its chairman. It was characteristic of Professor Handlin to take this new responsibility seriously enough to bring out a book to define the subject. It deals with the development of what Americans know as liberty, its meaning, its actualities, the dangers it faces now, as always. A deeply informed study, searching and provocative in the questions it raises, which, the Handlins say modestly, may have value to all interested in the problems of liberty. Harvard gave it the distinguished impress of its special Belknap Press.

The Conscience of Science

SCIENCE IN THE CAUSE OF MAN. By Gerard Piel. Alfred A. Knopf, N.Y. 297 pp. \$5.

Readers of *Scientific American* will not be surprised at the breadth, depth and insights of this book by its publisher. The title is suggestive of what science means to Gerard Piel. It's a way to understanding life. He gives it the largest dimensions and applies it here to explore some of society's most fundamental and complicated problems. The range of his essays runs from "The Economics of Disarmament" to "The Wilderness and the American Dream." He considers the Oppenheimer case, our industrial culture, Sputniks in the sky, the revolution in man's labor, the economics of underdevelopment, founding fathers as social scientists, and "How do we make our alumni publica-

tions appeal to the intellects of our alumni?"

His searching intellect roves with a distinction and grace of style among some of the more confusing riddles of our common existence. The writings of Gerard Piel happily fuse science, art and conscience.

The Menace of Our Slum Schools

SLUMS AND SUBURBS. By James B. Conant. McGraw-Hill, N.Y. \$1.95 paper. \$3.95 cloth.

This is a must for all who would understand the awful problem of the schools in our great cities. In exploring the ten biggest cities, Dr. Conant strikes new ground. His earlier studies dealt with the general high school and junior high in the medium sized city. To them he applied firm rules of sound educational method. But all his landmarks are buried in the desperate problems of the slum schools. "Terrifying" and "desperate" are words he applies, to arouse, he says, "anxiety" about "the social dynamite" of the slum conditions reflected in their schools. He seeks to provoke "drastic steps before it is too late."

The chasm in contrast between the schools of the affluent suburbs and the hapless slums jolts Conant's long cherished concept of the public school as the cement of democracy. Here it breaks down. The future executive and the future laborer are not even in the same schools and the goals of their schools are totally different. In the suburbs a chief school problem is the anxiety of parents that their children get into a prestige college. Conant dispenses a strong dose of common sense and practical psychology on this. But the reader's impression is of the wholly separate societies of suburb and slum. For the mass in the great city, the school problem is to fit the pupil for any place at all in a society endangered by his failure to fit anywhere. In the new slums, now largely Negro, race discrimination is added to squalor and neglect. After about age ten "the streets take over." Orthodox education fails to hold them in school or to teach many even to read. In most of their homes nothing is read, not even a news-

paper. Half between 16 and 21 are out of school and out of jobs, roaming the streets, forming gangs, falling into crime. Conventional vocational courses fail to fit them for any job they can get. They find discrimination both from employers and unions. Conant says: "It is far more difficult in many communities to obtain admission to an apprentice program which involves union approval than to get into the most selective medical school in the nation."

Even those who finish high school fare little better in employment. A third even of graduates are jobless. Conant insists on a drastic overhaul of vocational courses in the big cities. Bring in some garage mechanics to fit them for jobs they can hope to get. Train them for laundry and hotel service, where they have a chance. The schools must take on guidance in job finding and job holding, till age 21, Conant says. He sees here a vast job for a Youth Corps. The ten big cities have 300,000 recruits for it, he says—not in the woods but in the jungle of the metropolis where they find no trails blazed. Failure of jobs and on jobs is the key to the problem of the slum schools, as he explores it. It will take money, lots of it, to hold able teachers on these least attractive jobs, and to organize community cooperation that doesn't yet exist.

But Conant finds some schools in the worst slums that are meeting even their most incredible problems. He presents case studies of these successes as guide posts to the swamps of the slum schools. They prove the problems can be met, and they must, he says. For we all have a stake in a disintegrating urban society. This is a vital book that demands attention. The conditions Conant finds in the slums, of which the schools are an index, make him impatient with those who harp on competing philosophies of education. He finds the stark problem in our greatest cities for a third of our population, is to save these slum children from the streets by fitting them to get and keep a job—any job they can be trained to fill. This book is the most important yield of Conant's crowded and distinguished career, and one may guess the most illuminating part of the education of James B. Conant.

LOUIS M. LYONS

Nieman Notes

1939

Edwin A. Lahey, bureau chief in Washington for the Knight papers, received the annual labor award of the Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh.

Edwin J. Paxton, Jr., became editor of the Paducah *Sun-Democrat*, October 1. He was associate editor under his father 19 years ago, when he moved into management of the affiliated broadcasting station, WPSD. He added television to its radio programs and has developed a flourishing TV station. "In July we put into service the second highest man-made structure on earth," he reports, "our new TV tower, 1638 feet high, at Monkey's Eyebrow, Kentucky, for an 80 per cent expansion in coverage area." Edwin J. Paxton, Sr., died in July. Ed's brother, Frank, becomes president and publisher of the paper, and the younger brother, Fred, managing director of the TV station. Ed Paxton is also chairman of the Kentucky commission on public education and president of the Paducah Airport Corporation.

1942

Kenneth Stewart, professor of journalism at the University of Michigan, was elected president of the Association for Education in Journalism at its meeting in August.

1944

John W. Shively was appointed in July as Assistant Commissioner for Technical Standards in the Urban Renewal Administration by Commissioner William L. Slayton. Shively has been associated with the Federal slum clearance and urban renewal program since its beginning in 1949.

1946

Robert J. Manning assumed the editorship of the Sunday New York *Herald*

Tribune, August 1. He returned to the U.S. last November after several years abroad as chief of the big *Time* bureau in London.

1949

Grady Glay of the Louisville *Courier-Journal* has been elected to honorary membership in the American Institute of Architects.

Mr. and Mrs. David B. Dreiman announced the marriage of their daughter, Joanna Gail, to Adrian Stuart Goodman on August 25.

1952

John M. Harrison, since 1958 at the State University of Iowa, has been appointed assistant professor of journalism at Pennsylvania State University. One of his courses will be the senior course in Public Affairs Reporting.

1953

Melvin Mencher, assistant professor of journalism at the University of Kansas, spent the summer in San Jose, Costa Rica, where he was executive secretary of a faculty exchange program with the University of Costa Rica.

Watson S. Sims moved from the New Delhi Bureau of the Associated Press this summer back to New York, where he is news editor of the outgoing report to foreign newspapers.

1955

Albert Kraus joined the New York *Post* as financial editor in September, moving from the business news department of the New York *Times*. On the *Post* he plans to pay special attention to the concerns of the small investor. His appointment is taken as indication the *Post* finds its readers gaining in affluence.

1957

Mr. and Mrs. Marvin Wall announce the birth of a son, Hoke Kennington, August 15.

1958

Peter Kumpa is returning to Washington in December after a three-year hitch in Moscow for the Baltimore *Sun*.

Juan V. Saez of the Manila *Times*, now director of the National Press Club of the Philippines, joined a three-week tour of the Soviet Union in August on invitation of the Union of Soviet Journalists.

The Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association this summer presented its plaque for "outstanding service" to J. Wesley Sullivan, news editor of the *Oregon Statesman* of Salem.

Thomas G. Wicker is now White House correspondent in the New York *Times* Washington bureau.

1959

Shen Shan has been promoted to assistant managing editor since his return to the *China News in Taipei*, where he was city editor and earlier sports editor.

Mr. and Mrs. Howard Simons announce the arrival of twin girls on May 10. Isabel (twin A) and Julie (twin B) are doing very well, as is their sister Annie.

1960

Howard Sochurek of *Life*, has returned from an expedition of seven weeks in the Congo, photographing the United Nations Civil Operations there.

1961

John Pomfret has joined the editorial page staff of the Milwaukee *Journal*. His former assignment was labor news.

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