

# n i e m a n

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\$1.25

winter 1976/spring 1977



America's Capacity to Think • Karl Deutsch

*When your memories make no sense to you  
anymore, you've lost your identity.*

Hungary: Twenty Years Later • Ron Javers

*"There are no Russians here . . . We are Hungarians,  
Germans and Poles . . . never Russians!"*

Report of an Exaggerated Death • Ben Bagdikian

*. . . Loss of small papers has social and political  
significance beyond their size.*

A Mayor Speaks to the Press • Richard J. Daley

*We wonder . . . if the press really cares  
about the detrimental effects of violence.*

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New England Conferences on Conflicts  
Between the Media and the Law

*. . . Much good has resulted from the media's independence . . .*

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# r e p o r t s

# nieman reports

winter 1976; spring 1977

vol. XXX no. 4;

vol. XXXI no. 1

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*Nieman Reports* is published quarterly by the Nieman Foundation at Harvard University, 48 Trowbridge Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. Subscription \$5 for 4 issues; add \$1.35 annually for foreign mailing. Single copies \$1.25. Third class postage paid at Boston, Massachusetts.

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## Guest Editorial

### The Nature of Political Liberty

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by *Vermont Royster*

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As I look over the list of those who in my journalistic craft have previously received the Elijah Lovejoy Award, I confess to some uneasiness. Merely to mention a few of them — J. Russell Wiggins of *The Washington Post*, Ralph McGill of *The Atlanta Constitution*, Carl Rowan of *The Chicago Daily News*, Erwin Canham of *The Christian Science Monitor*, James Reston of *The New York Times*, and of course Bernard Kilgore, the great and moving spirit of my own newspaper, *The Wall Street Journal* — merely to call such names is enough to intimidate any speaker who follows in their steps.

For all of them have spoken on one or another aspect of the struggle to obtain, and to retain, the liberty of the press, which is fundamentally the liberty of the mind. And all of them have paid eloquent tribute to the son of Colby for whom this award is named, Elijah Lovejoy, who refused to be silenced. Indeed, Elijah Lovejoy speaks more loudly now, and is known by more people, than when he was alive, proving once again Tennyson's words "that men may rise on stepping stones of their dead selves to higher things."

I ask your patience while I share with you some thoughts about the nature of political liberty, about how it took root in the past, and what is required to preserve it. So doing, we will see how what happened to Elijah Lovejoy at the hands of a mob shows how narrow is that edge upon which liberty is balanced between preservation and destruction.

I begin by stating the obvious. Recently we held an election for President of the United States. It was a free and open election. Every citizen over the age of 18 — white or black, male or female, rich or poor — had the privilege of a vote. There were no elitist requirements of education, position or wealth.

In that election campaign every citizen was free to say whatever he wished about the character, ability and political philosophy of any of the candidates. All were free to criticize every aspect of our national policy, foreign and domestic. A great many people exercised that privilege. Some of them said things which in my opinion, and perhaps in yours, were unfair, unwise and even untruthful. No matter. As a free citizen, you are free to speak your mind, and, if you wish, to denounce our whole political system and urge that the whole of the social order begun in 1776 be swept away and another put in its place.

What may not be so obvious is that this is the only country in the world where all of this is true. In the greater part of the world — much of Europe, Africa and Latin America, in

(Continued on page 31)

# America's Capacity to Think

by Karl Deutsch

*Editor's Note: Continuing our practice of taping Nieman seminars from time to time, we present the transcript of a special session, part of a week-long workshop co-sponsored by the Nieman Foundation and the Program on Information Resources Policy. The "Executive Perspective-Building Forum" provided visiting mid-career executives with discussions and lectures with specialists from government, business and academia. Karl Deutsch, Stanford Professor of Peace at Harvard University, addressed the group at one of the evening meetings; a transcript of his talk follows.*

Jim and Friends: I propose to speak about the demands concerning our capacity for thought: the demands on the capacity of the political system, the society, the community of the United States in the next 35 years or so. That is to say, I must speak somewhat about the future. I would like to stress now the question not as to what is moving toward us in the future but rather what we need to be able to respond to it. I am interested, in other words, in our national capacity to respond to the objective processes that are going to make life somewhat more difficult.

Let me begin, however, with the large processes. The United States is a very big country. We are 220 million, roughly, but mankind is bigger. There are four billion of us right now. At the end of 1976 that was officially announced as the United Nation's estimate. Thirty-five years from now, at the present rate of growth, there will be eight billion of us. It will double. That is still manageable.

By the end of the next century, 2100, we will have doubled again even if we grow at a much slower rate than now.

And after 2100 we may stabilize the population of the world and have reached that famous state of affairs, zero population growth. But there will be 16 billion of us, and the world will be as densely inhabited as Switzerland is now. That's not impossible, but it may take a little organization.

By 2010 we must have food for eight billion people. Most of the good land in the world is being farmed already so we cannot get much more food by taking new land under cultiva-

tion, but rather by getting more food from the land we have. That is to say, we will use even more high-yielding seeds, miracle rice, miracle wheat, hybrid corn, and so on. And all these wonderful plants require a lot more fertilizer and especially a lot more water. We will have to shift in very many parts of the world to irrigation agriculture, and to very intense fertilizer use, particularly artificial fertilizer.

All these things, additional water and fertilizer, require a lot of energy. We shall need energy to move earth, to dig ditches, to build dams, to lay the pipes, to pump water. We shall need energy to make artificial fertilizer either out of petroleum products or you need more energy to fixate nitrogen from the atmosphere. Energy, in turn, will be harder to come by. The coal deposits near the surface, or the coal deposits just deeply enough below the surface that you don't have to replant when you take out coal, are already gone. The oil has to be got from deeper down in the ground or from under the sea. That is to say, the amount of capital per unit of energy is going up all the time.

With twice as many people, there is a question of food. Even if we don't feed the people any better than now (and God knows about one-fifth of mankind — something like 800 million — are estimated to be at the margin of hunger and half of them are below that margin — if we just fed the population of the earth as badly as we do now, we still will need twice as much food. We need more energy in order to be able to grow the food. We need more capital to produce the energy. If we add up, multiply these multipliers together, we come out, by 2010, that is less than 35 years from now, with a need for about four times as much capital in the world than we need now.

There is, however, also a change in the quality of people in the world, not only in the quantity. Until quite recently, the vast majority of humanity was illiterate. In 1955, for the first time, the majority of people in the world over 15 could read and write. (This marks the first time since the invention of writing.) The majority of mankind now no longer is em-

ployed in agriculture and just about now, the majority of mankind lives, for the first time, in cities and towns. From a world population of illiterates, a humanity of peasants, and a humanity of villagers, we are changing into a humanity of literates, of city-slickers, of people in non-agricultural occupations.

This means also that now the majority of mankind and womankind is exposed to the mass media of communications in one form or another. The isolation of people is becoming the exception, whereas for all the past centuries of history, it was the rule. Humanity is now being reached by the Phillips transistor radio, which did already for the eloquence of Egypt's leader, Nasser, roughly what the printing press of four and one-half centuries ago did for the technological eloquence of Martin Luther. We have new instruments that carry the words of political leaders or educators or religious leaders to very many people. We have radio, we have television, we have the movies.

When you drive through rural India, you will see the little posters with portraits of Indian movie stars stuck up on the telegraph poles. The mass media reach people all over the world. Demonstration effects reach even more. Almost everywhere in the world, small children see trucks driving by; they see airplanes flying overhead, and when a small child has seen an airplane, when it knows that human beings can fly, then it is not any more quite the same small child it was before. And that's happening all around the world. Technology is demonstrating the possibility of human powers to people all around the world.

But if so much is possible, then it seems less necessary for people to tolerate so much that is bad. That is, just as a sense of human powers and the horizon of human interdependence are increasing, human tolerance for frustration is declining. If the world declines in its tolerance for frustration, people will demand more, in one way or the other. Clearly most people know that nobody can have everything, but quite a few people will say that a lot of people should have at least a little more, and these demands are adding up all over the world.

Within the highly developed countries all this happened already in the last hundred years. When we read Dickens or another piece of 19th century literature, we still read about starving children in the big cities. Today in many of the highly industrialized countries the problem of the poor is not starvation but overweight or inadequate diets. When children don't get enough protein, it still damages them. There are areas, of course, both in sections in some of our big cities and in some areas such as rural Mississippi, where there is actual serious malnutrition. At least medical teams go there and report that this is what they find.

Moreover, the industrialized countries have only one-fifth of the world's population. Four-fifths of humanity are still badly, or at best very moderately well supplied, and people don't live by bread alone or even by protein alone. There are

many other things they want. They demand them. The modern state in the highly industrialized countries is an engine for reducing inequality for the large majority of the population. Such a state may still give a great deal of income to the president of General Motors or a great deal of public admiration to such leaders as Mr. Brezhnev, or the late Joseph Stalin; that is to say, some of the good things of life can go in quite disproportionate amounts to a few people.

But most people working for a living in highly industrialized countries today — perhaps between 90 and 95 percent — work within a wage scale of the proportion of one to ten. That is to say, if the federal minimum wage in the United States would work out at roughly \$4,000 — or the poverty line of \$4,500 — there are not very many Americans making salaries of above \$45,000. There are some persons

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### ... People don't live by bread alone or even by protein alone.

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who do, and they may well work for it pretty hard, and they may deserve it through their productive contributions, but the fact remains that the vast majority of the people who work for a living in the United States are in the bracket of \$4,500 to \$45,000. Oddly enough, a similar one-to-ten range seems to hold for most people in Russia and many other countries. In some countries the brackets are a little narrower or wider, but by and large, one to ten will cover most wage and salary earners within the modern nation states. In developing countries, inequality is bigger. And among countries around the globe the situation is quite different.

The nation state makes regions more equal. The richest state in the United States, Connecticut, back in the 1930s had three times the per capita income of the poorest state, Mississippi. As of today Connecticut only has twice the income of Mississippi. The modern state has reduced the income differences among regions. In Mexico the difference is 11-to-1 between the richest and the poorest state. In Venezuela it is 17-to-1. In the world, in the international system, the difference between rich and poor is 80-to-1 for the extreme cases and 60-to-1 for very many. The world as a whole is as unequal as some of the worst governed countries within it. The world does not resemble the United States. In terms of inequality, it resembles Bolivia. I have to add that in Bolivia on the average, during the last 100 years, the government was overthrown every 18 months. That is to say, the world is very, very badly governed and people of the days of the Founding Fathers, the days of Thomas Jefferson, already would have made dire predictions about the world so extremely unequal.

But since the world is so unequal and since our television chains, our radio, our newspapers and that well-known sub-



versive publication, the Sears Roebuck Catalogue, are telling people all over the world what they are missing, the tolerance for this inequality will continue to decline. That the petroleum producing countries are trying to get together and get more money for the oil, was predictable. Now they have done it. At the moment, there may be too much copper in the world so that the copper producers may have to wait a while, but they will get around to organizing for a higher price for their exports. The coffee producers will get around to it — they are getting around to it now with a little help from bad weather — but whatever the weather will be, we shall get all around the world efforts of the producer countries and the poorer countries to get together to offer less in the world market and to demand more for it.

At the same time, of course, in our own country we have much the same situation. We organize all our interest groups, the trade associations and the labor unions and all the rest, and the idea is always the same: get organized, increase your prices or wages, offer a little less labor, a little less product, and raise the price a little.

Can all of humanity overcharge itself mutually? Or to what extent will we get increased international tensions and an increased potential for international conflict? When the prices of oil moved up, the well-known former section men from Harvard's course, Social Science Two, Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger, began to speak of the possibility of military intervention in the Near East. It didn't come to it in the event, but as other things get more expensive, the temptation to use military pressure or force will increase.

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**From a world population of illiterates, a humanity of peasants, and a humanity of villagers, we are changing into a humanity of literates, of city-slickers, of people in non-agricultural occupations.**

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But as people have learned all over the world to read and write, they have also learned how to handle submachine guns. Back in 1898 when the British fought a group of Sudanese at the Battle of Omdurman, they killed 10,000 Dervishes in a battle at the cost of 150 British casualties. The main problem was that the barrels of the British machine guns got too hot. But today, of course, it is no longer machine guns against muzzle-loaders, or even spears and bows and arrows. Today it's submachine guns against submachine guns. Soon it's going to be bazookas, if they aren't there already; and ground-to-air missiles already are being developed to the point where a missile that costs a few thousand dollars can

knock out an airplane that costs millions. We will get, in other words, a fair degree of the spread of military skills and military service. The ratio of simple, plain soldiers was in favor of the highly developed countries as late as 1962. In 1962 the industrialized countries of the world, both America and Russia counted in among them, had ten and a half million soldiers under arms, and the under-developed countries of the world had only nine million. In 1972, the balance had tipped. The highly developed countries still had ten and a half million soldiers, and the reduction in American manpower with the end of the draft was made up for by some other increases elsewhere, but the developing countries have now 12 million soldiers under arms. By the end of the decade, by 1980, the highly developed countries will probably have a few fewer, and the developing countries are likely to have still more.

Now, of course, there's more to consider in a disarmament conference. It doesn't suffice to count naked soldiers. Our soldiers are more extensively "clad" in all types of hardware

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**.... In the nuclear weapons field we'll get, sooner or later, the equivalent of the Saturday Night Special.**

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than the soldiers of other countries, but the number of countries owning nuclear weapons has doubled on the average every eleven years. It began in 1945 when the United States was the only one. By now we have six that admit officially that they have nuclear weapons — the United States, Britain, France, Russia, India and China — and at least one country that doesn't admit it but doesn't deny it, either. That's Israel. We don't know which oil-producing Arab state is in the market for a few cheap black market bombs which may not be in the latest style. You know, in the nuclear weapons field we'll get, sooner or later, the equivalent of the Saturday Night Special. And as in other fields of life, the Saturday Night Special will be available and will be deadly.

It turns out, in other words, that the military advantage of highly developed countries is going. In the 19th century, British gun boats could go up and down the Yangtze River; British soldiers could conquer the Winter Palace in Peking at practically no serious discomfort to people living in Britain. In the world of today and the world that is coming to us, the world of the 1980's and 90's and the first decade of the next century, it will be impractical for any highly developed country to engage in major actions of warfare against poor countries without the risk of having to accept intolerable damage to itself. Even China could say today credibly that, if Russia or

America should make war on China, the Russians or Americans could kill more Chinese, but probably no one in Moscow, Leningrad, New York, or Washington, D.C. would live to enjoy the result. The few nuclear weapons the Chinese have, and by now they are estimated about 300 or 400 warheads, would be quite sufficient to take care of that. Whether they had to be sent by conventional airplanes, by intercontinental rocket, or by slow freighter, in one way or the other, enough of them would get there.

Since we cannot profitably stand off the poor four-fifths of humanity by sheer military force — apart from everything else it's getting more and more expensive — we may have to think of ways of running the world so that the differences in income are not abolished but are reduced to a tolerable level. This is what happened in 19th century Europe. When the European states began to train the mass of the poor in their countries by the laws of general conscription in the arts of military warfare, and when Col. Colt and others equipped large numbers of the citizenry with a weapon called the

Dakota without seeing anybody. In the evening, we came into Rapid City, South Dakota, and found ourselves in a traffic jam because the farmers from a hundred miles around had come in Saturday night to see a movie, and Main Street, all three blocks of it, was full of the farmers who all were coming out of the movie at the same time. Every time Americans look for a place to park on a weekend they become

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... Just as a sense of human powers and the horizon of human interdependence are increasing, human tolerance for frustration is declining.

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potential adherents of the Malthusian theory of population.

We would like, therefore, to keep this country pretty much to its present local inhabitants. We would not take kindly to the idea that 50 million Hindus or 50 million Chinese might feel that there would be a lot of room here for them to carry on their kind of agriculture if we would only move over a little bit to make more room somewhere in California, Oregon, or somewhere else. The same story applies to Russia. The Russians have a lot of very nice real estate and the Chinese have been making pointed remarks about how the Russians got it, and again, the Russians have no inclination to give it up. The same is true of Australia; the same is true of Canada. Well, I suppose that there's not much point in getting more settlers carrying on inefficient agriculture in the empty countries. It might make more sense to keep the countries roughly settled as they are now, to improve agriculture more, and pay a little rent to humanity. But if we want our empty countries — the American, the Russian, the Australian — to stay as empty as they are, then I think we shall not be able to avoid having to pay a little rent to the crowded countries whose inhabitants are not welcome here as immigrants if they come by the hundreds of millions.

If I put all these considerations together, I would argue that probably in order to keep life tolerable, we must continue to grow economically in the highly developed countries because even here, there are lots of poor people to whom we promised a better future for themselves and their children. The social peace in England, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, too, depends on maintaining the credibility of the long-standing promise of economic and social improvement. The doctrine of ending growth here and now is a doctrine of civil war within most countries, and a doctrine of international war in the world. If we have to grow — we grow now at three percent or so per capita income — we might

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## Every time Americans look for a place to park on a weekend, they become potential adherents of the Malthusian theory of population.

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equalizer, the elite, the best situated citizenry in these countries, learned towards the end of the century to pay income tax.

Universal military training and income taxes go together. Because we can either pay an income tax to mitigate social differences or we can hire a bodyguard. As more and more people acquire military skills and access to weapons, bodyguards get more and more expensive and less and less reliable. So eventually, distasteful as they may be, income taxes begin to look like a cheaper solution. This has happened in the domestic politics of almost all countries. I venture to suggest that it will happen in the politics of the world in the course of the next half century. Some countries will do it early, some later. In world politics, too, death and taxes eventually will be certain, but we may have a choice which of the two to accept sooner.

In addition to the possibility, therefore, that eventually we will pay some taxes to humanity, we may also have to deal with a second consideration. In the United States we are living on one of the nicest pieces of real estate in the world. From the Atlantic to the Pacific there's a wonderful continent and it is still fairly empty. The notion of a crowded America is partly an illusion. I drove one whole day through South

reduce it somewhat, but in order to keep hope alive and promises of improvement credible, we cannot go, I suppose, much below two percent. If we want the poor countries to catch up with us within a reasonable time, sometime in the next half century, we may have to help them to grow at four percent, which may mean to transfer some capital to them; we may have to step up the cross-national spread of training

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**In world politics, too, death and taxes eventually will be certain, but we may have a choice of which of the two to accept sooner.**

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and research; we may have to do various other things to help them grow.

If the 80 percent of the world that are poor grow at four percent — and remember they have only 20 percent of world income — and the rich 20 percent of humanity who have 80 percent of world income grow at two percent, growth works out on an average of just about three percent. That should be manageable.

We have done it before, and we can do it again. But if we do that, then per capita income in the world on the average will double in 35 years. If we put this doubling of world per capita income together with a four-fold increase in capital needs on other grounds — numbers, food, energy, and so on — we come out with a probability of needing perhaps eight times as much capital in the first decade of the next century than we have been needing now. With luck we might cut it down to six times as much. Maybe we can make capital more productive or more efficient. But there isn't really very much we can do to stay below this. That is to say, saving, capital formation and the guidance of investment in a rational and effective way, will become major topics of politics. The politics of the next 35 years will be in significant part the politics of capital formation and allocation of capital investment.

There is something else to be remembered. This process can only be solved by agreement of negotiation, and people are not very good at this in our century. It cannot be done by sheer power. Let me give you two sets of figures. The first is for the country which former President Nixon still so charmingly referred to as "number one." The United States in 1950 made 75 percent of all automobiles in the world. In 1960, we made 50 percent of the automobiles in the world, and in 1977, it was only 33 percent. This was not because Detroit had become less efficient, far from it, but because in the meantime Japan and Germany and Brazil and Argentina and a lot of other countries all had gotten into the act. They also all were making automobiles.

If automobiles are one measure of power, there is a second set of figures for the roughest overall measure of power: gross national product. In 1946 America and Russia, taken together, had about 70 percent of world gross national product. Sixty percent of that was American, ten percent was Russian. In 1962, America and Russia had about 50 percent of world gross national product, 33 percent American, about 16 percent Russian, and the rest are rounding errors. In 1972 America and Russia together had only 40 percent of world gross national product.

America and Russia, the two so-called "super powers," are no longer quite as "super" as we used to be. We are now minority stockholders in the world economy. We have been, in the 30 years of the cold war, very busy reducing each other's power, and both America and Russia have succeeded admirably. We *have* reduced each other's power. This is still going on; we are still to some extent at it, though less than we used to.

There is no overwhelming force available for any one nation. The question is no longer who should be the power

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**When your memories make no sense to you anymore, you've lost your identity.**

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ruling the world the way Britain maintained the Pax Britannica back in the 19th century. The late Henry Luce used to argue that somebody had to succeed to the British rule and that we should do this and set up the "American century." This "American century" lasted roughly 15 years. Today the question no longer arises, "Who shall succeed to the British rule?" The job has been abolished. We have today a world that is highly interdependent, but out of control.

Interdependence without control is a very awkward situation, but that's the world we are living in. Under these conditions, we ask what do we need most? I'm sure there will be some people in Washington and elsewhere who would say what we need most is more and better atom bombs. And we have doubtlessly excellent scientists working at producing them. Unfortunately, so have the other countries. By the time everybody has more and better atom bombs, we are no better off than we were before.

Perhaps what we need is more adaptation to the new situations, more responsiveness to the new needs. Perhaps we need more intellectual power to discover new solutions. Typically when an old way of behavior no longer functions, human beings seem to be constructed in such a way that they

look for new ways to respond to their troubles. We may need more social inventions, at least as much as technological ones.

Even more, we need more innovations. An invention is a new way of putting elements of physical hardware and human behavior together in new combinations. Innovations, as a former member of the Harvard faculty, the late Professor Joseph Schumpeter used to say, involve the change of habits of millions of people, so that they accept a new invention and begin to act in a new way. If the habit-change of millions of people, which is in very many ways crucial to the development of humanity, has been crucial in the past, it will be more so in the future. What will we need? We might need, for

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instance, innovations that teach us not to do more with more — Buckminster Fuller used to say any fool could do more with more — but to do what Buckminster Fuller says is true engineering, to do more with less. And we can do it. A transistor radio uses less metal than the bigger old devices. A computer running on transistors is a fraction of the size of the elephants of 1945, the very first computers running on vacuum tubes. We have developed printed circuits. We have developed miniaturization. A few micro-cards, being a fraction of the printed and bound *Encyclopedia Britannica*, can still store every word of the encyclopedia. We are learning a bit. We may learn a lot more in order to do the same things that we need with smaller gross amounts of energy and with smaller gross amounts of materials.

This brings us to another ratio which I think might be worth watching. I'd call it the information ratio. Information, as you all know and undoubtedly have been told by colleagues from the Bell Laboratories or IBM, and many others, — I'm sure Tony Oettinger could tell you a great deal about it — information in any message could be measured in the number of decisions that have to be made, and the extent to which this information reduces uncertainty under which our decisions must be made. The information we receive is important. It is obvious that a pound of iron or even steel contains less information than the same pound of steel made into Swiss watches. An ounce of micro-film can have more information on it than an ounce of the Sunday edition of *The New York Times*, and the Sunday edition contains a good many ounces. We might save ourselves a few forests eventually if we learn to increase the information ratio. The informa-

tion ratio is the amount of information per pound of physical material.

Another information ratio would be the amount of information per unit of time. When you drive down a super highway, or drive down in heavy traffic in the city, you have to accept and respond to a lot more information per minute than your great-great-great-grandfather when he drove the ox cart home to the farm. That is to say, we have to take much more information per unit of time. We do have more information to digest per dollar of the budget. We have to use more information per head of employee.

But all these measures will go in the same direction. We are moving not from the industrial to the post-industrial society, unless we agree to decide that Bell Telephone and IBM are no longer industries, or that *The New York Times* is not part of an industry, but we are moving from a gross industrial society to the information-rich society. We may call it the "highly informed society" and its measure is exactly the average increase in the information ratios. This on the one hand is a problem — more decisions per unit of time, unit of money, unit of budget, unit of manpower. It is also a hope because if many of the goods and services we want contain a lot of information, we may then increase people's living standards without necessarily running into intolerable bottlenecks of raw materials.

If every family in America insisted on having an outboard motorboat, and every teenager in America insisted on having a heavy motorcycle, we would need a lot of oil and a lot of steel, and a lot of other materials. If many of the American people should decide that a symphony sounds better than the

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**Buckminster Fuller used to say any fool could do more with more.**

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noise of a motorcycle, or the noise of an outboard motor, we may be able to provide excellent music by electronic means, tapes and all the rest, by things that are portable and fit into people's pockets.

We may, in other words, in many ways give people a higher standard of living in terms of a change in pace. We may someday decide that a good newspaper should carry illustrations made with many more points to the line or many more lines to the square inch and hence with a much better quality of pictures. We might find that eventually we might have more opera houses or concert halls in cities. This will not be enough, but it will take some of the pressure off our



economy if we learn how to have higher living standards, better incentive goods, as well as more efficient industrial production machinery by means of more and more finely deployed information, rather than simply by the gross waste of matter and energy.

We will have to learn how to find new patterns of capital investment and saving. We might, for instance, decide that national defense could be served by having partly automated factories and by having, let us say, a very strong capacity in computers and in producing intermediate equipment which would be switched to military and non-military uses rather than having the material frozen already in end-product uses such as tanks, which in peace time do not produce much more than rust. We might, in other words, try to see to what extent our industrial structure can be built in such a direction that less of our capital gets frozen and buried in the form of armaments. It's now approximately six percent of our income; 12 percent, according to some revised figures, for the Soviet income.

We might finally ask, how can we get the new ideas fast enough? And that leads us to the question, how do we think? The basis of human thought is communication. There is communication from nerve cell to nerve cell in our bodies; there is communication from person to person in our society; and communication from organization to organization through the mass media and in other ways throughout our societies and even from country to country. We typically communicate by having a flow of information coming in, usually from more than one source, and the more different channels of information intake we have, the more of a potential for choice we have. We then must make some sort of decisions, wittingly or not, as to which of the intake information flow we will take most seriously, and we then respond with some kind of output behavior. There is intake of decision, output of behavior. But human beings already have some autonomy as to which intake information they choose

elephants never forget, but the range of things they don't forget is limited. Human beings remember a great deal more. And we have many much richer and many more different memories. If you begin again to look at this very primitive, childish flow model, you see the information intake, then it splits, one to the decision area and one down to the memory, asking for the recall of something that was stored in memory. Recognition means to compare an incoming pattern of information with a pattern of information recall dredged up

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.... When a small child ... knows that human beings can fly, then it is not quite the same child it was before.

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from memory. That is how we recognize whether an airplane is one of our own or an enemy airplane. This is where the salesman knows whether the customer coming in is a promising new prospect or a well-known deadbeat, and in very many similar ways we use our memories for recognition. We can recognize a deadbeat as a threat to our solvency or as a challenge to our charity, or as the psychiatrists do, as an interesting professional problem.

We have freedom to some extent as to what we remember and how we then respond to our information intake, not only in terms of the other information we are getting at this moment, but also in terms of all the information we got in the past which we somehow stored and which we now more or less selectively recall. It follows that human beings are truly autonomous, because even if we knew their environment perfectly, we would not know what they remember. Even if we knew what they remember from the past, we would not know which selection from their memories they'd recall. Human beings are even more intractable. They can dissociate what they remember.

Let me use two examples from an earlier study of mine. When we tell a parrot a sentence with one juicy swear word in it, he will repeat the whole sentence. When we have been incautious enough to use some rather juicy words in our conversation in front of a three-year-old, our bright three-year-old will very soon find out which word it is that makes the grown-ups jump. That is to say, he can dissociate. If I go from that three-year-old and the swear words to a professor of theoretical physics at MIT, he may say to me as one of them did, "I think that Einstein was right in the theory of relativity, but completely wrong in his appraisal of quantum theory." This is again dissociation. In terms of dissociation, the human mind is profoundly anti-authoritarian. Authority, after all, means that we take a package because authority

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**A pound of ... steel contains less information than the same pound of steel made into Swiss watches.**

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to regard more than others. That is not completely determinable from the outside. This is already one element of human freedom.

But there is a second one. Human beings differ from animals (insofar at least as we have found out about animals): human beings have enormous memories. It is claimed that



is written on the wrapping and we don't look at what's in it. The opposite is to say, authority is nice and wrappings are good, but which parts of the package are usable and which are not? You may remember the good old American proverb, "Trust your mother but cut the cards."

But since we can dissociate, we can do one more thing. We can recombine. The most obvious example, a very old example, comes from the same earlier study. It is about one of the many primitive people who saw and watched birds; then in their imagination detached the wings of the birds from the birds and, again, in their imagination put them on the shoulder of a man or woman. I have seen winged pinup girls in granite, at an Indian cave entrance, 700 years old. That is to say all around the world, with Aztecs, Incas, Hindus, Europeans, and many others, people have thought of the possibility of human flight, very long before the first airplane flew. Eventually what they had put together in their imagination, they put together in fact. And by then with the new patterns or device, we usually omit most of the traces of the combinatorial origin. There are no feathers on an airplane wing. This is one reason why it is very difficult to retrace things backward. Human history is not quite reversible because we throw away much of the evidence of the combinations we made in the past and we keep only the results. In any case, since we can dissociate in many different ways, and since we

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## It doesn't suffice to count naked soldiers.

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can recombine in very many different ways, no outside controller can completely predict what we will do and no outside powerholder can completely prescribe what we shall think. From that point of view, the nightmare of Big Brother's omnipresent supervision in George Orwell's *1984* shows the imagination of a great writer who knew nothing about information theory and information overload. It couldn't be done.

Orwell overlooked that, while it is easy to mechanize speaking to millions of people, it is almost impossible to mechanize listening to them. If we put, as George Orwell's Big Brother does, a microphone under every bed into every family room, the amount of chatter and nonsense that would come over would drive any police officer mad. Those who had to listen simply could not take it. Or they would have to use their most superficial forms of sampling and with that, there would be again wide open doors to all sorts of errors.

So again, people cannot be completely controlled. Their minds cannot be fixed even by the most powerful ruler.

What can we do to increase the intellectual capacity of a nation as well as that of individuals? We can see to it first of all that there are more diverse channels of intake. We can, secondly, see to it that there are richer and more diversified memories. We can, thirdly, see to it that our culture encourages critical — to some extent anti-authoritarian — acts of dissociation, picking and choosing in our memories that which we approve of and that which we don't. And that we

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## ... Elephants never forget, but the range of things they don't forget is limited.

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encourage, teach our children and our scholars and our administrators to use bolder imagination in recombining, putting bits of old knowledge together in new patterns that never were before on land or sea.

The next step that one usually does in thinking is feedback. I think that I would like to adjust this microphone; my eyes tell me where the mike is; my nerves tell me where my hand is, where my arm is; and so I can touch the microphone and move it a little. If I did not make a diminishing series of errors, I would reach too far or would pull back too far and I would begin to make a series of increasing mistakes rather than decreasing ones. This would then be called hunting; it would be a feedback that was no longer adequately or appropriately negative. Negative feedback with a declining series of errors means reaching a goal. Feedback is a form of reality testing. We learn to test from reality, to use more samples. We do it now in medicine. A sensible doctor now tests for allergies before giving somebody a shot of penicillin. I still remember one German professor who was rushed to a hospital from an automobile accident. The young intern gave him a hefty shot of penicillin to save him from infection and killed him on the spot, because the man had been allergic to penicillin and they found this out only by the time they had to arrange for the funeral.

We use feedback, patchtesting, experiments in other areas. We can do so in social affairs, too. Perhaps it is a good idea to use a negative income tax and give poor people a minimum income. Perhaps it is not a good idea. According to one plausible line of verbal reasoning, it will give them self-respect, hope and a vivid desire for more expensive consumer goods. Therefore they will start working very hard. The other theory is that it will undermine their self-respect,

make them shiftless and dependent and reduce their effectiveness. You could argue the two lines of verbal reasoning until the end of a good many years. Or you could take three cities in New Jersey and try. This was done, and it turned out that the families who got family income maintenance payments worked as much or more than the families who didn't get them. There is apparently the power of American media to persuade consumers that we all should have a little more or a little better. The people who think that a floor under the income of poor families would make them hopelessly lazy are

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## The human mind is profoundly anti-authoritarian.

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in reality people who lack faith in the power of the American advertising systems.

The next thing is consciousness: becoming aware of what we are doing, and using highly abbreviated summaries of what we know for simultaneous confrontation and inspection. Here the mass media can be tremendous. Every well-made-up front page of an American newspaper can tell us what goes on in the world and can highlight or hide some of the contradictions or some of the news that supplement each other. Simply by putting things next to each other, we can tell people a lot more than they might expect or than we even know we are doing. We can do it well or poorly. A television picture from the Vietnam war showing a "freedom village" surrounded by three strands of barbed wire said a lot about the tragedy and the problem of that war, much more than an article would have done. Television, telling so many details, is in reality much harder to censor than most people think. And the front page, the picture, television, radio, can give us now an orchestration of putting simultaneous information before many people that may make them aware, on the one hand, of connections, of complementarities, things which fit together, or on the other hand, of contradictions which don't fit together. We can increase therefore our stimulation and resourcefulness.

Finally, we could organize our society in such a way that we would have enough resources to back up the new behavior we might try. For instance, even if we knew that one should set up, let us say, Medicare for old people, if we didn't have the resources for hospitals and doctors, this would be theoretical knowledge. Only a society that has enough resources that can be pulled out from one use and committed to another, recommittable resources, can back

its own ideas. Learning capacity is roughly proportional to the amount of resources that are not irrevocably committed. If the resources are completely frozen or sunk, we can think a lot but we can learn very little because we can't do very much. New behavior requires resources of time, of effort, of energy, of manpower, of hardware, sometimes of capital. Whatever it is, these resources need not be idle. But they have to be recommittable. This is what the military understands when a general does not pull all his divisions and regiments into the line where they are pinned down by enemy fire, but keeps what he calls an "operational reserve" back of the line. This is what a business company does when it keeps some liquid reserve or some readily mobilizable reserves at hand. We don't do this very much in political systems and we'll eventually have to learn it.

I am coming to the end. I have to say two things. The West is that part of world civilization that has learned to learn. When we ask what makes the West different from China, different from the Incas and Aztecs, different from Africa, it turns out the difference is that we have learned from all of them. We learned from Central Asia to use stirrups. We learned to use paper, block printing, and clockwork and noodles from China. But we learned the use of potatoes and maize from the Indians. We learned from everybody all over the place, all of the time. The Chinese learned something from their neighbors, but less. They had fewer neighbors and

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## ... We are moving from a gross industrial society to the information-rich society.

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some of their neighbors didn't impress them very much. Similarly, the Indians learned something, but not nearly as much.

There is no other civilization in the world that has learned so much from so many for so long and so thoroughly as the West has. In this sense, when now the world is getting Westernized, we're merely returning with a little interest what we borrowed in the course of centuries. We took the knowledge of all mankind and womankind in one way or another and made it into what we call Western Civilization. Now all of us are learning to use our habits of industry, our habits of science, our patterns of organization, including our ideologies, our militancies, our nationalisms. All this, too, has been taken over by the world. The world is getting, you might say, embarrassingly like the West all over the place. In the process they may send us their second-hand philosophy, but I would say that the Western course in Zen philos-

ophy is to Oriental philosophy roughly as a can of chop suey is to Chinese gourmet cooking: packaged for export with no great gain in quality. In reality it's the modernization of the world, the urbanization, the industrialization, that spreads everywhere. But what the world is getting from the West is really the result of what the West learned from it.

What can our media do about it now? They can increase the riches of what is offered in television. We can offer variety and openness to the world. We very often do not think that anything from abroad is really very interesting unless it's exotic. I remember the head of the Associated Press bureau in New Delhi who sent home an excellent report on the political structure of India and the background of the coming elections. He got the wire back from headquarters, "Our readers are not interested. Tell us more about maharajahs and elephants."

We may find that the American people now can take more and better information. We need the use of juxtaposition and of critical followups, asking, is this proposition really true? Or better still, how much of it or which parts of it are true, and which are not? We might ask more about values, if value

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**... What makes the West different from China, different from the Incas and Aztecs, different from Africa... is that we have learned from all of them.**

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is an advice of what to do when the information is incomplete. If we don't know whether Joe Doaks has committed a crime or not, we can take the French value, namely, that we want mainly to prevent crime, and we say Doaks is guilty unless he proves himself innocent. Or we take the Anglo-American value which says if we must fear someone, we'd rather have people fear the criminal than the government and we will, therefore, treat everybody as innocent unless proven guilty. Values are decision rules in the presence of incomplete information. And this again we could make clearer and more explicit. We can stress the combinatorial side of thinking. We can stress the need for more experiments and for more experiences.

Finally, we can try to make general what you gentlemen are now pioneering in. Namely, giving people in all walks of life periodic opportunities to renew their thinking a little. Why not for people? You will begin probably with the top leadership of industry and the organization, and then go eventually to the middle level. But some day it may even be possible for rank and file people every three or four years, to take off a few weeks or months to look at problems again and think

about them freshly, without having to worry entirely about the daily decisions they must make. In a Washington bureau there is a little inscription on the wall, "If you're up to your rear-end in alligators, it's hard to remember that you planned to drain the swamp." (The original wording is more alliterative.) But more and more people should be given the opportunity from time to time to remember that they planned to drain the swamp. They should be given a little relief from the alligators. Today we don't have that yet. It may come.

In the end we may learn that societies only survive if they solve a double problem: how to transform themselves — Mr. Carter would call it getting born again — and at the same

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**There are no feathers on an airplane wing.**

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time, how to keep their identity. Identity means the applicability of memories. When your memories make no sense to you anymore, you've lost your identity. The trick is to retain enough identity so that our memories make sense — our memories of our childhood, our memories of the time we first fell in love and all that — and at the same time to learn enough to make ourselves sufficiently over so that we can deal with the new problems of the world. We will get more burdens on our learning capacity, more challenges and more claims in the next 35 years than any generation of human beings has ever had in the long history of mankind. We must somehow increase our ability in our heads and hearts to cope with them. I think somehow, by the skin of our teeth, we shall manage.

The front page, the picture, television, radio, can give us now an orchestration of putting simultaneous information before many people that may make them aware... of connections... or of contradictions... We can increase therefore our stimulation and resourcefulness.

K.D.

# Hungary: Twenty Years Later

by Ron Javers

When the city of Budapest was mentioned not long ago at a fashionable Philadelphia Main Line cocktail party, a middle-aged lady in a proper tweed suit, wife of a very proper capitalist banker, began to gush.

"Oh, what a delightful city! We discovered it three years ago. Before that we had always spent several weeks each spring in Paris where my son was in school. But the year he was graduated he insisted on showing us Budapest—he had been there on holiday with school chums—and we've been going back ever since. The city is gorgeous, not spoiled like Paris and London. And the people are so nice and friendly. Why, one would hardly imagine they were Communists at all!"

Another heart subverted. Budapest has a way of doing that.

In 1956, the year Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest and over the popular uprising in Hungary, Dwight D. Eisenhower was President. Television was in its infancy. Elvis Presley and a vaguely subversive new music, rock 'n' roll, were sweeping America. Valiant cold warriors, led by Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, were battling the International Communist Conspiracy.

I was nine years old. I remember the air raid drills which were a regular part of the elementary school curriculum in 1956. While teachers painted horrid pictures of the atomic radiation, world-enveloping mushroom clouds and nuclear firestorms "The Russians" planned to unleash upon America, we children huddled beneath our wooden desks tensely awaiting the all-clear signal that would send us back to Arithmetic or out to recess while The Russians and Atheistic Communists retreated once more, vague threats on our developing political consciousnesses.

That those little wooden desks were no protection at all against a nuclear attack was never a consideration. Just as we never dreamed in our most ambitious and childlike dreams that in fewer than 20 years cold war would be replaced by détente as Richard Nixon journeyed to Moscow to sip vodka and proffer hopes for peace with the recently dismantled Red Menace.

In 1976, the tanks are gone, but Soviet troops remain in Hungary, closeted in their camps to be sure, and maintain-

ing as low a profile as troops anywhere can, but present. Yet little else in Hungary is the same as it was in 1956.

In the '70s, while the eyes of both the Americans and the Soviets have been riveted on the emerging Communist parties in Western Europe, the countries of Eastern Europe have been quietly pursuing their own brands of Marxism. American press reports from Eastern Europe have been scarce, concentrated mainly on the flare-ups such as Czechoslovakia experienced in 1968. Press accounts from the "satellites" have tended to follow a pattern developed in the cold war when access was more limited and correspondents pretended to report what was really going on by scrutinizing the seating order of party officials at public functions and interviewing occasional defectors. American reporting on Communist states, until very recently, has concerned itself almost entirely with classical "Kremlinology," concentrating on power struggles and personalities rather than on the dynamics of the individual societies, issues and emerging trends.

In the academic world things have not been much better. It is not insignificant that almost 20 years after its original publication, Zbigniew Brzezinski's *The Soviet Bloc* remains the standard American college text on East European affairs. A conservative tendency on the part of many American East European scholars, many of whom are émigrés, has not gone unremarked.

Most U.S. colleges, in fact, have no department of East European studies. Students wishing to pursue courses in the area quickly learn to look under "Russian Studies" in their catalogues. A Hungarian exchange student tells the story of his amazement upon discovering "Hungary" filed under "Austria" in stacks of Harvard's Widener Library, an anachronistic salute to the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

"But at least we aren't yet filed under 'Russia' at Harvard," the student adds wryly. "That seems to be where the American State Department has us."

His reference is to a widely reported "private" remark of State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt in December 1975 that U.S. policy would respond to "the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence" and "a more natural and organic" Soviet-East European relationship." After a firestorm of criticism, Sonnenfeldt withdrew the word "organic," the hackles of Americans of East European origin being too sensitive in this election year.

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Americans tend to see Hungary—when they see her at all—as either an enslaved nation of Molotov-cocktail-bearing Freedom Fighters or a romantic little backwater of colorful Gypsies all playing the same monotonous fiddle tune. On a recent visit to a Midwest university, one Hungarian journalist interviewed 30 American families and found their hospitality uniformly gracious and their knowledge of Hungary uniformly appalling. “Of 30 families,” he says, “seven or eight were completely unaware that Hungary is a Communist country. The others all asked the standard question: ‘Are the churches open? Do Communists really want to enslave the world?’ That kind of thing. I found the university professors equally uninformed. You American journalists brag about freedom of information. In no European country—East or West—are the people so badly informed.”

This view of the Ignorant American was reflected by other Hungarians I spoke with. Yet Hungarians, both officials and private citizens, displayed a wealth of knowledge

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## In the 70s . . . the countries of Eastern Europe have been quietly pursuing their own brands of Marxism.

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of American affairs. Everywhere I visited—factories, cooperative farms, private homes—the first question was the same: “What about crime in America? Is it really so dangerous in the cities?” Equally common were questions about Teddy Kennedy, (Would people forget about Chap-paquiddick by the time of the 1980 presidential elections), Jimmy Carter, and the Viking landing on Mars.

Today, most Western observers and Hungarians themselves agree that Hungary is probably the “freest” of the Communist states sharing a border with the Soviet Union. In 1960, only a half million citizens of other countries crossed Hungary’s slowly opening borders. This year Hungarian officials say the number will top six million.

János Kádár, the party first secretary, who came to power on the backs of Russian tanks in 1956, has been moving the country slowly along the narrow path between the people’s hearty nationalism and increasing pressure for “the good life,” and the reality of Soviet expectations for “correct” Communist behavior in neighboring Warsaw Pact countries. Kádár’s present popularity—and he is probably more popular among non-Communists than among his own party members—is a phenomenon Hungarians themselves are still trying to understand.

Terrible bitterness lingered after the events of 1956. Initially, Kádár was perceived as a quisling, responsible for the sellout of the revolution and for the execution of Imre Nagy, his fellow Communist who somewhat reluctantly came to preside over the uprising. It was Nagy who on November 1, 1956 dropped the biggest Molotov cocktail in the face of the Soviets, withdrawing Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and proclaiming neutrality. Three days later, Russian troops attacked Budapest. Kádár, meanwhile, had

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**“There are no Russians here,” he says firmly. “We are Hungarians, Germans and Poles, not Russians. Never Russians!”**

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fled the city to form an all-Communist government in concert with the Soviets. Defeated by the Russian troops, Nagy and a group of supporters took sanctuary in the Yugoslav embassy. Only Kádár’s repeated public assurance of full amnesty persuaded Nagy and his group to leave the protection of the embassy on November 3, 1956. They were immediately abducted by Soviet authorities and taken to Rumania. On June 17, 1958, the Hungarian government announced the execution of Nagy and three of his top supporters, along with heavy prison terms for a half dozen others.

Twenty years later many Hungarians seem to have forgiven or at least forgotten Kádár’s apparent treachery. I asked one prominent party journalist, a former politician, how Kádár could have assured Nagy amnesty and then permitted his execution.

“That still comes up among Hungarian close friends discussing past events,” the journalist told me. “But it seems to come up less and less frequently as the years go by. From ’56 to ’58 the play was completely in Russian hands. There was no way they would have permitted Nagy to survive. Kádár did what he had to. That’s what many believe, or choose to believe. It’s difficult to be really certain.”

“The average Hungarian today,” the journalist added, “is a hardheaded political realist, very pragmatic. He has learned his lessons the hard way.”

Such was the sentiment I heard repeated again and again everywhere in Hungary. Kádár, who was himself imprisoned in a 1951 purge, has gained acceptance and even grudging popularity among Hungarian non-Communists because he didn’t continue a bloodbath after the uprising. Certainly there were executions and jail terms—no one knows for sure how many—but by January 1959 the Kádár



government announced the end of trials for participation in the uprising. By November 1962, in a brilliant political stroke, Kádár had reversed the old Stalinist line, creating a new slogan: "Whoever is not against us is with us." This doctrine provided great changes in the lives of millions of Hungary's non-Communists, opening the way for at least limited participation in national life. Non-Communists were appointed to jobs formerly reserved for Party members. The universities were opened to all and the whole country began to breathe more easily.

Hungarians today are not so much questioning Kádár's seamy rise to the top as hoping that he stays there. At 64, he has been reported ailing and the question of his successor is one many Hungarians would rather avoid. Mentioned most often privately among those close to the government are Béla Biskku, now secretary of the party central committee, and Gyorgy Lazar, president of the ministerial council.

"I wish Kádár a long life," one middle-aged professional man told me. "Because after him there's a question mark. I hope there won't be a change for the worse, but I'm not expecting anything radically better either."

Kádár's political success stems in large part from his economic success. Economic development has not been spectacular or without problems, but it has been steady. Traditionally poor in natural resources, Hungary relies heavily—to the tune of more than 40 percent of its national income—on foreign trade. Although two-thirds of that trade is with the countries of Comecon, the Communist Common Market, Kádár is quite interested in enlarging trade with the West.

Hungary's desire for "most-favored nation" status in her trade relations with the U.S.—a development which would reduce present prohibitory tariffs—remains hostage in Congress to the Soviets' status, tied up in the debate over free emigration for dissidents.

Trade is economic life for Hungary; each 1 percent increase in the national income requires a 1.8 percent increase in foreign trade. In the 10 years from 1960 to 1970, Kádár's government managed to double the total value of all trade, materially improving the national standard of living and its own image within the country.

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On the way to visit the Budapest plant of the United Incandescent Lamp and Electrical Co., one of the world's largest bulb makers, I tell my guide that I am certain this will be one of the bright spots in the Hungarian economy. Being something of a foot soldier in the long march of Hungarian socialist transformation, he doesn't get the joke.

But Laszlo Teke appreciates the pun immediately. Teke has been around. At 42, the graying, sardonic executive is one of Hungary's top businessmen, employing some

32,000 people. Eighty percent of his firm's sales are in exports and Teke spends half of each year abroad on business. With degrees in economics and engineering and fluency in four languages, Teke is one of a growing number of semi-independent executives whose talents have flowered since the introduction in 1968 of Hungary's New Economic Mechanism.

The 1968 reform was designed to let market forces play a larger role in the planned economy, allowing managers a greater degree of freedom in charting the courses of their companies. Going far beyond the cautious decentralization of the Soviets, it provided profit sharing, merit raises, and other direct incentives to workers.

Laszlo Teke doesn't sound terribly different from most American executives when he says, "Frankly, my duty is to make as much profit for my company as I can." Just 10 years

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**Probably the most creative — and controversial — fruit of Marxian theory. . . . is the new, \$50 million, 325-room Budapest Hilton Hotel. . . .**

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ago, such talk would have been heresy in Communist Hungary. Today, more and more managers, especially the most successful ones, are speaking cautiously in terms of profits, competition and market conditions.

Traditional Western analysts, often wishfully it seems, view such economic liberation as a return to capitalism. More accurately, the liberalization reflects a return to realism, and the growing sophistication of Hungary's Marxist planners. The means of production remain firmly in the hands of the state, where the party intends to keep them. All liberalization in Hungary—democratic, social and economic—must be viewed in that context.

The Hungarian economy suffers a shortage of semi- and unskilled laborers and a surplus of white-collar workers, a problem just the reverse of that of most industrialized nations. Earlier five-year plans sought to create employment. The present glut of administrators and managers forced a government hiring-freeze on white-collar positions. Many factories have been directed to transfer non-productive administrators into the ranks of physical workers, a shuffling fraught with political tension.

The other large problem economic planners face is prices. Prices of many basic commodities—meat, sugar, dairy products, children's clothing—were held down artificially while production costs continued to increase. Planners now are trying to reconcile necessary price in-

creases—like last year's 50 percent hike in sugar prices and this summer's 33 to 40 percent boost in meat prices—with the public's natural resistance to paying more at the market. The government fears that public opinion if not tempered could become a source of popular unrest as it did in neighboring Poland this summer (1976) when Edward Gierek's government was forced to rescind massive food-price increases after workers rioted. The Hungarians thus far have avoided trouble by coupling their price boosts with a large "public information" effort and with monthly cash family allotments designed to soften the effects of the increases.

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"It's not exactly Southern California, but we Hungarians enjoy it anyway." The young government worker is referring to Lake Balaton, the largest lake in central Europe and Hungary's favorite playground. Each summer weekend crowds jam the newly completed M-7 highway for the two-hour drive from Budapest to any one of the dozens of fine resort towns strung out around the lake.

"The Balaton" is a ritual for Hungarians and it's fast becoming the same thing for thousands of non-Hungarian tourists, mainly from neighboring Communist states, but from Western Europe as well. Because of tight currency exchange regulations designed to keep Western hard currencies flowing into Communist nations and very little flowing out, it's difficult for East Europeans to vacation in the

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## A Hungarian exchange student tells the story of his amazement upon discovering "Hungary" filed under "Austria" in stacks of Harvard's Widener Library . . .

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West. In Hungary, the difficulties are mainly in expense (a would-be vacationer must buy his dollars or francs or marks from the government at high rates) and red tape. In other Communist countries, particularly East Germany, the borders to the West remain effectively closed for tourists. That's why more and more Poles, Czechs, and East Germans are flocking to The Balaton. Things are getting so crowded that the government recently banned motor boats from the lake in order to cut pollution. Balaton is a notorious meeting spot for East and West Germans, families and friends who live on different sides of the border and who otherwise would have no opportunity to meet in such relaxed surroundings.

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There is good music and bad music in the land of Bartók, Liszt and Kodály. This night the music is bad—ancient '50s imports from the U.S. The five-piece combo in the little Balaton resort club is struggling its way through "Tutti Frutti." The music is dated and slightly off key, yet for the dozens of young Hungarians, Poles, Czechs and Germans undulating on the tiny dance floor the feeling is definitely "all rooti." In the West such music would be labeled nostalgic or campy, but these sweating, gyrating kids seem unaware of that. Their dancing is as frenzied as any you'd find at a European disco. But there's a certain added athletic quality about it, a slightly primitive insistence.

At one table three Poles and three Hungarians are competing to see who can buy more of the excellent local \$2.40-a-bottle white wine. They are joined by an East German couple. No one speaks the other's language well, the *lingua franca* being broken German. Soon the laughing group begins proposing toasts.

*Ne csuggedj!*" one of the Hungarians shouts, downing his glass.

Next a Polish student rises. "*Na zdrowie!*" Again the glasses are drained.

*"Prosit!"* one of the East Germans contributes. More guzzling.

Soon it is my turn. "Well, here's mud in your eye," I offer. All drink, though I'm pressed by one dogged student of English for an explanation of exactly what that phrase means.

Soon, having exhausted all the nationalities present but not all of the wine, a Hungarian girl rises shouting "*A votre Santé!*" in mangled French. Next somebody offers "Cheers!" for England.

"How about Russian?" I suggest to one of the Polish students. "What do they say in Russian?"

The noisy group falls silent. Then the young Pole on my right, his face florid with excitement and wine and his eyes bright, addresses me quite seriously. "There are no Russians here," he says firmly. "We are Hungarians, Germans and Poles, not Russians. *Never* Russians!" His voice is drowned in a chorus of agreement. Soon they are back on the dance floor. The band is playing "16 Tons," the song Tennessee Ernie Ford made so popular during the cold war '50s. I hadn't thought much of the words before. But actually, as a Hungarian student will point out to me later, "It's a worker's song."

\* \* \*

"There's not much love here for Russia or Russians," an American writer living in Budapest says. "Politics is not a subject of immediate discussion among most people because to a large extent they know there's nothing they can

do to influence politics. But there are discussions. And people are quite frank among themselves. The atmosphere here is a lot more free and open than I expected I'd find. Most of the literary people I know are definitely non-party types."

Actually, fewer than 800,000 of Hungary's 10.5 million people are members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Communist party which is Hungary's only legal political party.

For Communists and non-Communists alike life is hard but not without a growing number of compensations. And life, it's agreed by Communists and Non-Communists inside and outside Hungary, is far better than at any time since the war. Wages are low by American standards, but social benefits are high. Health care is free. Food, child care, housing, public transportation, recreation and cultural activities are highly subsidized by the government. A ride on Budapest's clean, fast and practically crime-free subway costs a nickel. A two-pound loaf of bread is less than a dime. Film and theater tickets can be had for under a dollar. Prices of many consumer goods, which are in good supply, generally, are often below Western levels. Russian tourists in Hungary often stock up on items they can't get at home.

The typical work week is six days with every other Saturday free. As in most Communist countries, television sets are relatively inexpensive—every second family has one and the medium is used heavily by the party to make its points.

Housing remains a serious problem in Hungary despite a government effort which built one million new flats over the past 15 years. Most of the recent construction is ugly; Eastern European builders seem to have a preference for prefabricated concrete boxlike structures that manage to look old and grey before the mortar dries. There are long waiting lists for subsidized flats. Families with three or more children are given preference under the government's plan to encourage reproduction to combat Hungary's traditional labor shortage. Young singles and childless couples often live with relatives.

Eight years of education is now compulsory and the government says that 91 percent of all Hungarians finish the elementary grades, though illiteracy remains a problem among Hungary's 350,000 Gypsies. Study of the Russian language is mandatory from the fifth grade on, yet most Hungarian students speak better German or English. Several students told me the reason for such poor mastery of Russian is precisely because it is a required course, considered to be a hangover from the Stalinist '50s when the "Russification" of Hungarian culture was still thought possible.

Hungarians grow weary of Western tourists' questions about religion. The government doesn't keep official figures on the subject, but some 60 percent of the population is

Roman Catholic. Since the '60s, the leadership has pursued a peace policy with the Church, one of the largest landowners in pre-Communist Hungary and one of the government's bitterest cold war foes.

A 1964 agreement with the Vatican provided for religious freedom, a freedom theoretically already granted by Hungary's constitution. In 1969, relations with the Vatican warmed further and the Pope appointed 10 new bishops to Hungarian posts. Last December Paul VI named the Reverend Laszlo Lekai Primate of Hungary. The appointment was viewed in the West as the capstone of a religious détente unimaginable in the '50s or early '60s while Jozef Cardinal Mindszenty maintained his bitter and lonely exile in the American Mission in Budapest, a symbol of the deep enmity between church and state in Hungary. In 1971 Mindszenty was permitted to leave the U.S. embassy where he had resided since being freed from prison during the 1956 uprising. The agreement stipulated that he leave Hungary. In February 1975, Mindszenty, bitter and living in Rome, was "retired" by Pope Paul who described him as "indomitable, tormented, and controversial." The 86-year-old cardinal died in May 1975. In a large way, much of the residual Hungarian Catholic-vs.-Communist cold war fervor died with him. In 1976 Hungarian communists are quick to mention the government subsidies which keep many of the churches open. For the government the old buildings are tourist attractions, but for Hungary's still religious millions they remain houses of God where mass is celebrated and communion distributed the same way they have been in Hungary since the 10th century.

Perhaps a half million Jews were killed in Hungary or in concentration camps during the war. Today Jews are less than 10 percent of Hungary's population. Though few in number, they continue to play an important part in the nation's cultural and economic life. Several Hungarian Jews I spoke with refused to allow their names to be used. "These days we have few problems," one writer told me. "But there's an historical streak of anti-Semitism which runs through Hungary. We try to keep what you Americans call a low profile. We walk on eggs. The Soviets are notorious anti-Semites. We don't want them stepping in here, telling the Hungarian communists how to treat their Jewish intellectuals."

\* \* \*

"Creative" is a word one hears these days among the party faithful throughout Hungary. They speak of "creative" work, "creative" economics, and of the need to follow the teachings of Marx "creatively."

Probably the most creative—and controversial—fruit of Marxian theory in all Hungary sits atop historic Castle Hill

in the center of Budapest. It is the new, \$50-million, 325-room Budapest Hilton Hotel, something of a symbol of East meeting West with both sides looking to come out better in the bargain. The hotel's location provides the controversy. It sits on the Buda side of the Danube just above the historic Fishermen's Bastion, hard by the sweeping, Gothic Matthias' Church where Hungary's greatest king was crowned five centuries ago.

Architecturally incorporated within the hotel's modern concrete and tinted-glass walls are the remains of a medieval Dominican monastery and a subterranean cavern once reputedly the secret entrance of spies and statesmen to the nearby Royal Palace. The cavern, dubbed "Faust's Cellar" by Hilton promoters, will be a bar and lounge when the hotel opens early next year. Part of the ancient monastery will house a restaurant. For many of Budapest's two million citizens, the modern hotel is a blot on the historic and religious landscape, just as a "White House Hilton" or a "St. Patrick's Cathedral Hilton" would be for many Americans.

The Hungarian government first decided to build a hotel on the site and began negotiations with the Hilton company in the early '70s. When complete, the Budapest Hilton will be owned totally by the government through its agent, the Danubius Hotel and Spa Co. Hilton, primarily an operating company, has no capital investment in the project. The chain will provide the Hilton name, operational advice and

everything but the priest. Americans put Bibles in every hotel room," Biro says amiably. "We'll go you one better. We have a whole church right inside the hotel."

Biro, who has been supervising the project since construction began in 1973, is only half kidding. As we stroll through the 80-percent completed complex of bars, shops and suites, he grows more and more expansive. "You know, it was once thought quite impossible to build and operate a modern hotel in this medieval area. Aside from the aesthetic complaints, there were tremendous technical difficulties to overcome. For example, the hotel's air circulation will come from the network of tunnels and passageways that have run beneath this spot for centuries. With all that cool air, we'll save on air conditioning."

We are standing in the nearly completed Presidential Suite with its sweeping view of the Danube and Pest on the other side. The suite will rent for about \$220 a day. I ask the manager which presidents—Communist or capitalist—will stay here when it's complete.

"We have no foreign policy," he says with a straight face. "If they pay for the service, we'll change the flag daily."

Well spoken, Comrade Hilton.

\* \* \*

In 1976, American children no longer cower beneath their school desks in fear of the Red Menace. Yet they still do not know very much about their mutually coexisting adversaries. Dulles and Eisenhower are gone, along with Stalin and Krushchev. Yet there remain latent cold warriors sprinkled among the apostles of détente on both sides.

Despite cooperation in a growing number of areas, the Communist and capitalist systems remain unalterably opposed in fundamental philosophy. János Kádár phrased it this way: "It should be known that in the field of politics we are—even if we insist on the most polite terminology—opponents. While in ideology the two systems face each other with unreconcilable antagonism."

Last July Fourth, on the 200th anniversary of the nation at the forefront of the capitalist system, Clayton Mudd, the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Budapest made the following remarks at a picnic for families of embassy employees and American tourists:

"I'd like to remind the children here, and even those not so young, that we are celebrating July Fourth in a country not only opposed but antagonistic to all of those principles we hold dear. I hope you children here one day will look back on this celebration, proud of the fact that we showed the Flag here today in the People's Republic of Hungary."

Somewhere, the ghosts of so many happy warriors must have been smiling.

*(Reprinted with permission of Commonwealth.)*

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**Laszlo Teke doesn't sound terribly different from most American executives when he says, "Frankly, my duty is to make as much profit for my company as I can."**

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training, its worldwide booking service and a resident expert in return for a sliding percentage based on incoming revenue. The agreement runs for 20 years with a renewal option upon the consent of both parties.

The hotel's Hungarian general manager, Karoly Biro, is a dapper, Swiss-trained 50-year-old who says his first allegiance is to the Hungarian state with the Hilton brass running a close second. Biro has a doctorate in international law and a business instinct that would gladden the heart of Henry Ford.

"Everything here," he says with a sweeping gesture of both arms, "will be for sale. If there's a market for it, we'll even provide weddings in Matthias' Church and then bring the whole party across the street for a reception in our 12th-Century Dominican cloistered garden. We'll provide



## Report of an Exaggerated Death: Daily Newspapers That Failed, 1961-1970

by Ben H. Bagdikian

- Death among daily newspapers seems to be a disease that strikes at the very old or the very young, though by far the more vulnerable are the very young.

- Despite some negative signs, the American daily newspaper industry as a whole appears to be stable and profitable with an almost constant number of dailies from 1946 to 1976. Failure rate for daily papers is less than the national average for all commercial and industrial firms.

- By the decade of the 1960s, the number of new dailies was approximately the same as failing ones.

- Lost circulation from failed papers greatly exceeded circulation gained from new ones, though growth of sales by surviving papers increased during the decade for a net gain of 5 percent in circulation.

- A few large, historic papers disappeared during the study period but most of the papers that went out of business, merged, or left the daily field were very small and very young.

- Continued shrinkage of the Hearst newspaper empire was a factor in big-city losses. Six Hearst-related papers that went out of business between 1961 and 1970 accounted for half of all the lost circulation through newspaper failures.

- Risk of failure is highest in isolated, smaller cities; lowest in suburbs.

- Contrary to a conventional assumption in the newspaper trade, evening papers do not seem more vulnerable to failure than morning ones.

These are some of the initial findings of The Newspaper Survival Study, a project funded by the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation of New York City and directed by Ben Bagdikian.

The initial report deals solely with formal characteristics of the 164 daily papers in the United States that suspended publication, merged, or reverted to less-than-daily status during the study period, 1961-through-1970. Research concentrated on daily papers which have 90 percent of all newspaper circulation and 93 percent of all newspaper revenues.

Daily papers and their markets tend to be individualistic and this report deals only with surface characteristics. Later reports will describe the variety of internal and particular market factors that affect newspaper success and failure. Subsequent reports also will deal with patterns of individual papers and their markets, comparison of content of failing and successful dailies, and the nature of internal management of sample papers.

During the 1961-70 study period 164 papers failed and 170 new ones started. Of the 164 failures, 48 percent went out of business, another 19 percent merged with another daily, and 33 percent reverted to less-than-daily publication.

The slightly higher number of daily paper births over deaths is not matched by a comparison of new and lost circulation. Aggregate circulation of new papers was 1,832,000 and of the 84 (or 49 percent) still in business as dailies in 1975, aggregate circulation was only 719,000.

Aggregate circulation of the papers that failed during the 1961-70 period was much higher—6,162,000. (Of the 164 lost dailies, formal circulation figures are known for only 147, but the unknown 10 percent represents small papers whose total circulation would not significantly change the comparison.)

Failed papers, typically, were small. Median circulation for all dailies in the United States is 37,000 but for the failed papers it was 4,800. Even the 4,800 figure may be exaggerated. Interviewing in cases of mergers and of companies of failed papers, conducted in a separate part of this study, shows that new owners frequently discover that claimed circulations are inflated.

Failed papers (suspended, merged, or reverted to less-than-daily) tended to be new enterprises. Median age as a daily at time of death for all failures was 13 years. For papers that suspended outright, median age at death was 10 years. For those that reverted to less-than-daily publication, median age as a daily was five years.

Merged papers had a median age of 79 years. This seemed to reflect the reluctance of buyers of old and historic papers to wipe out the old paper without a trace, even though it was not unusual for the old, failed paper to survive

*Mr. Bagdikian teaches journalism part-time at the University of California, Berkeley, and at Stanford University. The above report is one of a series from The Newspaper Survival Study, a research project funded by the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation of New York City.*



TABLE I

	Outright Death	Merged with Another and Dropped	Reverted to Less than Daily	Annual TOTAL	New Dailies
1961	3	4	8	15	18
1962	9	2	7	18	17
1963	11	1	8	20	21
1964	7	1	6	14	15
1965	8	4	3	15	13
1966	6	3	5	14	21
1967	7	4	4	15	10
1968	3	4	2	9	12
1969	13	5	4	22	26
1970	12	3	7	22	17
TOTALS	79	31	54	164	170

(Data from annual Bulletins of the American Newspaper Publishers Association and from Newspaper Survival Study.)

solely as small print under the larger flag of the triumphant paper and, after a decent period of mourning, to disappear completely. Symbolic existence of an older failed paper as a hyphenated attachment to the winning paper is an American newspaper tradition.

Ages of failed papers at the time of defeat clusters at extremes. Most were new, with 17 of them (10 percent) in existence for less than a year, and a few less than a month. Forty-six percent were less than 10 years old, 57 percent less than 20 years old.

But the oldest half of the failed papers had an average age of 81 years, among them some of the country's oldest, like the *Boston (Mass.) Traveler*, born in 1825, the *New Philadelphia (Ohio) Times*, 1839, and the direct ancestral line of the *New York Herald-Tribune*, running back to 1841.

The type of community in which a paper is published appeared to affect its chances of failing. Most likely to fail was a daily in a small city standing by itself, like the *Cherryvale (Kansas) Republican*.

Next most likely to fail were city papers inside a metropolitan area, not the central paper for the big city, but not far enough out to be a true suburb. One example was the *Ridgewood (N.Y.) Long Island Advocate*.

Papers published in a named city designated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area also constituted a substantial portion of the failures, such as the *New York Herald-Tribune*.

Lowest number of failures were those published in suburbs.

Failure of metropolitan dailies accounted for most of the lost circulation and undoubtedly contributed to the popular feeling that newspapers are a failing industry. A few big-city competitive dailies continue to be in financial trouble. But most of the attrition in competitive situations has already occurred and in over 97 percent of all cities with newspapers there is only one newspaper management. All available data point to healthy annual profits for surviving dailies in the range of 15 to 20 percent return on sales.

The New York newspaper scene in the 1960s represented the most dramatic episode in the deaths of dailies and created a national impact both because of the size and age of some of the failed papers but also because national headquarters of most of the publishing industry is in New York City and the news media reaction mistakenly gave the impression of a national epidemic.

Much of the national impression of a sick industry is related to the fate of one particular newspaper chain. The six daily papers that were owned, operated or co-managed by the Hearst chain and that failed in the 1960s represent 3,063,000 circulation, or 50 percent of all lost daily newspaper circulation for that decade.

This phenomenon was a continuation of shrinkage of the old empire of William Randolph Hearst whose heirs in the 1960s were unable either to compete in a number of cities or were forced to cut their losses. The largest paper to fail in the decade was Hearst's *New York Mirror*, with 919,000 circulation when it went down in October, 1963. Other Hearst losses during the study period were the *New York Journal-American* (538,000 circulation; died in 1966); the *Los Angeles Examiner* (385,000 circulation; died in 1962); and the *Boston Record* (371,000 circulation; died in 1961). Two papers merged and run with Hearst management and co-ownership were the *San Francisco News Call Bulletin* (183,000 circulation; died in 1965) and the *New York World Journal Tribune* (circulation 675,000; died in 1967), a tripartite vestige of John Hay Whitney's *Herald-Tribune*,

TABLE II

N = 164

Type of City	Number of Papers	Percentage
Non-metropolitan	67	41%
Within a metro area but not the central daily	48	29
Metropolitan (SMSA)	42	26
Suburb	7	4

TABLE III

Year	Number of PM dailies	% of all dailies	Circulation of all PM dailies	PM circulation as a % of all dailies
1940	1,498	80%	25,018,000	61%
1950	1,450	82	32,365,000	60
1960	1,459	83	34,853,000	59
1965	1,444	82	36,251,000	60

(Data from *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1975, page 523, Table 869; and *Historical Statistics*, Vol. 2, page 809, Table R-244-231.)

Scripps-Howard's *World-Telegram*, and Hearst's *Journal-American*. It lasted eight months.

Tabulation of New York losses were complicated by the vague distinction between mergers and suspensions. The daily *Herald-Tribune* disappeared except for sharing the name of the new daily, concentrating its remnant in the Sunday paper. The *Journal-American* and *World-Telegram* merged to produce the daily *World Journal Tribune*, a new creation. Yet by 1967 the three former papers as well as the new one had all disappeared. All four were counted as suspensions.

Other problems of classification and counting occurred in Phoenix and Minneapolis where alternative daily newspapers started, stopped, and started again with slightly different financing and leadership. Each suspension was counted separately. In Winnemucca, Nevada, a paper fluctuated between daily and weekly publication depending on changes in ownership and management, once with a different name. Its reincarnations were counted as three reversions to less-than-daily.

Deaths of the metropolitan giants were clearly important losses. They represented large circulations and important losses in diversity for major populations who represent a significant portion of the newspaper-reading public.

The largest 15 failed papers had 82 percent of all lost circulation during the decade, or 5,030,000. After the largest

15 dailies, no failing paper of the remaining 149 had a circulation of more than 37,000.

It has been a truism in much of the newspaper industry that afternoon papers suffer peculiar competitive pressures and thus have had a greater mortality than morning papers. There are special problems for afternoon newspapers. Changed American work patterns have outmoded some kinds of afternoon readership. The atrophy of mass transit and the flight of the middle-class to the suburbs has meant reduced numbers in the centers of big cities buying an afternoon paper for the train or bus ride home.

Dominance of the evening news on television has diminished the perceived need for evening papers. And logistical problems of printing fat papers and trucking them through afternoon traffic to ever-expanding suburbs has meant that most "evening" papers go to press in the morning and sometimes are delivered after the family has started watching television.

Thus, it has been assumed that eve-

ning papers are dying at a disproportionate rate. Data for failures in the 1960s do not support this.

The number of afternoon papers in the United States and their aggregate circulations has remained remarkably stable through economic and wartime upheavals and during the radical rise of television.

In 1965, a mid-study year, 82 percent of all dailies were evening ones but only 60 percent of the failed papers were evening dailies.

All evening papers in 1965 had 60 percent of total daily circulation, and failed papers during the decade had the same percentage.

"Death in the afternoon" has been considered especially prevalent among the biggest dailies in the biggest cities, because of the intensity of suburbanization and logistical problems in major metropolitan areas. But of the top 50 failed papers in the study, representing 87 percent of all lost circulation, 56 percent were evening papers and their circulation 61 percent of the total, their numbers far less than for all surviving evening dailies and their lost circulation proportional to all evening circulation.

Only when papers of 100,000 or more circulation are isolated (12 papers of which eight were evenings) does their lost circulation rise above the norm. Even then it is 67 percent, compared with 60 percent for all evening circulation remaining.

Size has been considered an important factor in newspaper failures, the assumption being that larger papers in big cities have peculiar economic and

TABLE IV

Circulation size	% of all dailies	% of failed dailies
500,000 and over	0.63	1.83
250,001 to 500,000	1.55	3.66
100,001 to 250,000	5.26	1.22
50,001 to 100,000	7.27	3.05
25,001 to 50,000	13.90	4.27
10,001 to 25,000	27.98	17.07
Less than 10,000	43.42	68.90

(Based on *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1975, page 521, Table 855, and study data.)

TABLE V

	Number of Failed Papers	% of All Dailies at the Time	Number of New Dailies	% of All Dailies
1931-40	427	22%	347	18%
1941-50	303	17	215	12
1951-60	192	11	163	9
1961-70	164	9	170	10

(Subcommittee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly, Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, Col. 6, page 2846; ANPA Bulletin #5203, and data from study.)

logistical pressures, as well as a higher probability of competition from other papers and other media.

Some of this seems to appear at the level of the very large papers, but the absolute number of these among failures is so small (only 3 with more than 500,000 circulation) as to make the statistical significance unclear.

When all papers over 100,000 circulation (12 failures) are counted, the failure rate (7 percent) is proportional to all existing papers of that size (7 percent).

The lowest comparative failure rate is among middle-size papers between 10,000 and 100,000 circulation that constitute 49 percent of all existing dailies but only 24 percent of failures. The low vulnerability to loss in this size range may explain why dailies of this size are the prime target for purchase by newspaper chains.

Highest comparative failure rate is among dailies below 10,000 circulation. They represent two-thirds of all failures though papers of that size constitute only 43 percent of the total number of dailies. Most of these small failed papers also were relatively new as dailies, 36 percent of them having been born as dailies and having died during the ten-year period under study. Fifty-one percent of the failed papers had started as dailies sometime between 1950 and 1970.

Daily newspapers fail at a lower rate than industrial and commercial firms as a whole. The national average for business failures of all kinds in the 1961-through-1970 period was 51 failures a

year per 10,000 firms. If one counts all failed papers, 164, the rate seems higher—93 failures per 10,000 firms. But the national data for all firms count only outright closures, not mergers or reductions in operation. Thus if mergers of newspapers and reversions to less-than-daily are eliminated and only outright suspensions counted, the newspaper failure rate becomes 45 per 10,000, or 12 percent lower than the failure rate among other American business enterprises.

Failure at the rate of only 45 per 10,000 is partially mitigated by creation during the same period of 170 new papers. But most of the new dailies were small, in their aggregate circulation representing only 30 percent of the lost circulation from failed dailies. And by 1975 only half of them remained listed as dailies. Median circulation of new dailies the year of their creation was 7,000.

Though most lost circulation was from a few metropolitan dailies with very large circulation, loss of small papers has social and political significance beyond their size. They were usually the only daily paper in their community and their communities were usually small and did not have alternate sources of local daily news. There are more than 180,000 local governmental units with taxing power in the country and they are located in over 3,000 counties, most of them outside a metropolis.

As recently as 1920 there were almost as many daily papers as there were

TABLE VI

	Average daily pages
1940	27
1950	36
1960	43
1970	47
1974	60

(Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1975, page 521, Table 866).

urban places in the United States. Today there are four times more urban places, and 11 times more communities of all kinds than there are daily papers. So the shrinkage in small papers and the relatively spotty coverage of local civic affairs by local broadcasting leaves most communities without systematic daily reportage of their central political and social functions.

The apparent levelling of newspaper starts and failures represents a lack of marketplace flexibility in meeting local informational needs. But this stabilization of existing newspaper companies is

### Dominance of the evening news on television has diminished the *perceived* need for evening papers.

reassuring for surviving newspaper companies.

In the decade 1931-40, for example, 427 dailies failed, or 22 percent of all dailies at the time. But this level of business suspension has changed and both old and new papers seem to have reached an equilibrium.

The smaller number of daily papers does not mean a smaller aggregate quantity of news in surviving publications. Surviving papers have become fatter with steadily rising numbers of pages per average issue.

During this same period the average

TABLE VII

	Number of Dailies	Total circulation of all dailies	Average circulation of each daily
1940	1878	41,132,000	21,902
1950	1772	53,829,000	30,378
1960	1763	58,882,000	33,399
1970	1748	62,108,000	35,531
1974	1768	61,877,000	34,998

daily paper not only became larger in page size, but it became larger in circulation, with a recent ominous exception.

Surviving papers continue to become fatter in average papers printed daily, up to the present, but in the mid-1970s there was a drop in aggregate circulation.

Furthermore, the long-term trend for dailies is a drop in daily papers sold per American household, and per American adult.

Though consolidation of territorial domain and of advertising revenues among surviving dailies seems stable and prosperous, some indicators of the

place of newspapers in the population are less euphoric. Details of causes of failure and shrinkage among the less lucky dailies may provide some guide to which factors lead to increased daily newspaper readership and profits and which factors to decline and death.

TABLE VIII

	Daily circulation per adult	Daily circulation per household
1920	0.52	1.14
1930	0.48	1.32
1940	0.47	1.18
1950	0.54	1.24
1960	0.53	1.12
1970	0.49	0.97
1975	N/A	0.87

## *Notes on Book Reviewers*

**Patricia O'Brien**, Nieman Fellow '74, represents the *Detroit Free Press* at the Knight newspaper group in Washington, D.C. In addition, she hosts a weekly public affairs show in Chicago's Channel 44. Her newest book, *Keeping It Together: A Story of Six Marriages That Work*, was published this spring by Random House.

**James Thomson**, Curator of the Nieman Foundation for Journalism, teaches the history of American-East Asian relations at Harvard. He is the author of *While China Faced West*.

**Houston Waring**, Nieman Fellow '45, is Editor Emeritus of the *Littleton Independent* in Colorado.

## Daly on Daley; and Daley on the Press

*Editor's Note: Prior to the death of Mayor Daley of Chicago, Charles U. Daly, then Vice President of Government and Community Affairs at Harvard, suggested that we publish a rare insight into Mayor Daley's view of the press. For 21 years Mayor of Chicago until his death last December, Richard J. Daley gave the address that follows at a meeting of the Inland Press Association.*

*Charles U. Daly, currently serving on the Congressional Ethics Commission, and a consultant to several non-profit organizations, also runs an "exceedingly non-profit farm in Ireland." He has kindly agreed to introduce this retrospective piece from Mayor Daley's public life.*

*By the time anyone at Harvard got around to asking Mayor Daley to a seminar, somehow he'd gotten the impression that persons at the University had been led to regard him as one of those fat, dumb, heavy-handed Irish better suited to running garbage trucks than cities or countries.*

*"Lindsay's their man no matter what he did to New York," Daley said when Harvard's invitation was presented finally. "If I go anywhere, I'm going to Cambridge in England."*

*"Why there?" questioned the Harvard V.P.*

*"They asked me early."*

*The press helped shape the popular/unpopular image of "Boss" Daley, as it did that of "Tip" O'Neill, Philadelphia's Billy Green and others.*

*In one of Daley's few speeches, he made the comments that follow about the press and related matters at a meeting of the Inland Press Association. It's too bad he never got a chance to discuss his ideas in person with a crop of Niemanns. He'd a done good.*

— C. U. D.

I have had a relationship — positive and negative — with every aspect of the news media for years.

In those years I have received a great deal of free advice from the press. Publishers, editors and reporters have not hesitated to tell me just how the Mayor's office should be run, how the city should be managed, and what my political judgment should be. They have informed me with great precision and detail.

The week of October 10-16 was National Newspaper Week. It was an occasion for genuine pride in the contribution of the press to the cause of democracy and freedom.

But throughout all the celebration, conferences and observances, there was a theme of genuine concern about the declining credibility of the news media and the growing skepticism about its responsibilities — combined elements essential to the preservation of the concept of absolute freedom of the press under the First Amendment.

There is a realization that this growing cloud does not stem from the traditional criticism that you have experienced and weathered before, but arises from an urban society which has experienced more scientific, economic and social change in the past four decades than in the previous hundred years.

Among the most revolutionary of all changes was the invention of television. No one could foresee the tremendous impact it would have on the communication of news. There are many interpretations of what news is. All agree that the happening must be interesting. It should be recent or told for the first time.

There is little argument that an interesting story does not have to be important or "fit to print." Newspapers with large circulations have made this evident. To most editors the value of a news story is determined by the number of people who read it.

It would seem that the news editor of a newspaper would have an enormous supply of news items from which to choose. Actually, his judgment is heavily influenced by the tested, timeless appeal of crime, violence, sex and tragedy. I call these negative stories.

There was no reason why television should not adopt the same formula. It was also seeking the widest possible audience. Television brought a new dimension to communication, combining sight and sound with immediacy and intimacy. It brought the basic elements of news — crime, violence, sex and tragedy — live and prerecorded, into the living room. No one could foresee the impact the formula would have on the television audience.

The press underestimated the power of the television medium. It felt the television news, like radio news, would be fragmentary. It would only tease the public, who would turn to newspapers to get the full story — all the facts — the who, what, why, where, and when. The press felt that because of its superior news coverage it would maintain its leadership, but the television audience grew and the public began to rely on television as their primary source of news. Instead of the press printing all of the facts, instead of providing more space so that both sides of an issue could be presented fully, the newspapers began to follow instead of lead. There was a growing emphasis on more features, more commentary, more columnists, more pictures, and newspaper editors were demanding that stories be written shorter and shorter.

Meanwhile, television was making the formula stronger and stronger to get bigger audiences. Confrontation, conflict, dissension, as well as violence, dominated TV news. They would get higher ratings but they also began to get bitter



resentment — complaints — and protests from the public increased. For the most part, newspapers have also been critical of the overwhelming use of violence — of negativism — on TV. The newspapers' television columnists have been free with their criticism and doing an excellent job of monitoring the excesses of television, of trying to uphold standards of decency and good taste. The pervasive influence of television was being blamed for shootings without motive, of callous indifference to cruelty — to victims of crime — to the rights of others.

We wonder, however, if the press really cares about the detrimental effects of violence. A story in a recent issue of the *Columbia Journalism Review* gives us more than a hint why there is concern with the credibility of the press. It seems that the night editor of the *Detroit News*, who was in line for promotion to news editor, proposed a revised page one policy for the paper, the country's largest evening daily. In a memorandum he explained that the purpose was to aim "our product" at the people who make more than \$18,000 a year and are in the 28 to 40 group. A fine example of the type of story that would appeal to this group was a robbery-rape story that appeared on the bottom of page one. He was quite specific in his memorandum, and I quote:

"While it (the rape-robbery story) was Detroit and its horrors, it went beyond that. It was an example of just the horrors that are discussed at suburban cocktail parties — that's that \$18,000 plus and 28 to 40 group.

"What to do when the city desk doesn't come across. Go to the wires. I want at least one, preferably two or three stories on 1A (the front page) that will jolt, shock or at least wake up our readers. Go through the last few weeks of the early edition and you'll see what I want. 'Nun Charged with Killing Her Baby.' 'Prison Horrors Revealed.' 'They Chum Together — and Die Together.' "

He concluded: "If we get them talking about our product, I think our circulation will pop up!"

Maybe it will pop up the circulation, as it has in the past. But in the past, there was no television to create the fear of the possible detrimental effects of this kind of negative news. The public, aroused by the excesses of the television industry in its pursuit of higher ratings, protested to the FCC, to members of Congress, and to advertisers. Television, too, claims the protection of the First Amendment; nevertheless, today we have the "family hour."

The public's reaction to television programing has not been lost on newspaper editors. Many are more carefully selecting stories. The TV news shows are also changing. Yet the editor of *The Detroit News* received a promotion soon after his proposal calling for greater negativism.

There is another current issue which, I believe, should be of legitimate concern to the press — and that is the apathy of the voters in the coming election. In a recent editorial, Editor and Publisher pointed out that with election day only

a few weeks away, it was being projected that over 70 million Americans of voting age — more than voted for Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater 12 years ago — will not vote in 1976.

Said the editorial, "This abandonment of the electoral right for a variety of reasons of disinterest, distrust, and disinvolvement presents a major challenge to the press."

I wonder if the publisher and editors of the newspaper trade journal gave any thought that among the reasons for the apparent apathy is the action of the press itself. I believe that the American press, with hardly an exception, wholeheartedly supports the credo of *The Chicago Tribune*. It says:

"The newspaper is an institution developed by modern civilization to present the news of the day, to foster commerce and industry, to inform and lead public opinion, and to furnish that check upon government which no constitution has ever been able to provide."

I fully subscribe to that. But the kind of "check upon government" that we have been witnessing has led public opinion to abandon the basic premise of the democratic process — which starts at the ballot box. You might doubt my

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**[Television] brought the basic elements of news — crime, violence, sex and tragedy — live and prerecorded, into the living room.**

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objectivity, but let me quote the words of the outgoing president and general manager of the Associated Press, Wes Gallagher:

"The First Amendment is not a hunting license. Too many readers are beginning to look upon the press as a multi-voiced shrew, nit-picking through the debris of government decisions for scandals, not solutions. Readers and viewers are being turned off."

He went on to say: "Some of what is printed and broadcast today, ten years ago would have been confined to a waste basket as unproven gossip or lacking in news significance. It seems to me we need to lower our voices. We must bring a little sense to a highly emotional democratic society whose very structures are threatened by partisan dialogue."

Harold Andersen, outgoing chairman of the ANPA, put it this way: "Too many people, including more than a few in the positions of influence, believe either that the news media have too much power or that we are not using our power wisely or fairly. One of our problems, I believe, is the way some newsmen almost joyously cast themselves in the role as adversary of government officials."

Now I understand and respect the adversary relationship

that exists between the press and government officials — between the press and politicians. But the press has distorted this relationship. The press has created a blanket image of every government worker as a payroller — every politician corrupt — without a decent motivation — without a shred of patriotism. It is one thing to be adversaries; it is another thing to paint the adversaries as good against evil. From this, the credibility issue arises again, for you know better.

*The Chicago Tribune* — which like most newspapers in the land helped create the distrust that has led to apathy — may be having second thoughts. Let me read you a lead from a story which appeared in *The Chicago Tribune* last June.

“‘Cynicism and apathy by Americans toward their politicians can bring about the distrust of the best political system mankind has yet devised,’ *Chicago Tribune* editor Clayton Kirkpatrick warned.”

Speaking to the Women’s Athletic Club members, Kirkpatrick said — and I am going to frame this quote and hang it in the office of the Cook County Democratic Party where press conferences are held —

“If you want to do something for society, adopt an orphan. If you want to do something for your government, cherish and encourage a politician.”

It may be difficult to cherish a politician, but frankly, I am puzzled about the attitude of much of the press in regard to its obligation to respect the confidentiality of grand jury testimony. It wasn’t always that way. I can remember not too many years ago when Chicago newspapers were extremely sensitive about printing such testimony and editors would warn reporters about violating the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. After all, it is not like the usual leak from a government office. The confidentiality of grand jury proceedings is prescribed by law and for very good reasons. There are no rules of evidence. Gossip, hearsay, unsubstantiated accusations and suspicions can be and are presented to a grand jury. There is no defense counsel — no cross examination. The duty of the grand jury is not to decide anybody’s guilt, but to determine if there is evidence to justify a trial.

Isn’t it going too far to use the repeated defense of the people’s right to know to justify the destruction of an innocent person’s reputation? Does anyone really believe that grand jury proceedings, printed and broadcast before a trial is heard, are not detrimental to a fair trial?

I’m not arguing against the refusal to name the source. That’s not the issue. When will a courageous editor make it his business to find out if a United States attorney or anyone else is deliberately violating the law because it serves their interest? The public may read the testimony, but they realize that the leaking of grand jury testimony is an infringement of personal rights. The use of such testimony is another example of conduct that weakens the credibility of the press.

Some publishers might say that if someone thinks he can produce a better product he should start his own newspaper. And once upon a time that was a possibility. But no one knows better than a publisher what it costs to launch a metropolitan daily today.

One of the basic suppositions behind a free press was that it would provide a diversity of opinion. Ninety-six percent of the daily newspaper cities have a one publisher monopoly. Newspaper chains now control more than half of the nation’s daily newspapers and more than 70 percent of the circulation. In addition, in at least 85 cities, the owner of a daily newspaper also owns a local television station.

Perhaps the cost of operating a daily newspaper has unavoidably resulted in monopoly conditions. I won’t argue the point. But there can be no argument that such a condition places a heavier burden of responsibility on the free press in America.

Many newspapers do recognize their responsibility and have opened up the news columns to a diversity of opinion on the national scene. I hope that the same opportunity for divergent views will be given locally. Many newspapers and television stations have reduced the number of negative stories and are giving more space and time to positive news.

Let me return to the voices from your own ranks.

Harold Anderson has said, “We don’t become journalists to be loved. But if we aren’t trusted, we don’t have much left. The First Amendment would prove too thin a garment if we had to try to wrap ourselves in it to withstand the cold wind of a majority opinion, convinced that the news media cannot be fair as well as free.”

You cannot evade the issue of the loss of credibility and responsibility. They are being translated into a re-examination of the proper role of the press — into concrete challenges of your rights under the First Amendment.

Listen to this voice — the voice of George Reedy, reporter for UPI, press secretary to President Lyndon Johnson, and dean of the Marquette School of Journalism:

“Perhaps these [proper roles] are the actions of only a few leaders who are out of step with the dominant thinking of our era. But if they represent deeper forces in our society, the free press may turn out to be just another experiment in the history of humanity — an experiment that was abandoned after a brief trial because people decided that they preferred government control to freedom, as long as the control was in terms of fairness and social justice rather than divine right.”

The free press in our nation is an institution that is cherished by its citizens. They would never permit government control as long as the press uses the protection of the First Amendment to serve the people and this democracy. Only if the press fails to meet its responsibilities in terms “of fairness and social justice” can this happen.

# New England Conferences on Conflicts Between the Media and the Law

*The following is excerpted from the Report of the New England Conference on Conflicts Between the Media and the Law, September 1974 - September, 1976, which was edited by Jonathan Moore, Director, Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; James C. Thomson Jr., Curator, Nieman Foundation, Harvard University; Martin Linsky, Editor, The Real Paper, Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Michael Jozef Israels, an attorney with the law firm of Shearman and Sterling, New York City.*

Why two years of New England meetings about media-law conflicts?

To some, such conflicts would seem inevitable and healthy—one symptom of a free, dynamic society. The press, they would argue, must adopt an adversary posture in order to play its proper role as watchdog of the nation. The danger, they would stress, is not conflict or collision, but *collusion*—especially with government itself.

Such views have infused and sustained generations of American journalists. And much good has resulted from the media's independence—the tradition of open criticism, the exposure of corruption, the reform of institutions. Yet the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press is only one of the rights rooted in the Constitution and nurtured through years of judicial interpretation and Congressional legislation. The rights to a fair trial and to personal privacy are also protected by the Constitution, and in recent years these rights have come into considerable conflict with the right of a free press. Consider the record:

— Despite the Supreme Court's strong decision against gag rules in the 1976 Nebraska case, courts are still very much in the business of trying to control the release and publication of courtroom information—even, in some cases, of information revealed in open court.

— Tensions between the interest in personal privacy and the interest in reporting what people want to know are on the increase: libel law is in a constant state of reassessment, gossip journalism is in vogue, computerized data banks have provided a whole new world of concentrated personal information about individuals' private lives, and several states are agonizing over questions of sealing or destroying arrest and other records previously lodged in the public domain.

— Journalists often are expected to reveal confidential sources, and they are still threatened with jail if they protect them.

— The Congress has been struggling for some time with proposals, on the one hand, for an American version of Britain's Official Secrets Act to control flow of information to the people from their government, and on the other, for "shield laws" to prohibit the jailing of journalists who refuse to disclose their sources.

— Finally, all this is going on during—and partly in reaction to—a period of unprecedented activism by the press in the aggressive pursuit of information.

It has become clear, therefore, that the First Amendment's guarantees, and the survival of a free press, are more contingent upon a national climate of understanding and acceptance than upon any absolute and irrevocable Constitutional ordinance. One central factor in the perpetuation of such a climate is the behavior of the bar and bench in America.

Lawyers, journalists, and most judges are not required to stand for elections, to submit themselves to plebiscites on their promises or performance. Yet, they wield great power in determining the shape and direction of American society. Inevitably, without recourse to any public referee, they encounter each other in situations of acute antagonism. The press can attempt to sway public opinion in its favor. But the courts retain ultimate power and authority, and their decisions can silence and imprison journalists, and—as a result of the soaring costs of litigation—constrain media organizations by the threat of financial ruin.

It is the socially costly potential of such media-law conflicts that has persuaded many observers that some alternatives should be sought to all-out combat—alternatives worked out through efforts at mutual education, conciliation, and self-restraint within and between the two groups. In the absence of such efforts, it is predicted by some that freedom of the press, as we know it in America, will gradually disappear.

In early 1974, Fred W. Friendly of the Ford Foundation proposed a pilot project in media-law dialogue. In June of that year, a group of New England reporters, editors, publishers, lawyers, prosecutors, and judges gathered in Chatham, Massachusetts, under the auspices of the Ford Foundation, *The Boston Globe*, and the Nieman Foundation, to consider ways of resolving, or at least better understand-

ing, the conflicts between the media and the legal system other than in the contentious atmosphere of the courtroom. The principal recommendation of that conference was to continue the dialogue throughout New England, in order to involve more people at the local level, and perhaps even begin to build a consensus around approaches to some of the issues.

Since then, under the leadership of Jonathan Moore, Director of the Institute of Politics at Harvard, and James C. Thomson, Jr., Curator of the Nieman Foundation, and with funding from both the Ford Foundation and local sources, the New England Conference on Conflicts Between the Media and the Law has sought to fulfill the Chatham mandate. There have been five subregional conferences: in April, 1975 at Bedford, New Hampshire; May, 1975 at Boston; June, 1975 at Lakeville, Connecticut; and September, 1975 at Amherst, Massachusetts and Newport, Rhode Island. In June, 1976, the project's Steering Committee, together with those who had organized the conferences as well as some knowledgeable persons who had not previously participated in the sub-regional conferences, met at Osgood Hill in North Andover to assess what had taken place and to consider what proposals should be made.

The recommendations which follow are specific, concrete, and deserve broad attention, but standing alone they do not tell the whole story of the New England Conference experience—or the efforts over the past two years of scores of men and women, working lawyers, judges, and journalists who have come together in the spirit of open inquiry to deal with areas of mutual concern.

On the positive side, the New England Conference achieved its greatest success in the pursuit of its most limited goal. People who came to the subregional meetings expressed overwhelming support for their value in dramatically increasing awareness and understanding of the issues. Meeting with members of their own professions, participants found both that they shared problems and differed in suggested solutions. Judges, lawyers, and journalists who had never spoken in a non-litigious situation were stimulated to appreciate each other's roles and responsibilities, exchange ideas, and sort out differences in an informal atmosphere.

No participant could have come away from one of these meetings without a better understanding of the other side's point of view. And no participant should have come away without making an honest reassessment of his or her own professional instincts. We asked ourselves questions which are not often raised, and we realized, under scrutiny from other points of view, that the answers were not as simple as we had thought them to be.

Some individual quotes taken from the subregional conferences suggest both the nature of the problem and the vitality of the dialogue:

A television journalist: *"These are areas where we are right and the courts are wrong and there is no compromise."*

A judge: *"Freedom of the press is not an absolute freedom, not an unlimited freedom."*

Another judge: *"Make all the rules you want affecting the press but they'll go get the story and print it anyway; and that's the game, there's nothing moral or amoral about it."*

A lawyer: *"Along with the press's obligation to protect us against the misbehavior of a trial judge are the obligations to protect the right to a free trial and to preserve the liberty of its citizens."*

Another lawyer: *"I don't think any public figure has a right to privacy."*

A publisher: *"We are the final judge."*

A judge to a publisher: *"Nobody elected you."*

An editor: *"There are some things in life which are anti-social even if they don't violate the law."*

A lawyer for a newspaper: *"To hell with verification, print the story and we'll go for a law suit."*

A reporter: *"Whether or not a reporter has committed a crime to get a story should be of no concern to his editor or publisher."*

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We also learned from the unique grass-roots focus of our project that media-law conflicts are not perceived to be as great a concern at the local level as they seem to be nationally and in the larger metropolitan centers. This is attributed to a greater incentive and opportunity to work out problems in a cooperative spirit within a smaller region or state, as well as concern over the unduly cozy relationship between the press, lawyers, and judges. The greater familiarity among contending participants in the areas where a sense of community is shared does not eliminate the conflicts, but it may make them less intense.

On the negative side, the two-year experience fell short of some of our most optimistic goals. First, there was little follow-up. For most participants the dialogue begun by the

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**To have ethics, a person, an institution, or a profession, must have standards that exist over time, outside of the peculiarities of any particular situation.**

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New England Conference came and went; there was no organized local response to the subregional conferences.



Second, there seems to be little or no evidence of any change in the day-to-day world as a result of what we have done. Although the experience had an impact on the participants as individuals and even on the way they perform professionally, relations between the media and law generally do not seem to be improving. In some respects, the atmosphere between judges and journalists seems more contentious than when we started. But this goal may have been unduly naive, especially in light of the testimony by many of our participants that such conflict, provided it does not become destructive, is dynamic evidence that the process is in healthy equilibrium.

From the conferences themselves we realized that there are two overriding problems which permeate the relations between the media and the law. First, most judges and lawyers do not take the media's First Amendment concerns seriously enough. Therefore, they are more than willing to whittle them away and to try to balance and compromise them with other interests in society, even though those interests might not rise to the level of either a Constitutional amendment or a moral principle. What judges and lawyers ought to understand is that most journalists believe in an unfettered press as an article of personal faith, as well as a part of the Constitution and as an assessment of their own self-interests. Most journalists would be willing to go to jail to protect First Amendment considerations, and a realization of that fact ought to convince skeptics of the seriousness with which those beliefs are held.

Second, however, it is all too clear to us that many journalists have no standards at all. There are none for the profession as a whole and few on an institution-by-institution basis. The media is more vulnerable to images of arrogance and self-righteousness, given the extraordinary rights conferred by the First Amendment, without their consistent acknowledgement that Constitutional safeguards are provided for others. A purely situational ethic, where each individual journalist decides what his or her personal standards of conduct are going to be on a case-by-case consideration, is, by definition, not ethical at all. To have ethics, a person, an institution, or a profession, must have standards that exist over time, outside of the peculiarities of any particular situation. We can argue about what the standards ought to be, or whose they ought to be, or how they ought to be enforced, if at all; but it is hard to argue with the proposition that there ought to be some if journalists want to take themselves seriously, ask others to do so, and enjoy Constitutional protection for what they do.

As we moved toward forging specific recommendations, it was clear that there were several approaches to take. We could have focused just on future joint law-media efforts; we could have isolated specific areas of conflict which seemed capable of being resolved; we could have turned our attention to the media alone or to the bench and bar

alone; or we could have taken a longer view and talked about educating journalists and lawyers so that these problems might disappear or be ameliorated in the years ahead.

Our recommendations combine elements of each of these choices. We hope they will encourage others to join in more ambitious ongoing efforts to increase knowledge, understanding, and respect for the various apparently conflicting but ideally complementing rights and responsibilities of press and legal institutions.

### **Recommendation #1 — Educational Programs for Lawyers, Judges and Journalists**

Through undergraduate, graduate, and continuing education, the media and the legal profession must learn more about each other's practices. Journalists should be exposed to both substantive areas of the law and the structure and operation of the law enforcement and court systems. Lawyers and judges should learn more about journalism, how journalists and their organizations make decisions, and the responsibilities of a free press in the American system.

#### *Action*

1. *Deans and faculty members of New England colleges and universities should integrate these issues into their existing curricula, both by expanding present courses and by adding new ones.*
2. *In addition, evening and two- to four-week continuing education programs should be developed. Regular faculty should be supplemented by practicing lawyers, judges, and journalists.*
3. *Media institutions and bar organizations should participate in the funding of these programs.*

### **Recommendation #2 — Internal Procedures for the Media**

Each news organization should develop internal procedures for identifying and dealing with sensitive legal and ethical issues. This should include assembling information and fostering internal discussion of such issues as news-gathering methods, conflicts of interest, libel, and the substance of law-related stories. In addition, each media organization should develop a decision-making apparatus which insures that important legal and ethical decisions are made on the best available information, after consultation among reporters and editors—and with legal counsel and publishers when appropriate.

#### *Action*

1. *Each news organization should appoint an internal committee to develop and/or review procedures for handling legal and ethical questions which arise in news-gathering and publication.*
2. *Each new employee of any news organization should receive*

*instruction in that organization's standards of professional conduct.*

3. *News organizations in New England should share with each other the internal procedures they have already developed and may be developing over the next few years, in order to highlight problems and suggest alternative solutions rather than to prescribe general rules.*

### **Recommendation #3 — Media Critics**

Media organizations should examine each other's performance as well as their own. They should debate their own practices in print and on the air, and assess the general quality of the practice of journalism locally, regionally, and nationally. Reader and listener input should be part of this process.

A few larger news outlets have established in-house ombudsmen or critics, and some feature guest critiques of the media in their pages or programs. These activities should be expanded. Each media outlet should act as a journalism review, just as the media review concerts, plays, and films.

High quality media criticism can increase the public's capacity to understand and appreciate good journalism. This would foster competition and improve the quality of journalism in the best free-market tradition. Above all, it would enhance public confidence in journalists as people who can discuss openly their own humanity and failings.

The traditions of the First Amendment are best upheld by a public which understands how and why journalists make news and editorial judgments, and a press which is willing to have its judgments withstand public scrutiny. A vigorous press should take strength from such dialogue in an open society.

#### *Action*

*Editors and program directors should establish internal ombudsmen and external media critics, including better opportunities for reader and listener participation.*

### **Recommendation #4 — Procedures for the Legal Profession in Dealing with the Media**

Without compromising their responsibilities to their clients and to the legal process, lawyers and judges should be more open in dealing with the press and public. There should be a maturing of the legal understanding of the significance of an open legal process, and of the press's responsibility for informing the public about the conduct of it.

The legal profession already has some guidelines for dealing with the media in the *Code of Professional Responsibility*. Some of these guidelines are useful; others are less appropriate to the present climate of public interest in legal affairs, and some have come under constitutional attack.

#### *Action*

*Leaders of state bar associations should review pertinent portions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (in connection with media representatives) and should consider offering new guidance to lawyers and judges for on- and off-the-record comment, both on pending legal proceedings and on legal questions in general. Further, they should play a leadership role in stimulating increased attention to these issues in the legal profession as a whole.*

### **Recommendation #5 — Media and Law Enforcement Cooperation**

New England media representatives and law enforcement officials should consult locally to establish procedures for voluntary cooperation where journalistic self-restraint is essential to the health and safety of witnesses, victims, law enforcement officials, or others involved in a criminal investigation. In such situations, the voluntary cooperation of journalists should not be enlisted to conceal official incompetence or wrongdoing, or to make them agents in law enforcement. However, the journalist can and should aid in protecting the law enforcement process by his concern for the safety of individuals involved in that process. Law enforcement authorities should be cognizant of the necessity for the public to know and understand why restrictive measures are taken. Top policy-making officials in both the media and law enforcement should be informed about and involved in any arrangements for voluntary cooperation in specific cases.

#### *Action*

*Editors, news-directors, police chiefs, and prosecutors in each community should consult periodically on mutually satisfactory procedures for the implementation of this recommendation.*

### **Recommendation #6 — Free Press and Fair Trial: Directions for Future Study**

To safeguard the important constitutional rights of fair trial and free press, the bench, bar, and media of New England should develop procedural guidelines for resolving conflicts between the important constitutional rights of free press and fair trial.

The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on restraint orders leaves unresolved many such areas of conflict. Under this decision, there remain some limited circumstances in which a restraint order against media reporting of a criminal trial could withstand constitutional attack. Some conflict between the rights of a free press and fair trial is, of course, inevitable, unresolvable, and even healthy. Nonetheless, unduly escalated conflict can cause harm to both rights. For the present, some restraint orders will continue to be issued

and litigated. The best means of avoiding restraint orders remains voluntary self-restraint—on the part of the bench, the bar, and the media.

Guidelines might include suggested voluntary measures which could serve as alternatives to the issuance of a restraint order, guidance on the kind and timing of publicity which is most likely to prejudice a fair trial irreparably, procedures for affording the press a hearing prior to the issuance of any proposed restraint order, suggestions for limiting the scope and duration of any such order, and a recommended procedure for expediting appellate review so that publication does not become moot before the legal questions are decided. In addition, the results of ongoing research into juror attitudes and the effect of pretrial publicity on jurors may have an important influence on future policy in this area.

#### Action

1. Existing guidelines for resolving conflicts between the rights of free press and fair trial should undergo continuous review and updating as they are affected by experience and court decisions.

2. New guidelines should be developed under bench/bar auspices where such guidelines do not presently exist.

3. If the initiatives described above do not occur, a continuing cooperative organization, such as the one recommended by this Report, should develop model guidelines.

#### Recommendation #7 — New England News Council

The media, the bench and the bar, as well as members of the public, should form a New England regional "News Council." Such a council would be modeled on existing local, state, and national news councils—groups of journalists, lawyers, and laymen who review media performance and who hear specific disputes in areas such as fairness and accuracy, access to the press, and media-law conflicts, but

whose decisions are in the form of recommendations or admonitions only. A New England News Council could take up complaints arising in local media, which the National News Council now hears only where they are deemed of "national significance."

#### Action

1. Regional journalistic and bar/bench organizations should cooperate in the creation of a New England News Council.

2. Alternatively, statewide and metropolitan organizations should consider implementing the same idea on a smaller scale.

#### Recommendation #8 — Continuing Activities

We propose formation of a New England bench, bar and media organization that will:

- Follow-up recommendations of the New England Conference, and consider other recommendations;
- Broaden "consciousness-raising" efforts among lawyers, judges, and journalists including local meetings among the bench, bar, and the media in the format of the Socratic method of problem presentation;
- Attempt to increase public understanding of these issues, perhaps by an annual public forum addressing a major contemporary issue of conflict between the media and the law;
- Stimulate bar and journalistic associations to take actions with respect to these problems.

#### Action

*The New England Conference on Conflicts Between the Media and the Law will explore with individuals, organizations, and potential funding sources, the formation of a continuing organization of bench, bar, and media representatives in New England.*

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## The Nature of Political Liberty

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(Continued from page 2)

almost all of Asia — men can speak and write only what is authorized by authority. Even in England, which is the wellspring of our liberties, there remain restrictions upon what can be printed and published. There are extremely strict libel laws. There is an Official Secrets Act which prohibits publishing what the government says is injurious to the public safety.

As we will note, there are still good and thoughtful men who debate the wisdom of such untrammelled freedom of speech and of the press. But that the extent of that freedom in America is unique, is uncontrovertible.

Let me now mention some other obvious liberties we enjoy. We may each worship God in our fashion or, if we choose, deny Him. We may assemble peaceably to protest any actions of our government. We may sign and collect petitions for the redress of grievances. We may close the door to our home and no policeman may lawfully enter upon whim; he must first show cause to a magistrate to obtain a search warrant and specify for what purpose he searches.

If we are arrested, the authorities cannot let us languish without bringing specific charges; the writ of *habeas corpus* is our great protection against arbitrary arrest. Once arrested and charged, we cannot be found guilty and sentenced by an arbitrary judge. We are entitled to a public trial by a jury of our peers. We can be subjected to no cruel and unusual punishment. If we are found guilty, we have the right of

appeal. If we are acquitted, we cannot be harrassed by being tried again upon the same charge.

This list could be much multiplied. And all of these things seem obvious to us as necessary to liberty. So obvious, indeed, that we rarely think about them. These rights are simply there; they exist. They seem to us the self-evident components of political liberty.

If I seem to belabor the obvious, it is because to most of the world these things are not obvious at all.

But it is precisely because they are obvious to us that they are taken for granted. We are hardly aware of the roots from which they came, of how long it took them to bloom. And so, perhaps, hardly aware of how fragile they are, of how easily they could be lost if we forget that they all rest upon one fundamental liberty — the liberty of the mind to think and to express what it thinks. Without that, we would have none of these other liberties.

If one goes seeking in antiquity for the roots of liberty, one could begin with Aristotle and Plato, who debated the nature of man and of government. We are heirs of them both, but in politics more Aristotelian than Platonist. It was Plato, after all, who would have the state lay down rigid rules for philosophers and poets, who would have had their works submitted to magistrates to decide whether they were fit for the people.

Aristotle, though he defended the slavery of his time and was fearful of pure democracy, did broach the thought that the citizens exercising their collective judgment had the right not only to choose their leaders but to call them to account. The echoes of this are heard in that Declaration of 1776.

But for centuries this idea took no roots. It was the Reformation, with its revolt against the authority of the Church, that more immediately opened the Pandora's box and let escape the idea that each man had a right to make "free inquiry" with his own mind. The inquiry began about God. It was not long before it extended to the state.

Not long, but slowly all the same. In England, which is the principal source of our political heritage, the 16th century ended with absolutism triumphant. By the end of the 17th century, having suffered the absolutism of Cromwell, England was a ferment of liberal ideas.

One of those ideas was that the king should not be absolute in his power. This had been first advanced in the Magna Charta, but in that document it was only the nobles — not the people generally — who asserted rights against the king. That did not come until, in 1689, William of Orange and Mary Teck were jointly offered the throne.

The English had learned from Cromwell that dictators were as dangerous as kings. After James II had come to throne, renewed the religious strife between Catholic and Protestant, and been forced to flee, all factions agreed there should be no more absolute sovereigns. So in order to gain

the throne, William and Mary had to sign a "Declaration of Rights."

This Declaration of Rights in 1689 is a key document in the history of political liberty. Among other things these sovereigns agreed: that the making or suspending of law without the consent of Parliament was illegal. That ecclesiastical courts should try no criminal cases. That there should be no taxes levied without the consent of Parliament. That it was lawful for the citizens to petition the crown for a redress of grievances. That it was lawful for the people to keep arms. That all criminal trials should be trials by jury and that no excessive bail should be required.

You will see in all these foreshadows of both our Declaration of Independence and of our Bill of Rights.

But perhaps the most important provision in that Declaration of Rights was the provision that there should be "freedom of debate" in Parliament. That is, that a member of Parliament might express what ideas he would in that House without fear of reprisal afterwards.

This was, to be sure, freedom of speech only for members of Parliament, not for the citizens generally. But it was the first recognition in any official document that there should be anywhere such a thing as freedom of speech.

It was this provision which later permitted such men as Edmund Burke and Charles Fox to defend the rebellious

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Once you acknowledge that there is such a thing as freedom of speech, it becomes very difficult to draw a line where it stops.

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colonies and criticize the government as our Revolution was brewing.

It had other effects. Once you acknowledge that there is such a thing as freedom of speech it becomes very difficult to draw a line where it stops. If for members of Parliament, why not for those standing for Parliament? If for candidates for Parliament, not themselves officials, why not for other citizens?

And so by degrees, the concept broadened. By 1765, a decade before Bunker Hill, Sir William Blackstone wrote his famous commentaries codifying the common laws of England. And in it he laid down as an established principle of that Common Law that "the liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state . . . Every free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public."

This was the view seized upon by the rebels in the colonies — or the patriots, if you prefer. It opened the way for the



inflammatory oratory of Thomas Paine, Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams and all those Committees of Correspondence which exchanged political views before and during the Revolution.

And I think it fair to say that our Revolution was made as much by words as by arms. Obviously it took arms to win the war. But it took ideas to start it and to keep the people resolute to continue it. Without ideas and without the freedom to speak them, Washington would never have reached Yorktown.

Winning the Revolution, we won not only our independence from England but many other liberties. We won them and put them in our Constitution because our Founding Fathers could think about them, talk about them, argue about them. When some of these liberties were left out of the

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### ... Our Revolution was made as much by words as by arms.

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original Constitution, the people could complain, could petition for their inclusion and by argument win them as the First Ten Amendments to that Constitution.

In short then, of all our freedoms, freedom of speech is the first freedom. It is the first freedom not because of itself it is necessarily the most important one to liberty but because it is the freedom that made all others possible. We could not have such rights as trial by jury, free elections and all the rest if men were not free to argue their merits and to demand them from governmental authority.

Here, then, is the first root of all our liberty.

I wish I could tell you that the people of the colonies held a single-minded devotion to this principle of freedom of speech and of the press. But it was not so.

The view of colonial America as a society that everywhere cherished freedom of ideas and expression is a romantic one. There was indeed an enormous diversity of political and religious ideas among the various colonies, due to their origins and geography, and this diversity was ultimately to have an enormous effect.

But each colony, sometimes different counties within a colony, had its own orthodoxy and guarded it jealously, being quite willing to suppress the dissidence of the non-orthodox. In John P. Roche's phrase, "Colonial America was an open society dotted with closed enclaves."

We can see this during the Revolution itself. The patriot, or rebel, newspapers had indeed thrown off the yoke of Crown governors and made the most of it. Loyalist papers, of whom there were a few, did not fare so well. Those patriots were no more anxious to extend freedom of the press to them

than the Crown had been to extend it to the seditious patriot press.

The Boston *Evening Post*, the New York *Packet*, the Maryland *Journal*, all loyalist papers, were silenced. The New York *Gazetteer*, another Tory paper, was attacked and destroyed by a mob.

In every faction, freedom of the press meant freedom for *us*, not for *them*.

Nor should you suppose that even those wise and liberty-minded Founding Fathers were fully devoted to the idea of a completely unfettered press. That First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." The key word is "Congress" — that is the national government was to be prohibited from abridging the press. This was acceptable because the Founding Fathers were suspicious of the power of any distant government, which the national government was thought then to be, and were anxious to limit its power in every way possible.

But what was to be done under state governments was to be left to the states. They were not prohibited from regulating the press.

Indeed, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 and the Delaware Constitution of 1792 expressly imposed liability

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### ... The liberty of the press . . . is fundamentally the liberty of the mind.

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for abuse of free speech. Thomas Jefferson, the father of much of our liberty, explained: "While we deny that Congress have the right to control the freedom of the press, we have ever asserted the right of the states, and their exclusive right to do so . . ."

In other words, the freedom of speech and of the press guarded in the First Amendment was not then the sweeping doctrine it has since come to appear.

There lay ahead a long struggle — which is not yet ended. You will recall the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 which made it a crime to publish any "false, scandalous and malicious writing" bringing into disrepute "the government, the Congress or the President." Victims among the newspapers of this law included the New York *Argus*, the Boston *Independent Chronicle*, the Richmond *Examiner*. The editor of the Reading *Weekly Advertiser* was prosecuted merely for calling President John Adams "incompetent."

During the Civil War even President Lincoln, in plain defiance of the First Amendment, arrested the proprietors of The New York *World* and the *Journal of Commerce*. In

peacetime, in this century, President Theodore Roosevelt tried and failed to convict the *World* and the Indianapolis *News* of what he called "a string of infamous libels," even sending a special message to Congress on the subject.

So the struggle has gone on over two centuries, right up to the Pentagon Papers case. It is hardly surprising then that those of us who labor in this craft should come to feel that we must be ever vigilant against the efforts of those in authority to curb the flow of information to the people and the free expression of ideas.

But it is a mistake for those of us in the press to think that the only threat is from government. The danger to a free press lies also among the people, who are by no means all convinced that it is the root of all liberty. They are often angered by it, and sometimes find it dangerous.

It was not government, let us take note, that silenced Elijah Lovejoy. It was the people.

Lovejoy was a Maine man who graduated from Waterville College — now Colby — in 1826, the year in which both Thomas Jefferson and John Adams died on the fourth of July. The next year he moved to St. Louis where he became both a

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## In every faction, freedom of the press meant freedom for *us*, not for *them*.

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Presbyterian minister and school teacher. He also began journalistic writing and six years later became the editor of the St. Louis *Observer*, a Presbyterian weekly.

From the very beginning he condemned slavery and began arguing for gradual emancipation. This was not a popular idea in the St. Louis of the time, and a group of leading citizens demanded that he moderate his opinions. His reply was an even stronger editorial reiterating his views and his right to publish them.

"As long as I am an American citizen," he wrote, "and as long as American blood runs in these veins, I shall hold myself at liberty to speak, to write and to publish whatever I please." He also said, "I cannot surrender my principles though the whole world would vote them down — I can make no compromise between truth and error, even though my life be the alternative."

In the end his life was the alternative. Threatened by mob violence he moved his press across the Mississippi to Alton, Illinois, and continued to speak his mind. The mob followed, attacked his plant several times and finally in November, 1837, they burned it down and killed him.

Today, in retrospect, there are none to condemn his ideas. His ideas are now shared by us all. And he has become a martyr to the cause of wisdom and justice.

Remember that his views were not so seen in his own time. His was a voice, and very small one at that, against the prevailing view of his neighbors, of the community, even of the nation at large. The Civil War lay yet a quarter-century in the future.

Remember also that it was not government that silenced Elijah Lovejoy. It was the people who thought him dangerous. It was they who denied him the right to speak his mind. It was they who silenced him.

There is here no small lesson for our own time. There are today many voices questioning the wisdom of an untrammelled press, or at least questioning the uses to which the freedom of the press is sometimes put. It is criticized for being

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## The danger to a free press lies also among the people, who are by no means all convinced that it is the root of all liberty.

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prejudiced, biased, unfair, sometimes untruthful. There are people, some within the press itself, who say some restraints should be put upon its freedom for the protection of society.

Those who say so are not all foes of liberty, and the arguments they advance are not all unreasonable. For it is perfectly true that when men are free to speak their minds, what they speak may be falsity as well as truth.

There is no doubt that freedom of speech, and of the press, can be dangerous. The freedom to appeal to reason can also be the freedom to appeal to public passion and ignorance, vulgarity and cynicism. Libel, obscenity, incitement to riot, sedition, these have a common principle. Their utterance can invade vital social interests.

Furthermore, no man is free if he can be terrorized by his neighbor, whether by swords or words. Nor can a citizen be truly informed if falsehoods come masquerading as truth. It is also true that the liberty of the citizen depends upon the stability of society, which is why governments exist, and society has a right to protect itself against the predatory.

So we are confronted with a dilemma. The liberty of speech and of the press, as Blackstone observed, is indeed essential to a free society. But this liberty can be abused. It can, in fact, sometimes collide with other liberties, such as the right to trial by a jury that has not been prejudiced by inflammatory publicity. It can even at times put in danger the stability of society.

How are we to resolve this dilemma? The Blackstonian

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## Elijah Parish Lovejoy 1802-1837

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Born in Albion, Maine, a graduate of Colby College in 1826 and an editor who crusaded strongly against slavery, Elijah Parish Lovejoy is America's first martyr to freedom of the press. He published strong anti-slavery views in the *Observer*, a weekly in St. Louis; and continued his crusading journalism at Alton, Illinois, where mobs destroyed three of his presses. He was killed the day before his 35th birthday while guarding another new press. His martyrdom helped advance the cause of abolition in the North.

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answer was to say that while freedom of the press meant no prior restraint upon what may be said or published, if anyone published what is "improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequences." That is, he could be punished afterwards.

This is still the accepted legal view, as for example in our libel laws. Even in the Pentagon Papers case the Supreme Court, while refusing to let the government stop publication, suggested that if injury could be proved by their publication the government might have a case for damages against the newspapers.

The Blackstonian answer to the dilemma is reasonable enough when the injury is clear and direct, as in libel or slander. Yet I do not find it wholly satisfactory. What Elijah Lovejoy wrote was certainly inflammatory. He was certainly attacking the established and Constitutional order of things. He certainly ruffled the stability of society. So a jury of his contemporaries might well have found him guilty of publishing what was improper and mischievous.

But the verdict of history is not the same as the verdict of his contemporaries. And even with the utmost care for due process, we can never be sure at any given moment that the passions of the time might not punish a man for saying what history would judge blameless.

All the same, the dilemma is there. The liberty of speech can be abused, and that accounts for the fact that from time to time the people themselves grow uneasy about it and begin to ask if there should not be some restraints upon it.

Unlike many of my colleagues, I have never been fearful of the power of government to silence the press. I know that governments will try; they always have. But the First Amendment stands squarely in their way — so long as it stands there in the Constitution.

What I do fear sometimes, when a bleak mood is upon me,

is that the people themselves in a moment of high emotion will abandon their devotion to this freedom of thought, of speech, of the press. We need always to remember that this "right" of free speech, and of the press is not some right handed down by God to Moses on Mt. Sinai. It is a civil right only, granted by the people in a political document. And what the people can grant, the people can take away.

Whenever in the future you are disturbed by what you think are abuses of freedom of speech and of the press, remember that there is no liberty that cannot be abused. The right to bear arms can become a license to violence. All our legal safeguards to protect the innocent can become shields for crime. The right to trial by jury does not mean that juries will always be just. The guarantee of free elections is no guarantee that the people will choose wisely; they are free to vote out good governments and put bad ones in their place.

So too with our liberty to speak what we will. There can be no assurance that what is spoken will be wise and truthful; it can as well be false and deceitful — or merely foolish.

But if the people cannot be trusted to find their way amid all these abuses, then there is no hope for the American Experiment.

For that Experiment is based less upon logic than upon a faith that the danger of unbounded liberty is not so great as that of putting liberty in bondage. And it is a faith so far justified.

In our 200 years we have been better served by our freedoms, including most especially our freedom of speech and of the press, than we would have been served without them. That is the answer — perhaps the only answer — to those who would no longer trust those freedoms.

The best proof of that, I think, is that we are met here today to pay tribute to a once lonely and obscure man who dared to speak what those of his own time thought wrong and dangerous thoughts. So whenever there is a clamor to restrain this liberty of speech and of the press — as there always will be from time to time — I ask you to remember that we can never be sure whom we have silenced. If the day comes when we do that, we risk all liberty because we will have lost faith in the American Experiment.

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*Vermont Royster gave the above address at Colby College, Waterville, Maine, last December at the convocation honoring the 24th Elijah Parish Lovejoy Fellow. The citation recognized "the precision and craftsmanship, warmth and dry wit, and indeed the elegance of Mr. Royster's writing..."*

*His column, "Thinking Things Over" appears regularly in The Wall Street Journal. In addition, he is William Rand Kenan Professor of Journalism and Public Affairs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

# A Third World View Of the American Press

by M. G. G. Pillai

One problem facing a newcomer to Boston (or, for that matter, almost anywhere in the United States) is the sudden lack of news from home in the local newspapers. To persons from the developing countries in Asia, Africa or South America, the paucity is even more remote and rarely rates more than a few paragraphs when news from abroad does make the pages. Boston, like most university towns, has access to newspapers and magazines from all over the world. One has only to go to the Harvard Square to acquaint oneself with the reading matter available; and if people cannot afford to buy them, the excellent Publications Room of the Widener Library is but a few hundred yards away.

But this lack of interest by local newspapers spreads into the thinking and attitudes of the inhabitants. Bostonians who depend on the Boston newspapers (with the singular exception of *The Christian Science Monitor*), find themselves learning little of the world beyond.

The sad fact is that local newspapers are just not interested in covering events half way round the globe unless (a) there is a serious communist threat; or (b) racial violence; or (c) a state of emergency; or (d) any of the stock myths that Americans generally hold about developing countries turn out to be "true"; or (e) an American is involved in the action. And when this happens, the local press concentrates on this to the exclusion of other issues for a couple of days and then loses interest.

Partly, this appears so because the newspapers seem threatened by television and seem to ape it in coverage, often, sadly, in the same tepid way the "idiot box" has done so these past 25 years. The recent conviction of the three men who murdered the Harvard football player got front page lead play in the *Boston Evening Globe* and the *Boston Globe* the next day, even though the newspaper readers had the news over their television sets several times the previous day. And when one realises that 97 per cent of American households have TV sets, the play given the story the next day is even more surprising.

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*M.G.G. Pillai, bureau chief for Asiaweek (Hong Kong) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, also represents the British Broadcasting Corporation, Newsweek, The Washington Post, Radio New Zealand, and The London Observer. He is a member of this year's class of Nieman Fellows.*

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said shortly after the island's independence in 1965 that he hoped the Western media would ignore his state. By this, he meant that the island republic would face no major crisis that would bring it unwelcome international media attention. The pressures of daily deadlines and competition always ensure that events like a racial riot or an insurgency command more attention than the slow, orderly but essentially dull, move towards self-sufficiency. Part of the problem stems from the reluctance of editors to give the scarce space available for foreign news to anything but the most important news from abroad, but the criteria of what is important differs from paper to paper and area to area. But to be fair, the parochialness of local news even dominates reporting of events from Washington.

Whatever the reasons, the unfortunate fact is that these newspapers carry less and less news from outside their own communities. In one fortnight, one Boston newspaper carried less than ten foreign news items; and once, its foreign news briefs contained such "foreign" datelines as Washington, Tucson and Los Angeles. But this isolationist attitude is

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.... The parochialness of local news even dominates reporting of events from Washington.

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not uniquely Boston or Massachusetts: one southern state, before the peanut farmer moved into the White House, used to say proudly that its only foreign representatives were in the Congress in Washington!

There are, of course, significant exceptions, but even these—which include *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and perhaps, the *Baltimore Sun*—are essentially hometown newspapers. And even they give more interest to local reporting than the events elsewhere and are beginning to give progressively less coverage of foreign news than they used to. But the mass of American newspapers are just as bad in their reporting outside their own communities as most newspapers are in the Third World. Newspapers like the *Hong Kong Standard*, the *Bangkok Post*, the *Straits Times* and most of the national dailies of India are more balanced in their coverage of world and local news than all but a handful of American newspapers.

And the snooty criticism of Third World newspapers by visiting correspondents is not really justified: too often, they apply standards to that press which they do not apply to



their own hometown newspapers. But this is not to suggest that newspapers overseas do not work under complete freedom: in most Third World countries, they work under severe constraints, often making it impossible to operate in the Western sense. And a case can be made against American newspapers which do not, despite their impressive freedom, report on events which should be. In the Third World, editors sometimes lay their own heads on the line every time they allude to what is happening in their countries; this, in turn, has led to an art oft practiced by diplomats and called "reading between the lines."

Television news in the United States is little better. Often reduced to trivia and "live coverage," if the news cannot be filmed, it is just glossed over. And there is a tendency to be self-righteous, giving a lot of space, for instance, to Mrs. Indira Gandhi's tough measures in India. But when she kept her, ultimately suicidal, promise to hold elections, albeit a year later, it was just touched on in passing. A local fire got more prominence on local television than about 2,500 deaths in a recent Turkish earthquake. And trivia, like Amy Carter's first day in school, is given more prominence than more important news.

And the trend is towards more parochialism. California's 70-year-old freshman Senator S.I. Hayakawa insisted recently that local newspapers must cover local news even more thoroughly than they do now, even if that meant more important news from further away has to be excluded. Despite a growing reputation for digging up scandals and other skeletons in the cupboard of American officials, news editors are often on the defensive when these deficiencies are discussed. And yet few newspapers took issue with a convicted Massachusetts senator who spoke before his colleagues in the chamber, refusing to resign his seat because he alleged he did not have a free trial. There are, at this moment, several reporters with reports of scandals in the City Hall which their editors are unwilling to see in print.

There is a self-righteous posture when they discuss the absence of civil rights in countries overseas but refuse to

discuss problems nearer home: the treatment of blacks, the Indians and other minorities. One editor told me the circumstances were different. How different, he never told me, preferring to move on to other, less controversial, subjects.

There is no answer to this dilemma. One gets the feeling that the average Americans are not interested in things beyond their immediate circle. How can they, when they are not exposed to much else in the local media. What happens outside their immediate (nuclear) family, village or town is generally ignored. And so pervasive is this ignorance that more than one student in a college journalism class in Philadelphia thought that the Chinese Prime Minister who died before Chairman Mao was none other than a local politician named Chow Mein. This is, unfortunately, typical. And one gets the feeling that foreign policy is often formulated against considerable local opposition. Former Senator William Fulbright said he took care never to discuss important foreign policy issues before his bailliwick. "The only foreign policy questions I discussed in Arkansas were of my efforts in marketing chickens in Europe."

Maybe, American news is not reported properly in the Third World, but it is usually more comprehensive than the reporting of the Third World collectively in American newspapers. When I mentioned this to a Boston editor, he said there were too many local events to cover, an argument that cannot be faulted in a town where two newspapers are fighting to the death in a circulation battle. Here again, despite the resources and freedom available, there is considerable sparring when local scandals are to be unearthed.

There is, just as in the Third World newspapers, a great deal of courage in reporting scandals in Washington or civil rights restrictions in Timbuktoo, but such fearlessness does not often exist when it comes too frequently in covering local scandals. And when more and more towns find themselves with only one chain-owned newspaper, this effectively neutralizes local initiative and competition—but that is a different issue altogether.

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## In Britain, Ratings Are Not Everything

by John F. Day

There is something right about Britain — something in which the country leads the world.

That something is television. And it is no mean achievement to have attained Number One status in quality, to have given big audiences in Britain both information and entertainment and, at the same time, to have reached export earnings of something like 32 million pounds a year in program sales.

This success story is not the only one to be found in Britain today. But the country's skid from top world power status has been even more precipitous than most Britons realise. It not only is a long way from "Ruling the Waves;" its pound sterling and its economy have been on a decline so long it is not easy to find something moving up the hill. Since World War II in particular the nation has dropped rapidly in international standings for such production and export as cars, steel and ship building. Even books cost more in Britain than in, say, America, and as a result do not hold prime position in export to the English-speaking nations.

It is a bad joke, too, that Britain seems unable to produce competitively the television sets on which the Number One programs can be seen. The Japanese have so hammered the TV set market, there are some loud cries for import controls on TV tubes.

As with every other product, the total spectrum of British television programming is far from perfect, but it looks outstandingly superior when compared with that of other countries — and particularly when compared to that of the United States. The Americans are still

the biggest exporters of television films and videotapes, but for the most part the output could just as well be canned tomatoes, or sausages, or salted peanuts.

The American television industry is, in fact, a house of prostitution. It is a very classy house, rich not to say gaudy, dazzling at times, beautifully furnished, siren-like in its attraction. And some of its inmates have hearts of gold. But it is still a whorehouse.

That severe judgment comes from someone who worked in and with American television from late 1955 to mid-1964, who has seen much of the product since then on both the home and foreign ground, who has observed television not only in America and Britain but to a lesser degree in Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Japan. That someone is the writer of this article.

So that makes us, we suppose, an ex-prostitute. But we like to think at least that we had a heart of gold. Newsmen and newswomen are almost the only redeeming features of American television, and we believe critics will agree that in news and public affairs American TV does a good job.

The newsmen tend to dwell in the basement of the house (off-peak hours) and many of them are serenely confident they still have their virginity. Maybe they do. But except for those in Public Broadcasting Service (which except for products bought from the BBC must be the world's dullest) they probably could not pass a medical inspection.

The basis on which we declare the

foregoing is the almost incredible commercialization of American television — again with the exception of PBS, which is supported by foundations, gifts and some subsidies. In theory the three big network heads control what goes on the airwaves. But in truth they abdicated long ago to the "sponsors," the big companies who through the big advertising agencies spend the millions and decide what will and will not be shown. They do that by the simple expedient of buying time on the basis of "cost per thousand viewers" — or refusing to buy if the networks insist on airing something with a low Nielsen rating.

(We used to employ from time to time, when we were working on a documentary or special product we hoped to sell, a cynical crack: "Let's get down on all fours and look at this from the sponsor's point of view.")

Nielsen ratings constitute the bible of how many million sets are turned on to a particular station at a particular minute. We doubt Americans *en masse* are any more moronic than British *en masse*, but in Britain, thank God, ratings are not everything. We should be forever grateful to the BBC for that, because the pattern established by the BBC before ITV came along had great bearing both on the code and the practice of the commercial stations.

Why do Americans put up with lowest-common-denominator fare plus brain-battering every few minutes by sequences of commercials? Some of them don't, and that is why Public Broadcasting Service (about 2000 stations) came into being. But for the most part we figure it like this: If you are raised on a garbage heap and all you have to eat in your life is garbage, you get to think that garbage is pretty good stuff.

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*John F. Day, Nieman Fellow '43, is editor of the Exmouth Journal in Devon, England. He worked in American television for ten years as director of News, then vice president of CBS News and subsequently as European director for Time-Life broadcasts.*

The most commendable point about British television is that it has proved time and again that high level programming doesn't have to be dull. It requires — and gets — good writing, producing, directing and performing, whether by newspeople in documentaries or actors in other programming.

British television most assuredly is not above keeping a sharp eye on ratings. And since the BBC uses one method of estimating audience totals and ITV companies use another, they sometimes make themselves look ridiculous by both claiming a "victory" in size of audience.

If ratings were the sole criterion for determining what programs would be aired, we would have very little other than "Coronation Street," "Crossroads," "This Is Your Life" (that old chestnut which even the Americans have given up), Hughie Green and the

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## Newsmen and newswomen are almost the only redeeming features of American television . . .

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occasional Benny Hill Show. For they are nearly always in the "top ten."

But, fortunately for our pleasure, acquisition of knowledge and even sanity, the rating forms are not the sole judge. We have in fact a remarkably well balanced fare over the three channel range. It extends from "Open University" to "Top of the Pops."

We hold the view that an occasional dose of "Top of the Pops" is good for even the most square adult. If you turn down the volume a bit and listen to the caterwauling and watch the antics, you will be less sorry that you are getting on in years. And you can say to yourself, "Just think, more than one generation now has called that noise music; but Glenn Miller is coming back!"

British programs are sold not only to

the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, but to Sweden, Germany and other continental countries; and to Japan and South America and Africa. Sometimes controversial documentaries are sold in countries which are unable or unwilling to tackle the touchy subjects themselves.

And selling well over the last years are both the "class" productions and the programs that have no other purpose than to entertain. There has not yet been better television than Lord Clark's "Civilisation," Dr. Bronowski's "Ascent of Man," and Alistair Cooke's "America". They have sold, along with "Upstairs, Downstairs," "Rock Follies" and a very long list of others.

Some of the programs have been copied in other countries. Both the United States and Germany changed Alf Garnett into their own local yokel. "Till Death Do Us Part" became "All in the Family" in America — and in this case so successfully it was run on the BBC. "Steptoe and Son" became a black father and his offspring in America. The Americans also tried their own version of "Upstairs, Downstairs," but that was a catastrophe.

Few countries have such a wealth of acting talent as does Britain. That has long been so. The actors themselves used to be exported, i.e., they went to Hollywood or Broadway. Some of them still do, but it is more usual now that their product is exported on film or tape.

For example, Lord Olivier is to produce a series of major plays through a co-production deal between Granada and the American NBC. And the BBC is working on a 10-part serialization of Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* which will be shown here next year and in America subsequently.

(Whether Anna will look the same in America as she will in Britain, however, we would doubt. We saw parts of "The World at War" in America after having seen it here, and although that was exciting stuff and hardly difficult to comprehend, it was chopped down in "edit-

ing" to fill much shorter time slots while incorporating countless commercials.)

There is more humor on British TV screens than on those of other countries. Where you can find men who so tickle the funnybone as do Ronnie Barker, Benny Hill, Dave Allen, and the master of Fawlty Towers, John Cleese, among many others?

But it is not just these and numerous other comedians who make us laugh. It is also the script writers and the producers, and very importantly the executives who refuse to run series beyond the capability of the writers to produce new scripts, or to indulge in situation comedy *ad nauseam*.

Inevitably if a one-shot play has unusually good situation and characterization, the executives try to conjure up a

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## . . . In Britain, thank God, ratings are not everything.

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series. And "Smash Hit" is nearly always followed by "Son of Smash Hit." But in most instances the creators continue to be the writers. It is not, as in the United States, a case of putting the old sausage grinder in gear and shooting car chases, punchups and all the rest of the so-called "action" — with one writing team after another having a go. A good show begins with good writing, and no writer or writers on earth can produce other than routine scripts if Perry Mason, Ironside, Kojak, Cannon and all the rest grind out week after week for umpteen years.

Other fields in which British television continues to excel are the production of classic plays of Shakespeare, Ibsen, Chekov, Shaw *et al*; the recreation of history and the dramatization of novels. *War and Peace* may not be everybody's choice of viewing, but the production was true to this greatest of

novels and the total impact was considerably more shattering than that particular vodka advertises itself to be. Edward VII was memorable, as were the Sartre compilation "Roads to Freedom", "Emma," "The Forsyte Saga," "The World at War," and many others too numerous to list.

Panel shows produced here would hardly sell abroad, but that is not from

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The most commendable point about British television is that it has proved time and again that high level programming doesn't have to be dull.

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lack of quality. "Mastermind" and "Ask the Family" are surely the cream of knowledge shows.

"Play of the Month" and "Play for Today" no longer have counterparts in the United States. The sponsors say plays don't get the ratings. There is, of course, the occasional play. But occasional is the operative word. Sponsors tend to want the same characters returning week after week.

"Is There a God?" was a relatively simple production, masterminded by Magnus Magnuson. Undoubtedly the BBC never shook in its boots about airing that questioning of the existence of a supreme being, lest conformists and non-conformists alike bring curses to bear on the corporation. The program made hardly a ripple in the water. But in what other country would it have been produced in the first place?

Then there are the many programs of so-called minority interest, topped by operas both from Covent Garden and the Glyndebourne. If you were to suggest to top officials of the American networks CBS, NBC or ABC to air operas (or one opera) in prime time (between 7:30 and 10 p.m.) there

would be either an amazed hush over Manhattan or screams of anguish.

That would not be true, however, of continental television.

Not long ago Yehudi Menuhin reached the age of 60, and BBC-2 screened an hour and a half show beginning at 8 p.m. in honor of this greatest living musical genius. Not even a somewhat simpering David Attenborough could detract from the pure joy the program brought to anyone interested in either humanity or music. Listening to this noble man talk almost made one unashamed of the human race. Listening to his playing of Mozart's G Major Violin Concerto made one feel proud to be a member.

With any luck, people elsewhere, including Americans, through the PBS, will get a chance to see and listen to this man-for-all-countries.

There have of course been flops, as well as programs which seem to have no redeeming feature. In the first category one can put "The British Empire," "Churchill's People" and, probably, "The Pallisers." The first should have been great but was in fact an irritating

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The Americans... tried their own version of "Upstairs, Downstairs," but that was a catastrophe.

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failure. The second was written for television by so many different people with so many different ideas of what it was supposed to be, it turned out to be precious little of anything. The third was a beautiful production that tried, but failed, to reach the audience-gripping power of "The Forsyte Saga." There are others, of course.

In the second category we would put something we would so like to forget we have in fact already forgotten the

title. It was a series of plays about one family, in which Frank Finlay had an incestuous love for his daughter, and his wife was having intercourse with their son-in-law. If that mess had any *raison d'être* it was sheer voyeurism.

But the overall record is extremely commendable. Britain has made good use of the most pervasive medium of

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Undoubtedly the BBC never shook in its boots about airing that questioning of the existence of a supreme being... But in what other country would it have been produced in the first place?

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the 20th Century. Not perfect use; perfection is probably impossible — but sensible and, on the whole, beneficial use.

We have been bitterly critical of American television because it could have done more for American society, but did less, than the men who founded and shaped the American television networks.

For them we have a wish: That when they die they spend eternity watching the output of their networks — with the excision of any British program some underling may have purchased.

Coming  
Nieman Seminar  
with  
E. L. Doctorow



## A German Hears Noisy America

by Gunter Haaf

WASHINGTON, D.C. — It is not yet dawn outside my apartment here when I am jolted out of my sleep by the roar of a diesel engine, the shriek of brakes, and the clanging of metal cans. The garbage truck has struck again, and I am reminded despite my grogginess that this is America, the land of perpetual noise.

Certainly I have been bothered by troublesome sounds in my hometown of Hamburg, in West Germany. A car idles at midnight. A motorbike sputters past. A neighbor tests his new stereo set. But these are, happily, only random disturbances. Here in the United States, noise is endemic.

My introduction to American noise first came in New York City, where even atop a skyscraper I could not escape the hum and buzz of the traffic below. But then, I figured, this was normal for the world's most dynamic metropolis. Things would be different once I crossed the Hudson and traveled into the real America.

Out West, however, silence was not always easy to find. Consider the trailer camp outside Denver, where a nearby airport, railroad, and highway intersection combine to produce an unforgettable technological symphony. Or take the national park in Utah, which was majestically quiet until sunrise, when a platoon of dune buggies revved up, vanishing in a thunderous cloud of pink dust.

Major roads, it almost goes without saying, are shaken by huge trucks, their chrome-plated mufflers polished like saxophones for the purpose of producing noise. I was convinced of America's superior work ethic on a Sunday morning in Miami Beach as a giant tractor, clashing its gears, hardly seemed to annoy sunbathers jammed onto a strip of sand not far away.

All this—and much more—led me to ponder on whether we Germans, having been packed into our tiny country for centuries, finally lost patience with unnecessary din. And perhaps it was this impatience that prompted us to put pressure on our politicians to pass and enforce stringent noise controls.

The basic guidelines underlying the fight against noise in West Germany were initially set down in 1968 in a regulation that limited, among other things, the decibel count to which citizens could be exposed, day and night, in commercial and residential areas.

Under these rules, plastic containers were substituted for metal garbage cans, and compressors on construction sites were redesigned to make them quieter. Airports were required to cease operations no later than 11 o'clock at night.

But this was not enough. Germans continued to complain about too much noise, and their complaints were bolstered by a study that showed that 10,000 people had become totally or partially deaf in 1974, and that three million more were working in conditions that might endanger their hearing.

Armed with this evidence, special-interest groups argued for even tougher measures, and as a result of their lobbying, new regulations were introduced last May. These included compensation for Germans able to prove that noise has somehow damaged their lives. Unless noise levels are reduced, the claims for compensation could soon exceed the costs of preventive steps.

But while noise is the "number one environmental problem" in West Germany, as an expert there told me, it remains a low priority issue in the United States. In fact, America only began to enter the field of noise prevention and regulation in 1972.

Numerically speaking, the problem here in the United States dwarfs the problem in West Germany. Reading two pieces of American legislation on the subject—the Noise Control Act of 1972 and the Model Noise Control Ordinance of 1975—I learned that some 80 million people in this country are "significantly affected by noise."

I also discovered in the same documents that between 22 million and 44 million Americans have "lost part of the use of their homes because of aircraft and transportation noise." And one of the documents concluded that "inadequately controlled noise presents a growing danger to the health and welfare of the nation's population."

The text of the Model Noise Control Ordinance sounds strict, asserting as it does that "public health" shall be the "sole determinant" of noise levels, and that "no person shall unreasonably make, continue or cause to be made or continued, any noise disturbance." But a closer look reveals that there are not many teeth in this law.

For one thing, the Environmental Protection Agency spent only \$21 million to carry out the Noise Control Act between 1973 and 1975. Moreover, the standards here appear to be low compared to West Germany, where the permissible nighttime noise level is fully 10 decibels less than in the United States.

Out of curiosity, I also examined studiously the rules covering "refuse collection vehicles," or garbage trucks, finding that the shattering explosion that catapults me out of bed at dawn actually stems from ambiguities in the law. So, it seems, the U.S. drive toward silence is more theoretical than real, and perhaps I ought to return here in five years for a good night's sleep.

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*Gunter Haaf, Nieman Fellow '76 and a West German science writer, is currently on a Harkness Fellowship in the United States.*

# BOOKS

## Women in Television News

by Judith S. Gelfman

(Columbia University Press; \$7.95)

It's beginning to wear a bit thin, this business of women in television news being viewed as social and cultural curiosities. When will it be generally recognized that women who make it in as tough a business as television are usually solid, hard-working professionals? The amount of copy expended on whether Barbara Walters' entry into the Big Time as TV's first anchorwoman signals a *decline* in the quality of TV news and indicates the answer to my question above: a long time, baby.

*Women in Television News* takes a reasonably good shot at de-mythologizing the glamorous women of television, through interviews with 30 women newscasters on how they got there, what they want, and what they feel

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The success formula for these women isn't much different from that for men.

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about themselves. The author does a good job of focusing on some of the central problems and themes, although the treatment is superficial.

The most striking finding is that the success formula for these women isn't much different from that for men.

These women had brains, ambition, talent—and luck. The big difference is that they have to be young and look

pretty—much prettier than, say, Walter Cronkite. On this point one of the best quotes in the book comes from CBS newswoman Lesley Stahl; the only one of the 30 who regularly wears her glasses on camera: "My glasses have been one of the biggest debates of my life," she told Judith Gelfman. "One day my mother called me up—and it was recently—and she said, 'Forty-nine million Americans saw you on television tonight. One of them is the father of my future grandchild, but he's never going to call you because you wore your glasses.'"

It's funny, it's wry, and kind of sad.

Another interesting fact brought out through Gelfman's interviews is the price of glamour and celebrity. Most of these women have deliberately given up or tabled the idea of marriage and children. Long and erratic work hours are common; tossing a few things in a bag and taking off on an out-of-town assignment is part of the job. Pia Lindstrom, a newswoman for New York's WNBC-TV, took a chance. She married, had two children, and related her worries about going back to work to Gelfman as she cradled her newborn child: "That's going to be a problem. How could my husband possibly like it if I get put back on the one o'clock news and don't come home until one-thirty at night?"

Even the celebrated Barbara Walters was frank about her guilts: "I'm constantly torn. My daughter says, 'Oh, Mommy, are you going to work again?'"

It may indeed take a special type of personality to work in the demanding field of broadcasting, one willing to give up everything else that gets in the way of full-time work commitment. I don't think so. As in any career, it's a matter of balance, of establishing human values alongside of professional ones. And be-

cause women in broadcasting still have a long way to go towards equal representation in this industry, they're making the rules as they go along—and part of that means breaking the old ones. For example, women like Pauline Frederick, NBC News correspondent at the United Nations, have disproved the idea that women cannot come across as credible professionals to the viewing public. Still, even the fact that a book like this needs to be written points up the aura of exceptionalism around women in television. Clearly, the only way to get past that is for there to be more. It's happening—slowly.

— Patricia O'Brien

## The Man Who Lost China: The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-shek

by Brian Crozier

(with the collaboration of Eric Chou)

(Charles Scribner's Sons; \$12.95)

Among the smaller legacies Mr. Carter will soon discover as he explores the debris of the Oval Office is something called the "GRC," also known as the Government of the Republic of China. It was bequeathed to him as a problem not only by Presidents Nixon and Ford, but more centrally by a man who died in April 1975, while South Vietnam was collapsing, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang was 87 when he died; and for nearly 48 of those years he had held predominant power in Nationalist China—22 on the mainland, 26 in "temporary" exile on the island of Taiwan. Political longevity made him remarkable. So did his influence, for years, on American foreign policy and domestic politics. So, now, does his legacy: the thorny Taiwan issue which still prevents normal diplomatic relations

between the U.S. and the real China.

Such a man deserves a non-hagiographic biography. And the effort by Brian Crozier, a veteran British journalist, looks promising at the outset—especially with that teasing title, “The Man Who Lost China.” How many careers have been ruined, even lives snuffed out, thanks to that nastiest of charges, in more than one country!

Losing China, you see, was no mean feat—not some needle in a haystack, but instead a great big country, with more people than anyone can ever count. So to be accused in Russia of losing China, as many were under Stalin in the thirties, resulted in execution or long imprisonment. The same accusation in the U.S., after Mao Tse-tung’s victory, produced the maiming or banishment of our finest China expertise both inside and outside government.

So to suggest, as Crozier’s title does, that perhaps a *Chinese* lost China is at least a small step forward. But the lingo is still misleading for a fundamental reason: to “lose” a nation, you really must have *had* it in the first place. And neither foreign advisors—whether Soviet or American—nor Chinese Nationalists, nor Chiang Kai-shek, ever “had” China sufficiently to lose it.

That, indeed, is one perhaps inadvertent message of this tedious and muddled book. As the author jogs uncertainly through the dark alleys of Chinese political and military history in the first half of this century, he does tell us of the severe external limitations on Chiang’s power: untamed warlords, Kuomintang factions, Western privileges, Japanese invaders, and Communist rebels—to name only a few. Indeed, at its high point of control in the promising Nanking years (ca. 1936) Chiang’s government actually held direct sway only in the lower Yangtze River valley—about five of 22 provinces; the rest (excluding Manchuria) were governed through highly unstable alliances.

The book presents other difficulties. One has learned—notably from Barbara Tuchman on Stilwell—that biography can provide the foreground for a rich tapestry of historical narrative. But Crozier and his collaborator have reversed the process. They have written a chaotic, slipshod history of the (also chaotic) post-1911 Chinese revolution, and after 1927 a history of its Kuomintang wing—with a mysterious one-dimensional figure named Chiang Kai-shek coming on and off stage to provide some slight continuity. In the first sentence of his first chapter Crozier terms Chiang “inscrutable.” He might as well have stopped there, for after 399 pages our insight into the man is still not much greater.

I should add that as someone who has tried to fathom Chiang, I sympathize with the problem. A rigid ascetic in the

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### To “lose” a nation, you really must have *had* it in the first place.

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midst of rampant corruption; a Confucian convert to Methodism who apparently practised both; an admirer simultaneously of European fascism and the YMCA’s social gospel; a man who seemed to trust no one except, occasionally, members of his family; a non-charismatic orator and non-reflective writer; a military mind addicted to medieval tactics. How to penetrate or capture such a person—particularly, as in Crozier’s case, when Chiang’s language and culture are totally alien?

The author’s solution is to rely heavily on one Eric Chou, a Chinese journalist who lived through the Kuomintang era. Chou flits in and out of the narrative as the authority for far too many assertions and remembered quo-

tations (“according to Eric Chou,” “according to Eric Chou’s sources,” etc.). Otherwise Crozier simply borrows sizeable gobbets, here and there, now and then, from several other writers on 20th century China.

His borrowings seem quite random but reflect spotty judgment. For instance, he attributes to Edgar Snow, yet again, the description of the Yen’an Communists as simply “agrarian reformers.” The term actually originated with the British leftist-turned-rightist Freda Utley. And Snow himself never lost his original clear perception of them as dedicated Marxist-Leninists (as Kenneth Shewmaker has so carefully shown).

Crozier’s greatest lapses seem to relate to Chiang’s greatest problem: American policy in China. On this subject he has re-hashed the stale, discredited charges against the U.S. Foreign Service Officers who became the McCarthy-McCarran victims in the early 1950’s—those Americans then accused of “losing China.” He has apparently not read the State Department’s slowly released special volumes on China, 1941-49, nor the dispatches of the officers themselves—all of which tend to document and exonerate their judgment at the time: that the Communists would certainly win unless we jarred the KMT into reform; and that we should assist the Communists, *in our long-term national interest*, in order both to pressure the KMT and to keep our hand in the game if indeed the Communists should prevail.

Crozier’s view of Chiang is so confused, so ambivalent, so wildly self-contradictory, as to suggest that two authors of totally opposing viewpoints were writing under the same name. Half the time Chiang’s flaws and errors make him patently incompetent for the job of running China. The rest of the time he is a hero of very grand proportions—but betrayed by Communist agents, fellow travelers, bad luck and FDR. As a result, both the

book's title and the book's subject remain, at the end, an enigma. Also, I am sorry to say, the book's purpose.

Crozier's effort aside, Chiang's legacy to President Carter is nonetheless important and vexing: an alternative claimant to the Peking throne (now actually Chiang's son, Ching-kuo) ruling a Chinese province and U.S. protectorate, the island of Taiwan. Thirty-five years after Pearl Harbor thrust us into alliance with the KMT, the Generalissimo's shrewd maneuverings have kept us ensnared in the unfinished Chinese civil war—still recognizing the GRC as "China," unable to further our 1972 rapprochement with Peking's real China.

Is there any way out of this web of history? There may well be—if Carter's people have the brains and ingenuity. The formula is relatively simple, though admittedly unorthodox. The new Administration should work gradually toward the de-recognition of Taiwan and the recognition of Peking; and since de-recognition will terminate our defense treaty with the Nationalists, we should substitute for that treaty a unilateral declaration of our intent to prevent the use of force in the Taiwan Straits region. The upshot would ideally be what is called the "Japanese solution," plus a tacit commitment to Taiwan's defense.

Whether this process takes six months or four years will depend on a number of variables—including the views of policy-makers in Tokyo, Peking, and Taipei, for all three parties should be consulted by Washington throughout the negotiations. But the solution remains feasible.

And what of the longer future for Chiang's island legacy—where ageing refugee Chinese still yearn for return, while native Taiwanese chafe against KMT rule but also increasingly prosper? Virtually all Chinese—seared by a century of foreign attempts at China's dismemberment—believe that there can be but one "China." Yet millions of Chinese live outside that one China—in

Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Southeast Asia and elsewhere, as well as on Taiwan. And since Chinese ingenuity—and indeed, self-interest—has found ways to accommodate to the existence of those other peninsular and overseas populations, there is no reason to believe that accommodation between Taiwan and the mainland cannot eventually be achieved on the basis of "mutual benefit."

The Hong Kong formula—the essence of mutual benefit—is one persuasive model. Its key, of course, is commerce: trade and investment. All that that requires, in the case of Taiwan, is time, dialogue, and peace. Mr. Carter's people have a rare real chance to supply all three ingredients.

— James C. Thomson Jr.

## Main Street Militants

by Howard Rusk Long

(Southern Illinois University; \$10)

Journalists are proud of their investigative colleagues on *The Washington Post* and those who compiled the *Arizona Stories*. They can take similar satisfaction in the courageous exploits of the weekly editors described in *Main Street Militants*, an anthology from Grassroots Editor, a quarterly published by the International Society of Weekly Newspaper Editors.

A personal note: after my Nieman year, I helped Dr. H. R. Long start the society which soon began presenting an annual Elijah P. Lovejoy Award for Courage in Journalism under sponsorship of the School of Journalism at Southern Illinois University.

Each year, at our week-long seminars

designed to improve editorial performance, we invited a lone independent crusader-editor who always was the hero or heroine of the occasion. Too often the villain was a rural Southern sheriff.

Perhaps 2,000 of America's 9,000 weekly editors have stood up to dishonest politicians, gangsters, or greedy businessmen. Some of them were eliminated in the struggle, "born to blush unseen." Dr. Long is aware of them and dedicates his volume, "For all editors who published and perished."

His book gives the accounts of Mabel Norris Reese of Mount Dora, Florida, who reported the story of a sheriff who killed both by car and by gun; of Hazel Brannon Smith, the Lexington, Mississippi, editor who told her readers of a Negro-shooting sheriff and the doings of the White Citizens Council; and of Gene Wirges of Morrilton, Arkansas, who fought the sheriff, judge and other politicians only to wind up in jail.

With 71 percent of the daily press now under multiple ownership or curtailed by conglomerates, and with the same thing happening to book publishing, America is reaching the point where it must depend more on the weeklies for unfettered editorials. In many a state, the crusading of three to five such weeklies has had its effect in the state capitol, if not in Washington, D.C., itself.

*Main Street Militants* should be read in every journalism school to encourage more than the normal two percent of graduates to enter a field that needs cultivating. It should be read also by mature journalists who, as I found out decades ago, yearn for a publication expressing their own views.

— Houston Waring