

Nieman Reports

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SPECIAL CONVOCATION ISSUE

The Americans And The World After 1984

McGeorge Bundy

The Dream of Abundance Reconsidered

David Riesman

Change in America: Are The Media Responding Adequately?

American Coverage of Foreign News

The Washington Star • Lyons Award • Nieman Fellows 1981-82

"The Goodliest Land"

Eighteen years before the landing of the Pilgrims, Bartholomew Gosnold discovered Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard, and the Elizabeth Islands. He happened on these places in the course of a brave adventure across the Atlantic, to establish a trading station in the midst of the "savages" on the southern shores of Norumbega, now called New England.

Through the diligence of two of Gosnold's passengers, this seventeenth-century journey remains one of the best documented early voyages of discovery. Gabriel Archer and John Brereton kept separate journals of the four-month enterprise, and their writings are valued not only for historical accuracy but also for a lively and poetic style.

"Upon the five and twentieth of March 1602, being Friday," Bartholomew Gosnold set sail "from Falmouth [England], being in all two and thirty persons, in a small barke of Dartmouth, called the Concord, holding a course for the northern part of Virginia," as the present-day Eastern Seaboard was known.


Nearly six weeks after leaving Falmouth, on Friday, May 14th, early in the morning they made land, and they found their fall along a shore marked by low hummocks, full of "faire trees," and reaches of white sand.

During the days that followed, Gosnold and his party sailed "almost all points of the compasse, the shore very bolde, but as no coast is free from dangers, so I am persuaded, this is as free as any; the land somewhat low, full of goodly woods, but in some places plaine; at length we

were come amongst many faire Islands...."

Today we would be sailing off the southern coast of Massachusetts, in the midst of the Elizabeth Islands and their neighboring islands of Noman's Land, Cuttyhunk, and Martha's Vineyard, with the mainland of Cape Cod in the distance.

Gosnold and his companions spent some time exploring the islands, and during one of their landfalls, according to the journals, Gosnold remarked, "This is the goodliest land ever we saw."



Niemans often speak of their stay at Harvard as "the best year of my life." For them, the Nieman experience has been a voyage to a "faire Island" — a special place for refreshment and exploration.

Meanwhile, amid the turmoil of daily life, "no coast is free from danger." Indeed, the scope of contemporary problems is global: proliferation of nuclear weapons, economic chasms between classes and

countries, abuse of natural resources, skewed distribution of food, the link between industry and the military, the unknown boundaries of genetic engineering, and — within the media — the limiting and/or suppressing of open communication and the news flow.

Confronting these complexities from a homeground of lesser tensions and frustrations, exacerbated by the demands of the clock and the calendar, the intellectual process gets jammed, either by mechanisms or by events. The Nieman year can hold such tyrants at bay. With freedom at hand, Nieman Fellows are enabled to articulate their questions and seek answers. Knowledge can be discovered, and the search holds things together.

In Cambridge, as each new class of Nieman Fellows gathers every September, and then takes its leave of Harvard in the spring, the pattern of arrivals and departures constructs its own stability. The program continues, and there is strength in the continuity.

Reunions are occasions when even a brief return to the "best year" provides a connection to that earlier island of academe. Once again, Nieman Fellows pause to ponder, to challenge, and in the company of their colleagues, to explore new ways or revisit familiar ones. Isolation is alleviated, and for a day or two at least, there is clear sailing ahead.

We trust that for those who came to Cambridge last April, the quadrennial reunion was a rediscovery of "the goodliest land" ever they saw.

—T.B.K.L.

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EDITOR

Tenney Barbara K. Lehman

ASSISTANT EDITOR

Daphne B. Noyes

BUSINESS MANAGER

Kettee J. Boling

PRODUCTION

Jan Morgan

CIRCULATION

Betsy Ryles

PUBLISHER

James C. Thomson Jr.

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Convocation 1981

Three days in late April marked the third alumni/ae reunion to be held under Jim Thomson's Curatorship, and the first to take place in the Nieman Foundation's still-new headquarters, Walter Lippmann House.

The quadrennial event saw a record number of Nieman alumni/ae and their spouses (and some children), Associates of the Nieman Foundation, and assorted friends of the Nieman program from both the Harvard faculty and the outside world come to Cambridge to renew old friendships and make new acquaintances.

The expanding scope of this pioneering program for journalists was reflected in the geographical range of the countries represented at the reunion: Argentina, South Africa, Turkey, Japan, Canada, Colombia, People's Republic of China, Malaysia, and West Germany.

The program for the weekend gathering included events both formal and informal: alumni/ae socialized, participated in panel discussions, enjoyed the afternoon sun in the Fellows' Garden, strolled the Harvard campus, and enjoyed the view of Boston's waterfront from Quincy Market. The edited transcripts of Convocation proceedings on the following pages appear in chronological order.

The three days provided a chance for the nearly 300 participants to share memories and concerns, regrets and hopes, to establish and reestablish ties with their fellow journalists, surely one of the most copacetic groups to be found.

— D.B.N.

Welcome to Convocation 1981

Special Tribute to John I. Taylor

Presentation of Louis M. Lyons Award

James C. Thomson Jr. — Curator of the Nieman Foundation

Hale Champion — Executive Dean in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Nieman Fellow '57

Jack Nelson — Bureau chief, *The Los Angeles Times*, Washington, D.C.; Nieman Fellow '62

Jack Landau — Director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; Supreme Court correspondent for *Newhouse Newspapers* in Washington, D.C.; Nieman Fellow '68

John I. Taylor — President, Affiliated Publications, Inc., Boston, Massachusetts

Laurel Shackelford — Assistant city editor, *The Courier-Journal*, Louisville, Kentucky; Nieman Fellow '81

Mustafa Gürsel — Athens correspondent for *Milliyet* newspaper, Istanbul, Turkey; Nieman Fellow '81

Ulla Morris — *The Los Angeles Times*, Los Angeles, California

Louis M. Lyons — Curator Emeritus, Nieman Foundation; Nieman Fellow '39

James C. Thomson Jr.: Welcome to you all! President Derek Bok, who is out of town, has asked Hale Champion to give the official greeting for Harvard University. Mr. Champion.

Hale Champion: My role is simply to convey to you President Bok's and Harvard's genuine pleasure in your presence here — both past and present.

My credentials for this role are reasonably good. It was twenty-five years ago this fall that I arrived at Harvard for the first time, as a Nieman Fellow from *The San Francisco Chronicle*. It was a very good year. Ten years later, I came back as a Kennedy Fellow. I think I may have been the first of the two-time freeloaders, although there have been a few since. Five years later, I came back to Harvard again. This time I had to work for a living, but I stayed in close touch with the Nieman program, partly through an apartment in our house which we reserved for Niemans with children — some of you are here tonight and it's a pleasure to see you again.

Now I've come back a fourth time, to the Kennedy School to teach and plot against the government. We're a little further from Lippmann House than I'd like to be, but we stay in close touch. In all that time, and in all those roles, it has become clear to me that the best thing to be at Harvard is a Nieman Fellow. Deans are pests, vice-presidents are menaces, and Kennedy Fellows spend most of their time getting on and off airplanes, but Niemans are different. They are here for a full year. They raise questions from the outside. They test some of the theories. We learn from each other, and then they are gone before either one of us becomes a bore. When they come back, even President Bok thinks it is a matter of mutual celebration. Thank you.

Thomson: Among the things that we celebrate tonight is

the extraordinary presence of the first Nieman class ever, the Class of 1938-39, here in full force: Irving Dilliard and Dorothy, Frank Snowden Hopkins and Louise, Edwin J. Paxton Jr., and Osburn Zuber. In that same class, there is also a man who put this entire program on the map: Louis M. Lyons and, of course, Totty.

Now I would like to move on to two additional pieces of business. The first is about someone in our presence; the second is about someone not with us. May I recognize, first of all, Mr. Jack Nelson, Class of 1962, and then, Mr. Jack Landau, Class of 1968, for a special act of recognition tonight.

Jack Nelson: I do appreciate being asked to be here to talk about someone who has been very close to the Nieman program since the days it started, in 1938, when the first class was here; someone who has been with *The Boston Globe* for 48 years; someone who has been very close to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press since it was established eleven years ago. He is also the chairman of the executive committee of the *Globe's* parent company, so you might ask what he is doing spending all his time helping out the Reporters Committee when he has this exalted position. I would say it's because his background really is as a reporter.

In making this presentation to him tonight, we asked people at the *Globe* to go through the old clip files and tell us something about the kind of reporting he did.



Ulla Morris, Mustafa Gürsel, Maria Morris, John I. Taylor, Laurel Shackelford, Hale Champion, Marie Champion, Jim Thomson

John I. Taylor did a lot of reporting: police news, court news, politics, the arts — he really identified as a journalist. In 1933, President Conant stopped the practice of ringing the Harvard Bell — there was no more mandatory chapel. John I. Taylor called it the first

revolution at Harvard under Conant; the stilling of the bells at Harvard.

In 1934, he wrote about the headmaster of Mount Hermon School, shot with a gun through the window of his study, and killed.

In October 1941, he covered the story of a British ship that limped into Boston Harbor after being hit with a torpedo in the Atlantic; he interviewed the captain. Later, covering the arts, he would interview people like Danny Kaye and Eddie Cantor.

In World War II, he wrote a column answering questions about the war that came into the War Department offices in Boston. He covered politics, including Truman versus Dewey at the Republican Convention in 1948. He did profiles on various people, including Harold Stassen.

Back in 1933, *The Boston Globe* printed fiction — and it was titled fiction, not like today. John I. Taylor did one piece that was called "Deadeye Jake." Here is a memorable quote: "Jake Mahoney considers himself the last cowboy in the West to carry a gun. 'You never know when you're gonna need a gun out here,' he said." (There wasn't anything else in the clip files of Mr. Taylor's fiction.)

The people who know John I. Taylor best say that he puts great stock in his experiences as a reporter, that he's proud of them. He has been in the front office for many years now, and describes himself as the corridor diplomat. He is basically the liaison between the front office and the newsroom. As top executive officers of the *Globe*, John I. Taylor and Davis Taylor share offices. Dave Taylor has handled all the financial and business part of the paper; he has given the *Globe* the financial opportunities to expand, and John I. Taylor has been the editorial pulse of the newspaper. He has also done a lot of other community work, a lot of youth projects — particularly in journalism. He is one of the guys who liberalized the *Globe*. He has been active on behalf of minorities and women, and has been involved with the Nieman program since 1938. He helped Dave Taylor raise \$1.2 million for the Nieman endowment; he and the *Globe* helped to raise funds for the Walter Lippmann Memorial Fund. On behalf of the Nieman program, I am privileged to announce tonight that John I. Taylor is being named an Honorary Nieman Fellow.

Now Jack Landau will tell you a little bit about what John I. Taylor has done for the Reporters Committee.

Jack Landau: In 1970, a number of reporters decided to try to set up an organization to provide information and legal defense to what we then saw as many problems involving newsgathering and the First Amendment. Sometimes we have been right, and sometimes — as Tony Lewis will tell you — we have been wrong, but the Reporters Committee

for Freedom of the Press has been around for eleven years.

In 1974 John Taylor came to us and said, You fellows really ought to make this committee permanent — the problems between the press and the courts are going to be around for a while. He offered to give us some money from the *Globe* and to write letters to some of his publisher friends. Eileen Shanahan, who has been active on our advisory committee, asked him, "Mr. Taylor, don't you realize that there is going to be a time when a committee of reporters is going to disagree with publishers such as you?" He looked at her and said — and this is the truth — "Miss Shanahan, that is what freedom is all about."

John I. Taylor has been a very strong supporter of our program. More than half the original steering committee were Nieman Fellows; many Niemans have served on it since then and some are here tonight: Bob Maynard, Jim Doyle, and Jack Nelson. So, we would like to thank John I. Taylor for all his help over the years, to both the Nieman program and to this small offshoot of it, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.

Finally, because the certificate proclaiming him an Honorary Nieman Fellow takes only about ten seconds to read, Bob Manning was kind enough, on behalf of both the Niemans and the people at the Reporters Committee, to buy some books on contemporary politics for Mr. Taylor to read.

John I. Taylor: Thank you, Jack — both Jacks. Let me tell you something — when you get to be 69 years, 10 months point one to being 70, if you can find something to do that keeps you in the news business — and particularly in the newspaper business — you don't owe a thing to the Reporters Committee; you owe your life to them. They have given me a second lease on life. I'm delighted with all of them; I believe in them, and it has made my 69th year and my 70th very delightful. I have had a marvelous time for a year and a half working with these fellows and I hope to keep working for another year, and I hope I never get retired. Thank you very much.

Thomson: We move, finally, to the presentation of the Louis M. Lyons award. For that purpose, I recognize a member of the current Nieman Class — the entire class of nineteen served as the jury for this award. Ms. Laurel Shackelford.

Laurel Shackelford: When Harvard officials decided in 1923 that they would start a school of business, a young upstart came over from *The Boston Globe* to interview the dean. During the course of the conversation, the reporter asked whether they would be teaching anything about the business of journalism at the new school. "God, no," said the dean. "Journalism is nothing but the gift of gab."



Jane Condliffe, Joe Alex Morris Sr., Barbara Nelson, Jack Landau, Peggy Taylor, Jack Nelson, Tenney Lehman, Davis Taylor

Characteristically, Louis M. Lyons said nothing — then he spent his whole career proving that the dean spoke gibberish.

Fifteen years after that interview, Lyons applied for admission to the first Nieman class. An editor wrote, "He is one of the ablest journalists of this generation." Lyons earned that praise by being able to cover virtually any story. The Scopes trial, floods, presidential inaugurations, the Lindbergh tragedy, the Hauptmann trial, New England's textile industry. Not only could the man write and communicate with his readers, he did both with conscience and integrity. A year later he became Curator of the Nieman Foundation. When he retired after twenty-five years as Curator, the Class of 1964 — the last class under his guidance — searched for a way to demonstrate their love and admiration for Louis in a form that would be both enduring and tangible. Out of their discussions came the Louis M. Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Journalism. Presenting it and deciding who would receive the award would be the sole responsibility of each Nieman class, they said. They presented the award collectively to three Vietnam correspondents: David Halberstam, Malcolm Browne, and Neil Sheehan. In 1965 the award was given posthumously to Edward R. Murrow, and in 1966 it was given to Wilson Minor of the *New Orleans Times-Picayune*. Then the award receded, until tonight.

And now, before any academics can accuse us of exploiting our gifts of gab, I would like to introduce Mustafa Gürsel, Athens correspondent from *Milliyet*, who will present the Lyons Award on behalf of the Nieman Class of 1981.

Mustafa Gürsel: Since the Lyons Award has not been presented for the last fifteen years, the Class of 1981 felt

that it would be useful to open the nominating process to all Nieman alumni/ae as well.

Because of our gift of gab, it is not possible for two journalists to agree on anything. Nevertheless, nineteen of us, from eight countries, managed to agree on one name out of a long list of candidates who all had demonstrated conscience and integrity in journalism. We are proud to announce that this year's Lyons Award is given posthumously to Joe Alex Morris Jr., of *The Los Angeles Times*.



Jim Thomson, Ulla Morris, Mustafa Gürsel

Born in 1927, Joe Alex Morris worked for *The Minneapolis Tribune*, *The Hartford Times*, United Press International, *The Herald Tribune*, and *Newsweek* before joining *The Los Angeles Times* in 1965. He worked in Germany and in England but became a specialist on the Middle East. For roughly twenty-five years he covered those troubled lands and people in turmoil with an understanding and sympathy that will be hard to match. He always took the extra step necessary to understand the whys behind what he was covering. Such an extra step, while covering the Iranian Revolution, cost him his life on February 9, 1979.

Joe, talking about journalism, said, "The dangers aren't any greater than those you would encounter in lots of other jobs, and not nearly as great as those faced by, say, soldiers, or combat pilots, or police. And as far as no one caring very much about the madmen who are fighting, well, the people, the newspaper readers must be told about that fighting and what it means. Telling the people what is happening is important, very important." That is exactly what Joe did, and in the words of Jonathan Randal, his close colleague from *The Washington Post*, "He basically chronicled the losers, the downtrodden, the

manipulated, the cannon-fodder with a devotion and honesty that lesser journalists envied." Even the *Tehran Journal* said, "Morris was respected for his fairness, his untiring quest for the truth, his willingness to listen, to learn, to observe." They called him "a very human elder statesman."

Joe's loss is not only a loss for his readers but also for our global community of journalists. As one correspondent who had the honor to watch Joe work, I'm sorry that younger foreign correspondents will never get a chance to observe this master of our profession operate and learn exactly how the job should be done.

I would like to take the opportunity to thank Joe's father, Joe Alex Morris Sr., himself a veteran journalist, for being with us tonight, and Joe Jr.'s oldest daughter, Maria, who is also with us. And now, on behalf of my fellow Fellows, I would like to ask his wife, Ulla Morris, to accept the 1981 Louis Lyons Award for Joe Alex Morris Jr.

Ulla Morris: Thank you very much. I'm very pleased to accept this award for Joe and particularly pleased to receive it from Mustafa, who's an old friend and colleague out of Middle Eastern days.

Awards and honors usually embarrassed Joe. He did not think of journalism in terms of prizes and awards, I think. He thought of it in terms of stories and events that needed to be covered and told to his readers. And he always said a good story simply depended on being at the right spot at the right time. But this award would have been slightly different even to Joe because Louis Lyons's name is associated with it. I did a little bit of research on Louis even though I only met him tonight.


As I understand it, Louis Lyons thought that even the best newspapermen could be better and that is how he spent all of his professional life. And, in some ways, so did Joe. He was a devoted journalist. "Journalism is better than working," he used to say. Joe covered more wars and crises than I care to remember; he was kidnapped and shot at, but I became to believe that he was invulnerable. Once home he could be as devoted a husband and father as he was as a journalist on the job. Only those home visits were much too short and too infrequent as far as I was concerned. Not even Christmas or New Year's would be a safe bet to have him home. I remember one December in the early 1960's when Joe suddenly announced that he had to go to Riyadh on Christmas Eve to cover one of the very first OPEC meetings. I could understand that one has to cover crises and wars and coup-d'etats — but a conference over Christmas in Riyadh in those days seemed quite impossible.

"What the hell is OPEC anyway?" I said, deeply resentful, as he departed. "Mark my word," he said. "Woman, the time will come when even you will under-

stand that OPEC is very important." Well, that settled this little argument, and as all too often, he was right.

He had a nose for news and where to be at the right time. He managed to be in Jerusalem at the outbreak of the Six Day Arab-Israeli War as one of only three Western correspondents. I know that his death in Iran is significant as a tribute to his life. He was in the midst of history in the making, surrounded by fellow journalists. Though aware of the dangers that are always connected with covering events like revolutions, he would not have wanted to be in any other place at that time. He was a very special person to me and, I think, to a lot of his friends. Having said all that, I can just now see Morris smiling somewhat cynically at me and saying, "Are you kidding me, darling?" Thank you very much.

Louis M. Lyons: I share the high satisfaction of the Nieman Foundation of today's award by the present Nieman Fellows. I say it is a timely award. Under the seal of "Veritas" and a commitment to responsible journalism, our present group of Nieman Fellows has made an appropriate award for the work of a newspaperman of



Joe Alex Morris Sr., Louis M. Lyons, and Ulla Morris

notable honesty and courage and skill and unflagging devotion to fact. In honoring the work of Joe Alex Morris Jr., the Fellows of this group express their own standard of what is worthy to emulate. Only one who never sought an award deserves one. It's an anomaly to apply for an honor. It's bizarre for a newspaper to set up an office for awards for its own promotion; unconscionable for a city editor to urge a reporter that "you have a front-page story here if you can develop it strongly." Sensationalism has been the bane of journalism which must strive for professional standards against the tug of commercial competition. Some of us have deplored the expansion of awards, the increased emphasis on awards, that has tended to put a premium on dramatizing the news, on glamorizing the news, and has led some to just try a fictionalizing of the news as a form of creative journalism — a contradiction in terms. The disastrous consequence has now led to soul-searching by journalists, and this will be therapeutic.

The disaster at *The Washington Post* has exposed also the desensitizing effects of bureaucracy on an institution which, by its nature, must be the most sensitive of institutions. So this, I say, is a timely award that sets its own standards. If there are to be awards beyond one's satisfaction in earning the confidence and respect of one's readers and colleagues for the quality of his work, we can be happy that today's award to Joe Alex Morris Jr. sets so high a mark. □



Ulla Morris accepts the Louis M. Lyons Award on behalf of her husband, the late Joe Alex Morris Jr., Los Angeles Times

CHANGE IN AMERICA: Are The Media Responding Adequately?

PANEL I

Richard Wald, chairperson — Senior vice president, News, ABC, Inc., New York

Howard Hiatt — Dean of the Faculty of Public Health and Professor of Medicine, Harvard University

Stephen J. Gould — Professor of Geology and Curator of Invertebrate Paleontology, Harvard University

Otto Eckstein — Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Anthony Oettinger — Gordon McKay Professor of Applied Mathematics and Professor of Information Resources Policy, Harvard University

Eileen Shanahan — Senior assistant managing editor, *The Washington Star*

John Seigenthaler — President, publisher, and editor, *The Tennessean*, Nashville; Nieman Fellow '59

Richard Wald: We will now conduct a panel that will allow some small amount of room for your informed or uninformed questions. Our topic, as you may have seen, is "Change in America: Are the Media Responding Adequately?"

My name is Richard Wald and I am the moderator. Sitting in front of me are two rapporteurs who either will or won't listen to what we say but who certainly will say whatever they came to say before they heard us.

Our topic touches two things: changes in the business in which most of us work; and changes in the society in which all of us live. The changes in our business are sweeping, to say the least. By and large, the people in this room come from the disciplines of newspapers, rather than magazines, or broadcasting, or books. And in newspapers, the sturdy, independent printer on the winning side of the revolution — and therefore able to write the laws and the history books — has given way to the Gannett Corporation, and others, who claim the same rights with little of the same sense.

In terms of production, the system invented by Mr. Gutenberg, which was good enough for everybody including our fathers, has now given way entirely. And now in Waycross, Georgia, Jack Williams has not only a computer, he has a backup because he knows his computer will fail.

The system of distribution has changed. Once upon a time there were those sturdy, independent merchants called "newsboys." Now you can deliver the product by air, cable, and any other way you can think of.

And, indeed, the system of participation has changed. The invention of the telephone preceded by many years the phrase "interactive media" which now covers punch buttons on some kinds of cable on which you can ask for things or answer questions. On Teletext, you can ask questions of your newspaper, which ought to unsettle all the newspapers in the land. Those are some of the changes in our business.

There are also changes in our society. Whether news changes match the changes in society is one of the questions we will address today.

Dr. Howard Hiatt is the Dean of the Faculty of Public Health and a Professor of Medicine here. He will be our first speaker.

Howard Hiatt: Whatever else it accomplished by calling on several of my colleagues to tell the American people when human life begins, a Senate Committee helped me this week two ways. First, it called to mind a story — and Jim Thomson asked us to tell a story if appropriate. Second, the Committee provided the theme for my remarks this morning.

The story concerns a Pope who died, went to Heaven, and was about to enter the gates, when he saw St. Peter at the head of a long line. He was told by Peter to take his place. Reluctantly, he went to the end of the line — after Peter had assured him that Heaven is a perfect democracy.

Shortly, he saw a figure wearing a white coat and a stethoscope walk past the line, through the gates, and disappear into Heaven. The Pope approached St. Peter indignantly and said, "I thought you told me this is a democracy."

"I did," said Peter. "That's God — but sometimes he likes to play doctor."

The theme of my remarks is that, contrary to popular belief, we in the medical profession do have some limitations. I think one of the most significant events in medicine in the last several years was the decision by the trustees of the Massachusetts General Hospital not to embark on a heart transplant program. To do so, they said, would prevent them from doing many other things they consider as, or more, important. This dilemma — the dilemma of growing medical capabilities in a world in which resources are limited — is one that will confront us increasingly in years ahead. I would like to make a few observations this morning about some changes that are relevant to an equitable, logical approach to setting of priorities, something we haven't worried about to any considerable extent in the health field, at least, not until recently.

First, expenditures for health services have been increasing rapidly over the years, and therefore, we have not been pressed hard to set priorities. Total expenditures last year in this country for health services exceeded \$240 billion — a figure to be compared with about \$27 billion in 1960. In terms of gross national product, that represents an increase in expenditure from just over 5 percent to over 9 percent. This increase will clearly not continue and is slowing down now.

In regard to changes in health statistics, several have resulted from medical interventions. Certainly, among the most brilliant of the achievements to which we can point is the effect on infectious diseases. Antibiotics and vaccines have helped to relegate these diseases, formerly the most common causes of death in this country, to problems that now can be dealt with effectively. Today, the burden of illness is largely chronic diseases: heart disease, cancer, stroke, arthritis, and diseases of aging. In these cases,

improvements in our capacity to deal with acute leukemia in children and with Hodgkins' disease. But there has been very little change in outcome in most forms of cancer. This is also true for most interventions for the other chronic diseases, for which a very large fraction of our health expenditures go, including 40 percent for hospitals.

There have been some striking changes that clearly are of non-medical origin, or of origin still to be determined.

It is, therefore, extremely important that we evaluate the interventions that have taken place. We haven't really paid much attention to how successful we are with many procedures — for example, tonsillectomy is still very high on the list of surgical procedures, and the evidence is shaky at best that this makes a difference in most people who are subjected to it. This is also true for a large number of the expensive laboratory tests and other medical and surgical interventions.

On the other hand, there have been some striking changes that clearly are of non-medical origin, or of origin still to be determined. Infant mortality has fallen by 50 percent in this country in the last 20 years. It's still twice as high in non-white children as in white, but it has fallen in both groups. Death from coronary artery disease has fallen by 25 percent in the last 10 years. Stomach cancer, first on the United States list of killers among cancer fifty years ago, is seventh this year, and falling. These phenomena share one feature in common: there is no evidence, or, at best, limited evidence, that medical intervention made any difference.

Another change that we have seen, but not nearly to the extent that is warranted is an increased emphasis on prevention. The most common killer among the cancers is cancer of the lung, which will kill almost 25 percent of all cancer victims this year. It is clearly a preventable disease, but we give inadequate attention to preventive measures.

One more change worth emphasis is a change in those who are making decisions. I pointed to the fact that it was the trustees of the Massachusetts General Hospital who made the decision not to embark on a heart transplant program, over the objections of the professional staff. And that is not, it seems to me, inappropriate. The priority decisions that are before us are decisions that must be

made by all of society. In priority setting, in fact, it is appropriate, I think, that the physician be detached; the patient wants the physician to think exclusively in terms of the welfare of the patient when he — or increasingly, she — makes decisions. However, that requires involvement of many, many other groups in our society.

You can decide better than I the extent to which the press has been aware of and has been reporting these changes. I have the impression that there is still a great tendency among you in the press, as is true among us in the medical profession, to focus on magic bullets. Magic bullets are really not very frequent in medicine. I think that our expectations are often too high. I think there is also a tendency on our part as well as yours to be overly optimistic as to what we in medicine can do, and as a result, we give too little place to the role that non-medical factors play in this whole scheme. As we set priorities, I think this balance must be looked at with much greater care.

Wald: Thank you. Our next speaker is Dr. Otto Eckstein. He will address us on economics and that world which we either do or don't cover reasonably.

Otto Eckstein: This being a panel on change, I suppose from the point of view of an economist what is different now is that economics for the first time in forty or fifty years is generally granted to be the central issue. This may continue from 1981 into 1982, and even into 1983 and 1984, as President Reagan discovers that issues like abortion are basically losers, politically, and that he is better off focusing on the economy and continuing to put other issues as far away as he can.

Given that economics is the issue, and that the President was elected by promising to turn around a deteriorating economic performance, are the media — including television — just to economics? Posing the question that way, I have to give you the answer, No. It's much better now than it used to be; that is, twenty years

There is hardly a medium in the country that reports the money supply in relation to the target range.

ago, the coverage of economics in the media was pretty poor. Typically it was buried somewhere among the minor topics in the financial pages. The people who did the work were not particularly well trained. But the last twenty years have seen the development of a group of journalists

— including television journalists — who have a serious understanding of economics and who, if they chose to make a living as economists, probably could.

But the question is, What finally emerges? Let's take it piecemeal, because the coverage of economics has different aspects; some of them are much better than others. To begin with, perhaps I should make one distinction. I think you can take all of economics — indeed, most things — as coming in three stages as far as the media are concerned. First, there is *news*. What is it that has to be reported because it happened? Second, there is *information*. That is, how do you relate what these bits of news might be so that they can be understood? Finally, there is *interpretation*, which is to search out what the news means to broader purposes of the society of business or profits or unemployment.

The largest amount of space is devoted to news. And news, of course, is typically the daily harvest of statistics. So, on Friday you read that the money supply went down \$100 million. That was faithfully reported in probably the top 80 percent of all newspapers in this country. But I don't know what anybody would do with that knowledge, since it's usually presented in isolation. The only meaning you can attach to that figure is to put it in the context of the Federal Reserve's goals. And there again, in the better media you'll find that the M1B is up 12.8 percent in the last thirteen weeks, but that really doesn't help you either because that's not what the action is based on. Action is mainly based on the one-year targets of M1B — that is the dominant target on which monetary policy is run in this country. And if it turns out that the money supply should prove to be \$4 billion or \$5 billion above the upper limit of the magic range, then it is near certainty that the Federal Reserve will raise interest rates drastically, ruin the housing industry, drive down the stock market, and make the American people somewhat miserable.

Conversely, if the money supply should turn out to be \$3 or \$4 billion below the lower end of that clearly defined target range, the Fed will move in the opposite direction, creating great happiness among many of your readers. There is hardly a medium in the country that reports the money supply in relation to the target range.

Another example is the consumer price index, which rose only 0.6 percent for the month of March. You reported it faithfully. Fruits and vegetables went down; I think that was a major factor. Gasoline prices were not actually falling yet — that will help in April. You reported what the Bureau of Labor Statistics told you. And they're decent, honest people, but most of what they give you is irrelevant because they explain what happened this month and what happened this month is really beyond interpretation. It turns out to be all the non-recurring things: this month, the citrus crop was good; last month, the interest rates drove up the mortgage factor. So the one-month

interpretation is really focused, by design, on what is irrelevant because you know it is not going to happen again next month, and that is not what makes inflation in this country.

Why does the Bureau of Labor Statistics give you material that is guaranteed to be fleeting? The reason is very simple. They are not writing for you; they're writing for themselves and for other technicians, mainly inside the government, to give an explanation of what happened. And that is not the explanation that serves the interests of the American people or that leads to sensible conclusions about what's really happening to the economy.

So, although you report the daily data handsomely, you are misled by the government releases which focus on the wrong issues and which, in the end, make you report only news with little information and less interpretation.

Now let's move to a larger set of issues — take the question of policy, the other item that is a lot of news. When Secretary Regan gets up once more before the Senate Budget Committee — having within the previous six days also appeared before the House Budget Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, the House Ways and Means Committee, and perhaps two others; and in each case given a very minor permutation of the same speech — you will faithfully report what he said because that is news.

But how are you posing the policy issue to the American people? At the moment, you are asking only two questions. One is, Will President Reagan have his way — good, bad, or indifferent — without a very clear account of what is his way? The other is, Is it going to work? On policy, you probably devote too much space to what the policy people want this week and what the response of the Congress is without analyzing whether it really matters, or where the differences lie between what the Congress and the President want.

The third area where you owe the American people a lot more on economics is in education. In the area of economics the press is only to a very limited degree an educational medium. Yet the intellectual questions of supply-side economics, rational expectations, and monetarism are the issues that really matter at this time. These are the theories on which the whole current thrust of the society is based. Yet if you look through most media, where is the account of the substance of supply-side economics or monetarism? Very little space is devoted to this.

You assume nobody among your readers has ever taken a freshman economics course. This is not a valid assumption. The people who read that economics material — buried as it often is on the business pages, where it shouldn't be — most probably have had freshman economics. If they have, and if it was within the last thirty or forty years, they probably already know what you're

going to say. You really are underestimating what they could grasp.

Take rational expectations as one example. Now, this is a very obscure matter academically. But the fundamental idea of rational expectations — that you can change the public's perceptions of the future through something other than learning from experience — is really a fairly simple one. The rational expectations school believes that the public will form its belief about inflation from something other than looking backward at what has happened in the last few years. The traditional view of economics takes most expectation processes to be backward-looking rather than forward-looking. To improve inflation expectations consequently requires a prolonged period of better actual results. The rational expectation school which underlies the entire Reagan

Why does the Bureau of Labor Statistics — a group of decent, honest people — give you material that is guaranteed to be fleeting?

program believes that you can change people's perceptions in ways other than learning from experience. Well, you ought to explain that sometime.

Wald: One of our panelists has, at last, injected a healthy amount of antagonism into the proceedings. Ms. Shanahan sat up brightly. I think we will have some interesting comments later. We will now turn to Tony Oettinger, who is Professor of Applied Mathematics which strikes me as being a traditional and not terribly interesting title, but he is also a Professor of Information Resources Policy. Dr. Oettinger will talk to us about dissolving some of our traditional lines.

Anthony Oettinger: Thank you. We are here today gathered among fellows and alumni/ae of the Nieman Foundation for Journalism. There are no qualifiers in that title, like "print journalism" or "electronic journalism." Although accidental, like much of the "dubious experiment," that absence is nonetheless a very fine thing because if those distinctions had been implanted into the rationale or the program for the Nieman Foundation they would now have to be erased. As Dick pointed out earlier, the lines among the various classical media are eroding. Folks have computers in the newspaper plants and they think about distributing their products electronically. The

kinds of inequities or good things that Otto has talked about are going to take place over the next decade or so in a variety of ways — not all of them very traditional.

I remind you that the format of the newspaper, which tends to be cherished as something holy, sacred, and immutable, with sneers at things like tabloids, is no more than the result of a confluence of technological and political factors that occurred about one hundred years ago. The newspaper as we know it today was driven to the maximum size that the newly invented rotary presses of the day could accommodate by one simple political or policy factor: the British government in those days taxed newspapers by the number of pages. Now, you put together a size limit dictated by technology and a drive to increase the size as much as possible in order to minimize your tax bill and you have what one of my contemporary friends describes as an "electro-political" reason for the shape of the particular medium.

Well, many of the technological, political, and policy forces of a hundred years ago are gone. In their place is a vast array of distinctive forces that will not, as some tend to predict rather irrationally, get rid of the newspaper in the next few years and substitute for it all sorts of pipe-dreamy things going over wires, but that will destabilize the economic and the political base on which the current media rest in a much more aggravating and unpleasant sort of way. The destabilization won't occur through something miraculous or dramatic, like all the print things being sucked into wires, but rather by something insidious and slow, like the diversion of classified advertising on which the economic well-being of much of the press depends, into things that look presently like Yellow Pages and are produced by things called telephone companies to the tune of \$2 to \$3 billion a year. As one of my friends from the phone company pointed out to some publishers

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who had gathered with these electronics folk at a workshop last November, "Now that may not be much money to you folks" — meaning publishers — "but it's a lot to us" — meaning the phone company.

The members of ANPA woke up in May 1980 or thereabouts to find that some proposed revisions of the Communications Act of 1934 suggested that AT&T and, indeed, the whole telephone industry, might end up in the information business. Alarums and excursions, much consternation, and some loss, one might say, of objectivity showing up on the editorial pages when, along with the traditional inveighing against junk mail (by which is meant direct mail advertising which competes with inserts and the like), there appeared inveighing against the inroads of Ma Bell into information businesses. To *The Washington Post's* credit, its editorials did point out that these inveighings might be contaminated by some self-interest, but in many places the castigation of the phone company simply took on the cast of yet another anti-junk-mail editorial without an awful lot of care about indicating that this was more a commercial or survival matter than Peter Zenger-like protection of the free press. In this fanatical fascination with the telephone company as a competitor, what has been overlooked is the fact that among the competitors for the traditional media is not just the phone company. There are folks with names like IBM and Xerox and Compuserve and The Source. How many of you have heard of Compuserve? — A goodly number. *The Washington Post* is now starting to distribute itself through Compuserve.

I think it is time to forget — if you ever took it seriously — that awful McLuhanesque bit about "the medium is the message." The message is the message. The media are changing and the focus on journalism, on news, on reporting good or bad economics — even Otto's term about the business section; what is going to be the business section? Some folks out in Yuma, Arizona, are now writing squibs that are showing up not in the business section of a printed newspaper, but over a cable channel. These are people with newspaper backgrounds who happen to be working for something that calls itself a cable company. Their message may or may not be the same, but that is a matter of editorial discretion. The medium is changing. The formats will continue to change and the essence of survival for journalism as a profession is to remember that the message is the message; the problem is how to adapt to passing the message through what is going to be a continually changing and expanding range of media — media where the meaning of the First Amendment (which tends to be cherished as something that applies to newspapers in the traditional sense; not to worry if those folks over at broadcasting get reamed out and don't have much of the First Amendment) is again going to change. It turns out that folks like the telephone company also have First Amendment rights, and the self-righteous view that ANPA folk took in a walk around Washington last May saying "by introducing competition you're going to screw up the First Amendment" got

greeted with a measure of skepticism by legislators who understood very well that a whole series of recent Supreme Court decisions gave First Amendment rights to outfits like power companies and phone companies. And so the holy mantle isn't going to help protect newspapers in what is now a much wider range of information industries.

Wald: Neatly done. Our next panelist owns this building and wants you all to feel at home here. He is a professor of geology, Steve Gould, and he will talk to you about science and its changes and needs. Sir.

[The Editors regret that Mr. Gould's comments are not available for publication.]

Wald: You have been privileged to hear wise panelists speak long thoughts. If I may summarize very briefly: You have been told a little bit about the difference between process and product, about previous technologies and present realities, about the economics you think you see and the economics you should be seeing and about the changes in the way we live, changing the way we get operated on. Our general sense here is that we are to investigate a question. That implies that you may have some questions yourselves to ask of our panel. I will recognize anybody who would raise his or her hand and ask a pertinent question.

Question: Dr. Hiatt, you have been active in the Physicians Committee on Social Responsibility and Concern for Nuclear War. What is your impression of the coverage by the media of the dangers of a nuclear arms race?

Hiatt: I am not a member of Physicians for Social Responsibility, but I have worked closely with them. My involvement is recent, so my comments relate only to what I have seen in the past year. I think there has been extremely sympathetic treatment by the press of the effort of physicians to point out the medical realities of nuclear weapons. I do regret, however, that there has not been a greater effort on the part of the press in asking for some better definition of what is meant by "victory" and "survival" when people speak about "winning" or "surviving" a nuclear war.

Question: In most newspapers, medicine tends to be covered as science and not as politics — although many so-called medical decisions are actually political decisions, such as how public monies are spent. We are just beginning to learn how to cover health as politics. Dr. Hiatt, what can we do to help the medical profession admit that they too are part of a political process, that this is a principal point of controversy?

Hiatt: Well, I think that one difficulty in reporting the medical field as pure science is that we are far from being able to translate all medical issues in scientific terms. Let me make clear that I bow to no one in my admiration for the marriage of biology and medicine that we have seen in the last three decades. It's extraordinary.

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is the message."

Simultaneously, however, there has been much less attempt to inject the social sciences, and particularly the statistical sciences, into *evaluating* what we do. My comments were meant to focus on that to a considerable extent. It's very difficult to make judgments and to set priorities in situations where there is deficient information concerning the effectiveness of our interventions. We have really concentrated on that to a limited extent. Much of what you hear about the effects of intervention, even from physicians very sophisticated in biology, is anecdotal. The media can either encourage this by reporting the anecdotes, or, alternately, can press for hard evidence. As you point out, many decisions that have to be taken are political ones. It's not surprising that medical people don't readily give up their exclusive decision-making role. Frequently, we are turned to for decisions that are, in fact, non-medical. I cited the activities of the Senate Committee of the past week. I think that they are relevant. Why should a group of physicians be any more qualified to state when life begins than any other group in our society? There is no scientific evidence to answer that question and yet, it is understandable that physicians are asked, because society seeks ready answers.

Question: The moderator summed it up well when he said we have been discussing process versus product. While it is true that the media are in a problem-solving business, I suggest that the university is in a problem-solving business as well. I didn't hear anyone from the medical profession at Senator East's hearings say, "Why do you call on me to decide when life begins?" How should the press, any more than politicians or anyone else, know what is going to happen, what a certain statistic means? We tend to get not too much diversity of opinion from the people we contact, be they economists or doctors, on the political issues confronting them and the subject we're trying to cover. How can we get more help in conveying to people the kinds of things Dr. Eckstein and Dr. Oettinger want us to convey?

Eckstein: What I tried to do in my talk was to make you step back a bit and ask yourself what are you covering in economics? I think the way in which you're actually covering it is quite sophisticated. The basic quality of writing can't be faulted; it is infinitely better than what it was a generation ago and most professional economists would do it much worse. You can't really say that there is a major distortion in what the public is learning, it's just that you are allocating your effort in a strange way that is dominated by the rhythm of government releases and public policy speeches, and you're then failing to educate. The relation between the press and the news sources, I think, is excellent today. Both sides understand each other, and are reasonably candid and fair.

Oettinger: Your comment on the preceding question struck a responsive chord in me about what is a very important problem. In areas where there is a scientific component, we tend to take it for granted that the whole shootin' match is scientific. This is epitomized by the ghastly phrase — which may be resuscitated because of the success of the space shuttle — "If we can get a man on the moon, why can't we..." — fill in the blank. That tends to lead us to forget that in most of the things that we do — the scientific, the technical — the truly intelligible component is a very small part of what happens between discovery and invention and eventual diffusion of something throughout society in a useful — or, for that matter, harmful — fashion.

My strange title — which caused Dick some problems — with "applied mathematics" and "information resources" in it, reflects my own migration over a decade moving from the purely scientific to the question of what happens in a systemic way as things move out of the laboratory or out of scientific understanding into the broad political realm. I've come to think that we know far less than we pretend to in these complex socio-economic-scientific processes and it isn't just a matter of reporting, it's the fact that the economists don't know a hell of a lot, that the medical people don't know as much as folks tend to attribute to them. When these technical components get mixed up with a social delivery system inside an economic system, and so forth, the sum total of what is clearly understood in a manner that would satisfy my colleague Mr. Gould is very little. It is often in the interest of the politician or others to cast a scientific shade over a given issue because it protects them from responsibility.

The point being made of reporting things that are political as political, with maybe a scientific component, is an exceedingly important approach to placing responsibility where it should be, namely with the kind of lay body that Howard described in terms of the trustees of the Massachusetts General Hospital, or with the Senate. It is a problem of the Senate or the House to decide when

abortions are legal. It is not a scientific matter and dealing with these things as if they were purely scientific is a serious abdication of responsibility.

Question: Professor Eckstein, assuming that President Reagan's economic program gets underway, when can we judge whether or not supply-side economics and the budget cutdown are beginning to work?

Eckstein: We'll never know that. We do know some other things. Leaving aside the assassination attempt, it is evident that we have picked a lucky President, as opposed to his predecessor who was unlucky. So the economic situation is already better and he's been there only three months: the inflation rate is down, the world oil price is falling, the winter had remarkably good weather which kept retail sales going and helped produce this incredible 6.5 percent growth quarter, so things are better. He's going to get the credit, and justly so. He would have gotten the blame if this happened to be a bad season and things were going badly.

To really know if supply-side economics worked you have to answer the following questions: Did people work harder and work with higher productivity because the marginal tax rates were lowered? You have to know how much of the investment — which is likely to grow quite considerably in any event — how much of that investment occurred because the depreciation reforms were passed? Now there is one way one could assess whether the Reagan program worked, which really isn't right but is one they've asked for. They have foolishly propounded extreme projections where inflation drops to 4 percent, where investment grows by 11 percent a year to ultimately, within their period of forecasting, go to a share which is about 50 percent bigger than ever reported in American history. They really are projecting that we are going to convert ourselves into a Japan which has an investment rate of 16 percent excluding housing. If you're going to look at the Reagan program and say, Did they accomplish that, then it is my best judgment as a serious economist that it cannot work out. But that's not what really matters. The American people did not elect Reagan to accomplish a miracle. They elected Reagan to have the economy do better and it is very likely to do better throughout his first term, partly due to things beyond his control and partly because the country really needed a major dose of conservatism after fifteen years of the opposite.

Question: I'd like to be specific about something: We heard it said that 25 percent of cancer fatalities in this country are due to lung cancer. But suppose that we've had a national referendum and you have been put in

charge of developing a program for the nation to do something truly constructive about this terrible calamity that has hit the country. Please tell us what you would do if you had that opportunity, Dr. Hiatt.

Hiatt: It's clear to me that our understanding of the biology of cancer is such that the prospects for a cure of this disease within the lifetime of the people in this are remote. It's not an engineering problem. It's not like going to the moon. Therefore, I think that most efforts should be directed at prevention. And here's the hangup — it refers to the previous question. Prevention of lung cancer, just as prevention of most disease, is not only a medical problem. It's a problem that involves the law, that involves politics, that involves economics, that involves sociology and behavior. I think that what must be done is to mobilize not only the doctors of this country — I hope it's apparent from my remarks that I'm not an apologist for the members of my profession. But we tend to relegate to physicians responsibilities that they are not equipped to discharge. The prevention of lung cancer is a fine example. When, as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Joe Califano undertook to do something about the cigarettes, he got slapped down by his president and by the tobacco lobby. Or at least, that is what I read in the newspapers. I think that what must be undertaken is a campaign on the part of the American people, and American politicians, to control cigarettes and their disposition. I think that to do something about the very large number of people in this country, including those in this room, who may be addicted to cigarette smoking, is very difficult. There is no single approach that is going to solve the problem.

But we surely could do something to interfere with the continuous campaign to addict our young people to cigarettes. I think there are ways to go about that, ways that we are not using. I don't pretend that our level of understanding of the problem is such that this can be legislated or wished into action. I think that we can do a great deal more than we are doing, but I don't think that the necessary and appropriate steps are likely to come, or can come, from the medical profession.

Wald: We have time for one last question and the first person with the hand up gets it.

Question: Dr. Hiatt, in the area of addiction, what is your feeling about legalizing narcotics?

Hiatt: My impressions are derived from information that's probably less complete than yours. My sense is that in the United Kingdom, where some opiates have been legalized, there has been less of a drug problem than in

the United States. I think, and I don't know that this is what you were referring to, that there is a place for legalizing the use of some of the opiates that are now banned here, opiates that could be useful, for example, in the treatment of patients with cancer.

Again, this is another example of a question which my medical background equips me very poorly to address. I think the present approach to dealing with drugs is not a very effective one.



Howard Hiatt, Otto Eckstein, Richard Wald, John Seigenthaler

Wald: We are about to move into another phase of our discussion here. Before we do, I would like to take the moderator's privilege of asking one question on my own. It is a fairly simple one; we are in an academic setting and I've always wanted to ask it.

Gentlemen, taking into account all of the press, not your favorite reading or viewing, could you please give a grade to the press? How would you grade it?

Oettinger: I'll take the Fifth.

Eckstein: Pretty good.

Hiatt: Pass.

Wald: Better than fail, as we all know.

Our program is so structured that we are privileged now to have to journalists. The first is *Eileen Shanahan*, who is senior assistant managing editor of *The Washington Star*. Ms. Shanahan.

Eileen Shanahan: In the time-honored manner of discussants, I'm not going to say much about what the panelists said — instead, I'll say something that I want to say. As a lifelong Washington reporter, I see a change that I fear we in journalism will not deal with adequately. That is the fact that a very large proportion of the public policy stories of the next four to twenty years are going to be everywhere except Washington.

Journalism is ill-equipped to deal with this. We have three thousand journalists in the city of Washington: approximately half of them daily newspaper; a quarter, television or other broadcasting; and a quarter, magazine. But in state capitals and cities all over the country we have nowhere near such staff capabilities. Yet it is my firm belief that as the federal government withdraws, and federal money is withdrawn from so many programs, the real story is not going to be in Washington. The real story is going to be in state and local government and even neighborhoods and communities, as people either get organized or don't get organized to try to fill in some of these gaps; as the real issue becomes which of these programs is worth saving? How many can be saved with public money on the state level, or with private funds on the local level insofar as there is the money? I don't see

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any sign that journalistic resources are going to be returned to the state and local level where they will be needed to the degree that they should be. I am worried sick about the fact that we are just not going to be dealing with that story.

Just one tiny response to Otto Eckstein because he made a point that I had not entirely focused on before. First of all, it is certainly true, as he claimed, that Otto is a great source for journalists. He is one of those dreamy types you can often get on the phone the minute you call

him and almost always can get on the phone within, say, an hour, and he gives wonderful, clear explanations and good quotes. But I think he overstates his case a bit when he says we cover all the stuff that is not consequential.

However, I think he's identified a problem that's important, that I hadn't thought of before. And I think the problem is the product of a pendulum swing. He and others taught all of us who write in the field of economics — fifteen years ago — to ignore the monthly aberrations in statistics, or to explain the monthly aberrations so that people wouldn't think that something had risen 8 percent in a month or fallen 14 percent in a month when a lot of the change was the result of some freaky, non-recurring development. And perhaps we've gone too far so that now stories do, indeed, say, Well, this only happened because Reagan front-end loaded the oil price increase, and don't pay any attention, that's not the underlying thing. But maybe we ought to go back a little more to the underlying thing. And, Otto, since you are such a good source, why don't you tell us that when you so nicely come to the telephone or call back?

The other point I want to make, which is very troubling to me, is a journalistic matter. Otto was nicer than I would have been when asked about the possibility of success of the Reagan program. Reagan could luck out. I agree with that. I could give you a good-luck scenario where Reagan's economics would appear to have achieved a lot. The fact of the matter is — and this is enormously hard to deal with as a journalist even if you write a column as I do — that a very large part of supply-side economics is not only mistaken but, I believe, a knowing hoax. I don't say that lightly. I don't mean that the budget cuts aren't real. Or that the tax cuts aren't real. I could see some better ways of doing them but they both are real and totally irrational. But the economic forecast is, in my opinion, not only mistaken but literally made up. There is no basis for it and the administration knows there is no basis for it. There is no Laffer model; there is no electronic model of the economy presided over by Arthur Laffer. There is one supply-side economic model that the administration is using — the Claremont model. But it does not yield the results that the administration is forecasting.

That is a very hard thing for us as journalists to deal with. I go back to the Joe McCarthy years when we all learned how hard it was to deal with people becoming false. The McCarthy era marred and changed American journalism forever. We're dealing with something similar, I think, here. The misrepresentations of the basis for the administration's economic forecast is not as villainous as Joe McCarthy, obviously; it's just a little political chicanery. But it is very hard for journalism to deal with; it's something that we have to do some thinking about.

Wald: Perfect. Our next speaker will be John Seigen-

thaler, president, publisher, and editor of *The Tennessean* in Nashville. He is an example of change: a man who once proclaimed the sturdy independence of the individual newspaper and who now works for Gannett.

John Seigenthaler: As a newsman asked to respond to a man of science and a man of economics and a man of math and a man of medicine, I feel somewhat the way I suppose Jerry Falwell must have felt when he woke up one morning and found himself in *Penthouse* magazine — the images around me are exciting and provocative and — as they may have been for Jerry Falwell — spiritually uplifting.

I would like to take just a moment to address the question that concerns most members of the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the American Society of Newspaper Editors: the reality of electronic change and its impact on the news business as a business. I'd like to expand just a bit on the subject mentioned by Professor Oettinger and respond to his comments about the ANPA's lobbying in Washington last year.

Louis Lyons told me during my Nieman year, "Rotarians always act like Rotarians." And you shouldn't be surprised to see newspaper publishers act like Rotarians. For us, the nature of this change — which may be gradual and may be dramatic — is inescapable. It may be impossible to visualize what impact cable is going to have on what we do and how we do it. But one thing does seem clear. The present body of news consumers states consistently that they get most of their news from the electronic industry. In the ANPA we have our own polls which prove that they get most of their in-depth news from us. Now that may be Rotarians acting like Rotarians — or it may be valid. I suspect that it is. But aside from what may happen to classified advertising and other advertising — and certainly there will be some effect on that — the immediate, obvious result will be a diffusion of that present news consumer audience on the electronic side. And that's probably not going to be a gradual development. There are now at least three cable networks competing with the three traditional networks. Advertisers are going to look at that diffusion of audience and read where the audience is going and respond in a similar way. This will certainly have a great impact on the print media.

But I suspect the fact that Ted Turner's Cable News Network lost \$6 million last quarter, while of great concern to him, does not provide much satisfaction to the operators of the three major networks because they know that cable is there; that the audience will be diffused; and that the advertisers will follow. For those of you who complain — and the complaints I heard today were not as severe as I thought they might have been — that we have not enough focus on specialized economic information, medical

information, scientific information, all that will now be available as one result. There will be specialized channels dedicated to specialized audiences, and this too will help diffuse the major network audience.

The reality of a reduction of size of the press from the day it was enlarged to its maximum capacity is something we are living with. Fifty-five inch pages are now part of

We — the press — will never again look as we have looked, and we will never look as we have dreamed of appearing.

most of our lives. We are going to continue to contract. The loss of elements of our advertising will force restructuring and more change. And that is a matter of great concern for us — and for news consumers. We will not be wiped out, but we will be different.

How will the press respond to these dramatic changes? Will we become less general? More generalized as opposed to more specialized? Will we become more like television — responding to what an audience wants as opposed to more careful consideration of editorial judgment? It seems to me that our opportunities to be more elaborative, more expository will be restricted.

My mother, who will soon be 80, said to my aunt, who is 78, "Alice, do you remember when we used to dream of looking like Elizabeth Taylor?" And my aunt replied, "Yes, I remember. And now we do."

We — the press — will never again look as we have looked, and we will never look as we have dreamed of appearing. But I do hope that we will continue to be a medium that gets one no-grade, and two passing without a mark.

Wald: I would commend to your attention all that you have heard. And I would commend to you that you think of it in this way. There was a time, not too long ago, when the emphases at meetings like this was on specialties and specialization and followed our geologist's worry that we do not understand the process. There was a time when we worried only about the context in which things were put and in the way in which our audiences might understand it, the politicization of everything. Today you have heard both points of view put forth. And you have heard, as at all such gatherings here, at triennia or other regular meetings, that change is upon us. To quote a line about one of Dr. Oettinger's predecessors, Newton; a poet said of him, "He voyaged strange seas of thought alone." Our luck is that we can voyage these strange seas of thought together. □

CHANGE IN AMERICA: Are The Media Responding Adequately?

PANEL II

Robert Manning, chairperson — Editor-in-chief, Boston Publishing Company; Nieman Fellow '46

Samuel Huntington — Frank S. Thomson Professor of Government and Director in the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University

Ethel Klein — Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University

Nathan I. Huggins — W. E. B. Dubois Professor of History and of Afro-American Studies and Director of the William E. B. Dubois Institute for Afro-American Studies, Harvard University

Arthur Miller — Professor of Law, Harvard University

Ellen Goodman — Syndicated columnist, *The Boston Globe*; Nieman Fellow '74

Anthony Lewis — Syndicated columnist, *The New York Times*; Lecturer on Law, Harvard University; Nieman Fellow '57

Robert Manning: An old friend of mine who used to look unkindly on panel shows came up with the idea of a new show called "Stump the Experts" in which some experts are hit with some stumps. I am here today to protect our guests. I'm going to give up my allotted five minutes and get right to the introductions, if I may: Samuel Huntington, Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government at

Harvard; Ethel Klein, Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard; Nathan Huggins, Harvard Professor of History and Afro-American Studies; Arthur Miller, Professor at the Harvard Law School and whom some of you have, perhaps, seen on television as star of "Miller's Court."

We have agreed by process of arbitrary decision that Professor Huntington will begin and I give you the floor, sir.

Samuel Huntington: A few weeks ago, shortly before 11 o'clock in the evening, just as I was about to drift off to sleep, the telephone rang. I answered it and was greeted first by a rather unholy roar in the background, and then by the dulcet tones of the Nieman Curator, mumbling something about political consciousness into my very low state of consciousness. I apparently said yes to whatever he proposed before I drifted back to sleep — and I now find myself here, charged with discussing in a short length of time changes in American political consciousness and how the media have reacted to them.

I don't know that I can really say very much about the media reaction. Not that I don't try to pay attention to the media, it's just that I find them rather difficult to understand. I do think, however, that there have been major changes in American political consciousness — changes which have parallels in our history. They stem from a rather peculiar and unique problem we face in our society, in that we, as a people, are blessed with a set of very high — highfalutin, in some respects — ideals of liberty, democracy, equality, and the worth of the individual. Yet we, like most human beings, aren't always able to live up to those ideals. As a result, we continuously find a gap between how we think we should behave and how we do behave. We react to this gap — this condition of national cognitive dissonance, if you will — through various

combinations of cynicism, morality, hypocrisy, and complacency.

Over the past twenty years, we have shifted from the complacency of the 1950's to a brief spurt of patriotic hypocrisy in the early 1960's, then to an orgy of moralistic reform in the middle and late 1960's and early 1970's. We have now slid into a situation which, I think, could be described as somewhat cynical. Having emerged from this orgy of moralism and moralistic reform it is perhaps useful to focus attention on three elements of change since then.

First of all, there are attitudes which we have had toward our government, our political leadership, our political institutions. As we all know, there was a marked decline of confidence in our political institutions in the 1960's. You can look at almost any poll and see the trend lines plummeting downward. They leveled off in the early 1970's, and then — largely as a result of Watergate and related events — they plummeted again in the mid-1970's. And here, it seems to me, the media played a significant role. I vividly remember the metropolitan editor of *The Washington Post* going on television on May 7, 1973, and asking, "How can we rebuild confidence in the credibility of our institutions?" One obvious answer was for media giants — like *The Washington Post* — to stop challenging the credibility of our institutions. I think that to the extent that those lines plummeted downward in the mid-1970's, the press has to take a large part of the credit. By and large, those indices are still down; if you look at the public opinion polls, you see that the confidence in leadership remains minimal.

That is one dimension. A second concerns what you might call the ideological dimension; the shift in the ideological center of gravity from what my colleague Sam Beer calls the liberal, public philosophy of the New Deal — which carried over into the 1960's — and the emergence in the 1970's of something else which we can still see around us today. There very clearly was a conservative political and intellectual renaissance which started in the middle 1970's, picked up steam in 1976 in the politics of that year, and then further manifested itself in 1978 and again in 1980. Here, it seems to me, one can make the argument that perhaps the press was a little bit slow to catch on. This is reflected in the extent to which the press, after the election returns were in last November, joined in hailing this as a great landslide. It wasn't a landslide at all; it was a marginal shift of votes. Reagan got 51 percent of the votes; four years before, Gerry Ford had gotten 49 percent. That's hardly a landslide. In a sense the press was according belated recognition to — and overplaying, if you will — trends which had been present in our political and intellectual life for several years, but which had not received the attention they should have before then.

Thirdly, there is the whole question of public



Ellen Goodman, Samuel Huntington, Ethel Klein, Robert Manning, Nathan Huggins, Arthur Miller, Anthony Lewis

consciousness and attitudes with respect to America's role in the world and issues of national security. Changes in our security position in the early 1970's were very marked in terms of both military and economic security. Public opinion began to react to these with substantial shifts in poll results about questions concerning increases in defense spending, and willingness to use American troops abroad. There was a clear move away from the anti-militarism — almost isolationism — of the early 1970's to a very strong support in the late 1970's. I do not believe that the press played a leading role in pointing out either the changes which occurred in our position or the changes which were taking place in public opinion. I don't remember that *The New York Times*, for instance, addressed in a significant way the status of American defenses until last fall, when they ran a very good, useful, and comprehensive seven-part series on the American military position in the world. Yet the serious decline in relative American military strength was then a decade old.

Finally, what can one conclude from this very superficial and rather brief set of comments on shifts in public consciousness with respect to political institutions, ideology, and America's role in the world and the relation of the press to these changes? If one wanted to make a nasty conclusion — and Tony Lewis has challenged me to provoke him — one could perhaps say that if one looks at the role of the press in these three cases, the press has tended to carry to the extreme whatever trends are going out of style. There is a tendency for the press to be both off center and behind the times, and to hop on the bandwagon and give it a push, just before it collapses. I'm not sure whether this is a good thing or a bad thing if one considers the alternatives that the press might engage in. Perhaps this is the best we can settle for. In any event, if one does look at the changes that have occurred in American public

consciousness in the past decade, this is a conclusion which could be argued.

Ethel Klein: I was very thrilled to be asked to do this and called up my friends with great joy to say, "Guess what — I'm supposed to talk about what the media are doing right and what they're doing wrong." I was immediately told that you're not doing anything right — and that in addition to not doing anything right, you are responsible for changing the world and saving the women of the future.

Since I don't really agree with that, I thought that rather than do a critique of all the sexist practices that you all know very well that the media have been accused of, I would give you a different framework.

One problem is that the media do not understand that what is happening to people's lives is not so much what they have chosen to happen as it is a response to changing institutions around them.

To the extent that the media misrepresent or don't focus on women's problems, there is a portion of the population which is ignored. The general discussion these days is, What should women's roles be? But we lack an understanding of what women's roles have been, and what is in the future for us. So I thought I would paint some generations of American women for you and maybe through that give you a feeling for some of the demands that are being raised now. What we are really dealing with is the transformation of the sexual division of labor — a transformation that started with the Industrial Revolution. It's a long-term trend; it has escalated during this century and it has generated some very exciting things, as well as some severe consequences for the family.

Let me start with the woman who was born in 1880, got married in 1900, and worked very hard — but not in the labor force. She had a fair number of children — maybe five or more. A woman who survived childbirth — which meant living past roughly the age of 30 — was likely to live until age 66. This woman spent most of her life taking care of babies and young children — in 1900 not that many kids were going to school. For this woman, family responsibilities were crucial, they were work — work not only in the sense of chauffeuring children around, but work in the sense of producing goods at home.

At that time, more than half the population of women did not live in urban areas. The modernization of the economy, that is, buying goods for money, was not

dominant, which meant that you could barter. There were a lot of things that women made at home that could not be bought in stores. So although this woman was not a member of the labor force per se, she made important contributions to the economy.

Now let's look at the woman who was born in 1930 and got married in 1950 — the age of the feminine mystique. That's also a time when women were having a lot of babies, staying at home, raising their children, and supposedly reliving the domestic period of the 1900's. It is true that at this time, women were having large families, but because of these large families, many women had to go to work — 52 percent of married women with children between the ages of 6 and 17 were working. In addition, these women spent more than a third of their married lives with no children to take care of — that is, their children were grown or married. And these women were living longer — up to the average age of 75.

Their daughters, who were born in the 1950's, and who got married in the 1970's, find that they are facing a very different situation. They are expected to spend a very small portion of their lives taking care of young children — only 23 percent. Forty-four percent of their adult life will be when their own children are grown. They are going to live to the ripe old age of 78. And the options that they face are not the same as those faced by their grandmothers.

If marriage is viewed as a basically economic institution that two people prepare for, wherein women provide one set of goods by taking care of children and producing home goods, and men provide money, that's a very solid complementary role. But what happens when it breaks up?

The history of divorce in this country is interesting. I remember reading that at the turn of the century, people were getting upset because the divorce rate was escalating way out of proportion. Thirteen percent of the women who were born in 1900 got divorced. At that time, *The New York Times* was saying that divorce and abortion were destroying the family and were the most troublesome problems facing America.

Twenty percent of the women who were born in 1940 have already been divorced, and it is expected that 34 percent of them will be divorced at least once. And of the women born in 1950, half of them are expected to experience divorce.

This means that people can no longer count on some kind of family arrangement to take care of the children; that people have to be able to make their own living. And this is the criticism I have of the media — that they do not portray this as the reality that everyone faces. So we continue to hold on to old notions and conservative, traditional values of family life. In perpetuating this notion of a norm which no longer exists, the media are distorting the options that young women prepare themselves for —

not only young women, but all women. For example, in 1965, 25 percent of divorces were granted to people who had been married fifteen years or more.

Most of the current discussion about women centers on what political philosophers would call "freedom to" — women want to be able to be doctors, lawyers, Indian chiefs; they want to be full individuals and want opportunities that they feel have been foreclosed to them; they want to experience self-actualization.

But the other part of it is "freedom from" — from abuse, from hunger, from economic dependency. And these issues are not discussed with quite the same kind of bravado. Most women work because they have to — they may be the head of a household, or they may be supplementing family income. In the 1970's the salary of the second worker was basically used as a stopgap against inflation. In the 1980's, however, we see both men and women taking on second and third jobs in order to cope with inflation. This has implications both for families and quality of life.

Within that context, I think it is fair to talk about the normative, that is, what should people's lives be? What should the roles of men and women be? What should the future look like?

I think one problem is that the media do not understand that what is happening to people's lives is not so much what they have chosen to happen as it is a response to changing institutions around them. A lot of people still work very hard to create the ideal of the nuclear family where everyone is happy; where all of what you do is appreciated; where economic survival is reality. But this ideal family has never existed; many people are finding out that it is an impossibility.

In saying to people that this ideal is possible, the media are breeding self-hate. Men and women have different experiences. Most poor people are women. Family and child care are not simply women's issues or trivial issues. These things are going to say what kind of economics we are going to have in the future, what kind of society we are going to have in the future.

To the extent that these questions are ignored, I think the media need to be chastised. But to the extent that you feel it is your personal and professional responsibility to address those issues in terms of creating a future, I think you should be encouraged. And I wish you a lot of luck.

Nathan Huggins: I too have a charge which must be defined in process. I decided I wanted to talk about community and problems of change in our concept of community. One way of understanding this matter is to think about the media and their concept of audience. One fundamental change in the past fifty years has been a radical shift in perception of the American audience. There has not been a radical change in the population,

rather the change has been in the way the media think about the public and the way in which the population thinks about itself.

Looking at the past, we tend to think of a lost community, a wholeness which has become fragmented. That tendency among Americans goes back into the nineteenth century, at least, when one thought about the supposed unity of the New England town or the supposed unity of the Old South. Fictional notions, perhaps, but they were notions suggesting a consensus in the past which persons looking back longed for.

If one were to pick up newspapers from the 1930's, one would detect in them, as compared with present-day press and television, an assumption that there was an audience, an American audience, that could be addressed as one people, as the American community. In that assumption there was a distortion of reality, because that community was not a whole. It was, in fact, fragmented. It was as ethnocentric and class-divided as the present one.

I think the changes that have come about since the 1930's have been towards a consciousness of pluralism and of fragmentation. We observe this most clearly when we consider the programs and assumptions of government since the 1930's. We have chosen to use our government in ways which political scientists refer to as the broker state, as an instrument or an institution which parcels out the goods of society to interest groups. With such a state, it became important for persons to organize themselves into interest groups in order to get the state — and I don't mean simply the federal government, but all political organizations — to respond to them meaningfully. One tries to identify oneself with labor or business or ethnic

It becomes necessary for media people to touch base with all the various interest groups in order to say anything at all.

groups or farmers or whatever group one finds convenient. And on the claim of group identity, one makes claims on society as a whole. This had its real advantages and real payoffs. There were disadvantages, however, but we did not recognize them during a period of economic expansion when the pie — the goodies in the society — seemed to be growing.

Under changed circumstances, when the pie begins to contract, the various interest groups make the same demands over limited resources and so there is a growing sense of conflict within the society and a growing sense that the government itself (and other institutions as well) cannot speak for everyone. That creates some serious

social problems that we must address in pluralism. It also creates some real problems for the media in defining their audience. Who is being addressed by the press and television with any specific issue? It becomes necessary for media people to touch base with all the various interest groups in order to say anything at all.

Professor Huntington has mentioned the decline of public confidence in the government. We have ample evidence from polls attesting to it. I would, however, extend the phenomenon of declining confidence beyond government. I imagine that polls which would ask the public to indicate its confidence in experts in general would indicate a similar marked decline. My hunch is that over the past ten or fifteen years the public's ability to believe political scientists or economists or sociologists or psychologists has diminished greatly because the people's expectations of government or society or institutions have not been realized and the fault often rests as much with experts as with politicians.

Ironically, it appears as if things have gone in opposite directions: we have become more particularistic while at the same time more generalized.

I met a judge recently who said what she hated most of all as expert witnesses were two kinds: economists and psychiatrists. Her argument was that you could be certain that they would say exactly what was necessary for the side of the case they supported, and you could get equally expert witness on the other side. That, it seems to me, is a stunning lack-of-confidence vote in the expert.

There are so many opinions, expert and otherwise — all would acclaim to be heard — that it is impossible to know what is true, what is real, or what is for the public good. I am reminded of a story told by Washington Irving of a newspaperman who was sent to cover a boat accident on the Hudson River. When the reporter returned, his editor asked him what actually happened up there. The reporter replied, "We'll never know. There were too many survivors."

In a pluralistic state, where community is lacking, there are too many survivors. It is very difficult to find either meaning, or one's sense of direction, or purpose.

How does this problem of community relate to the media? I am not one inclined to blame the press and television for everything. I feel as Professor Klein does about the family and about the role of women: that the media are largely a response to the conditions they find. Reporters are inclined to go to such experts as they can

find, as problematic as such expert witnesses may be. They try to find the cohorts that seem to be meaningful: women, blacks, Chicanos, Native Americans, Italian-Americans, homosexuals. Define a group, and define that group's interest, and it is certain to get some kind of hearing.

There are real problems in this. One begins to ask, What is cause and what is effect? Are groups created by the media? Are leaders created by the media? I often have the feeling that a person becomes a leader when a television camera turns onto him. Too often, it appears the media have an extraordinary importance in defining leadership and what the issues are. Yet the media, characteristically, are ill-equipped to play such roles. I am not sure that press and television can be blamed for defining our leaders and the issues which preoccupy us. The vacuum must be filled, and the media seem to be the most dynamic forces around.

I would like to end by raising some fundamental questions. Is it important that we have consensus or a sense of community? Is it important than an American — man or woman, black or white — be able to sense within others a commonalty rather than difference? Is that important? I think that it is, and like most Americans I indulge the fiction of an earlier time, now lost, in which that was so.

Ironically, it appears as if things have gone in opposite directions: we have become more particularistic while at the same time more generalized. There are fewer newspapers, reducing distinctiveness and difference. We sense a population that has become fragmented and self-consciously pluralistic, yet the media (particularly television) produce an homogenized culture designed to speak to all elements of the society. Is the vapid and vacuous image our only means to community? If it is important that there be a sense of community, a oneness, a sense of nationhood outside of unifying crises such as war, is there a role that the press can play?

Arthur Miller: I've got some good news and I've got some bad news about the life of law and the media, which has, in the 1970's, been characterized by confrontations on several levels. I think we can look forward to a continuing series of confrontations between the legal system and the media — at least for the early 1980's — as we play out some of the themes that were so active in the past decade. Parenthetically, I don't find such confrontation to be unhealthy for either side.

The good news I have for you is that as I look at the legal system today, I really do not foresee that the First Amendment will be repealed.

Now here's the bad news: without regard to what you have been taught in journalism school, in the newsroom, or at your convocations, although we do have a First

Amendment, it is not absolute. The sooner the media stop drinking from the heady wine of absolutism, the more realistic they will be in terms of their own place in society and their interrelationship with the legal system — because all of the confrontations of the 1970's are a result of a journalist here, an editor there, a publisher somewhere else believing the absolutism pap and pushing too hard.

There are some major confrontations that are worth noting briefly: the first is access. The media are constantly demanding access, citing the public's right to know, freedom of the press, and all those clichés. One of the areas where you have demanded access most strenuously is the courtroom. As Professor Huntington has suggested, the press is always fighting the last war. This one is over — you've got the courtroom; you've got cameras in the courtrooms in an increasing number of states. I strongly suggest that with the change in the Chief Justiceship of the United States, you will get your cameras into even the federal courts. You have access to court records. Although there has been an enormous confrontation about the closing of pretrial procedures, the fact remains that no one suggests the closing of most trials and the numbers of closings of pretrial proceedings are extremely few. The real issue, I would submit, is not whether the courtrooms are open to you, whether you have access to them, but what you do once you've got that right.

It is like kids fighting over marbles: once someone wins the marbles, what happens to them? The tendency is to put them into the toy box and ignore them. The press is in the courtroom and what do you do? I'll tell you what you're doing here in Massachusetts: Nothing. Absolutely nothing. The media of this state cover murder cases — legally, socially insignificant murder cases. The Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts announced three opinions on one day that affected every man, woman, and child in this Commonwealth. It dealt with insurance. It dealt with consumers' rights. It dealt with environmental rights. It dealt with family rights. But there wasn't a single camera in that courtroom. When I turned on the television news that evening, I was shown the facsimile of some bloody knife that had been introduced in evidence in a legally insignificant murder case.

What are the two great media coverages of law lately? Number one, the Tarnower murder trial. Number two, a self-indulgent wallowing in the Carol Burnett case. Neither case has the significance to our society of a good insurance case or a medical malpractice case or a benefits case or an abortion case or an intra-spousal rights case. But those are too complicated to receive coverage; those are dull. The pictures don't grab; the copy doesn't sing.

Last week the United States Supreme Court reported two very significant cases. One dealt with the rights of the

mentally impaired. The other dealt with search and seizure. I read reports of those cases in two major metropolitan newspapers. The reports were absolutely incomprehensible, and, where they could be understood, wrong. There are lots of good law stories out there. But how many journalistic stories have been written in the past few years about the decline and fall of the federal courts in the United States? About the fact that we have had resignations from the federal bench at a higher rate than at any other time in American history? Why? What does that mean for society? Why do we have to spend seven years on the docket? In short, access is not the question. It is rather what you are doing with the access.

The second great confrontation is the media versus individual rights. I am talking now about defamation, privacy, and the like. You had a heyday in the 1960's under some Supreme Court doctrines that allowed you to proceed with anything short of wanton and reckless disregard for the truth. Well, the old pendulum is swinging. The last four Supreme Court decisions in the defamation area have been against the media. The great experiment of allowing the media to exercise restraint and clean their own houses in terms of the competence, quality, accuracy, and sensitivity of reporting may be going down the tubes. The Burnett case is, I believe, legally insignificant. It is, however, psychologically significant.

Now you can say that *The National Enquirer* is fringe journalism — that *The New York Times* or *The Boston Globe* doesn't have to worry. On one level, that is right; but psychologically, what is happening is that people do not have the willingness to say to the media, "We trust you to be sensitive enough with individual rights so that we will not have to insist on a demanding legal standard in terms of the quality of your work." I think that people are now beginning to queue up to sue the media. And lawsuits are nothing but a dog nipping at the heels of the media — the real problem is the psychological impact on people of the quality of your work.

The press is in the courtroom and what do you do? I'll tell you what you're doing here in Massachusetts: nothing. Absolutely nothing.

Further, there is a relationship between the Burnett case and the Janet Cooke caper. The Cooke business is an in-house event, but it must be stunning to the average person that somehow a story of that construct could be

first written, then printed, then given that holy of holies, a Pulitzer Prize. And all that happening a month after we are told that *The National Enquirer* makes up stories. There is some sort of symbiosis here — if I can't trust *The Enquirer*, that's one thing, but if I can't trust *The Washington Post*, why shouldn't the legal system rap their knuckles when they report inaccuracies or are insensitive?

The third area of confrontation is in the context of your duties to society. This is the whole business of your reaction to inquiry about your sources or access to your newsrooms; it brings on the perennial squeal of a hemophiliac hit with a pinprick. Some organizations, I think, are reacting quite well by finding their own private accommodations and dealing with the legal establishment to be sure that justice is done or at least not impeded.

On the other hand, there are instances in which the pressure is too great. Your access to the courtroom, your duty to report, both are in large measure justified by you as your right to engage in societal oversight of the legal system. And everybody applauds you in doing that. Most of us can't go down to the courtroom to see if the judge is drunk or if a bribe is being paid or if the criminal justice system is working properly — we are delighted that the media want to do that. But when, in the name of societal oversight, you get access to the system and then try to go further to feed the prurient interests such as often occur around evidence tapes that show people in intimate activity or in publishing the names of rape victims or

There is a general sense in the country that children and their future are out of control.

robbery victims or people involved in intra-spousal cases, then there is a threat to you with regard to this oversight. It is up to you to exercise self-restraint so that you don't use your access to trample on the individual rights on the other side of the line.

Manning: Thank you all very much. And I think I'll convey your thanks to all four of these panelists for packing so much that is provocative and interesting into such a short span of time. I would now like to turn to our press discussants, two fellow Nieman: Ellen Goodman, columnist in *The Boston Globe* and widely syndicated, and Anthony Lewis, columnist in *The New York Times* and also widely read.

Ellen Goodman: One of the things that I found interesting is that each person was trying to make us think about the

issues which we cover in a daily way in terms of their context and their history.

The other thing I found interesting was that almost everybody talked about the circular relationship between what individuals expect, what someone earlier called rational expectations, and how we behave, and then, in turn, how our behavior affects the real future.

One group that we didn't talk about though, was parents and children — the generational model of change. This is something that we don't cover very well or very easily because it's just plain hard. I've been very conscious of a loss of confidence among parents in terms of what they could, in fact, give their children; what their expectations were for their children's future; and what their expectations were for their own relationship to these children. There is a general sense in the country that children and their future are out of control. This sense affects what people feel about their daily family lives.

There is a lot of feeling on the part of parents that their own life experiences are somewhat irrelevant to their children's future. There were whole generations who could give their children something concrete, whether it was land or a business. Most of us can't do that. There was another generation who, in lieu of land or in lieu of business, felt that they could give children an education, and this would be their boost up into the middle class. But now, that is also under attack. In fact, the education isn't going to make our children's future secure. And the whole security issue, which looms so large for parents, is under attack. There's fear that our children will be downwardly mobile.

Add to that the reality that even mothers no longer believe they can prepare their daughters for their job. Mothers were one of the last groups to assume that they would teach their daughters the same work domestically. Now there's a sense that mother's life experiences are not going to be passed on.

We have the same sense that some of the values we had are not transferable. The desire to get a grip on our children's lives comes out in all the anxiety about teenagers, teen-age sexuality, or whatever. I think this is part of our difficulty in finding meaning and purpose in our lives. This deepest relationship, the relationship between parents and children, our own extension into the future, has become so difficult.


Anthony Lewis: Sam Huntington promised to be provocative. By his standards, I thought he was positively cuddly. And I thought he was right in saying that the press was slow to recognize the conservative trend or conservative revolution in this country — right in the particular sense that we didn't feel the public resistance to the increasing size and power and interventionism of the federal government. That feeling is not entirely or

necessarily a conservative one, since the person from whose works I learned it was Louis D. Brandeis, not a conservative. And if we have a task now, as journalists in the political field, it is to try to perceive and define for ourselves what is conservative in what is happening and what is something else. I have a bias in these matters, because my center of thinking is not the center of thinking of those who are in power at the moment. Nevertheless, I don't feel disabled from at least attempting — nor should any of us, I think — to try to distinguish what is truly conservative from what, shall I say, is the work of predators.

For example, we heard a moment ago about community. I think one of the important objects of a conservative mode of thought should be the reinforcing of a sense of community and obligations to the community, because those are some of the things that produce the stability that the conservatives rightly want in the society. That is one way of testing the programs of the current administration: whether they are likely to produce amid our vast population a loyalty to the system, a sense of stake in the society. My own guess is that some of the things that are being done will, on the whole, intensify the existence of the disaffected underclass rather than knit ties of community.

Another point at which I would apply a skeptical view of what is conservative is defense policy, national security policy. Professor Huntington is right that we, the press, were slow in catching up with a public perception that this country was falling behind the Soviet Union in the national security and defense area. But I hope we will not join this new toboggan to yesterday — as I would call it, picking up Sam's image — the belief that more is better, that extravagant spending without thought is the answer to national security needs. I can think of no tougher field for us as journalists. It's one that certainly throws me, because information is hard to come by in the defense area, or at least hard for someone in my position to understand. A lot of things are secret. There's an enormous force of both manufacturers and the military behind new things that may not be the right answer. So I would say that of all the areas today in which press skepticism is most needed, it is in defense: an area in which the current administration plans to more than double annual spending over the next five years.

Lastly, I mention one point that I happen to care a lot about. This administration has taken office with a forceful expression of desire for change in human rights policy. It has a motto invented by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and repeated by Secretary of State Haig and others, namely that we must distinguish between two kinds of governments in the world that don't agree with our notions of humanity: on the one hand, totalitarian or communist governments, on the other, authoritarian or



Nathan Huggins, Arthur Miller, Anthony Lewis

right-wing. And the first — the communist governments — are the real violators of human rights, while right-wing regimes are only moderately repressive. Well, if I were one of 15,000 people who had been tortured and killed in Argentina, I might find that definition a little bit hard to understand. I think it is precisely in the category of the Laffer curve: it doesn't exist. The notion is preposterous, an insult to our intelligence. Worse yet, it puts us in danger of associating ourselves with nasty regimes out of some sense that the doctrine will help us strategically. I think it will damage us very, very severely. And I would say that it is at the farthest distance from conservatism to fall gullibly into the notion.

Question: Professor Miller, I would like for you to share some pain with me. The story is this: for six months, an investigative reporter has looked into that twilight zone of American finance populated by those who are not served by respectable financial institutions. The local slumlord and loan shark is not a public figure — but we are advised by two law firms that because he is the lead tenor in a local church, if we publish, he'll sue. Would you please give me a publish or don't publish decision?

Miller: Judging from your accent, I don't think I am licensed to practice in your state.

Comment: You don't need a license to practice journalism.

Miller: You have, I gather, a slumlord situation. You have facts verified, sources confirmed. It seems to me a

legitimate journalistic tale. Now, I'm not going to play second or third legal opinion, but it seems to me that you might journalistically consider the need within the context of the story as to whether you identify the particular premises or not; whether you identify the particular landlord or not; whether you achieve the information flow you desire with or without that level of detail; whether it's a feature story or a news story. That might go a long way to the ultimate question of potential liability.

By the way, the last thing I would ever hope to achieve in my personal relations with journalists is ever to suggest that the threat of litigation should act as any real deterrent to a story that is journalistically decided to be newsworthy and in the public interest. You do me, as a reader, a disservice if you quit the field because some lawyer tells you some son-of-a-bitch may sue. That should never deter something you have the facts on and that you think is in the public interest — otherwise, you are being repressed.

Question: Professor Miller, those who have benefited the most from the excesses of the 1960's have been the Larry Flynts and *National Enquirers* of this country. Are you suggesting that we in the establishment press should not defend these rogues? They are in court and pleading First Amendment rights.

Miller: It's funny — in the past 24 hours, I have had conversations with three distinguished lawyers on whether they should take on the Carol Burnett appeal. And my instinct is that the First Amendment speaks with a single voice to everyone. An impairment of the First Amendment rights of Larry Flynt or *The Enquirer* or *Penthouse* is an infringement of my First Amendment rights, or yours.

To the extent that the First Amendment press can engage in their aid and comfort on a principled basis, they should do so. But simply to fall into the trap of saying that person is a journalist and I therefore must come to his or her aid is, I think, too simplistic.

Question: Dr. Klein, you spoke of one role of women as being to nurture children. I think there's another equally important one, and that is the nurturing of the old. How does the breakdown of the family affect the lives of all of us aging in this room, if we don't have the aid and comfort of our wives?

Klein: You are asking about the nurturing of old men — although most of the old are women. With the fall of the nuclear family and the economic inability of people to meet their own needs, the state is being asked to take on the role of caring for the elderly. Do we want the state to be doing that?

In some communities, the elderly are divided into the young old and the old old — the young old are supposed to be pretty healthy and able to take care of themselves, while the old old are not in such a stable condition; their health may be deteriorating and they may need different responses — including institutionalization.

If you take the normative stance of saying that what we want to do is preserve the nuclear family, then what are you going to do about the institutions that exist now that cannot do that?

Question: Professor Miller, some studies say that two out of three lawyers in the world are in this country, and other studies say that two out of three journalists in the world are also in this country. Yet we seem to be failing our mission. Should we therefore close the law schools and the journalism schools for the next decade and try to catch up?

Miller: Well, you know that in the middle of the nineteenth century it was decided that nothing further could be invented so they closed the patent office. Maybe the only mistake they made was to reopen it.

Actually, we don't have too many lawyers and too many journalists. We may have them maldistributed, and we may have them maleducated, or malfunctioning, but we don't have too many. We are blessed with being the most righted society and the most complicated society in the world, and these rights and complications breed litigiousness and a need for information. So we need those lawyers and those journalists.

Question: I have a question for Mr. Lewis. I think everybody in this country has a sense of things being stood on their heads when it is not surprising to find out that 15,000 people have been arrested and tortured in Argentina and other Latin American countries in the last few years. Even with regard to some of Ms. Shanahan's observations about economic truths, these things seem to call for some kind of response from the press — a response that has been slow in coming. Is this due to slow reaction time, or lack of brain power, or something else?

Lewis: Oh my, I don't know how to answer that. I have the same feeling you do — I think we all do — that a lot of life is out of control. We live in a century in which the irrational has become the commonplace. We live in the century of the Holocaust; what else is there to say?

As to what journalism can contribute to making some sense out of it, newspapers have tried recently to be more reflective on the op-ed pages. It's good to have more points of view and nonjournalistic points of view in the newspaper. But if life goes on with this sense of loss of control that you mention, I don't believe the press can make it better. □

The Dream of Abundance Reconsidered

DAVID RIESMAN

David Riesman — Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences, Emeritus, Harvard University

Barbara P. Norfleet — Curator of Still Photography in the Carpenter Center for the Visual Arts, Harvard University

Barbara Norfleet: In introducing David Riesman to you, I don't need to say much about him as the author of *The Lonely Crowd* or *The Academic Revolution*, or to mention his well-known interpretations of American society. We all know that his mind has been geared to see things as relevant that most of us see as very insignificant. Somehow he can put familiar pieces together and come out with new facts. Over thirty years ago he realized that America had changed from a country based on work and productivity to a country that was consumer-culture oriented. He also foresaw the increasing violence that would take place in America.

What I would like to talk about is things that you may not know about David Riesman.

When he was an undergraduate at Harvard, he majored in the biochemical sciences. In spite of the many labs that he had, he was also an editor at the Harvard *Crimson*. He claims that he was one of the worst editors they ever had — terrible on deadlines — because 4 a.m. always found him writing, or rewriting, the article.

But I think he was just the kind of editor you would want because he perpetuated good things. He found out that Harvard was buying up leases around Cambridge, and discovered that they had the House system in mind — and although the clubs were against it, he fought hard for

the House system. He started a column called "The Student Vagabond" in which he wrote up fascinating courses at Harvard in what he recalls was a very dehydrated curriculum at the time.

He says he drifted from Harvard in the Law School because he didn't have the confidence to think he could be a good academician — we find this hard to believe today. It is obvious that he could have been a good lawyer because upon graduating he became a clerk to Justice Brandeis. He then went to the University of Buffalo where he was a law professor — although somehow he managed to do mostly sociology and psychology there, I've never known how. Then he went to Chicago where, for the first time, he actually had an appointment in the sociology department and was probably the David Riesman we think of today, rather than David Riesman the lawyer or David Riesman the *Crimson* editor.

In 1958, he came to Harvard as a university professor. If you compare his teaching with what was being taught by the other professors at Harvard, you can see that he was just as original and unpredictable in what he did in teaching as he had been in his own career. He taught the first large lecture course that had neither hour exams nor final exams. That may seem old hat today, but he was the first at Harvard to do this. He substituted a mini-thesis that the students did under the careful supervision of the oddest kind of staff that anyone has ever seen in a course at Harvard. It wasn't just that they came from different fields, they came from different professions: there were doctors, priests, women reentering the job market — I think it was the first course at Harvard that actually got educated women out of the home and gave them a chance to get back into the educational system.

David was so gentle in his manner that he got away with a lot of radical things. If he had sounded more aggressive, people probably would have questioned him

or stopped him. He attended to undergraduates rather than graduate students — he did this very aggressively. Any undergraduate could get to see him, could get him to look at a paper, and might get long, informative letters from him advising and helping with a project or an idea. I can't tell you how rare this was at Harvard.

The other unusual thing he did was to pay attention to his staff. He recognized that not only had he collected this odd group of people together to teach this course, but that we all needed training as teachers. I think that his was the only teacher-training program going on at Harvard at the time. He turned out a group of superlative teachers who learned how to teach while working with him. He used to say the course was limited in size only by the number of competent teachers he could find to help him with it. And so it grew very large — to over 500, at which point everyone found it slightly unmanageable. But even when it was that large, he could take questions from the floor and start discourse among the students — this again was something that was quite unusual at Harvard.

Last year, David Riesman retired from teaching at Harvard. It was a very sad day for all of us, but from what I've heard, he's busier now than he ever was.

I don't know about you, but I feel that this is a very confusing time for America. I don't understand America at all. But David Riesman has shed much light on what has been going on in this country in the past and I look forward to giving him a chance to shed some light on it now.

David Riesman: Greatly influenced by Paul Lazarsfeld and with the aid of some of his associates who had worked at the Bureau of Applied Social Research, I created at the University of Chicago in 1955 a Center for the Study of Leisure. I took for granted that an increasing number of individuals and families would have the discretionary income to choose a variety of forms of leisure. At the center we inaugurated explorations of popular culture; of life in the suburbs; of a company which had initiated a four-day work week, and its ambiguous consequences; of sociability and vicissitudes brought about by the hesitance of hosts to act as such, because that would make them appear too authoritarian, in contrast to supposedly "natural" chance encounters; of studies of hobbies; of the mass media; and of further work in developing a theory of the spread of fads and fashions.

In his monograph *Work and Its Discontents*, Daniel Bell criticized the "prophets of play," notably the authors of *The Lonely Crowd*, who separated work from leisure in the hope that leisure could in itself be made meaningful. Bell believed that leisure could not be significant all by itself. We soon came around to agreeing with him. Various studies made it evident that people wanted to work, and would continue to work even if financially independent; they did not even want very much shorter hours; leisure

could not carry the burden of making life meaningful for most people.

This situation is not fundamentally altered by the fact that there are some people who make a living from work which they would choose to do in their leisure time also, and who are in large part being paid for doing what they want to do. But if there is no paid work of some sort, the situation resembles that of the schoolboy who is a perpetual truant — the day is not sufficiently structured or punctuated, with work separated from play as part of a diurnal rhythm.

From Quantitative to Qualitative Abundance And Other Fantasies of the 1950's

Writers from diverse disciplines assumed in the 1950's that abundance would continue to grow, with a more generous distribution of the anticipated surplus. My own dream was that an increasing number of Americans, once they felt secure that they had risen above poverty, could shift attention from quantitative abundance, that is, consumer goods needed both for sustenance and self-definition, to a focus on qualitative abundance. It has been evident ever since Thorstein Veblen's day that, in families of affluence, one could find a minority who exhibited a diminution of greed for possessions and even a certain asceticism. In the civil rights movement and in the Peace Corps and many local volunteer efforts, the desire to be of use to others was evident, as well as a wish to discover who the others might be.

This was the period of the coming of age of the first cohorts of the baby boom, a pattern of fertility which ran through all strata of society. One of the consequences among educated families was a great concern for their children's education, not only for the vocational imperatives heightened by Sputnik, but also for the development of additional skills sometimes provided by specialized summer camps, such as music camps and foreign language camps, or by exchange programs, such as American University Service or the Experiment in International Living. Robert Merton also highlighted some of the consequences of differentials in affluence as well as in patterns of discretionary spending in a small town on the Eastern Seaboard, and the conflicts thereby evoked between those he termed the local influentials, who largely confine their interests to the immediate community, and the cosmopolitans, who are also oriented to the world outside. The latter wanted more money spent on schools and other facilities for their children, and were apt to focus on national and international events rather than on the local contest for selectman or chief of police. In search of qualitative abundance, the cosmopolitans have encouraged the development of small-town bookstores, art

studios, chamber music groups, and amateur theater, so that there now remain in the Northeast and many other parts of the country few enclaves which are entirely claustrophobic for the restless cosmopolitans or entirely comfortable for the stay-at-homes. In the 1950's, conflicts between the two groups were, especially along the Atlantic Seaboard, manifested in recurrent fights over the fluoridation of water and, there and elsewhere, over school textbooks and the behavior of teachers — symbolic crusades against the experts and other educated folk. S.M. Lipset and others have interpreted these controversies as a consequence of affluence which stimulated mobility, geographic as well as social. However, mobility was also occurring for many members of evangelical churches, the growing affluence of whose members made them no longer churches of the disinherited, but strong and wealthy institutions, capable of fighting a frequently embittered rearguard action against the styles and values of the cosmopolitans.

We recognized in these essays that the shift toward a concern for qualitative abundance was still an affair of a minority, greatly outnumbered by those who were uneasily perched on the first rung of the ladder toward abundance, looking enviously at those above them and anxiously at those beneath them.

As I reread our essays on abundance and postindustrial work, leisure, and education, I was astonished by an extraordinary provincialism, evident also in *The Lonely Crowd*. It is hard now, with our productivity failing and our social services worse off than those, for example, of the United Kingdom, to recapture the often euphoric spirit of the 1950's concerning the continuing growth of the gross national product and a corresponding surplus. Focusing on divisions of region, ethnicity and race, class and culture, we saw that surplus in an ethnocentrically American perspective as a way in which the fierce individualistic energies and unreconciled fragmentations of a large and growing national society could be eased. As we looked around the globe, we saw no challengers to American enterprise. Germany and Japan were struggling, with American help, to rebuild their shattered economies; and we ourselves were not sufficiently alert to the dangers of taking the lead which history should have taught us. I also believed the common fantasy that, even if America did not continue to command the markets and resources it needed, it was possible for us with sufficiently inventive technology to create substitutes for scarce resources (as had been done when the supply of rubber from Southeast Asia was cut off during the World War II). We took for granted limitless resources in oil and water.

This confidence is all the more surprising in the light of evidence accumulating on the instability that stemmed from modernization of countries as disparate as Turkey and Iran, and that pointed to dangers of an economic,

cultural, and political sort — dangers to which any illusions of world stability would be forfeit. I refer to the late Daniel Lerner's study based on interviews designed and analyzed at the Bureau of Applied Social Research which eventuated in his book *The Passing of Traditional Society in the Middle East*. More recently, Paul Samuelson says that none of the economists proved themselves adequate to forecast the future. He observes that all the advanced industrial countries, even to some extent the Japanese, are vulnerable to still newer competitors, for example, those he refers to as the "Gang of Four": South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

While we were provincial in our intra-American focus, we were less so vis-à-vis the American past. In other words, we had not forgotten American history, but we had underestimated the eventual dangers from our wastefulness and recklessness with regard to resources. During my short stint (1943 to 1946) of working in an industry that was a major military supplier, I could see waste in production, inefficiency in cost control, inability to maintain or locate adequate inventories, and mistrust and rivalry that handicapped production. The engineers who had developed the company were men of high integrity and patriotism, but the recently unionized work force distrusted management, as is so commonly the case today in America, and thought that management were trying to give the company away to the armed services and the government; hence, they hid materials from the auditors. Though I did not realize it at the time, I know now that such inefficiency and wastefulness were and still are endemic in this country.

Restructuring Work

As for the restructuring of work conditions, Rolf Meyersohn's research on the attitudes of workers at a California plant that had experimented with the four-day week was not promising. There was no change in the work itself; the largely male work force was not happy with the additional leisure thus provided, which often turned, as some put it, into "honey do" days: the wife ordering the husband to fix things around the house, in the way a foreman would not dare to do: "Honey, do this," and "Honey, do that." Better the sociability of the plant, the structure it gave to the weekend, than the extra day off which did not jibe with family time off. Today, of course, we are experimenting with other patterns, such as flextime, particularly for women with children.

A far more searching experiment in altering the conditions of work has been going on for a few years at a small auto parts plant, owned by Harman Industries in Bolivar, Tennessee, where Michael Maccoby and several

resident anthropologists and others, with the cooperation of management and of the United Auto Workers, have been examining the possibilities of workplace democracy and the redesign of the flow of work in the plant, along lines pioneered by the Swedish Volvo factories to relieve monotony. It has turned out that there is a great diversity among the workers, once they are given freedom to express themselves without any fear of reduction in pay, concerning how they want to organize their work. Many had no desire to take part in running the plant. Others



Barbara P. Norfleet

welcomed a chance to participate in decisions on how a product will be manufactured. Some individuals preferred the sociability of an assembly line, and did not desire job rotation because they "owned" their simple jobs. But a great many individuals appreciated the chance to express their preferences, even if they used it to maintain the status quo. Many women employees did not care about the sociability; they wanted to get their work over with, and under the reorganization, they were often able to leave after five rather than eight hours, returning to their homes and, in some cases, their subsistence farms. Thus, while the experiment has not been a "success" in the way envisaged, the plan allows workers to choose the modes of work appropriate to their character and situation, and this in my judgment makes it a genuine achievement. We cannot generalize from this plant in the South to what

might happen to a similar effort in the North, for the workers at Bolivar, more than half of them black, are not on the whole alienated or cynical. On several visits, I have talked to men who take pride in work that to most onlookers appears heavy, hot, and physically exhausting. It is important to recognize that people did not participate simply for the sake of participation. Productivity rose significantly, along with benefits to job security and the freedom to work fewer hours.

Although experiments like this indicate that it is possible to raise productivity and quality control significantly, both managers and union officials often feel threatened, lacking trust in each other and confidence in their persuasive powers once they begin to shift the ground rules for their still-adversarial cooperation. Moreover, at Bolivar, for example, it proved necessary to limit the freedom of individuals to leave the plant upon declaring that they had finished their stint, because some solipsistic individuals would leave early, cheating on their production and skimping on quality control; it was concluded that particular work groups must help each other finish up before any would be permitted to leave the plant.

These experiments as yet do no more than hint at the possibility that America can find ways to compete less ineffectively in the world economy, although I doubt if we can ever recover our lost sense of abundance.

Waste, Spending, and Postindustrial Values

Considering that only about 20 percent of the work force is engaged in actual productive industry and large-scale agriculture, and that the majority of the work force is in the service sector, forming a rapidly rising and politically stimulated class, followers of Colin Clark, such as Daniel Bell and myself, would say we are indeed postindustrial. In our various studies, we recognized continuing but, as we thought, moderate inflation, frictions created by veto groups, bottleneck industries and unions, and inadequate literacy to cope with the problems our society faced. Even so, despite an ingrained skepticism, we believed that the United States would remain sufficiently inventive and energetic to generate a surplus. It was a mistake, however, to believe that defense expenditures, whatever their eventual international perils, could serve indefinitely as quasi-Keynesian stabilizers for the economy — and as the easiest way to put unemployed people back to work. Whatever may have been the case at a time when the country had a growing surplus and a high rate of investment relative to the size of the labor force, we are in no such situation currently. Military hardware is neither a producer good nor a consumer good; rather, it is a form of "conspicuous consumption" by nations, often in

the name of national purpose. Defense plants, with their cost-plus contracts and combinations of labor and managerial featherbedding, compete with the lagging civilian economy precisely for the skilled tool-and-die makers, engineers, and other technically proficient workers the civilian economy needs. Likewise, high-technology weapons manufacture competes for ever more scarce and expensive natural resources. As military spending increases inflation through government borrowing, and hence interest rates, the dynamic small business sector of our economy is among the first to suffer from shortages of investment capital and of skilled workers and other growing scarcities.

One of the manifestations of our postindustrial values is a dichotomy between those who have increasingly rejected science and technology as "inhumane" and those who continue to believe that science and technology can develop capital-saving rather than capital-expensive forms of investment, reducing the cost of goods and the need for great increases in investment in our antiquated large industries, such as steel, auto, and many consumer goods. Such a development would ease the demand for investment capital in a society where many Americans are negative savers, using credit cards and mortgages to spend more than they earn (receiving tax incentives for the latter by being able to deduct the interest payments).

However, the deployment of so much of our scientific and technical expertise in making ever more refined military hardware, and a general belief that science and technology are the enemies of humane scales of livelihood and living, have led many young people and a number of scientists themselves to turn against science. Such a position has been strengthened by the evident difficulties of achieving any policy of conservation in our fragmented society, in which a growing surplus was seen as the only form in which the fierce individualistic energies and unreconciled divisions of a large and growing national society could be eased. Harvey Brooks believes that in principle science and technology could discover renewable resources and avoid the ecological catastrophes feared by such diverse writers as Garrett Hardin or Robert Heilbroner. For Brooks, with his range of scientific, political, and ethical intelligence, the issues are reduced to the question of whether humankind, individually and in its various collectivities, can inhibit present consumption for the sake of future generations in the absence of an immediate threat, such as war or an imminent disaster.

Brooks wrote his only modestly sanguine essay prior to the inauguration of the Reagan administration. That administration has come in on a platform of restoring the dream of abundance without any necessity for sacrifice on the part of the population, whether in terms of conservation of fuel or of savings or of military service as a less terrible alternative to the demand for national defense

than the building up of nuclear weapons, far beyond the need for minimum deterrence; the Reagan administration minimizes the probable incapacity of the voluntary, semi-mercenary military to install adequate measures of command and control in domestic nuclear weapons plants, or to police proliferation overseas, or to safeguard nuclear weapons at home and abroad. We are even promised a reduction of inflation combined with tax cuts — a series of proposals which, taken together, have some of the quality anthropologists have observed in cargo cults in South Pacific islands, where the indigenous population assumes that, if they get rid of their old gods and possessions, the great ships and planes will come, bearing all the goods the false messiah promises.

With the United States setting an example of profligacy, combined with the belligerencies of the "better dead than Red" sort, when the mass media and widespread travel have popularized American consumer goods in every part of the planet, it is difficult to envisage even less stable and developed countries restraining the desire for immediate gain for the sake of a long-run future whose intricate interdependencies, to be understood, require a combination of political and technical sophistication which cannot be reduced to the prevailing slogans.

Japanese Examples

My view of the world greatly expanded when, in 1961, I went to Japan for two months. What struck me most forcefully about Japanese industry was that workers and managers were not in an adversarial relation; even if a number of union leaders defined themselves as socialists, class conflict was moderated for many reasons, including the relative lack of social distance between Japanese managers and their workers. The managers, though they have large expense accounts for evening entertainment, would often eat in the same cafeteria with their workers. When workers went on strike, they wore headbands to signify that they were striking and hung banners with strike slogans at the windows of the plant — but they went right on working. I was impressed by the ways in which the government ministries work with the large banks and the industrial combines, banned after the war, but now again permitted to flourish, to advance investment, first in one and then in another sector of Japanese industry. To be sure, Japan is a remarkably homogeneous society which (with some slight slackening now) has maintained an extraordinary degree of literacy in a language with well over 2,000 characters in regular use, and over 3,000 altogether.

In the Japanese meritocracy, many of the students in the most highly selective universities, notably the Universities of Tokyo, Kyoto, and Hitatsubashi among govern-

ment universities, and Waseda and Keio among private ones, eagerly compete for jobs in leading industries (jobs they have traditionally held for life), and graduates often also enter MITI, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the leading investment banks. This is in spite of the fact that many of these same students, in what has been called the "pink shower" — a quasi-Marxist indoctrination in their first year at the universities — had thought of themselves as ideologically to the Left though not on the terrorist Left. In contrast, here in the United States it is only recently that students in the most prestigious liberal arts colleges have relaxed their animosity toward organizations as such, and especially toward business of any kind; until the last three or four years, Harvard undergraduates, except for blacks and/or women, were ashamed of confessing that they planned to attend a graduate school of business administration. There is, of course, hostility toward corporate authority to be found in other countries, and even adumbrations of comparable attitudes (and youth alienation) in Japan, but the animus has been especially strong in our country.

As observers from industry and academic life, including my colleague Ezra Vogel, have been pointing out, there is much that we can learn from Japan. For example, managers have high but not exorbitant salaries; and they do not have short-term incentive plans. Such plans are among the factors which encourage American managers to focus attention that is already too intense on the annual and quarterly balance sheet, rather than on the long-run viability of a corporation. Some stock option plans may have been put into operation to hold onto executives. But they often fail in this respect, not only because a manager may not want to hold his job for life even if this were the practice, but because of the company's dependence on equity capital rather than bank financing. The manager and his or her stockholders are occasionally at each other's mercy, and it is always possible that a conglomerate is seeking to develop a momentarily alluring balance sheet as a proper base for tax losses through mergers, as well as the rapid expansion which may soothe vanity but interrupts concentration on the productive processes. A manager who makes a good showing this year, failing to reinvest and not plowing sufficient earnings into research and development, leaves terrible legacies to his or her successor. Of course, this might just be the way for a manager to move to another company.

Hence, I was interested to see, in an excellent summary of the changing backgrounds of corporate managers by David Vogel of the School of Business Administration at Berkeley, that in a recent poll, "three out of four U.S. executives criticized corporate incentive plans for rewarding short-term performance and thus discouraging risky long-term projects." David Vogel also

emphasizes what is evident to readers of the business pages and business journals: namely, that non-American corporations, notably Japanese, in their American plants can produce automobiles or television sets without the defects that escape our inspection procedures.

I have for years been impressed with the irony of our exporting business schools to other countries (including Iran) while doing such a poor job of management in our own large enterprises.

Small Business and the Hope for a "Second Industrial Revolution"

On the other hand, one of the most thriving sectors of the American economy today is small business, which many economists and other theorists have written off as a dying area. Small business is employing nearly as many people today as it did ten years ago. Despite a high rate of withdrawal from the field because of bankruptcies, intensified currently by high interest rates, it is a principal growth sector of the private economy. It is where we find many of the small high-technology companies that have been inventive in bringing down the costs of micro-chips and, correspondingly, of computers, software, and other electronic equipment that was once immensely expensive. Of course, some of these companies, which were started by small, risk-taking entrepreneurs, such as Hewlett-Packard or Texas Instruments or Intel, have become quite large, though still able to move more quickly and dynamically than their large competitors. These developments have in fact led a number of observers of business to talk about a Second Industrial Revolution, in which numerically controlled, i.e., computer-controlled machine tools, and robots will spread throughout industry because of their rapidly declining costs and their apparent ability to replace expensive and combative workers with compliant machines.

My skepticism about any quick and painless way to reverse the prevailing decline of productivity and the indifference to detail on the part of both many workers and many managers in large part reflects my political and cultural misgivings concerning American anarchic individualism, the difficulties of engendering cooperation, and the relative shortage of people with the training and character structure of the craftsman who is also institutionally loyal. This skepticism is reinforced by recollection of my experience of a conference on automation organized by *Fortune* magazine early in the 1950's. A number of futurologists supposed that automation would spread with enormous rapidity, creating immense problems of unemployment and underemployment among both blue-collar and white-collar employees, whereas I was more cautious, recognizing that new equipment was costly, and,

despite its proffered benefits, would certainly meet resistance and inertia on the part of companies and their employees who were doing well enough without what were then very large and bulky computer installations. In contrast, today the costs of numerically controlled machine tools have dropped dramatically, and the use of micro-chips has reduced bulk as well as cost. Yet John E. Bergman, a tool-and-die manufacturer, who has had ample experience with numerically controlled machine tools, has explained that the more numerically controlled machine tools he installs, the more he must depend on men with the intelligence and training of tool-and-die craftsmen to learn the additional skills necessary for efficient computer-controlled output, in order to solve such problems as how to time the speed of the machine for minimal waste and optimal production, bearing in mind the work flow of the plant itself; they must add training in electronics and computer control and programming to their skills as tool-and-die workers. Thus, he is desperate to find individuals who already possess these skills or are willing to be trained in the seven-year apprenticeship within his company. In sum, the more sophisticated the technology, the more sophisticated must be the training of those who keep it operating. This technology requires individuals who have some mathematical aptitude and some willingness, while undergoing the rigorous training, to postpone the relatively high wages paid even to the less highly skilled craftsmen.

The Prospect of Continued Inflation

We are entering a new era, and the question "abundance for what?" no longer seems relevant. Instead, we shall be paying the penalty for what the MIT economist Lester Thurow ironically describes as the genius of having "designed an economy where it is possible to consume without saving." In fact, Americans spend 95 percent of their income, compared to 80 percent for the Japanese, and 86 percent for the West Germans. Since the inauguration of President Reagan, there has been additional talk about reindustrialization, cutting down on onerous regulation of business and providing incentives for investment. But the promised tax cut, which to a considerable extent will benefit consumers rather than business investment for modernization, will increase inflation without increasing investment.

Cuts in spending are promised to compensate for the inflationary effect of the tax cuts. But the indications as to where these cuts will occur both abroad and at home are ominous. We shall cut down on what we provide for the United Nations, the World Bank, and other international agencies for lending and technical assistance. Attempts will be made to slash funds for student loans and for grant

aid to so-called middle-income students. This might be a good idea if coupled with the Educational Opportunity Bank, but instead there is a plan to restore the idea of tuition tax credits, a proposal in 1978 whose regressive nature was evident to the Congress and led to increasing



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the loan and middle-income student provisions as an alternative to tax rebates, though an increasingly costly and easily abused alternative.

But those who consider themselves poor in the United States will not readily accept cuts in services, including aid to education, to which many have to feel themselves entitled. Harboring, like other Americans, no longer great but only slightly subdued expectations, they are unlikely to acquiesce quietly and without, at the least, civil disobedience, or, more dangerously, riots and looting. Because of further military spending and an inability rapidly to cut the rising costs of government, including rising pay for our semi-voluntary army, it seems likely to me that inflation can only increase under the new administration. One source of resistance to cuts in government spending or changes in regulations will come from the courts, especially federal courts, which, guided by public interest lawyers and their retinue of social

scientists, can decide that almost any group in the population — prison inmates, mental hospital psychotics, those who suffer from any definable handicap, including many school children — have had their Constitutional rights violated, and the state must somehow find the money for a remedy. With the growth especially in federal but also in state judicial activism, these veto groups of litigants are a more powerful drag on productivity than was true a generation ago. The adversary process spreads outward from the legal process to the larger American society and is inadequate to deal with the kinds of tradeoffs and compromises necessary when abundance can no longer lift all boats or grease all squeaking wheels.

Since so many Americans wanted to believe in President Reagan's promise of restored abundance as well as virtually imperial global power combined with old-fashioned isolationism (which was never averse to interfering in Asia or Latin America), they are bound, it seems to me, to become quickly disenchanted as inflation continues to rise. I wish I could say that most Americans who are above that median income level feel secure enough to move from quantitative to qualitative abundance at a lowered level of consumption not based on credit. Instead, I fear that many who voted for President Reagan, with the expectation that all these bounties would prove compatible, may become even more cynical about politicians and "bureaucrats," with a further weakening of the already strained bonds of what has been since the beginning, as the Civil War reminds us, a bitterly divided country.

Dreams versus Nightmares

My dreams of qualitative abundance are always tintured by my nightmares about the possibilities of nuclear war. My writings of the 1940's and 1950's exhibit my recognition of the continuing power of the Radical Right. Unlike many of my friends and colleagues, I opposed the election of John Kennedy in 1960, because his belligerent talk about a nonexistent "missile gap" and his call for a national purpose seemed primarily nationalistic. But where I supported him most strongly was in an effort to mobilize support for the treaty to ban atmospheric nuclear tests, a measure which, after getting off to a slow start, began to gain public support during the summer of 1963. In recent years, during which a whole generation has grown up without atmospheric testing, in this country or in the Soviet Union, the once intense nightmares of many people who could recall Hiroshima and Nagasaki disappeared or became greatly attenuated. I have wondered whether securing the passage of that treaty was wise, since it has helped make the nuclear danger seem remote to most Americans.

Indeed, it is a depressing experience for me to live in Cambridge and to see on every street and parking lot the bumper sticker, "No Nukes." However, the bumper stickers do not refer to nuclear weapons, but to nuclear energy plants, which are another matter entirely; the stickers are part of the environmentalist attack on these plants in energy-short and power-short New England. I do not doubt that there are hazards in nuclear power plants. We moved too rapidly toward a single type of reactor, without continuing extensive experimentation with alternative types of colling or of fusion rather than breeder reactors. Nuclear power plants require management and monitoring by adequately trained personnel, and the further development of safe ways to handle the intricate problem of waste disposal as well as potential risks of excessive radiation occurring within the plants themselves.

Even so, knowledgeable physicists believe that the dangers appear to be relatively trivial compared with the wild scenarios generated by the Three Mile Island accident — an accident that, according to the John Kemeny Commission Report, could easily have been avoided by better training of the workers in daily charge of the plant, training that would have given them both the authority to make decisions and the knowledge to cope with unanticipated difficulties. Many of the protesters against nuclear dangers are indiscriminately attacking utility companies, which are vulnerable corporate targets. They are not attacking the military installations manufacturing nuclear weapons for an already enormous stockpile. They seem to forget about nuclear war.

Moreover, this attack on nuclear power plants — and indeed on science and technology generally — appears to me a symbol of the attitudes I have termed postindustrial: that is, attitudes which could be afforded if the problems of industrial production were as easily soluble as was once hoped. Few of the protesters seem able to believe that they will have to freeze in winter and boil in summer, or go without electricity or fuel for automobiles or airplane trips as a result of these campaigns. Few are aware of the fact that fossil fuels are not inexhaustible and that, for certain purposes, they are not easily replaced, for example, in making pharmaceuticals or other necessary products which we derive from petroleum. The campaign which has been most successful in this country against nuclear power has some of its roots in the counter-culture, among people who, lacking a sense of global dimensions and demography, believe that it is possible for individuals in an enormous society to live as they like, close to nature and with at least moderate self-sufficiency. Though they make use of electricity and many high-technology devices, such as transistor radios and hi-fi equipment, they have much the same kind of supposedly humane anti-scientific and anti-technological bias about which C.P. Snow wrote

many years ago in his famous Reith Lectures on the two cultures.

This bias also includes a disdain for regular work, particularly work that is hard. They regard people who are dedicated to such work as unsympathetic, and have coined the word "workaholic" to describe them. To be sure, there are some individuals who are addicted to work because they can find no other interest in life or because of greed for money or power, but others, as I have suggested, are attempting in a small way to put a brake on the disorder, and indeed on the entropy in the world.

The concept, if not the term, "workaholic" has been around for a long time. To work "too hard" has always been risky for employees on the factory floor (as for some college students also), who would be punished as rate-busters. What is relatively new is that similar deprecation is heaped on those managers of public and private enterprise who continue in the face of difficulties to keep the wheels turning. Thus, the use of the term "workaholic" may be taken as a symptom of the wide prevalence of postindustrial attitudes which in fact interfere with our ability to compete on a worldwide basis.

After the Dream of Abundance, What?

I was prematurely pessimistic in concluding, a dozen years ago, that by this time most private colleges would have had to shut down. I underestimated their ability to cut costs, to raise private and public support, and to be inventive in surviving (often at considerable cost to academic integrity and morale). I also expected a Right-wing backlash against the unruliness of the most visible and prestigious institutions of higher education — a backlash of outraged morality delayed by the conflicts over the Vietnam War and the peculiarly American drama of Watergate. Doubly chastened both for my early sanguinity and my later premature pessimism, all I now believe I can say with confidence about the future is that it is least likely to resemble an extrapolation from the present: It will surprise us.

Beginning with the Puritans, with their concept of a "City on a Hill," America has been a country of hope, looked to by millions of people who came here or wished to come here. This assessment was not entirely illusory, but the belief that this country could produce abundance for all was carried too far. The more modest concept of incremental progress was drowned in that illusion, which also gave rise to the belief of the post-World War II era

that one could have abundance in the sense of consumption, equality, and security, in a world of armed nation-states. In his new book, *Le mal américain*, Michel Crozier comments on the lack of fatalism (there was always a buried strand of this in our thinking) that he experienced when he first came to this country after World War II: he saw an innocent belief in unlimited progress on all fronts simultaneously. He goes on to note how, unprepared for ill fortune, the United States today, at least among its elites with which he is familiar, has shifted from exaggerated self-confidence to an exaggerated defeatism.

Indeed, with the decline among many of the more thoughtful elites of the older American dream, though it is harbored in different versions both among the far Right and the far Left who defy the constraints of history (and of the American character types we have evolved as a result of that history), there is now a widely prevalent belief that America is a decadent and declining power, inferior even to the Soviet Union. Yet all the major industrial economies have suffered reverses, even the Japanese, in terms of real, noninflated growth. These reverses reflect not only the newly enormous costs of the once cheap energy on which much earlier abundance rested, but also the attitudes and behavior that I have referred to as postindustrial; such attitudes, for example, in Sweden, have led to the belief that it is unwise to buy a Saab or Volvo made on Mondays or Fridays because of the absenteeism and drunkenness.

What is required is to draw on the still available enormous resources of intelligence and energy in this country, to recognize that the idea of progress, with its roots in some of the Greek philosophers and in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, has value when it is not pushed to messianic extravagance. We need to get back to the task of putting our minds and our emotional energies into improving our technology and our managerial capacities so that we can maintain the true gains that industrial society made possible and still makes possible. An increase of productivity of 1 or 2 percent a year is not utopia, but it is the order of magnitude that we must strive for and regard, if we achieve it, as we can, as an accomplishment more important than the dream of abundance. □

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The Americans and The World After 1984

Some hopes for the years beyond Metternich, Mishmash, and Haigspeak

McGEORGE BUNDY

John Kenneth Galbraith, chairperson —
Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics,
Emeritus, Harvard University

McGeorge Bundy — Professor of History,
New York University

Stanley Hoffmann — C. Douglas Dillon
Professor of the Civilization of France,
Harvard University

John Kenneth Galbraith: It's nice to see you here and very nice to see you looking at least the minimum standards of health for your profession.

It's also nice for me to reflect, as a long-time member of the Harvard faculty, that there are elements of fraud in your presence. It has long been the practice at Harvard, almost uniquely among such institutions, that we have a large number of enterprises and programs that bring people back to the University. Or bring people to the University for the first time. There are the Fellows at the Center for International Affairs, which was created by McGeorge Bundy. It was originally called the CIA but in the late 1960's it seemed wise to put in the added "F." We have the Advanced Management Fellows, the Kennedy Fellows, the Mason Fellows. It has always been assumed that this is a thing of great advantage for those who so return, and of course it is. But it is a greater advantage for those of us who comprise the University. I think it fair to say that these activities have kept us in

better touch with the world at large than any of our competitors. Therefore it is a factor in the extraordinary pre-eminence that we so obviously enjoy as regards other universities.

I'm glad to welcome you here this evening for a change in the mood of the day. All day today and yesterday you have been engaged in the greatest of journalistic exercises, which is self-flagellative reflection on your own inadequacy. This morbid exercise is peculiar to journalists. So far as I know, professors, foreign service officers, politicians, police officers, do not so occupy their time. But journalists, when they assemble, always do. It impresses me that any profession could regard itself publicly in so unfavorable a light and be proud of it.

I now come to the business of the evening, and my first source of pleasure is to call on McGeorge Bundy. I can't imagine that there are many people in the audience who know of the affection with which McGeorge Bundy was regarded by my generation in the years following World War II, during the years when he served as Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. I remember going to see him once in the late 1950's in a condition of considerable sorrow and pain, occasioned by an important but unwritten book. His response was immediate. "If you have a book as important as you believe this to be and you can get it out, I will certainly do anything possible. You can have whatever time off is necessary for that purpose."

All of which reminded me, as it will some of you from the West Coast, of Robert Gordon Sproule. Sproule was for many years the head of the University of California. Once in the course of one of his great orations he came up with the novel thought that a university was run after all for the students. This aroused the ferocious anger of Professor M. M. Knight, a noted economic historian who

made a series of speeches pointing out that universities are run for the faculty and that steps should be taken to confirm that fact by keeping the students out of the library.

My affection for McGeorge Bundy extends over a great many areas of association. Most of all I call on him now as a man who recognized what I earnestly desired, namely that a university should be run for the faculty. Mac.

McGeorge Bundy: Galbraith, through all his long and distinguished career, has always told part of the truth. I did believe in part that the university should be run for the faculty, and he believed in part that that was sufficient. His underlying view was that the university should be run for the absent faculty — a position that he sustained by a variety of devices: bestsellers, conversations with Buckley, visits with Jackie in Delhi. Ken has done Harvard more good over greater distances than any other ornament of whatever height that the institution has ever had, except perhaps the Nieman Foundation. What Ken forgot to tell you is that the Nieman Foundation was created by Mr. Conant because of his deep dissatisfaction with his last preceding innovation, which was the Littauer School of Public Administration, where both Galbraith and I worked for many years. A close contemplation of the consequence of trying to make people actually take courses, take degrees, and do work, when they had been out in the wider world of public and journalistic affairs, persuaded Mr. Conant that a somewhat more gentle process of conversion and communication was desirable. He would set up the Nieman Foundation, nobody would have to do anything, and Archie MacLeish would spread charm. And that's actually the way it happened.

I am supposed to make you a reasonably serious speech, and then Stanley will sort it out, straighten it out, and then we'll have an argument. And I hope we will. There's a marvelous description of the condition of this discourse in the morning paper — a discussion of Mr. Suslov's visit to Warsaw in *The New York Times*. What it says is that the discussion was partylike and cordial, which is in their language a way of saying that there was a blunt exchange of views. That is what I hope we can have here: let's be partylike and cordial and have a blunt exchange of views. My suggestion as a theme for the evening is that it is time for that, as we think about the United States in world affairs, because if people like this company don't do it, probably not many other people will in the next three-and-a-half years. We are in a period in our national politics in which the polarizations which grew out of Vietnam have led us to a series of administrations prone to rigid political postures, first in one party and then in the other, that are defined much more by what we are against at home than by what we think the world really is like beyond our borders.

I offered you as a subtitle a kind of come-on, a bit of a clever phrase about Metternich, Mishmash, and Haig-speak. I don't have to spell out any one of those three



John Kenneth Galbraith

slightly flip characterizations, because the press has done it for all of us. We know that secretiveness and even duplicity, a kind of feeling that only one man can do it, vitiated much of what was attempted in the time when Henry Kissinger was the principal person below the President in foreign affairs. We know about the divisions and the internal conflicts that were mutually destructive among the people at the top of the Department of State and the top of the White House staff in the Carter years. And we know that it can be a quite serious impediment to communication to have a Secretary of State for whom all nouns are verbs and vice versa. But we also know as of the last forty-eight hours that the Secretary is beginning to make speeches with the aid of a speechwriter, so that particular difficulty may have been removed. There are other difficulties, and I think quite serious ones, in the Secretary of State's last speech, but I really don't want to take your time on such matters because you can all do it for yourselves, and in addition because I run the great risk of having you ask me questions about the principal adventure of the first hundred days of the Kennedy Administration, which was of course the Bay of Pigs.

The thing I'd rather talk about is harder, and I myself a

bit more uncertain about it. It is not something we can finish cheerfully in one evening. It is whether we are not — both you and we, if I may speak of you as journalists and us as academics — whether both you and we are not paying too much attention, as we think about the world and our country's part in it, to our *own* country and what *we* do. It might be to our advantage, both as teachers and reporters, to think about the degree to which the world is *not* just what the Americans think and do, and not even what the Americans and the Soviets think and do. I would offer you two supporting propositions and then try to give them a little substance.

The first is that the principal key to an understanding of international affairs for the rest of this century is in a recognition that the rising relative force is not either in the United States or in the Soviet Union and still less in the rivalry between them. That rivalry is certain to continue, and in some measure and by some choices we must play our part in it, but except at the level of continuing strategic stalemate, which I think is inevitable and very hard not to have, I suggest that in the main it will be mediated through the relations of the two powers to others; that those others, their interests, their upheavals, their attacks and defenses, their successes and failures, are likely to be the primary force in defining what happens.

My second point is that the American part of this adventure will be good or bad in the measure that we are able to harmonize our purposes with those of these other societies, and that insofar as these areas are to be the scenes of rivalry and even conflict between our interests and those of the Soviet Union, the result will be determined mainly by our relative success or failure in that effort of harmonization. Durable domination based on direct military or political control will be decreasingly available to either superpower in most of these areas, even in those quite close to their own borders. I offer you those as two general propositions and I would like to take the argument just a little bit further before we go to discussion by looking at them in the light of two particular cases. One is Iran, and the other is Poland.

We have had a great many postmortems on the fate of the Shah and the rise of the Ayatollah, and in this country we have found that the argument, as so often in the last ten or fifteen years, has been polarized, and people at both poles start from the notion that it is in some sense our fault. To the critics of a faint-hearted Jimmy Carter, bemused by an intrinsically inapplicable concern for civil rights, unwilling to seem to encourage the use of force by anyone in any circumstances, torn by the hopelessly conflicting tactical counsels of Vance and Brzezinski, for these it is Carter who did it. But for others it is Nixon and Kissinger, the issuers of blank checks for endless military purchases, publicly engaged in identification of Iran and still more of the Shah himself as a major pillar of American

security. And for still others it goes back, way back, and includes all of us who ever served in Washington, all the way back to the early 1950's: we did it. What all of this analysis neglects, I think, is that the fall of the Shah was primarily, centrally, decisively an Iranian event, and that the main forces were never more than marginally accessible to American influence, much less to American control. This basic general point — it's time I gave you some homework — is made, I think brilliantly, in an essay that appeared initially in the *Washington Quarterly*, by Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, called "Carter and the Fall of the Shah: the Inside Story." It is now a book, I find in this morning's *New York Times*, and you can read 230 pages instead of 40. It's an excellent article, but it also illustrates my point, because what they say, at least in the article (I haven't yet read the book), in the 35 of the 40 pages, is that there was terrible confusion in Washington, that Brzezinski was sending messages on one wire and Vance was sending other opinions on another wire, that private telephone calls through Zahedi were contradicted by cables to Sullivan, and that Carter could not make up his mind. My guess is that this is all true, or at least near the truth. But what it says in the first five pages is that that's not the point. So it is a misfortune that this excellent analysis has the title it does — *Debacle: The American Failure in Iran* — when the basic argument of the authors is that the Shah himself was on the whole the first cause of his own downfall, and that a number of fundamental, internal, social, and political changes in Iran were the supporting forces that were really decisive.

Now, I don't mean to argue this beyond your tolerance or beyond the point of your interest, but it is not a trivial point. If what happens in Iran is going to be decided primarily in Iranian terms and by Iranian actors, then it is a deep error of both politics and reporting to suppose that what is going on in Washington in response to a crisis in Iran is the center of the story. It's not. The ultimate irony, in the case of Iran, as this same article reports, is that who do you suppose finally concluded that it was what they thought in Washington that would decide? The Shah. I think one can say quite plainly about any country in the last twenty years of the twentieth century that when its ruler so far loses touch with his own responsibilities and his own political survival as to believe that what he most needs to know is whether his telephone calls from Zbigniew are American policy, he has missed the point. But the fact that he missed the point is not a reason for us to do the same. What happened in Iran happened for mainly Iranian reasons.

One comfort in this particular conclusion in this particular case is that it gives an excellent indication for the generally useful course of American foreign policy with respect to Iran in the immediate future. We are very, very lucky that a combination of events has cleared away

our past preoccupation about Iran. Here I include another whole set of problems in Iranian history, those which come with the arrival of the Ayatollah, the taking of the hostages, and the anguish of our year of not dealing with that problem, which may well have been the right way to deal with it. Now we have no hostages in Iran, no relations with Iran, no immediate problem of Iranian policy. The administration is presented with an absolutely ideal situation because the one obvious way in which we can make enormous progress in our relations with Iran over the next months and perhaps years is to do nothing. I think that a combination of conflicting forces, the forces of those who believe that this is in some sense the geopolitical epicenter of the universe, of those who believe that the revolution, because it is a revolution, requires support (a small group), and of those who believe that because this is the wicked Ayatollah and these are the people who took our hostages we must have revenge — all these forces have been neutralized. We have for the moment a policy that will spread across Iran a profound sense of American indifference, which is the best therapy we have in a process by which eventually we reconstruct some kind of sensible relation to that deeply troubled and terribly torn country. We never should have supposed that any man in Iran could have been our agent if he were not his country's agent, and that man should never have supposed it either. Neither should we suppose that merely opposing that man and having some other American view of what is good for Iran is much better. We should never have attempted to be the Iranian conscience.

Now let me turn to Poland, an even more interesting and important case. I remind you to start with that there is a sense in which Poland is where it all began. The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which were nonexistent in the 1920's, trivial in the 1930's, hostile after the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, wary in 1941 and 1942, became warm over agreement to defeat the Nazis, and became wary again, and then hostile, in the first instance over Poland. I would remind you further of an interesting point, that in those days the notion that we should not worry about Poland was shared by no one. When we came to the debates that we did have in 1946 and 1947 over Poland, there was not in fact disagreement in American public opinion over the importance of a Poland not controlled and dominated by any other country and specifically not by the Soviet Union. When Walter Lippmann wrote the most important single set of essays in opposition to George Kennan, later published in a little book called *The Cold War* (which I would assign if you were all still in class), he said that the heart of the trouble was the presence of the Red Army in Central Europe, and that the heart of the solution was that the Army should be removed. His disagreement with George Kennan was over ways and means, not over ends. The existence of Soviet

control over the nations of Eastern Europe was unacceptable then, in the sense that we could not ourselves endorse, support, encourage, or insure it and it was unsupportable in a wider sense: that no one who had a durable sense of history of Europe, and specifically the history of Poland, would suppose that domination of Poland by the kind of force that was represented by the Red Army and international Communist control was durably stable. The error, if there was one, in the shared analysis of Walter Lippmann and Dean Acheson, was in supposing that there could be any early vindication of that profoundly accurate historical judgment. And what we now confront is that a later answer, but not an American answer, is being forced by the people, the society, the situation, on the scene. We think sitting where we are, that the squabbles between Al Haig and Cap Weinberger, or fuss over the confirmation of Assistant Secretaries of State, are the large issues of international affairs. Mr. Suslov's visit to Warsaw is the large issue of international affairs. We think, partly because the administration tells us so, that the question of our balance of power with the Soviet Union at this or that level of tactical theater or strategic strength is of enormous importance. That is not what worries Moscow most. We think that if we say firm things about what is or is not done in Poland our posture may somehow decide the event, and we are even inclined — nearly all governments do this — to claim credit for favorable changes in the immediate course of this or that process of negotiation, this or that movement of troops, or abandonment of maneuvers. We are wrong. What is going on is something much larger, much deeper, and much less our affair.

If I were assigning homework here I would ask you to read a quite extraordinary essay in the 1980 annual issue of *Foreign Affairs*, by Professor Bialer of Columbia, another university which has its own traditional and sometimes turbulent connections with the press. Professor Bialer's point — well taken, I think, and deeply argued — is that what is going on in Poland is not a matter of small importance, that it is much larger even than such relatively large and serious matters as the East German rebellion, or the Hungarian enterprise of 1956, or the Czechoslovak affair of 1968. It is deeper because what is going on in Poland has a deeper root, a wider base, a better leadership, a stronger resonance, not only among the Polish workers, but among the Polish Catholics — which is most Poles — and even in the Polish Communist Party, and because the choices that are faced by the men in Moscow as they think about what to do about this are larger. They are not sure where the Polish army would be; they do not know where the other European parties would be, with the exception of the unlovely East Germans and possibly the Czechs. So they have stood back at choice after choice since August, making each later choice larger

and harder. The question of choice in Poland for the Soviet Union is not what Al Haig will say. It is what is the future of Marxism-Leninism, and even what is the future of their own control by their own party of their own politics in their own country. Bialer, after assessing in a powerful set of



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passages the costs that would be faced by the Soviet government if it were to decide to resolve this matter by military force, reaches the conclusion that they could take that course only if they had reached the gloomiest possible conclusions about the impact of inaction upon their own control in their own society. Now I don't wish to predict, replacing by my error the error I am attacking, how this unfinished story will play out. I wish only to say that it is not centrally an American story. What is giving strength to Solidarity, what is giving change to the internal structure of the Polish party, what is giving pause to men who did not pause in 1956, is a set of events and development that is fundamentally East European, initially but not only Polish. We do not understand it, and we cannot react well to it, if we think of it as a phenomenon that is to be measured by how we look at it. It's not.

Yet the probability is that if we think about this event simply as I suspect nearly all of us do think about it, as human beings, we would come to a conclusion that is also a good conclusion in terms of American foreign policy. When Harry Hopkins went to Moscow to talk to Stalin for Harry Truman about the breakdown in communications that seemed to threaten the establishment of the United Nations, the issue that was most difficult was Poland, and

what Hopkins said to Stalin — and given where they both came from at that time it was a natural thing to say — was that you must understand that for us in our country it is just going to be terribly hard to explain our policy if we cannot say that the Poles have been allowed to make a free choice. Stalin, who was enormously quick in the immediate tactics of debate, picked up not that particular question, but the question of what was hard to explain from his standpoint, and talked about how hard it would be for him to explain these matters to his people if there were not a friendly government in Poland. And they were both right. Thirty-five years later we are at a situation in which that problem, then probably not resolvable, might in fact be resolved. If the issue is what kind of Poland is dangerous to the Soviet Union in national security terms — not in terms of bad examples to party minions — if the issue is who is threatened by external force, there is no threat, and the only thing that could give a false appearance of threat is a foolish claim by us that what is going on in Poland is somehow our doing. In the widest, deepest, human sense the Polish renewal is indeed in our interest, but we can be absolutely sure that Solidarity is not acting as an agent of the American government. An enormous part of its strength is in the total clarity of that fact, and, therefore, those who are counseling restraint in the Soviet Union — and one must remember that they are still in the majority because that is what has been the policy so far — need to understand not so much what we will do if they invade, but what we will not do if they do not. They need to be confident that what is going on in Poland is a Polish phenomenon, not the vanguard of some worldwide anti-Soviet counterrevolution. All this is understood by the Poles, whether they are the Poles of Solidarity, or the Poles of the Party, or the Poles of the Army. All this is understood by some, but not by all, in the Soviet Union. The part of wisdom for the United States, it appears to me, is to understand that this is the largest and, with luck, the most constructive single force set loose within the last five years in the affairs of the world, and that the best thing we can do for it is not to try to seem to be the creators of something that can have lasting life and strength only in its own terms, through its own people, and in its own context. Wisdom, generosity, awareness, and our own interest combine to argue how very large this event is and that we should not make the probably fatal error of trying to make it ours.

I have given you these two examples as part of a larger, more general theme. I do not intend to say that there is no large issue between us and the Soviet Union directly, although I do intend to say that those issues which are direct are few, and in my view relatively manageable. I believe, for example, that the strategic nuclear balance that we do have between us will remain stable in spite of the worst efforts on both sides to switch it

around. On the high seas we are both present, and will continue to be present, but that does not mean that we are getting ready for some new battle of Trafalgar. There are economic relations between us which it is worthwhile to sustain but to both of us, for a variety of reasons, they are trivial. I believe that we will have differences, and deep differences, in public discussion — and here I associate myself with George Kennan, who once said that it should be our policy to leave no lie unanswered and to earn and keep a reputation for telling the truth. It is not easy to do, but it can be done. But what I really believe is that to set the world's affairs in terms of a contest between the two of us is to miss most of the interesting issues and to focus attention on the wrong ones. I offer this not really as a prescription to the current administration but as a means of thinking about what might come later, because I am not an optimist about the early future. If I were giving you still more homework, I would explain that I think this administration will fail in its domestic economic policy for the reasons amply argued by Francis Bator in *The London Economist* in an issue that he will be glad to send you on request; that it will fail in foreign policy because it would rather have posture than performance; and that it will fail in the area in between because its defense programs will spend inordinately, to the domestic damage, without adequate advantage to the international position. And now I may have said enough to start an argument.

Galbraith: Thank you very much, Mac. I'm not prepared to insist that there be an argument, for I'm prepared to agree with you.

If there were one thing that I would wish every journalist to have in mind in considering the somber issues with which we're concerned this evening, it is that he or she be conscious of the fears to which any particular speaker is subject where the Soviet Union is concerned — as was once the case with China. An extraordinary amount of our comment is motivated either by the fear of conservatives of Communism or the fear of my fellow liberals of being thought soft on Communism. This should be put in the back of the mind of anyone who hears a speech on these issues.

One of the things that I have always liked most about Stanley Hoffmann is that he's exempt from both of those fears. I don't have to introduce him because a large number of you at one time or another have had the very good sense to go into his lectures. It gives me very great pleasure to call on the man, the person, from whom I have sought more of my guidance on international affairs than any other — with the possible exception of Mac Bundy — Stanley Hoffmann.

Stanley Hoffmann: Thank you very much for this overly generous introduction. I am in a very difficult position for

two reasons. First, it is late in the evening and I have to react on my feet to Mac's usual brilliant performance. The second reason is that I agree entirely with him. It's perhaps not altogether surprising that we should agree since I learned much of what I know about international politics from when I assisted him, almost thirty years ago when I first came to Harvard and he was teaching Government 185. I have to inform him that in Government 185 as it is being taught now, by me, the Lippmann book is assigned, and unfortunately, like most interesting books in every field, it is currently out of print. Incidentally, I discovered this year that this extends to John Stuart Mill.

I do agree with Mac's two propositions. I think that they have been demonstrated not only by the current events in Iran and Poland but by many other things in the last twenty years, including Vietnam. What I am bothered by is one difficulty that is very clear, and that has been made even clearer by the last election campaign: the quite extraordinary difficulty the nation seems to have to accept those points. Now, there is a great deal the United States as a world power has learned in the last thirty-five years; it would be absurd to argue that the United States is condemned to repeat the same mistakes again and again. I sometimes go back to France, where I originally came from, and I am amused to discover that the French still believe there really is a danger — or a hope — that the United States might return to isolationism. This is a phenomenon which, it seems to me, was destroyed on December 7, 1941. It is one lesson the United States has learned. There are many other things we have learned, but there are quite a number of things we have not learned and which are quite worrisome: I would like to tick off five around the points that Mac made.

The first one is the really quite amazing exhaustion of ideas about international affairs which was demonstrated by the last campaign. I know that campaigns are never great occasions for political theory, but from time to time, new ideas appear — even if they don't turn out to be very good. In that respect, the 1976 campaign was a much more interesting one. However, after thirty-five years as a world power, and after having tried a number of foreign policies, each one of which had its mixtures of failures and successes, none of which has been an unmitigated failure, none of which has been a complete success (there is no such thing as complete success for a great power in international affairs), there was a total exhaustion of ideas this last time. One witnessed a curious non-contest between one side demoralized by having ended in 1980 exactly where it had said four years earlier that it would not be, and another side which simply fell back on every one of the illusions of nostalgia and the clichés of the 1950's as a strange way of adapting to a world which has very little resemblance to the world of 1950. At this point, I don't see any particular sign of great change; the people in

power still believe in the kind of mythology that Mac has so effectively criticized, and the other side is still trying to find out where the wounds are and where the bullets entered. This is a very unhealthy state of affairs indeed.

The second disturbing point has to do with these recurrent explosions of American insecurity. In a sense there was a first one immediately after the second World War. If one thinks back to the period of the late 1940's one realizes how strong the United States was compared to everybody else — including the devastated Soviet Union, which incidentally also proceeded to demobilize to a considerable extent. And yet when one looks at the rhetoric of the period and at some of the fears that underlay the rhetoric of officialdom, one realizes that the United States, finding itself suddenly in charge of a world completely different than the world it had hoped for during World War II, reacted with a certain amount of panic which had serious repercussions in domestic affairs. We've had a second such wave of insecurity, a mounting one, over the last four or five years, when the United States discovered that the world had indeed changed; that partly through its own efforts its allies were now displaying both power and independence to an extent which had not been conceivable in the 1950's, when we discovered that the Soviet Union had been continuing its own build-up; the reaction was and still is a kind of insecurity which seems to seek solace almost exclusively in the realm of the military. As if the only way of reassuring oneself against the kinds of trends that Mac has mentioned, and of which the most important is the decentralization or the fragmentation of power in a world of a hundred and seventy actors, consisted of giving oneself the kind of weaponry that, on the whole, one can do very little with.

The third point is precisely this bizarre American concentration on the military dimension. This has been particularly noticeable in the discussions of recent years, as a visiting Swiss economist mentioned in a letter that he sent to Ken Galbraith a couple of years ago. He noticed after three months at the Harvard Center for International Affairs that every seminar, even if it started with an arcane discussion of the international monetary system, ended up with forty-five minutes on Minute Man vulnerability: in other words, with the least likely, most nightmarish scenario of all; it is this nightmarish scenario which seems to have been driving American policy in recent years. Why is it that whenever there is insecurity abroad, and whenever one feels that trends are adverse, one falls back on those calculations of hard-target kill capabilities and all of that awful jargon? I think it is partly to reassure oneself with something that is quantifiable and apparently therefore certain; but it is also partly a diversion from having to face the fact that when it comes to the terms that Mac has mentioned, the multiplication of independent

actors in the world whom we simply cannot control, we prefer not to think about it and to concentrate instead on what we know we are good at, which is the building up of technology and force. There is here, as in so many other areas, a rather deadly symmetry between the two superpowers. In our moments of gloating (which alternate with our moments of panic) we congratulate ourselves on being a nation which, unlike the Soviet Union, has many other instruments at our disposal beside military power. But if you look at what the present administration seems to be pointing to, soon, like the Soviet Union, we will be a power that puts all its foreign policy money into the military basket exclusively. We seem to be giving up what could be called diplomatic power, economic power, foreign assistance except in the form of arms sales. (Do you want weapons? Of course, we will sell them to you, and the consequences will be whatever they may be.) So that both superpowers, in a world which is too complicated for them, seem to be relying exclusively on what is ultimately a rather dangerous and limited instrument.

The fourth point has to do with the consequences of what McGeorge Bundy mentioned. If it is indeed true, as I profoundly believe it is, that the most important thing in the next twenty or thirty years might be called the end of colonialism — a phenomenon which, incidentally, the Europeans with their own and long colonial experience seem to have understood better than the United States — if the key necessity is for each one of the superpowers to associate itself with the interests of the other countries rather than superimpose its own concerns and priorities on those countries, then we will face some extremely difficult policy questions, which neither this administration nor really the previous one have begun to address. In order to associate oneself with the interests of so many regimes and countries going in very different directions, there is a first prerequisite, and that is a minimum of expertise. And one rather striking thing is that in every major American defeat or failure of the last twenty years, Iran being only the latest example, policy makers realized that when they made their decision they really knew extremely little about the culture, mores, society, religion, politics, history, and traditions of the country in question. It would be incomprehensible otherwise that for so long, for instance, the North Vietnamese would have been seen as the stalking horses of the Chinese. The last ambassador to Iran, when he was at Harvard some months ago (some of you might have heard him) said that when he got there — not being an expert on Iran since this had never been his area of service before — he discovered how few people knew anything at all about that society. The creation of a pool of expertise doesn't have to be the monopoly of universities, it can be done in a variety of ways; but it is simply neglected, and the decline of the study of languages is going to make it worse in coming years. This

is something which no amount of arms buildup and rapid deployment forces can substitute for.


Moreover, if we find that some of the regimes on which we very deeply and directly depend are regimes in trouble and that, as in the case of Iran, their fate will ultimately be determined by their own internal processes without our being able to do very much about it (except blame ourselves in retrospect for everything that goes wrong in one of those traditional American debates where it is always other Americans who are at fault, which is again a marvelous way of not examining the outside world), then we do have an enormous and important priority: we must, if not dissociate ourselves from such countries — that's not always possible — at least make ourselves less dependent upon them. This ought to be the first priority; I'm thinking of a case like Saudi Arabia. But very often precisely because we are driven by strategic considerations which project an East-West grid on events far too complicated to fit into such a framework, we are likely to do exactly the opposite. And thus when the regime sinks, as has happened in Iran, we are very likely to sink with it.

Also it may very well be that the only way for us to associate ourselves with the interests of other countries in order perhaps not to obtain their good will (this is not necessarily the purpose of foreign policy) but at least to prevent the Soviet Union or other enemies from exploiting local opportunities, is for the United States to resign itself to the coming to power in various places of regimes we don't like: regimes that do not believe in the kind of stability which Washington believes in, or which are not in agreement with the model of free enterprise or democracy or peaceful change that we are fond of. Accepting this remains extraordinarily difficult for a great part of the American public, and even more for a great part of the political class which in a sense is courting defeat, by calling a defeat everything which does not fit a model which works practically only in America and in a few other countries.

The last point I'd like to make has to do with our relations with the Soviet Union. Here again I agree entirely with McGeorge Bundy's points. I think that to be obsessed with the Soviet relationship is a terrible mistake. I do think that in that respect the initial impulse of the Carter administration was correct although I also do believe that you cannot compartmentalize United States-Soviet relations, separated from everything else. But if we think about the future of our relations with the Soviet Union, we do have to think about the evolution of the Soviet Union as a country, as a society, just as we ought to think about the evolution of society in places like Saudi Arabia or Brazil or El Salvador or South Africa.

And here we have to think about the following problem: It is clear that the Soviet Union will face all the kinds of troubles which experts on the Soviet Union

including the admirable Seweryn Bialer whom McGeorge has so rightly mentioned, and many others, have described — succession problems, economic rigidities, the decline of economic growth, nationalities problems, what



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have you. It is going to be very important in our relations with the Soviet Union to keep in mind that even though history never entirely reproduces itself there are also some historical patterns that do. And in Russian history over the centuries many things have reproduced themselves.

One of the things we have to be concerned about, is not to treat the Soviet Union in such a way that when its internal troubles escalate, external adventure becomes a kind of logical way out. We have to be very careful not to corner the bear, or not to corner the beast, in such a way that inside the Soviet Union itself external adventure or war or the temptation to take far greater risks than in the past, justified by the accumulation of military power, seems to become the way out. Now this is not something based exclusively on the kind of gloomy vision of the fundamental essence of Russia, à la Richard Pipes. It is something which anybody who studies the way in which revolutionary regimes evolve has to be aware of. And this is one of the reasons why the present line which consists simultaneously of stressing the internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union, the military threat it creates, and the need for all good people to form a kind of worldwide coalition against the cornered beast, is in the long run thoughtless. So that even if one agreed, which I personally do not, that

there has been a distinctive change of Soviet foreign policy around the middle 1970's, and that for the years to come the only possibility is containment (the argument made for instance by Robert W. Tucker in *Foreign Affairs* a few months ago), there is a duty on the part both of the statesmen and people who think about foreign policy (which I do hope from time to time includes the press) to think beyond those few years; in this respect the policy of perpetual containment with no other prospect than containing, with the hope that somehow in the end everything will be all right, is a rather bleak one because it's not likely to work and also because it does not offer any kind of long-range vista for anybody at all, either on this side, or among our allies, or for the Soviet Union itself. So what I'm suggesting at a time when everybody watches to see whether this particular administration is going to match or even outdo the last one in exuberant incoherence is a resumption of thought not about what will happen in the next two or three years but about the rest of the century, beyond 1984 to quote from the title of Mac's presentation. Thank you.

Galbraith: I confess to a fascination with the point that Stanley Hoffmann made when he spoke of the economic and social difficulties of the Soviet Union, difficulties which are not confined to Russia, but extend to Eastern Europe and which have their counterpart in China. One is fascinated by the thought that these difficulties are shared by the Western industrial economies. Economic difficulty, some prefer the term crisis, has come both to the socialist and non-socialist world at the same time. It would be quite interesting if socialism were working brilliantly, communism were working brilliantly, and we were having our present combination of unemployment and inflation. Or were the reverse true. It's obvious that there is some benign guidance which leads both systems to misfortune at the same time. But there is really a deeper force for convergence here. In highly organized societies there are problems that aren't common to the world of the great corporation and the large state in the Western industrial countries and to the comprehensive organizations of the socialist or Communist world. In my profession we have studied the market beyond diminishing returns, but we have largely left unstudied the economic problems of great organizations and highly organized societies. We have a convergent tendency here, a converging force that operates on both republicanism and socialism. I yearn to continue but I'm going to turn the conversation back to you.

Question: You seem to have taken an attitude of indifference about Iran and Poland, Dr. Bundy. If you were President Reagan, what would you do about Saudi Arabia?

Bundy: That is not an easy question at all. I think that it is a mistake to try to enlist the Saudis in our anti-Soviet enterprise in quite the highly visible "This-is-what-I'm-going-to-do-this-is-what-I'm-going-to-say-this-is-what-I've-said-and-I'm-making-progress" way that the administration has done, but I'm a little wary of expressing wisdom merely by criticism of what is. If I were to pick a point of tone and temper that is where I would differ with Stanley. I think that's too easy. The question is always what we should do, not what should we not do, and in this case it is very hard, and your question is a good one.

Our posture toward the Saudi Arabians should have a number of components that it doesn't have at the moment. The simplest one, and the one I think would define the point best, is that it is really nonsense for us to be hesitant about our own oil arrangements, and in particular our own notions about a strategic reserve. Sheik Yamani has the most obvious reasons for not wanting a strong American strategic reserve, but they are not our reasons. They are the opposite of our reasons. It's astonishing that no administration, neither this one nor its predecessors, has truly made this high priority item. In each administration subordinate forces — in the Carter administration the Office of Management and Budget, and in this administration, as far as I can tell, some kind of silly coalition of Democratic and Republican money-savers — have sidetracked the strategic petroleum reserve. It is nonsense. We may not need it, but *if* we need it — it's like other kinds of insurance — we will need it like hell. And we ought to do it, and it ought to be clear between us and them that we are going to do it.

There are other things that ought to be clear between us and the Saudis, like our belief in the secure establishment and maintenance of the state of Israel. I also think that the Saudis need AWACs not just like a hole in the head but like a permanent mechanical problem in all four of the cars in the garage. It is a dumb thing for them to want and a stupid thing for us to sell, and to be honest with you, I fear that only a Secretary of Defense whose attitudes toward this matter of selling the Saudis what they want to buy have been shaped by years of intimate association with the Bechtel Corporation could have made such a hasty and unilateral decision. It would be a great deal better for the British to sell their slightly inferior machines; that would diversify Saudi procurement and it would frighten the Israelis less. Of course the Israelis get frightened more than they should. AWACs will not defeat Israel; it won't be run that well; it is not that important. But it is buying trouble. It comes out of a simple-minded desire to make friends by doing for your friend what he thinks he wants when what he wants is wrong. So I think that a grown-up approach to Saudi Arabia is long overdue. This is not one administration's problem, and it is reasonably manageable right now because of the short-run

situation in the world of oil supply and demand. But this administration did not come to power with any preceding experience in these matters. The only time in the last six months that I have had a deep sense of sympathy for Al Haig (it comes hard for me for a variety of reasons) is that he understood this point and would have liked to have stopped or delayed the AWACs sale.

Question: Is there something in the internal dynamics of this country that prevents us from lining up on the side of change and revolution?

Bundy: I don't think in fact that proposition holds up. If you look, for example (and I have to admit that I'm taking a case out of immediate, personal memory) at what Kennedy was trying to do in Latin America, it was genuinely to engage the United States on the side of the non-Communist left. It wasn't easy to do. It wasn't wholly successfully done, but that was the object of the enterprise. The leaders of the non-Communist left, a very powerful and interesting group in Venezuela, in Colombia, and Puerto Rico, understood that and were responsive to it, and that could be done again. I don't think that there is any fatal flaw that prevents us from doing it. What has been hard about it in that area in the years since the Castro ascendancy in Cuba is that the problem of associating with liberalism, and with change, and with democratic forces, and not associating with Moscow-supported forces has been a hard one, really a very hard one. People probably don't notice, but in the Dominican Republic today the President is the man who was in fact the proposed leader, the man who could have been the leader if we could have got Lyndon Johnson to agree to it, of a liberal non-Communist government, way back in 1965. There are other instances in particular countries where Americans have associated themselves with persons who would be regarded, I think, as progressive and liberal — Magsaysay comes to mind — but also anti-Communist.

Question: What about Argentina?

Bundy: Argentina is not a good place to hunt for liberals. Argentina really is — well, you know we cannot remake Argentina. Argentina is a country in which for a long, long time the processes of politics have alternated between radical and reactionary governments. That is roughly what it is, whether it is Peron or the generals, and the notion that there is available in Argentina for American support some sensible, forward-thinking Galbraithian leader is — just ask Ken, it's not the country in which he has the largest number of resident colleagues. That is just a fact. There are countries like that, and I think this is an important point.

The irony of the inter-American system is that with exceptions that are definable country by country, Costa Rica, Colombia, in the main Venezuela, and sometimes and marginally in Peru, and another kind of pragmatic and not explicitly liberal force in Brazil, with those exceptions you are dealing with translated Iberian cultures, mixed in varying proportions with the South American indigenous culture, and it cannot be said in most of these countries that charity towards one's enemies, forgiveness toward the opposition, and acceptance of diversity — elements of the political process that we usually take for granted — are normal. They are not. The hardest case we have, and one that we seem to understand psychologically but not logically, is the Mexican case. There we have really very good relations, governed in large part by mutual acceptance of neighborhood and an unwillingness to raise to the political plane two enormous economic problems. Our is what to do about our relation to their oil. Theirs is what to do about the fact that they solve their fundamental demographic problems by unacknowledged export.

Question: With regard to the Bay of Pigs, do you think that it overthrew Frondizi in Argentina, or that American anti-Communism somehow destroyed liberal — or liberal left — governments in Argentina, Peru, and Brazil?

Bundy: I think that notion is an example of the error I thought my remarks were about, the error of thinking that the way the Americans behave decides the internal political dynamics of countries of very considerable internal strength and energy, whatever direction that energy may take. I just wouldn't agree that what happened in those three countries was the consequence of the Bay of Pigs, which is not to say that the Bay of Pigs was a good event. Let me say one thing about the Bay of Pigs that is important in this period of a new administration. It is often thought, and Stanley Hoffmann has said it in a recent article, that one important thing for new administrations to do is to avoid a rapid change. The Bay of Pigs is a perfectly marvelous example of the consequence of inertially doing what was on the table when you came in. It is not always true that a new government is wise to change nothing in its first hundred days.

Comment: All you folks have said *we* and *they*; *us* and *them*. Remembering the motto of A. E. Housman — "Nothing human is alien to me" — I wonder if there is anyone else in this room who fails, occasionally, to identify totally with the national interest as it is defined from the head of the table.

Beyond that, I should like to congratulate the Nieman Foundation for inventing a kind of reverse Nuremberg in which the past sits in judgment on the present.

Bundy: Well you know, this is a very interesting point that you make, not an entirely polite one or a generous one, but a firm one. I'm perfectly prepared, and have always been prepared, to discuss questions of the past. I had thought that this audience would rather talk about questions of the future, and I would not have expected that my arguments would be denounced merely *ad hominem*.

Question: How long do you think Alexander Haig will be Secretary of State?

Bundy: Part of him will be Secretary of State as long as he can manage, which is understandable and indeed important. Part of him will be troubled, too troubled, I think, by questions of who is or isn't in charge of crisis management, who did or didn't win the argument over AWACs or the grain embargo. I wish myself for any Secretary of State that he should not have too much worry about himself or how he's doing or what the papers say about him. I think the Secretaries who have coolness about that have done better, and also the National Security assistants and also, on foreign affairs, even the Presidents. I think that it is really better to try to look (as I thought I was trying to do) at issues and at arguments about people. I don't think Al Haig finds that entirely easy. I hope he finds it easier as time passes. I would not have chosen him, but I would not be all that happy about who might replace him in this particular administration, because as I said much too hastily, I'm not an optimist about the current executive branch.

Question: I seek a little enlightenment on El Salvador. Are we doing the right thing by supporting an ostensibly middle-of-the-road regime which, however oppressive, looks less dangerous than the potential savagery on the extreme right or the extreme left? Or, are we supporting a regime that is so oppressive that we are in danger of winning the battle of El Salvador and losing the war of the hearts and minds of Mexico, Venezuela, and the rest of Latin America?

Bundy: I don't know. I got asked a question about El Salvador at a New York meeting like this one three or four months ago and I had to say I honestly knew nothing about El Salvador. That was regarded as bad, and maybe it was. But I cannot honestly say a whole lot more now. I think one of our problems in dealing with El Salvador is that an awful lot of people in this country chose up sides before reading. They know intrinsically that if those nuns went down the street they were carrying submachine guns and they deserve what they got. There is a little bit of that even in some official statements. Or, alternatively, they know that Duarte has to be merely a stooge for a bunch of

gunmen and that nothing good can be done through him and that the whole business of land reform is a fraud. I don't have first-hand knowledge, but I would be inclined to think that more sense has been spoken by former Ambassador White and by those reporters who tend on the whole to be more or less of his opinion than by any other strong statement I have seen. And I would like to connect your question to an earlier question. I don't think it beyond the wit of the United States to move a little further to the left in El Salvador (but not in this administration, I fear). I can imagine that it would be possible to develop an American position that was left-center in El Salvador and sustain it, but that has not been done.

Question: I wonder if the Soviet Union really is dangerous only as a cornered beast is dangerous — if the only things we truly have to fear are the things the Soviets may do in response to some kind of unwise or excessive pressure from the United States? I feel the Soviet Union has done many things that are not the product of American pressure but are rather the product of Soviet expansionism, either by opportunity or by the presence of their armies. And I think we should understand that the Soviet Union is engaged in this kind of expansionism, prudent or imprudent, cautious or incautious, and that it needs to be resisted.

Bundy: It's a terribly important question. Let me say that I don't think that the Soviet Union reacts only as a cornered beast or is a purely neutral or amiable force in international affairs. I think sometimes Stanley sounds that way, but he will speak for himself in a minute. My own view is that the places at which we need to resist the Soviet Union nearly all relate to the interests of other parties whose interests are deeper than our own, and that it is absolutely fundamental that we should keep those interests forward. Thus in Europe it is of no interest to us to be braver than the basic sentiments of the Europeans; it won't work over the long pull. The same thing is true in terms of interest, competence and commitment in other parts of the world. The Soviet Union is a totalitarian power and opportunistically expansive, I believe. Its buildup of military force creates latent dangers that could become open, I believe. That it is everywhere and always the enemy of the United States, and that this opposition should define our foreign policy in the sense in which Secretary Haig argues, I do not believe. That's where I am. Let's see where Stanley is.

Hoffmann: Very briefly, I'm in exactly the same position as Mac. I was saying that we should not treat it as a cornered beast; I've never said that Soviet actions are entirely defensive. I think they are indeed an opportunistic

power that tries to exploit quite a number of situations which seem to be favorable, as long as the risks are not too high, that certainly means we should do nothing to lower the risks for them, and that in areas like Europe or the Far East or to some extent the Persian Gulf, we ought of course to resist expansion. But first of all, and here I, like Mac, would take what I would call a modified Kennan position, the post-1947 Kennan: in this posture of resistance or containment, one has to think also about impact on the Soviet Union itself. If one went around doing what the Chinese have sometimes suggested, it would have very dangerous results. And precisely because in a country whose leadership has a certain tendency to collective paranoia in its leadership, there is a discrepancy between its military might and its general geopolitical situation in the world, which is not favorable, we have to be very careful not to take a provocative position. Secondly, the best way of dealing with some of the Soviet threat, is not at all to analyze every problem as if it had no independent existence, but to deal with the local roots of those problems. If one simply looks at every issue, whether it be El Salvador, or South Africa, or the Middle East, as if it were merely an issue of us versus the Soviet Union, this is the surest way of getting defeated and of just missing the boat. This is one of the reasons why in some of the discussions about the Middle East by people who have now joined the administration I rather worry at the amount of energy spent trying to forestall what I think is the least likely risk, a massive Soviet invasion of the area, rather than concentrating on the inter-state conflicts and the internal instabilities in the area, which the Soviets could very easily exploit without invading anybody. And for those kinds of problems the last approach I would recommend is the one that the present Secretary of State seems to be taking, at least in his public speeches.

Question: Professor Bundy, you have made the point, and Professor Hoffmann has agreed, that you cannot reduce all the problems of the world into some kind of bipolarity, some kind of military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. I am reminded of the time about sixteen years ago, when I heard a debate between McGeorge Bundy and Hans Morgenthau. Without dwelling on the past unduly, has some lesson from that time changed your mind about this, or am I misreading your analysis?

Bundy: Well, the question is very fairly asked, and asked, I think, in an entirely different spirit from the earlier question. And I'll repeat it for the audience. The questioner remembers a debate between Hans Morgenthau and myself — actually I think there were six of us, but we were two of them — and he remembers

Morgenthau raising some of the same questions about American power and other people's interests that have been discussed this evening. I haven't reread that debate in a long time, but I freely agree that Professor Morgenthau raised questions about the capacity and strength and durability of the South Vietnamese in that debate. Then I said that he had considered similar questions before and had then changed his views about the same South Vietnamese, which I did think was an argument *ad hominem*, merely a description of his record. But if you ask me what I then thought about Vietnam and what I think now, I will tell you. And it is something like this: I think I can say for myself that I always believed about that part of the world what I said in my speech tonight — that what happened in *South Vietnam* would depend finally upon what the South Vietnamese were able to do.

What I believed in 1965 was that after eleven years of deepening American engagement in trying to help them survive as a non-Communist society, we had an obligation not to quit. I also believed — and on these points I was not successful within the administration — that we ought to do some things we did not do. One was to explain our position to the government, to the people of the country and to take it to the Congress and the country in the way the President decided not to do. He was the President; I was not. The second was that we should make it very clear to our country and to our friends in South Vietnam that there were limits to the level of our engagement. And the third was precisely that we should emphasize what I have been talking about this evening: that what happened in the end would depend on the resilience, the determination, the effort at self-protection of the society of South Vietnam.

All of those things I believed then and I believe now. The imperfections that there were in my argument of those cases within the government I'm not the one to judge. I'm sure there were many. There were failures of communication and probably in the larger sense a failure even in the prescription, namely that even with a better exposition, even with a clear position of American restraint and even with a very different American relation to South Vietnam, it wouldn't have worked. I think on the whole that's right — that it wouldn't have worked. But I did not think then it should not be tried. So that's where I am on that. I do not find any inconsistency between what I then believed about the nature of our policy and what I am saying to you this evening. I do indeed feel that, as Stanley Hoffmann says, if one had known clearly in 1965 how enormously determined the totalitarian forces were — they were and are totalitarian forces and it's nonsense not to admit it — and how difficult it would be for our kind of society to help give the needed strength to the South Vietnamese society, it might well have been better in 1965 or 1964 or 1960 or 1958 to cut our losses. I came to believe

that only in 1967 when I was not in government, so in one sense I only thought it through when I could no longer do much about it. In 1965, when I was urging public exposition of the issue, limitation on our commitment, and emphasis on the responsibilities of the South Vietnamese, my personal judgment was that I wasn't doing much good in the government, and if you want to know, that's why I got out. But I really don't propose, as a guest invited to talk about the future, to engage in a prolonged defense of my past; I'm only answering your question.

James Thomson: We commemorate here tonight a very famous debate between Stanley Hoffmann and McGeorge Bundy and others, which took place at Harvard under the benevolent chairmanship of John K. Fairbank. At the time, these two friends were very much at odds over the Vietnam war, and I would now like to hear Stanley's reflections on what Mac just said.

Hoffmann: The last thing I want to do is get us back into the Vietnam debate. I think the disagreement between Mr. Bundy and myself in 1965, as he quite rightly put it, was over the possibility for the United States to succeed given what I thought was the inability of South Vietnam to become a nation in the middle of the war; it is only if the South Vietnamese had developed that capacity that the United States would have had a chance of winning because ultimately, as he said, you cannot win a war for another country. That, I think, was indeed the area of our disagreement.

I have a second point (but then again, it is the view of somebody who has never been in the government, and it is always easier of course to criticize from the outside). Even if the United States had conducted a public debate, and very clearly in the beginning indicated what it wanted the limits of its involvement to be, there would have been a very, very strong pressure to go beyond those limits if things turned out to be not working well. I think one of the lessons of a war like this is, that unless those limits one sets oneself are very, very stringent indeed, once one starts pouring in fairly large amounts of forces as was done in 1965, the escalation of the stakes follows the escalation of the means, and getting out, even if one had the best intention in the beginning of limiting one's actions, becomes extremely difficult. Especially in a country which finds it difficult to admit defeat. And precisely because of the need to convince people, there is inevitably going to be a tendency to present the thing in terms of victory versus defeat, not just for the people one tries to protect but for the United States itself. But that is really a very retrospective debate.

What I would like to emphasize is that whatever disagreements may have existed between us in 1965 and in 1968, I really detect no disagreements at all about the

next twenty years. Whether that means that Mr. Bundy now recognizes things he didn't recognize then, or whether we simply analyze in similar terms a world which is not the world of the 1960's, or whether it is that I'm getting tired myself is totally irrelevant. I think what matters is the agreement.

Thomson: I would like to ask Professor Galbraith to adjourn the proceedings by giving some form of benediction.

Galbraith: I must say that the theological tone on which we are ending is in if not pleasant contrast, then considerable contrast with some of the questions that were presented here this evening. I had some difficulty, when Vietnam came up, staying out of the debate. There were times in the Vietnam years when I had differences with McGeorge Bundy. I must tell you all, friendly or critical, that his was one of the doors always found open. It was an avenue of access to the President's office. And through deep and sometimes difficult differences of opinion I retain gratitude, major gratitude, for this.

I would hope that there might be room for another thought available to both Hoffmann and Bundy. That is the possibility that both the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a race to see which can lose influence in the rest of the world more rapidly. I became a servant of American imperialism, as the Soviets call it, just twenty years ago. The Soviet empire, to use that loosely constructed term, then extended all the way from the Brandenburg Gate to the port of Haiphong. The greatest power in Europe united with the greatest power in Asia. There was a seemingly strong band of states to the west and wholly reliable Communist parties in Italy, France, and elsewhere. There were Soviet advisors in Egypt and Algeria, even in Ghana, and a strong Communist party in Indonesia. When one contrasts that with the reality today, one realizes that, in the process of losing influence, the Soviets have done even better than we. We look at the rising economic power of Germany and at the disappearance of the SEATO and CENTO treaty organizations, which have gone with the wind, that being of what they were mostly composed. I'm not sure that this is a ground wholly for optimism. In fact, I rather share Mac's pessimism. There is danger of countries, our own and the Soviet Union, reacting out of weakness. About that we must be concerned.

That pessimism is the requiem of the evening's performance. On your behalf, I extend my gratitude to my two friends and colleagues. I extend my thanks to you for your patience. I hope that we will see you back here again next year and in the following years with your children and grandchildren, not showing any more of the effects of your unhealthy profession than you already do now. □

American Coverage of Foreign News

H.D.S. Greenway, chairperson — National and foreign editor, *The Boston Globe*; Nieman Fellow '72

Masayuki Ikeda — News writer and editor, Radio Japan, Tokyo; Nieman Fellow '81

Jinglun Zhao — Senior editor and managing editor, Foreign Languages Publishing and Distribution Bureau, Beijing, People's Republic of China; Nieman Fellow '81

Robert J. Cox — Editor, *Buenos Aires Herald*, Argentina; Nieman Fellow '81

Fleur de Villiers — Political correspondent and columnist, *The Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, South Africa; Nieman Fellow '81

Mustafa R. Gürsel — Athens correspondent for *Milliyet* newspaper, Istanbul, Turkey; Nieman Fellow '81

Daniel Samper — Columnist with *El Tiempo*, Bogota, Colombia; Nieman Fellow '81

Jinglun Zhao: A Harvard professor has recently described China as the most secretive country in the world. This might be so, except for a time in the Cultural Revolution, when China probably had the freest press in the world with Red Guard papers printing top-secret documents and prying into people's private lives. The kind of muckraking we then had far exceeded anything in American history. That was only for a short while. China was on the whole

xenophobic. Then, Mao, Zhou, and after them Deng Xiaoping, opened China's doors to the West, the United States in particular.

Today, practically every American paper has a bureau in Beijing. American correspondents don't have the kind of access to sources as did the Red Guards, to be sure. But some of them are very aggressive. The notorious "Bohai II Incident" (an oil-drilling platform that capsized, killing 72 on board) was first reported in *The New York Times* several weeks before the Chinese press took it up. It made such a furor that a Vice Premier was recorded a major demerit, the Petroleum Minister got the sack, and four other officials received prison terms. It turned out to be part of a struggle waged by the pragmatists against the "Leftist" way of running the economy characterized by commandism, callousness to human lives and total disregard for cost effectiveness.

In fact, as far back as 1974, when the Gang of Four launched the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, Western reports immediately interpreted it as spear-headed against Zhou Enlai. At the time, Chinese officials tried to deny it. It turned out to be true.

Chinese newsmen sometimes complain that Chinese leaders prefer to make important disclosures to foreign newsmen through leaks rather than through official Chinese channels. The ordinary Chinese sometimes has to learn what is going on in his own country from foreign press reports, translated into Chinese and printed in a tabloid called the *Reference News*.

American reporters claim objectivity. Most reports are straightforward enough. Others are clearly tendentious. They look at Chinese reality through the looking glass of Western democracy, and tend to be overly critical of Chinese politics. They don't seem to understand there has to be some sort of a tradeoff: personal liberty for political stability and economic growth. To overcome stiff

resistance, some good things can be had only gradually, not overnight.

Reports are uneven. There are very good ones as well as wild conjectures. Competition is keen. Everybody goes after the "big story." In short, there is room for improvement. This applies also to Chinese reporting on the United States. Let's all work harder.

Masayuki Ikeda: So much of what is written on our political development, social development, and alternate economy, is written in Japanese, then translated into English. But often the meaning is changed and sometimes the Japanese nuance is lost.

There are some good reporters who can speak Japanese very, very well — for example, Mr. Sam Jenson of *The Los Angeles Times*. Sometimes he corrects the mistakes of simultaneous interpreters.

And there are a few reporters who know Japan well. For example, Mr. Bernard Krisher who was once chief of *Newsweek's* Tokyo bureau. He has been in Japan more than sixteen years and he was very good at covering not only Japan but also Korea.

But many journalists say that they are asked to cover Taiwan and Korea and other countries when they report from Japan — they cannot concentrate on Japan. In a sense, that is an advantage, they can understand the situation of Asia.

When Japan's media covers this country it is quite different. My company, NHK, has offices in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles. The Washington bureau has six journalists, six reporters, and a cameraman. In New York, six; in Los Angeles, two.

Last week my colleagues came here to cover the Boston marathon, and another camera crew came here to film a panel discussion at Tufts University for a program called "Japan's Conditional Foreign Policy." They also covered Professor Reischauer's last lecture — I'm not sure, but

It's quite clear that people are now starting to realize that one day Latin America is going to blow up and that everyone is going to be faced with an enormous ignorance.

probably Professor Reischauer's last lecture was not broadcast or in the paper here, but it was in Japan.

Of course, I should admit that your coverage is becoming better as Japan's economic situation and economic power become better.

For example, on economic friction. As you know, Japan had had troubles with television exports, steel exports, and wood exports, for almost ten years. When the textiles became a controversial export, I saw almost every day that textile makers, owners of small farms, broke their weaving machines in pieces. A very sad story. Did you cover that story? I don't think so.

When we covered the auto friction, the situation in Detroit was mine to report. The big papers sent temporary correspondents to Detroit.

When steel was controversial, we sent some people to Pittsburgh to cover the stories, and there were two- and three-week series. And if one big paper starts this kind of story, another paper will change the copy just a little bit and start another series. In other words, your situation is rather well known in Japan.

I wonder to what extent this country's media could cover the fact that Japan's Polish colleagues cannot get out of the triangle made by the Soviet Union and China and the United States. In other words, our watch toward the Soviet Union is just a bit different from this country's. We are not so much militarily oriented. We are always seeking some ways to improve our relations and development is a big thing — if we can do it.

Robert Cox: Last night McGeorge Bundy confirmed something that I have always suspected — I think he proved quite conclusively that the problem of dealing with Latin America is that people do not want to know about Latin America. He professed total ignorance about El Salvador, then, in a short summary of Argentina, he gave a completely false impression of the country. His view of Argentine history indicated that he has probably never read a book about Argentina.

Now, this works two ways, but I think there is a very strong prejudice which exists whereby people simply do not want to know. I worked in Argentina, not only editing a small, English-language newspaper, but also working as a stringer — because I needed to support myself — for most publications in the United States and some in Europe. I can remember one cable which I actually got from *The Economist*, which calls itself a newspaper but seeks to cover the news in magazine form. I had proposed a story and they cabled back to say, Look, if this is just continuing disaster, let's leave it for a few weeks....

It works the other way too. What happens is that Latin America is seen in terms of clichés. It's very difficult to cover it anyway. First of all, I think you have a reluctance to get involved and a tendency to dismiss Argentina as McGeorge Bundy did last night as an impossible country where you couldn't find any liberals. Yet it's a country that has a strong liberal tradition; it's a country that has had parliamentary government for a considerable period of time — more than most other countries in Latin America

as a matter of fact. The traditions are still there. The parties are still there. There are alternatives to military government. But Bundy wasn't prepared to look into it. Yet it's quite clear that people are now starting to realize that one day Latin America is going to blow up and that everyone is going to be faced with this enormous ignorance. And then journalists are going to start running down there and they'll realize what has happened.

In many publications, they don't want to carry Latin American news at all. If you live in this area, you are very fortunate because *The Boston Globe* takes an interest in Latin America and they have an excellent Latin American correspondent — Stephen Kinzer. But it's a kind of missionary work — I think his copy is so good that the paper doesn't mind printing it.

I know examples of correspondents who have been asked to go from, say, a European capital to Buenos Aires, and who have resigned rather than go there. The feeling is that it's at the bottom of the league, doesn't matter very much — and this is a completely false conception of Latin America. By the year 2000, the population of South America will be bigger than that of North America. Many resources are there that the United States is going to need. There should be a whole American family trying to increase trade between one another, trying to understand one another. For example, we've all seen European films, we see French films, Italian films, Japanese films. But has anyone ever seen an Argentine film or a Brazilian film?

This lack of understanding makes the work of the correspondent very difficult. It means that you've got to have a very hard-working journalist who is going against the grain all the time because unless he's got a really incredible story with tremendous impact, the news editor is not going to be very interested in it. Yet, the same correspondent has to fill in all the background that people don't have. They have no idea what Argentina is like, so there has to be historical background in the story — something which is not necessary if you're filing from France or even many countries in Africa. There's an understanding; there has been continuing coverage.

Those are the major problems that I see. What worries me very much is that it is working the other way now. It's as if Latin Americans have come to the conclusion that nobody is ever going to try to understand them and that they are always going to be seen in terms of clichés.

When the riots came in Miami, the Argentine government — which at that time wanted to picture the United States in the very worst possible light, as it has been doing for some considerable time — sent every available television crew into Miami and ran the story for all it was worth, to give people in Argentina the idea that the United States was going up in flames. You have this kind of reaction all the time. If anything goes bad in the United States, it will get tremendous coverage in Latin America

because they want to be able to get their own back on all these years of often uninformed coverage, sometimes very good coverage, but not appreciated and understood here.

Fortunately, there are some very good people working in Latin America now. I have a feeling that Latin America may even become hot property because of the fact that there are crises blowing up like volcanoes throughout Latin America. But I wonder whether that kind of coverage — how the countries really are — is going to get across to all the people in the United States; they are going to have to make an effort to cover so many aspects of life in Latin America that are not being covered at the present time.

At the same time, the reverse has got to happen. There have got to be more Latin American correspondents in the United States. Latin American coverage of this country is truly deplorable, unbelievably deplorable, because of the wish to feed the prejudices of the people back in Latin America. As it stands, if the country is not having very good relations with the United States — which is fairly frequent, after all — they will want to picture the United States as a very violent country and they will play up all the negative aspects. There is a whole fund of goodwill there to which lip service has been paid over the years — the Pan-American idea, the Good Neighbor Policy, the Alliance for Progress. They haven't gone very far simply because there hasn't been a continuing interest.

This is something that I would like to see come out of programs like the Nieman Fellowships. It is interesting that Daniel Samper and I are the first people from Latin America in the 43 years of the Nieman program. What we have to fight against is the idea that you shouldn't cover Latin America because it is too difficult, too complex, or doesn't really mean very much.

It is going to mean an enormous amount and we should be prepared for that. These ties, which should be natural ties, should be there because I can see a situation in which Cuba is repeated again and again. There won't be other Vietnams but there will be other variants of Cuba unless we have these naturally mutual ties.

Fleur de Villiers: There's a common misconception in my country, bred of years of a pariah's state of isolation, that every American from President Reagan downwards, wakes up and says over his breakfast coffee, What the hell are we going to do about South Africa?

Given that I've fought against that misconception for a long time, I'd like briefly to play devil's advocate here. I noticed in yesterday's panel discussions that we had medicine, science, economics, and law, all demanding much better treatment and much wider coverage from American newspapers. Well, given the limitations of space, if all these pleas were met, there would really not be much of interest to the lady from Peoria who is worried about the strike on the Boston T or that the students

weren't getting to school tomorrow. Nevertheless, as I must speak to my own interest: the American coverage of South Africa — as of much of the rest of the world — poses a danger to this country in that it tends, and this is an old cliché, to coups, crises, and disasters. It gives the American public and its opinion-makers the idea that the rest of the world was invented yesterday and will be destroyed tomorrow. That was the problem with Iran, where, I believe, the British and European media did a much better job before the Iranian revolution of informing

The result is a direct ratio between the depth of the trouble that the country is in and the number of foreign correspondents there.

their readers, of preparing them for what was about to happen. It didn't come as a bolt from the blue, as it did in this country.

However, I think South Africa has been better served in recent years than it was in the early 1970's when the number of accredited correspondents was up around four — mostly from the wire services and the BBC. And as news editors around the world began to realize that the South African problem could be the news story of the last years of this century, they began pushing in foreign correspondents. The fact that Zimbabwe was blowing up at the same time was also handy because you could have your correspondents based in Johannesburg and they could cover the Zimbabwe situation as well.

The result is a direct ratio — a rather depressing ratio — between the depth of the trouble that the country is in and the number of foreign correspondents there. In 1972, it was stuck around four or five; it has risen to well over sixty today, all sitting in Johannesburg — and a goodly portion of them are American.

This has served South Africa extremely well in the American press because we've at last gotten away from the parachute journalism of past years where Sharpeville would blow up or Soweto would blow up and CBS would send in a team with absolutely no background knowledge of what was happening and they would come back and for another year or two South Africa would disappear from the front pages of the American media until the next crisis arose. It is impossible to expect these parachute journalists to have any background knowledge of the country, of its complexity.

This is not a plea for greater understanding of the South African government. When one uses the word *complex*, the knee-jerk response of most Americans is that one

has gone into a defensive attitude. I haven't, because it is complex; it's a great deal more dangerous, and it requires a great deal more understanding of that complexity because of the natural secretiveness of the South African government — a government which is trying in some ways to actually reverse itself, without telling its supporters. This means that whatever it does, it tries to do by stealth and it reacts very bitterly to any exposure of any good it may do, as well as reacting bitterly to any exposure of the bad it does.

To cover South Africa adequately means to become something of a Moscow watcher. You need to be able to read the signs and symbols. You need to know the people. You need to get behind the obvious news, the obvious crisis. You need to have begun to acquaint yourself with the chief players on the stage — both black and white. And as both black and white opinion is deeply fractured, it is a very involved, very lengthy process. No parachute journalist can do this.

But because there have been for the last four or five years a large number of foreign correspondents permanently stationed there, this has improved. I can think of two organizations in the United States where the coverage has most notably improved. One is *The New York Times*, first of all with John Burns and lately with Joseph Lelyveld. The other is *Time* magazine, despite the fact that correspondents writing for *Time* with a good and sound knowledge of the story tend, sometimes, to get hijacked by people rewriting their stories in New York, who go back to their antiquated files and change the perspective on the story rather drastically. As a result, the piece often contains major factual errors which destroy its credibility in South Africa and which makes one wonder about *Time's* authenticity as it relates to other stories around the world.

One of the elements that the American media based in South Africa tend to rely very heavily on — and for this I'm very grateful — is the news they get from what is loosely called the opposition press. Despite government attempts to curtail our freedom, this press remains virile, vigorous, and is a very good and sound source, or secondary source, for much of the news that appears in the American press. But too many foreign correspondents tend to rely solely on that, or solely on people of like mind, who, however difficult it might be, do not actually get out into Soweto or Longa or Kwazulu or who actually go and camp on the doorsteps of public officials. However difficult it may be to understand their minds and the way they work, this sort of contact is absolutely essential if this highly complex and involved situation is to be brought home to the American public.

One of the results of its reliance of the overseas press correspondents on the opposition press was the South African government's curious venture into its own form of

journalism where it tried to buy first *The Washington Star* and then part of the *Sacramento Union*. Neither adventure has served it well, thank God, and I think having burnt its fingers, it won't try again.

There is a very deep sense of paranoia in South Africa about the way the world sees it — a paranoia bred largely of its own actions. Bishop Tutu's visit to New York went largely uncovered — in fact, it was entirely uncovered by the American press until P.W. Botha, in an effort to impress his constituents, threatened to take Tutu's passport away. I suggested — and only half in jest — that Tutu should employ the prime minister as his press agent because it certainly got attention.

Knowing the constraints of space, the problems of scale in this country — when you're dealing with a continent, how can you focus as much on the rest of the world as a smaller country can focus on the United States or as Britain could focus on Iran? Yet, I do feel when I'm in the United States that I am gravely cut off from events in the rest of the world, and this sense of isolation makes me feel very nervous about how people are going to react when crises do come, either in my country or anywhere else.

Daniel Samper: A few weeks ago, I received several phone calls from friends in my country — Colombia, South America. They told me that the country I have left in September was very different from the country that I was to see in June when I return, and they explained why. I decided that it would be interesting to take a look of the perception of this change — which I knew because they told me and sent me many clippings — the perception of this change that a typical Bostonian could have.

I would say that the most important factor in this change was the month of March, 1981. So I went and reviewed the collection of *The Boston Globe* and *Time* magazine for the month. I discovered that a Bostonian who subscribes to *The Boston Globe* or to *Time* magazine would have received the following accounts of what was going on in Colombia in the month of March.

From *The Boston Globe*, the reader would have learned that on March 8 — definitely — an American Bible translator was murdered in Colombia; it was displayed, two columns, upper right-hand corner, photograph very large, very devoted account.

There was later a very small item on his burial, so the reader would have learned of that.

On March 26, the reader would have learned that Gabriel Garcia Marquez, author of *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, had fled the country, had gone out of Colombia to Mexico.

On March 29, the reader would have learned that Colombia had suspended ties with Cuba.

This typical Boston person would then have gone to

Time, to learn, in the March 23 edition, in the "Milestones" section, that this Bible translator was murdered. It was told in a very typical "Milestones" style: it says that Chester Bitterman, 28, Protestant missionary, was kidnapped from the Colombia headquarters, was found murdered, and that he died of gunshot wounds.

On April 13, the reader would have learned — in the "People" section of *Time* — that Gabriel Garcia Marquez, the most important Colombian novelist, possibly the most important Latin American novelist, had fled the country and he said that he was being trapped by the ministers. The government said that it had nothing against Garcia Marquez. According to *Time*, a countryman offered a more illuminating possibility: Garcia Marquez has an electric typewriter in his apartment. They turn off the power at 7:30 every night. Next book, *One Hundred Kilowatts of Solitude*? This was an account that was carried by both *The Boston Globe* and *Time* magazine during the month of March.

Now I want to tell you what really happened. In March, an American Bible translator was murdered by a guerrilla movement. In March, nearly 120 guerrillas disembarked, probably from Cuba, in Colombia. In March, these guerrillas clashed with the armed forces; 17 were killed. The rest managed to escape to Ecuador where they sought political asylum. In March, Ecuador imprisoned most of them and sent them back to Colombia. In March, the general commander of the army in Colombia wrote an editorial in the army magazine in which he criticized the social policies of the government. In March, there were rumors of the possibility of a military coup in Colombia —

I feel when I'm in the United States that I am gravely cut off from events in the rest of the world, and this sense of isolation makes me very nervous.

one of the few surviving democracies of the continent, according to most of the American press. In March, the president was about to start a trip that would take him to the Soviet Union and China, but cancelled it at the last moment. In March, Colombia broke relations with Cuba, and the president said that Colombia, as well as El Salvador, was a target of international Communism. In March, a scheme linking Gabriel Garcia Marquez to a guerrilla movement was disclosed, and Marquez fled the country and sought shelter in the Mexican embassy.

It was really an important month in Colombia. Even a very dispassionate person has to understand that. Colombia is different now — not only from what it was in

September, but from what it was in February. However, this is not reflected in the magazine and the newspaper that I reviewed. I have to say that *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* covered a much more analytical version. But if you go to the two that I reviewed, you have to conclude that first, the importance given to the news depended mainly on the presence of the United States there. The murder of the Bible translator was displayed on the front page, upper right-hand, two-column photograph; while there was only a very small, short account about the breaking of relations with Cuba.

Second, there was a complete fragmentation of news. You can see from *Time* magazine's version that they jumped from the "Milestones" account of Bitterman's death to the piece on Gabriel Garcia Marquez almost four weeks later — and nothing linked the two of them, although they were part of the same phenomenon.

Third, there was a trivialization. It is very important to understand that it is a revealing fact that they tried to trap Garcia Marquez. The military was trying to say, We dare to touch Garcia Marquez because he is against the government. Now the government said, in an official communiqué, We have nothing against Garcia Marquez; he is not linked to any guerrilla movement.

However, the military wanted him to go to headquarters and be asked questions and be photographed with the military. They wanted to show that they dare to touch everyone. That's an important fact and it didn't deserve the trivialization it received with *One Hundred Kilowatts of Solitude*.

The idea of my country that the American reader is receiving from the American press is very different from what is really going on.

This is not a matter of being fair to the Colombian government or fair to its opponents. I'm not a friend of the Colombian government. It's matter of being fair to the reader. The reader didn't get a whole idea of what went on in Colombia in this very important month that was March.

Finally, it is not a matter of space. You don't have to devote three pages to Colombia every day; it would be very boring. Sometimes it is hard to devote more than one page to what's going on in Colombia, even in a Colombian newspaper.

But you can say much more in the same space. You can analyze more; you can be more accurate; you can have less trivializing. The idea of my country that the American reader is receiving from the American press is very

different from what is really going on.

If tomorrow we had the disgrace of having an Argentine type of military coup in Colombia, people in Boston would ask, Why? When did the military become so powerful in Colombia?

Mustafa Gürsel: Usually, when members of the foreign press criticize American media, a question is asked at the end: Is the press around the world any better than the United States press? The answer to that is a definite, No. In a lot of countries around the world, the press is a lot more worse off than the quality of the United States press. Then why are we criticizing the United States press? Why do we get upset with either the incorrect coverage or the lack of coverage or proper coverage of our areas of the world? It is because of the importance of the United States media — an importance which cannot be overstated. Poor and underdeveloped countries do not make world policy. Washington makes policy. What is decided in Washington eventually decides the fates of hundreds of millions of people around the world. This country claims to be a model of democracy and freedom. So how the American public is being conditioned, how public opinion is being created, eventually has reflections on Washington and eventually on Washington's policy. That's why the foreign press is so concerned that the American press does a better job than it is doing.

Having said that — my area is Turkey and the Middle East. First, Turkey. In Turkey, democracy has been suspended for a while now. On September 12, 1980, the higher echelon of the military, in a bloodless coup, took over the country, so I will be going back to a very different place. What did the American public find out about this military takeover? Not very much, I think, despite the importance of Turkey to Western interests.

At the time that the coup took place, none of the major newspapers had correspondents there. *The New York Times* has a bureau, but Marvine Howe was taking her annual leave. So, during the following days, as we read the commentaries of *The Boston Globe*, *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, it was as if these three editorials had been written by the same pen. Foreigners who don't know how the United States press works would have immediately said, Aha, they were dictated. Obviously we know that they were not dictated. What probably happened when the coup took place was that political editors of newspapers called up the State Department and spoke with the same official on the Turkish desk who gave the State Department's point of view — because all the articles end up by saying, With the generals, who are allies of the West, we can now expect an early reintegration of Greece back into NATO, a possible settlement of the Cyprus problem, and economic stability in Turkey.

About three weeks ago, *Newsweek* carried an exten-

sive article about the state of affairs in Turkey. The title was "Benevolent Despots." I have difficulty with those terms, benevolent despots. It is too much like Haig's concept — trying to differentiate between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. As a believer in democracy, I am very worried about that difference. For a victim of rape, it doesn't make a difference whether the rapist was young, old, black, white, Turk, Greek, American. When someone is being tortured, I don't think we can talk of the qualitative difference between totalitarian and authoritarian electric shock. The effect is the same.

I think the coverage of Turkey and the state of affairs in Turkey has been simplistic, and not independent enough from Washington's policy toward Turkey. Definitely, the West needs Turkey and definitely, there were a lot of problems in Turkey before the military takeover. But what is taking place in Turkey, as much as I have been able to follow events there through the broadcasts of the Turkish section of BBC, is that the generals are trying to change the entire socioeconomic structure of that country. This will have long-ranging consequences. Due to the horror that preceded the takeover in Turkey, there is a sense of a honeymoon at the moment. However, all honeymoons inevitably come to an end if a natural base is not built. We can expect the same fate of this honeymoon.

As far as the coverage of Turkey is concerned, the American press should be very careful to differentiate between the interests of having stability in Turkey through authoritarian means, and the ultimate interests of the Turkish people, because certain feelings and certain desires cannot be oppressed. And if American readership is not given all the facts on Turkey, in five or six or ten years there might be a new question: What happened in Turkey? We thought those generals were benevolent.

I think we saw this kind of simplistic approach to the Middle East, as well, in the past. Especially in trying to relay the world of Islam — as if it were one entity — the countries where 90 to 100 percent of the population is Moslem: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic. Suddenly, when we had a crisis in Iran, all these people were lumped together. Suddenly we started reading about the upsurge of Islam as if Islam were a dirty, dangerous element against the West. People were talking about the Moslem's hatred of America. That is not the case as we look at these countries. My God, they have a wide range, the people are different races; each has a history of its own. They cannot be lumped together.

I think what should be done is to have more foreign correspondents. Regardless of the quality of the person involved, it is not possible to have someone based in, say, Nairobi, and have him cover entire Africa, or have one

person based in Beirut and assign 25 countries to him. It is not humanly possible.

The coverage of Turkey and the state of affairs there has been simplistic and not independent enough from Washington's policy toward Turkey.

Question: Listening to this discussion, I've gotten the sense that each of you has some secret way of keeping in touch with what's going on back home — through the BBC or something else. Could you give an idea of how you do this?

de Villiers: After two months of increasing isolation, I sent various smoke signals back home and now I get my paper delivered once a week; I also get an opposition paper — in opposition to us — once a week.

Cox: I think we all do the same. You mentioned the BBC: the BBC is probably the best service you can use to monitor everything. As an editor of a small English-language paper, I used to listen to the BBC to monitor all the wire services. I tried to listen to two or three bulletins every night, just to see that everything was covered in that particular way.

Question: What about Reuters?

Cox: I don't think the coverage is all that bad. I think the problem arises in difficulties of space, or of actual knowledge and knowing how to handle these things. It is very difficult to keep up on all the Latin American countries unless the paper has a commitment to do that.

Comment: I come from Honolulu and I want to make a few observations. My colleague from South Africa has a good point in suggesting that the American press doesn't do all that good a job of covering America. The reason, of course, is our size. I get calls from, say, a colonel at Dickerman Air Force Base saying he hasn't seen a hell of a lot in *The Honolulu Advertiser* about Iowa, and I have to suggest to him that unless Iowa blows up, the insufficiency in that area is likely to continue.

The Advertiser gets the full service of UPI, *The Los Angeles Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Christian Science Monitor*. It is the guy on the desk who has to make the final determination of what will be used and what will

not. A slow but good way of correcting deficiencies along this line is to have journalistic exchanges. The coverage of Japan by the United States has vastly improved over years ago, and part of that is due to the fact that every year about fifteen journalists from each country spend three weeks in the other country with tightly scheduled programs seeing a pretty good section of the country. Those are the guys who are on the wire desk and on the news desk and who are actually seeing the copy every day.

I think if we can get editors and reporters moving around in some organized way, exchanging ideas, that's one way of gradually doing it. But with the price of newsprint going up, the newshole is not going to get any larger. About the best you can expect is a capsule version of the news.

Question: My question — and I'm sure it's a rhetorical one in terms of the panel — would you welcome Fulbright-funded exchanges of, say, 100 foreign journalists and 100 American journalists going back and forth each year? Would our very delicate sense of ethics be any inhibition to accepting a government-sponsored tour at a university or a working exchange abroad?

Cox: I think if it were government to government, you would just increase the amount of misinformation. Most governments in Latin America would look upon such a program as a wonderful opportunity to give a group of journalists a completely false impression of the country. In regard to most governments in the Third World, you definitely need independence.

de Villiers: My newspaper had for many years an ad hoc policy which could be usefully expanded and that is to bring young American journalists to South Africa and have them work on our paper, one at a time, for six months or a year. *The Boston Globe*, itself, has an exchange with *The Rand Daily Mail*. I do think that policy could very usefully be expanded without anybody losing their virginity as far as government is concerned, given the American editors' sensitivities about receiving government grants in any shape or form.

Question: Would someone like to comment on what impact Carter's human rights policy had on reporting, and also on the effect of the new Reagan administration policy that deals more with terrorism?

Cox: It had an extremely good impact in Latin America, I think. It made people start to perceive the United States in a different way. People here don't realize that the average person in Latin America looks upon the United States the way that a Pole looks upon the Soviet Union — which is extremely unfortunate, but that's the way it is. The

perception of the United States is one of an imperialistic power which exerts its power through multinational companies. This changes according to who is in the presidency — Kennedy was an extremely popular president. Eisenhower was popular too. Then they began to see the United States in an entirely different way, as a country that cares about them, that cares about the people, and cares about the links between the American people.

All the ideas that are part of the constitutions of Latin American countries have been based on the United States Constitution and the idea of liberty.

I think the sudden emphasis on human rights was unfortunate because it should have been there all along. It should always be there in American foreign policy. It should underlie every political act that the United States takes because that is what the United States is about. The United States is an idea, and that idea is very attractive. It's the only idea that can counter communism — which is an attractive idea to those people who want their lives improved.

I do feel that there's an awful need for an entirely new approach to Latin America on the part of the United States to start to establish those links which don't seem to be there and to counter the appeal of communism which is a completely materialistic appeal, but it makes sense. The Carter policy made sense in that there really isn't a security risk — in terms of a military invasion — anywhere in Latin America. The most you're going to have is a problem of insurgency, a problem of guerrillas, or attempts to infiltrate guerrillas from Cuba. But those people have to be defeated by ideas — because we've seen that, unfortunately, none of the governments in Latin America are efficient enough to deal with terrorism without becoming terrorists themselves. This has been a tremendous defeat for democracy. For example, Uruguay was not a perfect democracy, but it was a pretty good society that ran into tremendous economic difficulties. But instead of getting help to overcome these difficulties, and therefore, to reestablish democracy on a new basis, it didn't get any help at all. All it got from the United States was ideology. This is wrong.

The United States needs to make a real effort to improve the standard of life of the people of Latin America, and to let those people know of the effort. What we've had so far under Carter is an indication that the United States does not like torture, does not approve of people being "disappeared," does not approve of wholesale slaughter of political opponents who are shut off by possibly being terrorists — but then it goes and includes those who might have vaguely left-wing views and then picks up all sorts of innocent people: university professors because they're considered to be suspicious, or psychiatrists.

Reagan's policy has got to say that the United States has always believed in human rights; we don't believe it was applied in the right way under Carter because he emphasized too many things for political advantage, but it is important to us. Otherwise, the people of Latin America will come to the conclusion that the United States does not believe in any of the things that it is supposed to believe in; that it does believe in dictatorships and it is not offering anything else; and that it will simply use human rights for political purposes when it suits them.

David Greenway: Let me just say a good word for parachute journalism. When the Secretary of State stands at a pulpit and announces that El Salvador is the soft underbelly of Central America and that we ought to start sending advisors, and so forth, there is no way that the press can ignore that story. The fact that the response was substantial, that a lot of local stations sent reporters and camera crews down there, is a good thing, on balance. Although they may have done their jobs imperfectly, or less well, at least it did put the name of the country and something of the situations before a vast amount of American people. It is a pity that it has to happen in that sort of situation, but if we had not done it, then that would have been a worse crime.

Another example is Cambodia. When the situation there got terribly bad and the response from the world press, let alone the American press, was simply extraordinary, reporters and camera crews who didn't know the Khmer Rouge from the Ku Klux Klan were coming in. And what they were there to do was to put on film and in words the very compelling stories of a human drama. They were able to get the attention of the world, they were able to mobilize an extraordinary relief effort.

There's no question in my mind that hundreds of thousands of lives were saved in Cambodia because the press reported the story, reported it thoroughly and well. The fact that the people there were not experts in the ins and outs of the Cambodian and Vietnamese situation misses the point a little bit, I think. The press sensitized people in this country and in countries elsewhere, and the populations responded by taking in refugees and so on. When I came back, day after day, people would ask, What about Cambodia? But I think it has been six months since anyone has asked me, What about the Cambodian refugees? What's going on in Vietnam? If we have a problem there, I think it's that the press has dropped the ball and has not continued the story and has not kept it on page one.

de Villiers: I think you've made your point — made my point — at the end of your criticism. I have nothing against parachute journalism if that's all there is. I myself have had to do it and have liked doing it when I've had to. But,



Mustafa Gürsel, Daniel Samper, Fleur de Villiers, David Greenway, Robert Cox, Masayuki Ikeda, Jinglun Zhao

in Iran and elsewhere, it does amount to closing the stable door after the horse is gone. If you had had somebody on the ground, if you were able to get an early warning system going much earlier, it would have been a hell of a lot better than jumping in after the people have all been killed.

Question: How many American news organizations can afford to have a full-time foreign correspondent in all the potential trouble spots — and even if they could, what kind of space could they get? How often could they get on the air? In the papers?

Comment: I would make the point, too, that even if we had had correspondents from virtually all the United States media there, the Cambodian situation couldn't have been avoided. Other things are important in a world where we are dealing with government.

Cox: It does have an effect, though; it saves lives. In Buenos Aires, the presence of a camera crew or of foreign journalists means that they wouldn't do certain things; they would wait until the press had left.

Comment: Many times you are dealing with governments and people who do not have the high regard for the press that we have amongst ourselves. I'm thinking of a case like Bill Stewart. He was a foreign journalist and they shot him and killed him.

Cox: They don't have a high regard, but they are frightened. That's why they shoot. United States concern undoubtedly saves lives because it makes some people think twice. They can't do anything about some idiot who goes off with a gun and shoots a foreign journalist, but

they probably will redouble all their efforts to stop it happening again and again, because no regime wants to appear to be doing that.

Zhao: I would like to comment on some of the questions. I think the problem in China is quite different. Last night, Professor Stanley Hoffmann cautioned that one shouldn't evaluate foreign policy with the values that apply only to this country. My point is, then, that the wall of democracy in Beijing has been too much reported by the United States press. Not enough attention has been paid to the new experiments and reforms in political, economic, and cultural spheres.

Carter's human rights policy plays no role in China. And I understand that there have been specific instructions to the State Department that questions of human rights should not be mentioned in connection with China, because of these developing relations.

Reporters should watch for the social developments that point to the future of the country. That's why short-term exchanges of correspondents would help — but not very much, because quite a few of the correspondents are trained here [at Harvard] at the Asian Center. They have studied Chinese history many years, but the trouble with their stories is that they all bear the imprint of Professor Fairbank, who tried to interpret Chinese traditions and institutions. There is continuity, of course, but you also have to look for new developments.

Comment: I too had studied under Fairbank when I was a Nieman. I was on my way to the Far East, but before leaving, I went to see him. I asked, What's your view of what's going on in China? He said, It's perfectly extraordinary — students allowed to burst into the room of a professor and tear up his papers — it's a shocking business. Years passed, and around 1970 I came back on a home leave. I went to see Professor Fairbank, but I couldn't get into the building because the doors were locked. When I finally found my way upstairs, I saw that he had an icebox in his office. I asked, What's the icebox? Well, he replied, if the students burn down the building, the papers are still safe.

Comment: I am wondering if on the whole panel, there wasn't an unstated assumption because you focused on the paucity of material that comes from foreign news sources. Statistically, I think that if you are really interested, the material is available. For example, nobody mentioned the extraordinary burgeoning of National Public Radio, which has a superb news program twice a day — "Morning Edition" and "All Things Considered." Together they provide as good a panoramic view of the world each day as you can hope for.

The problem is, in part, a cultural thing: that is, the

press is no more and no less than a reflection of its own culture. At this point — and we probably said the same thing twenty years ago — the American public is involved with a tremendous search of its own identity. Many Americans would do well to go back into their own history, let alone that of Cambodia or South Africa. I'm not suggesting that we shouldn't be interested, but I am suggesting that there is an almost impenetrable wall, as long as this society doesn't break away from its ethnocentrism. And the same, unfortunately, applies to Latin America. Bob Cox is absolutely right when he says that we deal with clichés. Why? Because clichés are comfortable. You don't have to think very much about them. You don't have to reexamine your own identity to see what you are willing to give up in terms of your own values.

Cox: There is more information about Argentina's basic crucial problems in the foreign press than there is in the Argentine press and that's another problem.

Comment: I just read a long article about Argentina in *The New Yorker* by Jacobo Timerman. While I had read stories about Argentina before, I hadn't been drawn into an understanding of the country. But the way this man presented it was so fascinating. Part of the thing we overlook is the necessity for better training in professional writing and presenting foreign subjects so people are compelled to take a peek.

de Villiers: If I could add to that — not only what you say is true, but also the attempt of American reporters to diversify their coverage. I would use Joe Lelyveld as a good example of a reporter who hasn't just followed the main political story but who has also tried to widen the spectrum of life in South Africa for his readers.

Comment: I wonder if there is one factor that we have overlooked in this discussion: the economic barrier, not just the matter of the newshole and the cost of newsprint. It seems to me that the integrity and viability of the political process has been somewhat undermined by the increasing reliance on political polling. In the same sense, I think that the readership surveys on which many newspapers have relied so slavishly have perhaps done the same thing for reporting.

I recall that after Austrian Archduke Ferdinand was slain in the summer of 1914, the publisher of the *Denver Post* was asked why he hadn't given the story more play. He replied that it was more important to the people of Denver to read about a dog being shot in the back yard of our state than to read about some obscure Archduke being assassinated in Serbia.

Obviously, I have no statistics, but would suppose that the impact of the draft and military volunteering was such

that one or two hundred young men — residents of Denver — were planted in Flanders Field or the Verdun Forest, all because the Archduke was shot.

I think that sometimes foreign news falls victim to the preference for localism; that sometimes even when there is foreign news to be played, there is a subtle feeling that people will read about four nuns being murdered in El Salvador, but that they are not interested in an analysis of the progress of land reform in Colombia — or wherever. . .

Greenway: I wonder if anything has changed from the rather old proposition that journalism generally follows empire. Japan covers the United States because it's a market. The United States covers those countries important to its economic interest.

de Villiers: Some time ago, I suggested to someone from *Newsweek* that the coverage of Iran had been a great deal better in the European and British press than it had been here. Yes, he replied, but of course there had been colonial interests.

Well, I would have thought that the modern American colonial interests would have been better represented if there had been more coverage of Iran.

Question: If there is an Indian here, I would like to know what kind of coverage he is seeing of his country by our press and the British press. I would also like to know whether journalists in India are really free to operate the way they were before the Emergency.

Greenway: About three weeks ago I was in Delhi and had some conversation with Indian journalists. Not to belabor the answer too much, they don't think that the United States cares anything about India. They think that it is shocking how little coverage we have — especially when you compare ours with the British coverage of a country of that size and importance. And many of the Indian journalists expressed a worry to me that the Emergency is going to come back. Mrs. Gandhi is getting tougher and tougher.

Comment: If I could make a few observations: There are, in India at the moment, two major conflicts which would have destroyed most small countries.

One is the move in the northeast of India, where the local inhabitants want all other Indians designated foreigners, out of the country. This agitation has been going on for eighteen months and just about stops any oil that India used to get from that area, which means that 90 percent of its oil consumption has been cut. There is absolutely no control by the government of the policies on that area. Recently, there was a strike and the central government said that anybody who went on strike would

be sacked — and on the day of the strike the whole population was sacked, including the man who was supposed to carry out the government's instructions, the secretary.

Then, in Gujarat, you have a state with more people than most countries in Europe put together. Here, there is a replay of the Bakke position, where the upper middle-class and upper caste Hindus felt that special privileges were being given to the untouchables, and that their children were being encouraged to get into universities. There has been some agitation about this for five months, and occasionally you will see a story about it.

These are issues that are going to come back to the central theme that Mrs. Gandhi brought about in March of 1976, when she decided on her state of Emergency. I am afraid that there will be another state of Emergency; once you break a barrier it's very easy to put it back again, and if it does come back again, you're in for a long period of repression.

Question: Are these factors in India piling up fast now, or is there some timing involved?

Comment: India has been falling apart for the past five thousand years.

Comment: I have a strong feeling of déjà-vu at this conference, because I believe that if I had a tape recording of our Nieman sessions from thirty years ago, we would hear echoes of the same thing. It all boils down to one thing: the popular press is going to print information that is pertinent to its readership, and that is the way it is going to make its selection.

The Miami Herald, for example, is doing a spectacularly good job of covering Central and South America. I don't know whether you see the *Herald* very much, or whether the other Knight-Ridder papers are carrying much of what the *Herald's* burgeoning foreign staff is doing, but there are more than two million Latin American or Caribbean tourists and business people in Miami every year. We are doing about \$6 billion worth of trade with Latin America. About 40 percent of all United States exports to the Caribbean and Latin America go through Miami, so we get an enormous amount of news out of those regions — but we also get selectivity of that news, as it applies to the interests and economics of the Southern Florida community.

If we have had an improvement in our foreign coverage, it simply reflects the fact that the United States is more internationalist than it was previously. I believe the coverage will improve, but only the coverage that is pertinent to our immediate interests will find its way into the popular press. Don't expect the popular press to be the foreign policy journal. □



Class of 1980: Stanley Forman, Judy Stoia, Paul Lieberman, Bob Timberg, Kelley Andrews (guest), Mike Kirk, Bill Grant, Lynda McDonnell, Jan Stucker



Michael Hill, Bill Eaton, Sidney Cassese




Masayuki Ikeda, Te-cheng Chiang, Khen Chin



Nuran Gürsel, Jo Stewart, Anna Jordan, Gerald Boyd



Class of 1939: Irving Dilliard, Dorothy Dilliard, Osburn Zuber, Edwin Paxton Jr., Louis Lyons, Totty Lyons, Frank Hopkins, Louise Hopkins



John Seigenthaler, Louis and Totty Lyons



Opening dinner at Pound Hall, Harvard Law School

Books

D.C. News: Two Views

Trade Secrets of Washington Journalists

Steve Weinberg. Acropolis, 1981,
\$12.50.

The Washington Reporters

Stephen Hess. The Brookings
Institution, 1981, no price given.

by WAYNE WOODLIEF

The Washington press corps, that diverse and often contentious body of journalists who seldom want to go home again, is scrutinized in two new books, each with a distinct point of view.

Trade Secrets of Washington Journalists by Steve Weinberg, a reporter and journalism professor, concentrates on the "how" of Washington reporting, providing a roadmap of sources and sometimes obscure but useful places in which to poke around.

Weinberg's book is practical not only for new reporters in Washington but also — as he was told by some of the veteran correspondents he interviewed — uncovers some fertile soil the more seasoned journalists had overlooked.

The Washington Reporters by Stephen Hess of the Brookings Institution emphasizes the "why" — the traits of human nature and other forces which, Hess concludes, have given Washington correspondents far more independence and control over their own product than they realize.

Weinberg, director of the University of Missouri's Washington Graduate Reporting Program, has written a no-nonsense compendium, full of solid (if sometimes stolid) facts and figures.

He spotlights some seldom-worked sources that contain good story material — such as the U.S. Tax Court — and provides this worthwhile tip from Jack Taylor of *The Daily Oklahoman and Times*, a self-proclaimed "junkie" hooked on the Freedom of Information Act:

"Army or other military censors in Washington would release documents sanitized simply by blacking out words or sentences with Crayolas," said Taylor, who has filed 2,500 FOI requests. "Of course, a sharp knife scrapes away all their efforts."

Weinberg also suggests reporters can spot future investigative possibilities in the federal budget by thumbing through frequently specific requests for funding by agencies and congressional committees.

But Weinberg's book is weak in anecdotal material, with few memorable yarns from a town that's full of them. He also brushes far too lightly over some potentially rich material, such as the power and influence of congressional committee staff directors. He gives us a handful of paragraphs when several pages on the identity and work habits of these behind-the-scenes kingmakers and policy-setters would have been appropriate.

Weinberg skates over what could have been a fascinating ethical debate with this lonely paragraph on reporters' approaches to Washington's social scene:

"Some Washington correspondents and columnists refuse to mingle with sources or potential sources at par-

ties. Other journalists say they attend parties willingly and consider the evening a bust if they do not learn something new."

The passage gives us a canapé when we want roast beef. There's no "why" there.

Fortunately, Hess's *The Washington Reporters* provides some answers, based on a thorough study — including work logs, a 14-page questionnaire, and follow-up telephone interviews — of 292 Washington reporters during 1977 and 1978.

They worked for newspapers ranging in size from *The Los Angeles Times* to the Burlington, Vermont, *Free Press*. And though Hess certifies the diversity of the Washington press, he also found several common themes. Journalism is attractive, Hess writes, because it provides reporters "a front-row seat at important or unusual events. It places them near important or unusual people...."

"Reporters resist document research for a variety of reasons, not the least being that this type of information gathering distances them from events and people.... Boredom — or the absence of excitement — is the most uninvestigated explanation of media resource allocation, most notably of why certain topics are not covered."

But the excitement Washington correspondents derive as "eyewitnesses to important events" and the relative freedom they enjoy from tight home-office supervision has a reverse side.

The reporters' isolation from their [readers] and organizations is often considerable, Hess found. "For some, this lack of connection is the dark side of freedom."

An antidote, Hess's respondents

suggest, is to travel more frequently to home base, where the correspondents can find out firsthand what the citizens of Iowa or Massachusetts or Virginia feel about the government in Washington.

Hess, a felicitous writer with an ear for the illuminating anecdote — he has some rich quotes from the likes of LBJ and Eugene McCarthy — found that Washington journalists don't always fit popular perceptions, including their own. About half the reporters he surveyed said the Washington press corps betrays a political bias. And nearly all those who said so claimed the bias is liberal.

Yet when individuals were asked to rate their own political leanings, 39 percent said they were middle-of-the-roads and 19 percent claimed to be conservatives.

The more prevalent pattern, Hess determined, is an apolitical attitude — most correspondents are more concerned with the big story and the ripe exposé, no matter the political persuasion of the person being exposed.

Only 4 percent of the reporters Hess surveyed said their bosses back home pressured them for a particular political slant to stories — a remarkable drop from the 56 percent uncovered in a similar survey of Washington journalists by Leo Rosten in 1936.

The reason, Hess concludes, is that more management-oriented owners, especially the large chains, have supplanted the strongly political publishers — the McCormicks and the Hearsts — of earlier eras.

For the same reason, and also because line editors often assume the Washington correspondents know more about Washington than they do, Washington reporters have come close to autonomy, Hess believes — even as they grumble about occasional directives from the city desk.

And those autonomous stars of Washington, Hess suggests, generally are bright, though not especially

intellectual; are highly skilled professionals, though godawful planners; and are expert people-watchers who occasionally do get sick of being so passive.

"At 50, you may be interviewing an assistant secretary of the interior who is 15 years younger than you are, and you think you know a great deal more than he does," a former maga-

zine writer told Hess.

"Reporters," the writer declared, "do not age gracefully." □

Wayne Woodlief, Nieman Fellow '66, is chief political writer for The Boston Herald American. He was formerly a Washington correspondent for the Herald American and Landmark Communications.

Words, Words, Words

On Language

William Safire. Times Books, New York, 1980, \$12.95.

A Pleasure in Words

Eugene T. Maleska. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1981, \$15.95.

A Browser's Dictionary: A Compendium of Curious Expressions and Ingruiging Facts

John Ciardi. Harper & Row, New York, 1980, \$16.95.

by HOWARD S. SHAPIRO

There is a professor at Harvard, a young fellow named James Miller, who teaches something called "The History of the English Language." He is mad about words — in a way different from a writer's love of words. A writer's love of words, it seems is largely a fascination with the ways words can be used; can be sewn into the fabric of thought that compliments not only the words but also the writer's intellect and ability to communicate. James Miller, however, is enamoured of words for what they are: just words.

On a recent day, Miller carefully

read a portion of the great folk epic *Beowulf* to his class and pointed out some of the Old English curiosities. In one section of the tale, Beowulf had given his *beugen* as a gift to an acquaintance. A *beugen*, Miller explained, was a finger ring. Miller said, "Only one word has come from this, and it is a common one." He looked around the class for volunteers. "Bugle?" someone asked. No. "Buckle?" No.

"Think — a ring, a finger ring; think of the shape." There were no takers. "It's a food," Miller hinted. Then, with a victorious air, Miller revealed that the word was *bagel*. It took only a second for the class to respond with a collective smile that obviously pleased Miller, because the smile was one that comes with the satisfaction of discovery — in this case, the discovery of the strange symmetry and logic inherent in our modern language. In an instant, it all made sense. Miller had gotten through.

This sort of discovery has, of late, become marketable. Language is a means of becoming human, and many humans have taken a renewed interest in it.

A quick look in the library shows that a spate of books on usage and etymology (other than grammars,

dictionaries, and academic dissertations) appeared three and four decades ago, with H. L. Mencken leading the pack of writers who believed that the preservation and study of our language is an important part of understanding our culture and how we think. That interest apparently faded until a few years ago, when Edwin Newman and others began dissecting the American tongue, both in popular books and magazines. Now, the business of exploring words and ways we have come to use them is flourishing.

New York Times columnist William Safire can be credited with much of this; his thoughts on everything from etymology to simple pronunciation have become, for many Americans, as much a part of Sunday as a hymnal or a brunch. His explorations into the American vernacular are filled with insight, and his writing style is so breezy and witty that his columns in *The New York Times Magazine* are pleasant conversations about, well, conversation.

This can be dangerous stuff. Edwin Newman, for instance, had chosen the same road, but he traveled in a different lane. His theme was simple and valid: the forces of clarity are battling the forces of mud, and the mud is winning. He won points by waging a war against obfuscation, and any of us who speak or write — and care about either — signed up on his side. But he developed the reputation as a purist and came, it seems, to view the English language as a sacred trust that we have somehow violated. He became (in a word) a pedant.

Safire is anything but a pedant, and that is a prominent reason for his continued success in a field that could be considered a minefield. For him, language is living — constantly refined, renewed, and updated. Certainly, there are forces of evil. But there are just as many forces of necessary change, and when Safire writes about English, you can almost

hear the words breathing because the underlying theme is that they are alive.

His wonderful collection of columns is oddly sliced, with bits and pieces under their original headings, and appearing in alphabetical order of the headings. This at first seems silly and annoying, since the meaning of many of the headings is not immediately apparent. After a full reading of the book, though, the



arrangement makes sense, because each heading is less a reference marker than a plain old title, and readers who want a good reference to the many words, phrases, and examples of usage can turn to the well-assembled index.

One of Safire's strengths is the lack of self-consciousness about his enterprise; the "Shame-on-you file," as he calls the readers' comments about his own mistakes in usage or explanations, leads him to some of his best commentary. This, of course, invites even more mail, and the sampling from readers that appears in *On Language* is as interesting as Safire's own manuscript.

This interchange makes Safire's exploration a community affair. For instance, in clearing the record on a mistake about Copernicus in a column — a mistake pointed out by a reader — Safire coincidentally writes that the word *earth* is sometimes lowercased and sometimes uppercased, depending on its use. This, then, draws more fire. "Would not capitalized serve better than uppercased?" a letter writer asks. "The latter strikes me as printer's jargon..."

A small comment on the word *copacetic* brings disagreements on its etymology from all over; everyone has his or her own explanation. A

treatise on the real meaning of "regular coffee," "black coffee," or "light coffee" offers some theories of just how much cream goes into the stuff — and then readers from around the nation either refute, amend, agree with the Safire explanation. The group grope over one of our most common requests — for a cup of coffee — is marvelous.

When Safire grits his teeth, he does so with such charm that the anger is appealing as the subject matter. "Sweeten, ironically, is a word advertisers are shying away from..." he writes. "An applejuice manufacturer who adds a sweetener to his product has rejected *sweetened* in favor of a new participle: *sophisticated*. Apple juice is less tart when it has been sophisticated by a ton of sugar." That is about as pedantic as Safire becomes.

A less critical approach is taken by Eugene Maleska, a man who probably has as much to say about the way we use the language as Safire. But Maleska has chosen to compile an impressive collection of anecdotes and tidbits and give us just that and no more.

A Pleasure in Words is a pleasant trip into derivations and tales about derivations by the nation's leading creator of word puzzles, most recently *The New York Times* crossword. Here, words are curiosities, and the book succeeds in imparting enough information about etymology to elicit the same type of smile James Miller likes to draw from his charges at Harvard.

Alas, Maleska is a better puzzler than writer. For instance, in an explanation about the word *curry*, we learn that when Maleska's wife first used it, she cooked an inedible concoction because she was unaware of its strength. Or, in a totally gratuitous aside about the derivation of *quahogs* (hard-shell clams), that

Mrs. Maleska has a wonderful clams casino recipe — which is then given, down to the last detail. There are many references to Maleska's days as a public school teacher in Harlem, and many of them in the form of anecdotes that are only vaguely interesting.

The book, however, is such a wealth of etymological information that readers who can get past the occasionally strained cuteness come out winners. *A Pleasure in Words* is, at the bottom line, a handy book for enlarging word power. And as a bonus, Maleska includes a chapter on word puzzles, then presents some challenging examples of his own.

Writer, editor, and poet John Ciardi, who loves words in much the same way as Professor Miller, has come out with a dictionary that promises exactly what it gives — the opportunity to browse at leisure, with a hefty dose of entertainment. *A Browser's Dictionary* is to dictionaries what the work of James Beard is to cookbooks; basically, it is a compendium of acts, a book you would normally use only when you needed

to refer to something specific, but so wonderfully written that, in journalistic parlance, it's "a good read." For its exploration of American idioms, it is rivaled in richness only by an oversized book called *I Can Hear America Talking*, a hot two-year-old seller in many bookstores.

The research that Ciardi put into the work is impressive. Here, we learn that *posh* was probably not a sailing acronym for port-out-starboard-home; that *butterscotch* has nothing to do with Scotland; that a choice cut of beef was not named for Sir Loin.

Ciardi goes a step past the regular lexicographers. He gives not only the provable derivations of the entries he has chosen, but also the folk etymologies of many words — the stories that, through the centuries, people have told about word derivations, whether true or false. These endearing tales aid in understanding the logic of gradual changes in our language. True or not, they have had, and continue to have, effects on word usage. □

Howard Shapiro, Nieman Fellow '81, is a reporter and editor with the Philadelphia Inquirer.



her daily assignments as a staff photographer for *The Boston Globe*.

A major portion of the first edition remains in the second. Many of the more static first edition photos have been replaced by photographs showing everyday people doing what they do on Main Street: being in the park, fishing, sailing, sleeping, or having fun with their pets.

Ulrike Welsch's photographs are visually "clean." Other photographers might know and appreciate that label since it is recognition of the photographer's eye and the ability to photograph the subject without clutter or distracting elements.

Clean, well-ordered photographs have a great impact on newspaper readers.

Her photographs are well-designed too — the main elements don't conflict with each other or with other important parts of the photo.

In her preface to the first edition, Ulrike Welsch said she was searching for "the little extra spark" for her photos. In the second edition shop talk, she says she has searched for the "decisive moment" (a phrase usually associated with Henri Cartier-Bresson, one of photojournalism's living giants). There are many more "sparks" in this second volume than the first, but unfortunately few decisive moments. Her photos have a quiet look to them.

The book's opening picture of a child with a puppy drinking in the fountain gets close to the spontaneity of a "decisive moment" as the child seems totally immersed in caring for the dog. But unfortunately, too many of the other photos appear to show the subject aware of the photographer.

However, this collection does have that spark — a warmth. Many of the photographs convey subtle feelings

Excellent Exposures

The World I Love to See Second Edition

Ulrike Welsch. The Globe Pequot Press, 1981, softbound, \$9.95.

by C. THOMAS HARDIN

Ulrike Welsch has revised the successful (and out of print) first edition of *The World I Love to See* to include

more photographs of her "Main Street" Massachusetts and New England neighbors. And certainly the second edition is more peopled.

She captures these people with great technical excellence — crispness of light and printing.

Her photographs must be the result of a commitment of many hours and days spent recording the life of her city, Boston. Surely, too, many of the photographs come from

and brought an inward smile to this viewer.

Her animal photos are the most spontaneous — in fact, the most fun-loving. They bring a real sense of humor to this book.

At the end of her book, Welsch has a four-photo series and some text on Ray Phillips, a beautifully bearded man who lived the simple life on the Maine coast. This package is the highlight of her second edition.

The accompanying text complements these fine photos by helping us to understand more about why Ray Phillips was important. The last picture of Phillips is one of the very best of the people photos in the book — such spontaneity, candidness, information, and dimension.

I would like to know more about these people and places she has photographed. Although Welsch says she likes the photographs without captions or text blocks, her Main Street would be more meaningful to me if I knew more about her subjects. They must certainly be surrounded by interesting circumstances — like Ray Phillips' story.

In one of the few places where a text block amplifies the photograph, we discover that some strange-looking windows are actually gallon jugs and cucumber jars cemented into window frames to form their own style of Thermopane.

The second edition of *The World I Love to See* is much stronger and more vital than the first edition — like Ulrike Welsch's photographs, it's crisp. It's entertaining. It's consistently solid feature shooting of her Main Street — her Boston, her Massachusetts, and her New England. □

C. Thomas Hardin is director of photography, Louisville Courier-Journal and The Louisville Times, Kentucky.



Requiem for The Star

ROD MacLEISH

There was a time in Washington when The Star dominated the city even more completely than The Washington Post has done in recent years. When Washington had four newspapers, The Star carried as much advertising as the rest combined. It was so powerful it literally told advertisers whether or not they would be permitted to buy space. But like many other evening papers faced with stiff morning competition, its circulation declined, and thus its power.

Rod MacLeish, who was a regular contributor to The Washington Star remembers The Star's days of glory and now, its end.

The death of a newspaper is always a dolorous thing. Whether it's Argentina's *La Prensa*, being closed by the tyrannies of the late dictator Juan Peron, or even the threatened demise of *The Times* of London, happily rescued by the Australian press lord, Rupert Murdoch, the passing of a newspaper suddenly creates a mournful vacuum. Newspapers are both public and personal. When one folds, something goes missing in the life of its community. And something personal disappears for each reader, too. The trick of great newspaper publishing is to be both splendid and intimate.

The Washington Star was a remnant of that simpler time when a major city had three to four newspapers. If television didn't exist, if people still relied mainly on newspapers for the news, if *The Washington Post* didn't exist, *The Star* might

have flourished indefinitely. But television does exist and most of all so does *The Washington Post*, which has emerged over the last several decades as one of the world's great newspapers. *The Star* was a distinguished newspaper, but somehow it never succeeded in galvanizing that inner energy which raises papers from fine to great. The fault is not that of *The Star*; it's nobody's fault.

Each newspaper has its own personality. *The Star's* had changed under its last two ownerships, from a rather fusty, dull paper to one that was quite lively and increasingly individualistic. Its scathing political cartoons by Australian-born Pat Olliphant, the political commentaries of Pulitzer Prize-winning Mary McGrory, its deliciously malicious gossip column, "The Ear" — all gave *The Washington Star* an individualism that was distinct. But the immense facts of life still oppressed it: economics and *The Washington Post*. *The Star* lost a great deal of money and its owners, Time Incorporated, finally had to give up.

There's something triumphant about a newspaper like *La Prensa* which closes for political reasons, because it's on the side of the angels against a tyranny. The death of *The Washington Star* is less dramatic. It didn't roar into oblivion. It tried, sighed, and died. And everybody is sad about the death of the paper, and the economic facts which killed it.

Mr. MacLeish's comments appear courtesy of "Morning Edition," National Public Radio, Washington, D.C. Bob Edwards is host of the program.

Letters

PLAUDITS

Last night I enjoyed the reading the spring issue of *Nieman Reports*, which I had put aside until I could concentrate on it. That is quite a publication, really stimulating, and I congratulate you on it. More pertinent reading there than in half a dozen issues of other journalism magazines.

Robert H. Estabrook
Lakeville, Connecticut

As a Belgian professional journalist, some of my American friends mentioned the existence of the *Nieman Reports*. They all agreed that these reports are the ne plus ultra in challenging views on contemporary journalism.

I would be very pleased to receive the complete list of *Nieman Reports* in print.

Thanking you beforehand I remain,

Frans Crols
Brussels, Belgium

I am enjoying my subscription so much that I want you to enroll my daughter, Mary, who covers the federal courts for the *Pittsburgh Press*.

I am tired of duplicating articles I think she would enjoy, and so am enclosing this check.

David Stolberg
Cincinnati, Ohio

ON SECOND THOUGHT

The editor's enlightening report on the General Assembly of the Interna-

tional Press Institute in Nairobi [*NR*, Summer 1981] makes an ecumenical but erroneous leap in its spelling of the name of the Assembly's keynote speaker.

The *Aga Khan* (A.B. Harvard '56) hasn't yet, to my knowledge, converted to Judaism — which tradition is, of course, the wellspring of all those other famous *Kahns*.

Claude James Jr.
Cambridge, Mass.

The memory of that 7-year-old radio fan, reported in your Summer 1981 edition, was flawed. Let me at 66 be the first to correct it. It was *not* the Dempsey-Carpentier fight (1921, not 1922) that my father and I heard Graham McNamee describe, but the Harry Greb-Johnny Wilson fight of 1923. We also heard him describe that historic Tunney-Dempsey long count of 1926.

Graham McNamee was indeed a pioneer of sports broadcasting. Ring Lardner, who once sat near him as he was announcing a ball game, said a double-header had been played: "the game that was played and the game that McNamee announced." Some of the sportscasters of today may be better journalists than Graham, but the cue "Take it away, Graham" still pulses in this sports fan's soul.

Fred W. Friendly
New York City

TAKING ISSUE

Because I carelessly neglected to put my *Nieman Reports* of Autumn 1980 on the bathroom availability shelf, it took me a while to get to Edward C.

Norton's "Places and Place Books." He labeled his piece "semi-scholarly." I'd agree with that. He was about half-right.

After some 27 years as a daily newspaper editor, I bought the remains of a city magazine. (Since I am not a chain nobody would sell me a newspaper.) I have learned since several things I wouldn't have believed half of even if Mr. Norton had told me.

1. Several city magazines do indeed offer examples of excellent journalism and do not mind shaking up advertisers and agencies.

2. Making deadlines and dealing with production/printing is tougher than a daily paper routine because (a) magazines are even stingier with people than newspapers and (b) it is more difficult to establish a work rhythm.

3. Advertising/editorial separation is much more difficult because advertisers and agencies, somewhat like Mr. Norton, still are not accustomed to editorially honest magazines.

4. Magazine advertising works, too, and the ABC is just as stringent with us as when dealing with a newspaper.

Mr. Norton is totally right about one thing: the city books pick on their local newspapers. Who else will? Readers love newspaper criticism. They think those arrogant newspaper bastards need taking down a peg or two.

Mr. Norton said *New Yorker* is the granddaddy of the city books. *New Yorker* does run some calendar and activities listings. But *New Yorker* is more a grand-uncle. I'd call *San Diego* the granddaddy and *Felker's New York* the daddy.

Mr. Norton's ratings of the city magazines may have been overly

abbreviated. Not to worry. His assessments didn't deserve any more space than *Nieman Reports* gave them. From "The Tops" he omitted *Philadelphia*, *Columbus Monthly*, *San Diego* and *D of Dallas* as well as the ultra-fat *Chicago*, all of which are regarded as pacesetters by their peers.

The inclusion of *Broward Life* is a joke, even under "The Boring" category. The City and Regional Magazine Association accepts only ABC (paid circulation) magazines. *Broward Life* doesn't count.

Our book, *Miami Magazine*, in the past year dealt with guns and crime, the growing rate of arson, problems with our local nuclear generating plant in a story months ahead of the local press, for example. We followed the May 1980 riots here with a special report that took about half our editorial hole and, again, I think it told more about what really happened, and what ought to happen next, than the hundreds of columns of newspaper type similarly employed. I should add it didn't sell well on the newsstands.

It was discouraging, also, to read Mr. Norton's opinion that the worst places to live have the best city books. I think this is a good place to live. I also think after five years of building we are moving toward a pretty fair city magazine that on a proportionate basis has about as much "journalism" in it as most newspapers, the copy cats.

Sylvan Meyer (NF '51)
Publisher
Coral Gables, Florida



SHARING MAIL CALL

William J. Miller
Nieman Reports
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Mr. Miller:

I've just read your review of *Without Fear or Favor* [NR, Summer 1981] with undisguised pleasure. It's the best review of the book I've seen and there have been some pretty good ones. But, as it works out, you hit so many of the points I am very proud of and with a fat one like that a lot of people didn't get much beyond Pentagon Papers.

I was particularly pleased that you got into the CIA a bit. That was far and away the toughest part of the book so far as digging is concerned and while I am still far from satisfied (I know there is more to the story than I or anyone else will ever get into) I have been disappointed that the segment did not get very much attention. I would have hoped that it would have provided the bottom line for a real digging effort by other reporters. But it didn't.

All the best,

Harrison Salisbury
Taconic, Connecticut

PROSE CODA

I am enclosing a copy of a letter written to Paul Lieberman with regard to his review of my textbook, *Investigative Reporting: From Courthouse to White House*. Although the review had a number of laudatory comments about the book and my career, I regard it as a bad review because he failed to appreciate the audience I was addressing — journalism students and young reporters with limited experience.

I am trying to stimulate sound investigative techniques in obtaining evidence and pushing issues at

government agencies that will not get the young reporter in trouble with his editor or his publisher on his first public service news stories. I was avoiding suggesting the unsound or illegal methods of obtaining evidence and was stressing a cautious and documented approach to low-key stories dealing with a wide range of corruption, mismanagement, and injustice.

If I had been promoting the highly emotional and ideological approach of a Saul Alinsky, which Mr. Lieberman says he favors, it could get a lot of young reporters in the deep trouble that would discourage them from pursuing courageous investigative reporting. If I had used the approach of a social revolutionist in my text, I might properly have been accused of contributing to the reportorial delinquency of the Cookes of the news business whose irresponsibility and lack of standards have given investigative reporting a bad name.

Clark R. Mollenhoff (NF '50)
Lexington, Virginia

P.S. I hope you will run this cover letter and my letter to Paul Lieberman, plus anything that Mr. Lieberman wishes to say to clarify or support his position.

Mr. Paul Lieberman
The Atlanta Constitution
Atlanta, Georgia

Dear Mr. Lieberman:

First, I want to say I appreciate the time you gave to reading my textbook, *Investigative Reporting: From Courthouse to White House*, and the generally favorable review. At least I think it was a generally favorable review.

While I did not write the book you wanted me to write and I did not use the words you would have wanted me

to use, I am sure that if you go back and read it more carefully you will realize that I am not opposed to the Saul Alinsky philosophy. I tried very hard to make my investigative projects create issues that government agencies at city, state, and federal levels had to face. While I am not opposed to depth investigation of social issues or the crimes of business or labor, it is usually difficult to get a direct handle on these issues that will be acceptable to editors and publishers unless the reporter is able to demonstrate that laws are being violated, that basic rights of individuals are being trampled, and that government agencies and officials are not doing their job.

If you analyze it properly you will see that in almost every case where there is a social wrong there is a government official or a government agency that is not properly enforcing or administering the laws that are on the books. The text was an effort to demonstrate to students and to reporters with less experience that a careful analysis of almost any injustice in society will disclose that laws, rules and regulations are being violated and that some official or group of officials are involved in gross negligence or worse.

While you have every right to disagree with my "tactics" that make you "uncomfortable," I do believe you could have been more specific on this score and not dealt with it in the vague manner you used.

With regard to the multi-billion-dollar frauds in the Teamsters Union, should I have dropped my journalistic pursuit of those matters because the Teamsters had fixed city, county and state as well as federal officials? Why does it make you uncomfortable that I called those stories to the attention of Robert F. Kennedy, who as counsel for the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee had oversight authority and responsibility to expose the government mismanagement and corruption involved?

With regard to the Billie Sol Estes case, should I have stood by calmly and not tried to alert Attorney General Robert Kennedy to take cognizance of my stories and the evidence indicating a blatant obstruction of justice — a knowing cover-up of criminal conspiracy to hide evidence of many serious federal crimes? Did you read of Orville Freeman's brutal retaliation against Agriculture Department lawyer N. Battle Hales? Did you read of the outrageous bureaucratic brutality by Agriculture Department officials who sent Mary Kimbrough Jones, Hales' secretary, to a mental ward for 12 days? Those injustices and the callous attitudes at the Agriculture Department and the White House infuriated me more than the multi-million-dollar thievery of Billie Sol Estes.

How would you have dealt with this when your stories, factual and documented, were ignored by Washington and New York newspapers? How would you distinguish between the obstructions of justice and abuses of power in the Kennedy administration and the properly aggressive exposure of abuses of power by Richard Nixon, Richard Kleindienst and Pat Gray and the Watergate cover-up, also an obstruction of justice?

You note that your own philosophy is patterned after Saul Alinsky. That is your privilege, and I find no fault with you or Saul Alinsky in carrying out that philosophy by raising hell on every injustice or social issue you can find. I might even be with you most of the time.

However, I was writing a textbook for students and young journalists, and I believed it wiser to recommend a safer approach to investigative projects that is less likely to get them in trouble with newspaper management in their formative years. There will be time enough for the more precarious investigation projects when they have the experience to cope with the authoritarian editors

and publishers they may face on many newspapers.

My own philosophy might be: "When I go into a government agency there may be no issues. There may only be the sad scenes of corruption, mismanagement, injustice and favoritism. My job is to turn that sad scene into carefully documented news stories that will create issues that can be understood by the average citizen."

If you will read the book through more slowly you will see that is what I was saying over and over again with case histories. I tried to put those case histories together in a systematic order that demonstrated sound investigative reporting techniques and the types of stories that can be developed in city, county, state and federal government.

While I am certain we are not far apart on any of these points, there is one point upon which I must sharply disagree. You wrote with regard to the Kenneth Cook case that "one man's plight is not much of a story," and I very deeply believe that one man's plight can be very much of a story if the reporter takes the time to listen carefully, to carefully document the facts, and the official responsibility and recognizes that the story is not dead as long as the injustice persists and there is any governmental body with oversight and responsibility.

The Wolf Ladejinsky case and the A. Ernest Fitzgerald case best demonstrate grave injustices that were corrected to some degree because I followed up on injustices to individuals in what has been my standard pattern. Both are covered in the textbook. You could read that material again and inform me which of my actions in those cases make you uncomfortable. I really want to know.

What I did with regard to the Kefauver Committee was what a dozen or two dozen crime reporters from one coast to the other did during the crime committee investigations,



The Fellows Garden, Walter Lippmann House

and what reporters on a dozen or more of the top papers did with regard to the McClellan Labor Racket investigations.

If you take a look back at the operation of Ida Tarbell and her much-applauded investigation of the Standard Oil Company you will find that she also engaged in much the same pattern as did Lincoln Steffens, Ray Stannard Baker, and Paul Y. Anderson, who won a Pulitzer for doing the job of reporting and working with Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana and Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin to expose the Teapot Dome payoffs to Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall.

I have devoted my life to writing about injustice, corruption and mismanagement and have tried to be fair in those investigations and to develop some standards of fairness in the stories and with relation to sources and subjects. While I would like to have included more investigations that are only remotely related to government, the book as published

finally was minus 17 chapters dealing with a wide range of other investigations. There are limitations on how much of the relevant experience you can jam in a book when you have spent 40 years in the middle of the controversy that stirs around what we generally refer to as "investigative reporting" and that Ben Reese, of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* called "public service reporting."

While I am not angry about any part of the review, I am disappointed that my full message did not get through to you. You were wrong in indicating I believe investigations should be limited to government. However, to be effective in combating corruption in business, the professions, labor or essentially any other field, news organizations must stimulate actions by government agencies at local or federal levels. If you are any kind of a follower of Saul Alinsky, you don't want sensational stories just to titillate the readers. You should want results.

Clark R. Mollenhoff

Mr. Lieberman responds: Mr. Mollenhoff's tactic that made me uncomfortable was his repeated face to face lobbying with public officials to get them to act on his stories, or to get them to act even before he had written anything. I see nothing wrong with sending one's newspaper to people in power, or even delivering copies of articles to their desks. I believe, however, that if we are to lobby, it should be done in print, where the public can see what we are doing.

I still believe also that Mr. Mollenhoff needed to include samples of his newspaper stories in his book *Investigative Reporting*. The journalism students who will read Mr. Mollenhoff's text need to know what he was sharing with his readers and in what exact words — and not just how he chased down the bad guys.

Finally, Mr. Mollenhoff mistakes praise for criticism at one point. I indeed wrote that "one man's plight is not much of a story," but only as a criticism of other Washington reporters who might have had this erroneous viewpoint when they refused to listen to the sad, ex-government employee who claimed he had been unfairly railroaded out of a job. I thought I made it clear that it was to Mr. Mollenhoff's considerable credit that only he — one member of the press corps who had earned the right to act like a big shot — took the time to hear this man out, then shared the important story with his readers.

The editors welcome and encourage letters from readers. To be considered for publication in the next issue, letters should be received by October 15th. They should be signed and addressed to: Editors, Nieman Reports, One Francis Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138. All letters are subject to editing for clarity and space.

Nieman Fellows

1981-82

Eleven American journalists have been appointed to the 44th class of Nieman Fellows to study at Harvard University in 1981-82. The Nieman Fellowships were established in 1938 through a bequest of Agnes Wahl Nieman in memory of her husband, Lucius, who founded *The Milwaukee Journal*. The Fellows come to Harvard for a year of study in any part of the University. The five women and six men who are the new Nieman Fellows are listed below.

MARGOT ADLER, 35, reporter and producer with National Public Radio in New York. Ms. Adler received her B.A. from the University of California in Berkeley and her M.S. from the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism. While at Harvard, Ms. Adler will study the history of science and theories of progress; anthropology, economics, and Islamic studies.

CHRISTOPHER BOGAN, 27, staff writer with *The Spokesman-Review* in Spokane, Washington. Mr. Bogan holds a B.A. from Amherst College. His study plan at Harvard will center on American cultural history, specifically, constitutional law, economic theory, and sociology.

PETER BROWN, 31, national political writer with United Press International in Washington, D.C. Mr. Brown, whose bachelor's and master's degrees are from Syracuse University, plans to study American history and political science, with an

emphasis on polling, during his Nieman year.

ANITA HARRIS, 32, reporter for Public Television's "MacNeil-Lehrer Report" in New York City. Ms. Harris holds a bachelor's degree from Cornell University and received her master's degree from the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism. At Harvard she will focus on constitutional and corporate law, organizational management, and the decision-making process.

ALEXANDER JONES, 34, editor of *The Greeneville (Tennessee) Sun*. A graduate of Washington and Lee University, Mr. Jones will concentrate on the psychology of politics, ethics, business, ancient history, and African studies.

GERALD JORDAN, 32, radio and television critic for *The Kansas City (Missouri) Star*. Mr. Jordan holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Arkansas and a master's degree from Northwestern University. His course of study at Harvard will include social sciences, politics, and government.

FAY SMULEVITZ JOYCE, 31, political editor of the *St. Petersburg Times*, Florida. Ms. Joyce attended Syracuse University and received her bachelor's degree from S.U.N.Y. on Long Island. While at Harvard, she will pursue studies in American history, government, sociology, economics, and the presidency.

JOHANNA NEUMAN, 32, reporter in the Washington, D.C., bureau of the *Jackson (Mississippi) Clarion-Ledger*. She received her bachelor's degree from the University of California at Berkeley and her master's degree from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. At Harvard, Ms. Neuman will study psychology, education, history, and political science.

STEVEN ONEY, 26, writer for *Atlanta Weekly* magazine in Georgia. Mr. Oney graduated from the University of Georgia. During his Nieman year, he will concentrate on American studies, including art, music, psychology, and economics.

JUDITH ROSENFELD, 32, editor at the *Louisville (Kentucky) Times*. A graduate of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, Ms. Rosenfeld plans to take courses at Harvard's Graduate School of Business Administration, and to explore social changes and trends.

EDWARD WALSH, 39, reporter with *The Washington (D.C.) Post*. Mr. Walsh graduated from the College of St. Thomas in Minnesota and attended Marquette University in Wisconsin. His course of study will focus on American foreign policy, as well as modern European history, American history, and literature.

The names of foreign journalists who have been awarded Nieman Fellowships will be announced early in September.

Nieman Notes

— 1939 —

As a sequel to the Class Note in the previous issue of *NR*, we are sorry to report the news passed on to us by IRVING DILLIARD, who recently learned of the death of HILARY HERBERT LYONS. He had died about a year ago, on May 18, 1980, in Mobile, Alabama.

Irv Dilliard also sent us a copy of Archibald MacLeish's response to the letter that the five 1939 class members present at the April Convocation had written to their Curator during the opening dinner. Mr. MacLeish replied:

Dear Irving: What a marvelous burst of love and delight! How like you! It made my day and I am still reading over and over that envelope full of some of my life's happiest memories. God bless you and the five of the living six [Editor's note: Mr. MacLeish had not yet received word of Herbert Lyons's demise] who lifted a glass with you. We brought something new into the world that year and we did it together, feeling our way as we went. My love to you all. Archie.

— 1941 —

WILLIAM J. MILLER writes from Cape Cod that "it might be of possible interest" that he attended the Islamic Summit Conference, January 25 through February 2, in Taif, Saudi Arabia, to help with the press arrangements for the dozen or so United States correspondents assigned to cover that meeting.

— 1947 —

ERNEST H. LINFORD, editorial writer for *The Salt Lake Tribune*, last May received the Service to Utah Journalism Award at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City. The presentation, by the University of Utah Communications Department, took place at the annual awards banquet.

Mr. Linford's career in journalism has extended more than 50 years. He was editor of the editorial page, *The Salt Lake Tribune*, when he resigned to head the

Department of Journalism, University of Wyoming. In 1973 he retired from academia; since then he has been teaching part-time and writing weekly columns for *The Salt Lake Tribune* and the *Laramie Boomerang*. He is a former editor of the *Boomerang*.

Msgr. WILLIAM H. McDUGALL retired this past summer as rector of the Cathedral of the Madeleine, Salt Lake City, Utah. He will continue to edit the *Intermountain Catholic Register*, a weekly diocesan newspaper.

Monseigneur McDougall is the author of two books. *Six Bells off Java* is an account of his "private miracle" rescue in World War II, after his ship had been blown up in the Indian Ocean. Later, on the island of Sumatra, he and his companions were captured by the Japanese and imprisoned. He relates that experience in a sequel titled *Through Eastern Windows*.

A letter received in today's mail from CLARK PORTEOUS to Jim Thomson informs us: "I retired from *The Memphis*

Press-Scimitar after 47 years as a reporter June 1, 1981. Stayed retired a month — a vacation.

"On July 1, I became editor of the *Collierville Herald*, a weekly paper with a circulation of about 3,500 in a suburban city in Shelby County (same as Memphis) of more than 8,000 population. I commute from my Memphis home 21 miles, work only two or three days a week, and am enjoying it.

"I was doing a political column when I retired from *P-S*, but most of my career was as a reporter, though I did sometime city editing, I always managed to get back to reporting.

"They made a big to-do about making me unemployed because of 70, even a letter from President Reagan, plaques, resolutions from city and county governments, letters from both our Senators and three Congressmen. Both city and county mayors and Congressman Harold Ford attended retirement party at paper. Best thing was they gave me a new set of Jack Nicklaus golf clubs — the staff — and the Guild — a new pair of golf shoes. And I play quite a lot of golf.

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"I enjoy the *Nieman Reports*, and the publication seems to get better and better. My congratulations to Editor Lehman and her staff.

"Best regards to you."

— 1950 —

HAYS GOREY, formerly Boston bureau chief for *Time*, moved in April to Washington, D.C., to be a correspondent in that bureau of Time-Life News Service.

— 1955 —

MORT STERN has been selected to fill the Robert and Evangeline Atwood Chair in Journalism at the University of Alaska in Anchorage. Atwood is publisher of the *Anchorage Times*.

Stern will be on leave from the University of Denver where since 1978 he has been executive assistant to the Chancellor. Prior to his appointment at the University of Denver, Stern had been managing editor, editorial page editor, and assistant to the publisher of the *Denver Post*, Dean of the School of Communication at the University of Alabama, and Dean of the School of Journalism at the University of Colorado.

The Atwood Chair in Journalism provides the recipient with a one-year visiting professorship. Dr. Stern will be in Alaska from August 1981 to early June 1982.

— 1957 —

As we reported earlier in *Nieman Notes* (Spring 1980) the book *Gideon's Trumpet* by ANTHONY LEWIS was the basis for a television drama on the CBS Hall of Fame series. The program has now won a 1980 George Foster Peabody broadcasting award. In announcing the prize last April, the University of Georgia School of Journalism and Mass Communication cited CBS Entertainment for its portrayal of the true story about a Florida convict who altered the course of legal history through a handwritten campaign directed at the U.S. Supreme Court.

Lewis, a columnist with *The New York Times*, is also a Lecturer on Law at Harvard University's Law School. *Gideon's Trumpet* was published in 1965 by Random House.

— 1958 —

WILLIAM F. McILWAIN, formerly executive managing editor of *The Washington Star*, has been named editor of *The Arkansas Gazette*.

Before joining the *Star* two years ago, McIlwain was editor of the *Boston Herald American*, and his more than 30 years' experience includes reporting and editorial positions at ten newspapers including the *Bergen (N.J.) Record*, the *Toronto Star*, and *Newsday*.

TOM WICKER, associate editor of *The New York Times*, was one of five journalists recently selected as the first members of the North Carolina Journalism Hall of Fame. The other newsmen are: C.A. McKnight, former *Charlotte Observer* and *Charlotte News* editor; Vermont Royster, editor emeritus, *The Wall Street Journal*; Charles Kuralt, CBS News correspondent, and the late Joseph Daniels, *Raleigh News and Observer* publisher and statesman. All are natives of North Carolina.

The Hall of Fame is sponsored by the School of Journalism at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

— 1960 —

REG MURPHY, publisher and editor of the *San Francisco Examiner* since 1975, has been named publisher of *The Baltimore Sunpapers*. He will return to the East coast in midsummer to take up his new position. He had served earlier as political editor and editorial page editor of *The Atlanta Constitution*.

— 1962 —

JOHN O. EMMERICH Jr., publisher of the *Greenwood (Mississippi) Commonwealth*, was elected director in the cities under 50,000 population category at the annual meeting of the American Newspaper Publishers Association convention in Chicago last April.

MARTIN GOODMAN, president of the *Toronto Star*, has received a Doctor of Civil Laws degree from the University of King's College. His citation was for "distinguished contributions to the growth of a free and vigorous press in Canada."

King's College, Canada's oldest university, is the only degree-granting school of journalism in Atlantic Canada.

Mr. Goodman is a graduate of McGill University and the Columbia University School of Journalism. He began his newspaper career with the *Calgary Herald* in 1957.

The White House announced in June that President Reagan intends to nominate JOHN HUGHES as associate director of programs of the United States International Communication Agency. The appointment is subject to confirmation by the United States Senate.

Hughes is president of Hughes Newspapers Inc., Orleans, Massachusetts, which publishes several weekly newspapers on Cape Cod. He is a former editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*, and former president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

MURRAY SEEGER, European Economic correspondent for *The Los Angeles Times* in its Brussels bureau, returned home to the United States this past summer after nearly nine years in Europe.

He writes: "I have contributed a chapter to a new book soon to be published by St. Martin's Press — *The Soviet Worker: Illusions and Reality*. The editors are Leonard Shapiro, the well known British analyst and historian, and Joseph Godson, a retired foreign service officer. My contribution is research on working conditions from my assignment there, 1972-74. The book was first published in London this summer."

— 1970 —

HEDRICK L. SMITH, chief Washington correspondent for *The New York Times*, has received the Choate Alumni Seal award at alumni weekend on the Choate Rosemary Hall, Wallingford, Connecticut, campus. He was graduated from the preparatory school in 1951.

WALLACE H. TERRY, visiting professor in the Department of Journalism, Howard University, is a member of the Scholarship Selection Committee of the Gannett Foundation. Twenty-four scholars were selected from more than 400 applicants to receive financial assistance under this new program for "outstanding

"Enterprise" Premiere

Fellow Fellows Zvi Dor-Ner and Paul Solman, both Class of 1977, share the conviction that business is an exciting and largely untapped journalistic beat. They spent their Nieman year studying at the Harvard Business School — Solman in the MBA program, Dor-Ner in the Program for Management Development.

Their recently completed series of 13 half-hour documentary films on business is a direct result of their Nieman experience. Titled "Enterprise," the series is an unprecedented joint effort of WGBH-Boston and the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. The first television series committed to showing how business works, "Enterprise" will have its premiere airing on PBS on October 2. Eric Sevareid is host.

Among the episodes will be: a wild-catter drilling for gas, Levi Strauss attempting to diversify with a men's suit; a new airline being created to challenge the Eastern shuttle flights; and a bankrupt computer company trying to stay alive.

Zvi Dor-Ner, "Enterprise" executive producer, is senior producer/director for Israeli Television. He is best known in Israel for such documentaries as "El Fatah" and "Children of the Kibbutz"; the weekly political satire, "Nothing Gets By"; and a live news feature program, "The Third Hour."

In the United States, Dor-Ner was one of the originators and producers — for WGBH — of a seven-part series on the Mideast conflict, "Arabs and Israelis," broadcast nationally on PBS. It won the Dupont-Columbia Award for Television Journalism in 1975 and was broadcast abroad in England and Sweden. Dor-Ner has also produced and directed documentaries throughout the world.

Paul Solman, "Enterprise" executive editor, is a television producer, print journalist, author, and media consultant. In 1972 he helped found, and became editor-in-chief of Boston's weekly newspaper, *The Real Paper*, as well as a member of its Board of Directors.

During the same period, Solman worked on two radio programs, hosting a weekly interview show on the Boston public FM station, WBUR, and reporting for its nightly news show, which won UPI's Major Armstrong award.

After his Nieman year, Solman became business editor of WGBH-TV's nightly news, winning an Emmy for his feature coverage on business.

Solman is also managing partner of Cambridge Media Consultants and has been published widely. He is currently co-authoring, with "Enterprise" story editor Thomas Friedman, a book for Simon & Schuster about the myths of American business.

young Americans studying for careers in journalism."

— 1971 —

JAMES T. SQUIRES, former vice president and editor of the *Orlando (Florida) Sentinel-Star*, was recently named vice president and editor of *The Chicago Tribune*. He assumed his new post on July 1st.

— 1973 —

JIN-HYUN KIM, former editorial wri-

ter with *Dong-A Ilbo* in Seoul, Korea, was a recent visitor at Lippmann House during a business trip to the United States in his new capacity as Research Director of the Economic Research Institute in Seoul. He is also president of the Seoul Press Club.

— 1975 —

SHERYL FITZGERALD, health specialist reporter for *Newsday*, has been given a grant from the Ford Foundation to do research for a history of black American newspapers from 1900 to 1970. The grant period commenced in August.

MICHAEL RUBY, senior editor of *Newsweek's* Business Section for the past three years, in June was named national affairs editor.

Ruby joined *Newsweek* as an associate editor in 1971 and was promoted to general editor two years later. He was made a senior writer in 1978. He was the recipient of the G. M. Loeb Achievement Award for business journalism in 1973 for a cover story on multinational corporations.

GUNTHER VOGEL, editor and director, *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen*, Mainz, Germany, paid a brief visit to Lippmann House in May when he was on holiday. He planned to see also Linda and DAVID HAWPE in Louisville, Kentucky. David, his classmate, is managing editor of the *Courier-Journal*.

— 1978 —

DAVID DeJEAN, formerly systems manager of the *Courier-Journal* and *Louisville Times Company*, resigned that position in March to join the *Times-Mirror Corporation* in Los Angeles, California, as director of Videotex services.

— 1979 —

Formerly a reporter with the *San Francisco Examiner*, NANCY DAY has moved back to the Boston area with her husband, Thomas B. Waggener, and their infant daughter, Mary Allison. Allison was born June 10, 1981, in San Francisco.

Nancy will be teaching journalism at Boston University this fall. Tom, a bio-engineer, has a three-year grant to study breathing patterns in premature infants and is on the pediatrics faculty of Harvard Medical School.

Their new address is 907 Watertown Street, West Newton, Massachusetts 02165. Telephone: 617-964-4515.

MARGARET ENGEL, a reporter with the *Des Moines Register and Tribune* since 1976 — most recently in their Washington, D.C., bureau — has resigned from that newspaper to join the staff of *The Washington Post*.

Fred Garretson 1934-1981

Fred Garretson, reporter with *The Oakland Tribune*, died unexpectedly on July 10. He was 47 years old. Garretson — “Skip” to his friends — succumbed to heart failure after undergoing lengthy surgery for removal of a stomach tumor.

Frederick Von Hon Garretson had been with *The Oakland Tribune* for his entire working life, beginning in 1954 as a copy-boy before becoming a reporter.

From the start, he earned the respect of his news sources, the admiration of his colleagues and the trust of his readers through the exhaustive background knowledge and painstaking research he brought to his work. He often found front-page news buried in the footnotes and charts of dry technical studies and reports few others had the patience or the ability to wade through.

Fred Garretson was the person most often credited with raising public and official awareness of the need for drastic action to avert environmental destruction of San Francisco Bay and the San Joaquin-Sacramento River Delta estuarine system.

His stories on the Bay and Delta won countless local and national awards, but his interests carried him through a wide range of disciplines — seismology, engineering, genealogy, politics.

Under “avocations” on a company personal information form, he once wrote, “Omnivorous reader, particularly in history and natural history. Hobbies include small firearms, geology, and exploring strange roads.”

One of the “strange roads” he explored led him to become one of the few newsmen, if not the only one, to have a portion of an earthquake fault named for him. While tracing the Hayward Fault for a story, he came upon and documented a small branch, until then unknown, near Oakland’s historic Duns-muir House. A geologist verified the find and wrote it up in a technical journal, duly naming it the “Garretson Creep Zone.”

The appellation appealed to Skip’s

quiet humor.

In his methodical fashion, after he married the former Maureen Mulholland (referred to by Skip as “my bride” ever after) in 1964 and was house-hunting, he located the most stable bedrock in the Eastbay on a geological map, circled the area in pencil and told his wife she could have any house inside the circle, on the theory that only such a location would be relatively safe from earthquakes.

His theory was borne out some years later when an evening earthquake centered near Santa Rosa jarred the entire Eastbay. An editor called Skip at home for advice on how to cover the event and was told by his wife that Garretson, then in the basement, hadn’t felt the tremor.

“But then,” she added, “you know Skip has a low center of gravity,” a reference to his more than generous avoirdupois.

Garretson was noted for his sometimes apocalyptic approach to stories, but then there were the words of the sober Scripps-Howard judges in awarding him one of their prizes:

“The perception of Garretson...while covering City Hall in Alameda one day in 1961, was the key factor in what is now known as the ‘Save the Bay’ conservation drive. Until Garretson got going on his typewriter, there was little public recognition of the fact that San Francisco Bay, one of the wonders of the world, almost certainly was headed for an eventual future as a mud flat...”

In 1963, after a series of Garretson reports pointing out the need to dredge the heavily silted Sacramento River shipping channel to keep the ports of Sacramento and Stockton open to ocean shipping, the Army Corps of Engineers decided to begin the dredging program.

That was also the year he was named the first alternate public information director for the Bay Area Civil Defense District Office, in recognition of his knowledge of civil defense matters.

Similarly, in 1965 he was guest speaker before the California Geologic Hazards

Conference and in 1978 was appointed to the Advisory Council of the University of California’s Water Resources Center — each again a mark of the extent of his knowledge.

Among Garretson’s many awards are: two Edward J. Meeman Conservation Awards from the Scripps-Howard Foundation (awarded in 1965 and 1968, they constitute the first time any journalist had won the award twice); the American Political Science Association’s Distinguished Public Affairs Reporting award, 1968; a National Editorial Association award, 1965; and the first journalism award ever granted by the National Society of Professional Engineers, 1965.

Skip attended Stockton College and the University of California at Berkeley, where he was night editor of the *Daily Californian*. He was a Nieman Fellow in the Class of 1971.

After three years at the *Tribune*, he entered the Army, serving first as editor of weekly unit newspapers in Korea and later as a reporter for the *Pacific Stars and Stripes* service daily in Tokyo.

In addition to “my bride,” survivors include his son, Cornelius; brother William, a lawyer and university lecturer in Des Moines; and another brother, Gilbert Jr., a news editor at the *San Diego Union*.

(Excerpted from *The Oakland Tribune*, July 11, 1981.)

As we go to press, arrangements are being made to establish a Garretson Memorial Fund to assist Nieman Fellows with families during their stay in Cambridge. We have already received a few gifts in memory of Fred Garretson. A more formal announcement will be made as soon as details are settled, but in the meantime, any who wish to remember Skip in this way may send contributions in care of the Editor, Nieman Foundation, One Francis Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138.

SABAM SIAGIAN, chief editor of *Sinar Harapan Daily*, Jakarta, Indonesia, wrote in May from Amsterdam that he was en route to Geneva, Switzerland, to cover the OPEC meeting. He sent his regrets for not being able to attend the Nieman Convocation and wrote, "Throughout that weekend in April, I kept thinking about what's happening in Cambridge."

— 1980 —

ACEL MOORE, a member of the *Philadelphia Inquirer's* editorial board and the writer of a weekly column on the op-ed page, has been appointed an associate editor.

In 1977 he and *Inquirer* reporter Wendell Rawls Jr. won a Pulitzer Prize for a series of articles on the abuse of inmates at Farview State Hospital. He and Rawls also won the Robert F. Kennedy Award, the National Headliners Award, the Women in Communications Clarion Award, and the Heywood Broun Award for the Farview series.

— 1982 —

EDWARD WALSH, a reporter with

The Washington Post, received second prize in the Merriman Smith Memorial Award for outstanding journalistic performance. The award was presented at the annual dinner of the White House Correspondents' Association in April.

RANDOM NOTES

Curator James Thomson has "at long last brought to birth a book" whose progress has been monitored, he says, "by more Nieman classes than I care to reveal." Published by Harper & Row, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia* was co-authored by Peter W. Stanley and John Curtis Perry. Stanley is a specialist in American and Philippine history and Dean of Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota. Perry is Henry Willard Denison Professor of Diplomatic History at Tufts' Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a specialist in Japanese history. As well as teaching and writing about American-East Asian relations, all three have lived and traveled in Asia.

A history of our Asia involvement from 1784 to the present, the book carries endorsements by John K. Fairbank,

Edwin O. Reischauer, David Halberstam, Ross Terrill, Frances FitzGerald, and Barbara Tuchman.

Two Niemans from *The Atlanta Constitution* won first and second place award in one category of the annual Silver Gavel competition, considered the leading national judge of reporting on legal issues.

PAUL LIEBERMAN ('80) was one of the winners of a Silver Gavel for newspapers with 200,000 to 500,000 circulation for his work on the series "Voting: A Right Still Denied," which disclosed continuing racial discrimination in voting and election practices in the South fifteen years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act.

JAMES STEWART ('81) took runner-up honors in the same category for the award, which is sponsored by the American Bar Association, for his series "Poor Man's Justice," which examined failings of the public defender system in Georgia.

Stewart's work also took the top legal writing award given by the Georgia Bar Association and the Atlanta Bar Association.

— T.B.K.L. —



Alexandra Dor-Ner

Peter W. Stanley, John Curtis Perry, and James C. Thomson Jr.
Authors of *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia*

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